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Abstract 
 
This thesis reads 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra in dialogue with Galatians on the topic of 
God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Scholars have occasionally noted parallels 
between the vocabulary and themes of these texts—especially, Gal 3 – 4 and 4 Ezra 3 
– 10 and Gal 5 – 6 and 4 Macc—but their conceptions of divine life-giving 
benefaction have not been analysed. This thesis aims to fill this scholarly lacuna and, 
by placing these texts in conversation, to expose and compare the theological logics 
of Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra. 
 Part one provides separate readings of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 3 – 10 on 
divine life-giving benefaction. Chapter one argues that 4 Maccabees’ apologetic 
blending of Hellenistic virtue ethics with Jewish theology depends on a conception 
of God’s gift of the Torah to order the mind at creation as inviolable, while God’s 
life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the eschaton grounds and 
vindicates this order. Chapter two argues that, because 4 Ezra considers irrevocable 
the divine donation of life as Torah-ordered freedom at creation, its apocalyptic, 
two-ages theodicy explains the fall of Zion and occlusion of historical justice as a 
function of the epistemological (not moral) estrangement of the inhabitants of the 
fallen, ‘dying’ cosmos. 
 Part two reads Galatians from the perspective of the concerns of 4 Maccabees 
and 4 Ezra. Chapter three considers how the presentations of Eleazar and Ezra as 
exemplary recipients of Torah-ordered created life raise questions about Paul’s 
understanding of the divine donation of creation and the Torah, given his 
presentation of himself as an unworthy recipient of life in the Christ-gift (Gal 1 – 2). 
Chapter four hosts a debate with 4 Ezra over Paul’s reading of scripture and 
salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4), arguing that Paul considers the law to be fitted to 
humanity’s ‘dead’ estate in view of the eschatological life created and ordered in the 
Christ-gift by the Spirit. Chapter five argues, through debate with 4 Maccabees, that 
Paul’s conception of the gift of ‘life’ to the unworthy ‘dead’ reaches its climax in an 
inchoate theory of moral agency and account of moral order (Gal 5 – 6). 
 In this way, this study unites streams of scholarship on grace and ‘life’ texts 
both to further understanding of the theological relation between Paul and his 
 3 
Jewish contemporaries and to propose a new account of the theological logic of 
Galatians.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Odd that a thing is most itself when likened…’—Richard Wilbur, ‘Lying’ 
1. Aim of the Study 
This study reads Paul’s letter to the Galatians in dialogue with 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra on the theme of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Though there are 
comparative studies of these texts, they differ in focus, scope, and length from the 
present study. Moreover, this work furthers research on Paul’s relation to his Jewish 
contemporaries by inquiring into the theological and hermeneutical grounds for the 
differing accounts of both God’s life-giving activity and the kind of life he gives in 
Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra. In so doing, the study contributes to the 
longstanding debate on the character of Paul’s theological logic in Galatians by 
demonstrating that it is his particular construal of God’s life-giving activity that 
distinguishes him both from texts like 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra and from his Jewish-
Christian interlocutors in Galatia. Thus, it is in asking and answering why Galatians, 
4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra affirm God as life-giver but construe both his activity and 
gift differently that both the task and contribution of this thesis lies. 
 To get a clear sense of the aims of the present comparison, it is necessary first 
to situate the analysis within the wider debate about Paul’s position within Judaism, 
on the one hand, and the ongoing reconsideration of Paul’s theological logic in 
Galatians, on the other. Then, we will be in a position to survey the literature related 
to our theme and texts, in order to define the gap in scholarship this work aims to 
fill. Finally, because our comparison focuses on a theme that is apt for significant 
and diverse metaphorical expression, it is necessary to make a few brief 
methodological remarks on the nature of this comparison and our approach to 
metaphor before closing with an overview of the thesis. The first two sections of this 
introduction will contend that while recent work challenging both the paradigms 
prior to and after E.P. Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism is persuasive, there is a 
need both to extend the analysis to additional texts and to further clarify the 
theological and hermeneutical differences between Paul and his Jewish-Christian 
opponents and thus his theological logic in Galatians. In the selective history of 
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research we argue that, despite the paucity of comparisons of our chosen texts on the 
particular theme of divine life-giving benefaction and the gift of life, a careful 
exegetical theological comparison of these texts on this theme holds promise in 
uniting two streams of recent scholarship on divine benefaction and ancient Jewish 
and Pauline appropriation of biblical ‘life’ texts.  
2. Paul and Judaism, ‘Grace’ in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
The twentieth century reconsideration of ancient Jewish soteriology that culminated 
in E.P. Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism is well known and documented.1  
Though Sanders’ influence is unquestioned, the precise character of his achievement 
is in a state of reevaluation.2 Thus, rather than rehearsing in detail the history of 
scholarship, we will limit ourselves to select examples that demonstrate the need for 
this reevaluation, focusing, where possible, on interpretations of 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra.3 
 Frustrated by the relative impotence of previous attempts, Sanders aimed to 
‘destroy’ the regnant construal of the relation between Rabbinic and ancient Judaism 
and Christianity in the New Testament guild, wherein Judaism was considered a 
religion of legalistic works-righteousness in antithesis to the religion of grace of 
Pauline Christianity.4 If Sanders has been successful, it is because he had a point. 
                                                
1 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1977). See e.g. S. Westerholm, ‘The “New Perspective“ at Twenty-Five‘, in Justification and 
Variegated Nomism: Vol.2, The Paradoxes of Paul (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2004), 1 – 38; J.D.G. Dunn, The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays (WUNT II 185; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 1 – 98; and J.M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2015), 151 – 165. 
2 For earlier criticism of Sanders’ interpretation, see e.g. M.A. Seifrid, Justification by Faith: The 
Origin and Development of a Central Pauline Theme (NovTSup 68; Leiden: Brill, 1992); F. Avemarie, Tora 
und Leben: Untersuchungen zur Heilsbedeutung der Tora in der frühen rabbinischen Literatur (TSAJ 55; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M.A. Seifrid, eds., Justification and 
Variegated Nomism: The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001); and S.J. 
Gathercole, Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1 – 5 (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). For recent criticism, see e.g. J.A. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness in 
Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 
2013); O. McFarland, God and Grace in Philo and Paul (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015); and Barclay, 
Paul and the Gift. 
3 As will become clear, this introduction shares a number of concerns and questions with 
Linebaugh, McFarland, and Barclay, op. cit. 
4 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, xii. cf. G.F. Moore, ‘Christian Writers on Judaism‘, HTR 14 
(1921): 197 – 254; W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology 
(London: SPCK, 1948).  
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Beginning with the work on rabbinical theology of Ferdinand Weber,5 in German 
scholarship there was, as Sanders claims, a tendency to ‘[retroject] the Protestant-
Catholic debate into ancient history’.6 In his influential and controversial Die Religion 
des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, Wilhelm Bousset, for example, praises 
Weber’s work and reflects its categories.7 Thus, in a discussion of ‘die individuelle 
Gerichtsgedanke’ among ‘der führenden Geister im Pharisa ̈ismus’, Bousset 
concludes: ‘Das ewige Leben ist der Lohn der guten Werke der Frommen’.8 
Likewise, elsewhere he portrays this system as a ‘Rechenexempel’ in which ‘[d]as 
Leben… der Fromme bei Gott’ has the character of ‘einem fortwährenden Ziehen der 
Bilance’. Thus, acts of charity (Wohltätigkeit) and mercy (Barmherzigkeit) are treated 
under a heading in the table of contents entitled ‘Der Gedanke der verdienstlichen 
Leistungen’9 and are identified in the treatment as ‘opera supererogationis’ that 
produce ‘einen besondern Lohn’.10 The problem with this system in which God 
always calculates and responds to human ‘Leistungen’ in the form of ‘Lohn’, 
according to Bousset, is that the Jewish faith in the ‘gütigen und barmherzigen Gott’ 
always stands in ‘einer unausgeglichenen Spannung’ to the ‘gerechten und 
erbarmungslos strengen Gott’, such that one’s self-assessment is always one of 
uncertainty (Unsicherheit).11 Appealing to 4 Ezra 7:117 – 119, 1 Enoch 103, and 
Wisdom of Solomon 3, Bousset summarises: ‘In dieser Welt…steht der Fromme 
                                                
5 Franz Delitzsch and Georg Schnedermann edited two posthumous editions of Weber’s work, 
the first entitled, F.W. Weber, System der altsynagogalen palästinischen Theologie: aus Targum, Midrasch 
und Talmud (Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1880) and the second, more influential, idem, Jüdische 
Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften: gemeinfasslich dargestellt (Leipzig: Dörffling & 
Franke, 1897). 
6 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 57. For other critiques, see e.g. S. Schechter, Some Aspects of 
Rabbinic Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1909); C.G. Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays 
(New York: Dutton, 1915); H.J. Schoeps, Paulus: die Theologie des Apostels im Lichte der jüdischen 
Religionsgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1959). 
7 Bousset calls Weber’s Jüdische Theologie,  ‘Ein treffliches Hülfsmittel zur Kenntnis der 
zeitgenössischen pharisäischen Theologie’; W. Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im 
neutestamentlichen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1903), 52. For immediate criticism of Bousset 
on philological and historical grounds, see F. Perles, Bousset’s Religion des Judentums: im 
neutestamentlichen Zeitalter kritisch untersucht (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1903). For an overview of the 
reception of and controversy surrounding Bousset’s work, see C. Wiese, Wissenschaft des Judentums 
und protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein Schrei ins Leere? (SR 61; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 140–72. 
8 Bousset, Die Religion, 262–63. 
9 Ibid., xiii. 
10 Ibid., 395. 
11 Ibid., 363. 
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verlassen und greift so wenig von der Gnade seines Gottes’.12 It is not difficult to 
discern Lutheran concerns in this analysis. 4 Ezra does not know true grace because it 
construes divine saving action not according to undeserved mercy but as a 
corresponding response to human ‘Leistungen’ in the form of ‘Lohn’ at the final 
judgment. 
 4 Ezra was not only interpreted in this fashion but also played a key role in 
the story that Bousset and others told about the development of Jewish soteriology. 
Justus Köberle argues, for example, that 4 Ezra represents the negative logical 
culmination of a long line of Jewish thinking on the relationship between God’s 
mercy and the future judgment of individuals. Thus, framed in the context of ‘der 
Kampf um die Heilsgewissheit’ in ‘spätere Judentum’, 4 Ezra 8:33 – 36 approaches a 
proper understanding of grace as ‘das Vertrauen auf Gottes vergebende Gnade’13 in 
opposition to ‘das Bemühen durch Treue gegen das Gesetz das jenseitige Erbe zu 
erlangen’14 but retreats to ‘das alte Lied’: ‘Die Gerechten’ expect ‘den Lohn ihrer 
Arbeit’, while ‘die Sünder’ receive ‘keine Gnade’ but await rather ‘das Gericht’.15 
Bousset and Köberle evaluate Jewish soteriology according to their Protestant terms, 
which set mercy and justice, grace and reward, and faith and works in antithesis 
without considering whether such antitheses are appropriate to 4 Ezra. The same 
antithetical paradigm is assumed in contemporaneous interpretation of 4 Maccabees. 
Thus, while Bousset asserts ‘[d]as Centrum der Frömmigkeit ist der Glaube’ in 4 
Maccabees, this assertion occurs within the context of a criticism of ‘jüdische 
Gesetzesfrömmigkeit’, which ‘verhindert… den Durchbruch der Erkenntnis der 
fundamentalen Bedeutung des Glaubens’.16 This ‘fundamental meaning’ is revealed 
in the opposition ‘Werke oder Glaube’.17 Similarly, R.B. Townshend, holding that 4 
Maccabees antedates Christianity, writes that its author ‘has naturally no inspired 
                                                
12 Ibid., 352. 
13 J. Köberle, Sünde und Gnade im religiösen Leben des Volkes Israel bis auf Christum: eine Geschichte des 
vorchristlichen Heilsbewusstseins (München: C.H. Beck, 1905), 658. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. For the same paradigm in Anglophone scholarship on 4 Ezra, see e.g. G.H. Box, ’4 Ezra’, in 
The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English (ed. R. H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1913), 2:555. G.H. Box, The Ezra-Apocalypse: Being Chapters 3 - 14 of the Book Commonly Known as 
4 Ezra (or II Esdras) (London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1912), xlviii. H.M. Hughes, The Ethics of Jewish 
Apocryphal Literature (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1910), 144, 240–41. 
16 Bousset, Die Religion, 176–77. 
17 Ibid., 177. 
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anticipation of the Christian doctrine of God’s grace whereby sinners may be led 
into the way of truth…’18 He is ‘a Jew to the core, and his conclusion is preemptory; 
for him the Law is the last word’.19 Thus, as with 4 Ezra, so with 4 Maccabees: a 
number of scholars assume a univocal definition of grace apart from works. 
 Given Sanders’ express aims in Paul and Palestinian Judaism, we might expect a 
thorough debunking of these ‘Pauline’ theological impositions. On 4 Ezra, Sanders, 
however, agrees: ‘in IV Ezra one sees how Judaism works when it actually does 
become a religion of individual self-righteousness.’20 This is so, for Sanders, because, 
Palestinian Judaism exhibits the pattern of ‘covenantal nomism’,21 while 4 Ezra 
breaks this pattern: ‘obedience maintains one’s position in the covenant, but it does 
not earn God’s grace as such’, but in 4 Ezra, ‘God has no concern for sinners but will 
save only the righteous, who are perfect like Ezra.’22 Thus, Sanders agrees with 
Bousset and Köberle on 4 Ezra: ‘God’s character as compassionate, gracious, 
forgiving and the like is effectively denied’.23 The basic problem with this view is the 
assumption that grace must be defined with reference to God’s merciful character 
either apart from or despite human activity.24 Thus, at the point where Sanders 
agrees with those whom he criticises, his Protestant assumptions emerge most 
clearly. As we will argue, however, 4 Ezra emphatically prioritises divine action as 
grace while insisting that this grace is in harmony with salvation via judgment 
according to obedience to the law. There is no ultimate tension between the two in 4 
Ezra. 
 Though Sanders gave no attention to 4 Maccabees, his influence may be seen 
in an important article on νόµος in 4 Maccabees. For Paul Redditt asserts that ‘Nomos 
is not conceived [in 4 Maccabees] in a narrowly legalistic fashion’,25 explaining that it 
is not ‘fear of eternal punishment’ but ‘positive expectation of reward’ that serves as 
                                                
18 R.B. Townshend, ‘The Fourth Book of Maccabees‘, in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old 
Testament in English (ed. R.H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653. Cf. Hughes, Ethics, 233. 
19 Townshend, ‘Fourth Maccabees‘, 2:664. 
20 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 409. 
21 Ibid., 422. 
22 Ibid., 412–13. 
23 Ibid., 415. 
24 For a critique of ‘grace’ as a dispoition and his alternate conception of ‘Die χάρις als Geschehen’, 
see R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (7th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), 287 – 92. 
25 P.L. Redditt, ‘The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees‘, CBQ 45 (1983): 253. 
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the motivation for the martyrs’ self-offering.26 In support, Redditt cites ‘the view that 
nomos would not condemn [the martyrs] and God would pardon them for acts 
committed in fear (8:22)’.27 That is, God would, as Antiochus asserts, ‘be merciful to 
[those] who act contrary to the law because of compulsion’ (8:14). Though Sanders’ 
influence is not explicit, it is enough to notice that the same view separates Sanders 
from other interpreters of Palestinian Jewish texts and Redditt from other 
interpreters of 4 Maccabees. Whereas Redditt sees mercy apart from obedience in 4 
Maccabees, Townshend does not. As we will argue in chapter one, the brothers’ 
resistance to Antiochus’ line of argument belies Redditt’s claim. In agreeing, 
however, that mercy should not be conditioned on law-observance, neither Redditt 
nor Townshend consider the possibility that grace or mercy can be defined 
differently. 
 A number of interpretations of Judaism around the turn of the twentieth 
century assumed or constructed a linear evolutionary trajectory that reached its 
‘proper’ climax in (their respective versions of) Christianity. These schemes 
projected a legalistic works-righteousness soteriology onto these texts as a 
theological foil to a ‘Pauline’ religion of antithetical ‘grace’. The irony, however, is 
that Sanders has assumed that grace is ‘groundless’, ‘free’, ‘not earned’, and 
‘unmerited’, and thus imposed a univocal theological definition onto the Jewish texts 
he interprets.28 This study will argue that Galatians, 4 Ezra, and 4 Maccabees each 
represent divine gifts as both constitutive of human action and the criterion by 
which such action is evaluated. Yet, the specific differences in these accounts of 
‘grace’ disclose their unique and ultimately opposed theological accounts. Thus, by 
attending to the specific differences in their respective accounts of divine benefaction 
and divine gifts, this thesis will aim to contribute to the ongoing reevaluation of the 
writings of Paul and his Jewish contemporaries on ‘grace’ and to reframe and 
resolve a number of specific issues of interpretation. In this regard, our primary 
contribution will be a reevaluation of the theological logic of Galatians, a topic on 
which Sanders and those who followed him have been quite influential. 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 394 – 96. Rightly, Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 
6; McFarland, God and Grace, 7.  
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3. Paul’s Logic in Galatians 
As a natural corollary to his interpretation of Palestinian Judaism, Sanders aimed to 
‘argue for a certain understanding of Paul’.29 Put simply: if grace is univocal in these 
texts (except 4 Ezra), how and why does Paul differ from his Jewish contemporaries? 
Whereas, for example, Bultmann interpreted Paul’s logic as grounded in the 
justification of the sinner as conceived from the perspective of faith,30 Sanders 
construed it as the experience of participation in Christ.31 As we will see, Sanders’ 
construal of Paul’s logic proved both controversial and fecund, especially regarding 
Galatians. Yet, for our purposes, William Horbury made the most prescient early 
criticism, remarking that Sanders’ Paul and his Jewish contemporaries ‘pass like 
ships in the night’.32 This perceived lack of contact was the impetus for the family of 
explanations known as the ‘New Perspective on Paul’.33 Though the New 
Perspective family of views is diverse, their likeness includes both the conviction 
that Sanders’ critique of the ‘traditional’ paradigm of Judaism is correct and that an 
alternative to Sanders’ dogmatic interpretation is necessary. Paul is neither opposing 
individualistic legalism, nor promoting Christological dogmatism, but rather 
fighting Jewish ethnocentrism or nationalism.34 In other words, Paul’s arguments are 
covenantal and missionary in character—having to do with the broadened basis for 
the inclusion of the Gentiles among the people of God post Christum.35 
 As we consider further in chapters four and five, these two construals have 
come to dominate discussion of Paul’s theological logic in Galatians. With regard to 
the account of Paul’s target as ‘national righteousness’ or ‘ethnocentrism’, this study 
will analyse the argumentative function of the Jewish food laws and circumcision in 
Galatians and 4 Maccabees.36 That is, we will ask why both texts regard these 
                                                
29 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, xii. 
30 Bultmann, Theologie, 315–20. 
31 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 447–53. 
32 W. Horbury, ‘Paul and Judaism‘, ExpTim 90 (1979): 116. 
33 J.D.G. Dunn, ‘The New Perspective on Paul‘, BJRL 65 (1983): 95 – 122. 
34 N.T. Wright, ‘The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith‘, TynB 29 (1978): 61 – 88; J.D.G. 
Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). 
35 D.B. Garlington, The Obedience of Faith: A Pauline Phrase in Historical Context (WUNT II 38; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 265: Paul’s arguments are over ‘a more ethnically inclusive vision of 
God and his love over against one which was more nationally restrictive.’ 
36 For a recent re-examination of the lexical issues with an overview of the literature on the works 
of the law, see L. Doering, ‘4QMMT and the Letters of Paul: Selected Aspects of Mutual Illumination‘, 
in The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pauline Literature (ed. J.S. Rey; STDJ 102; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 69 – 87. 
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practices as the fulcrum on which their respective arguments pivot—i.e., not as 
matters of relative cultural accommodation but categorical theological repudiation.37 
Why would accepting the practice of circumcision render the benefit of Christ null 
and void (Gal 5:2);38 why would eating pork entail the very destruction of the 
ancestral law (4 Macc 5:33)? For Paul’s opponents thought the Gentiles could be 
included in Torah-terms,39 and 4 Maccabees could hardly be more Hellenising but 
draws the theological line at circumcision and food laws. As we will see in chapter 
one, 4 Maccabees resists interpretation in the terms of a distinction between 
individual and national righteousness, as the Torah orders both the self and society 
as a matter of the created design of the cosmos. This raises the possibility that Paul’s 
relativising of Jewish practices has not simply a national but also an anthropological 
significance. 
 Along with the problem of contact raised by Horbury, the ‘dogmatic’ account 
of Paul’s logic in Galatians has a more fundamental difficulty. That is, Paul, at least 
in Galatians, is not arguing with Jews but Jewish Christians and the Gentiles they 
seek to influence.40 Consequently, if Paul is appealing to his experience of 
participation in Christ or the powerful work of the Spirit per se, then such an appeal 
is question-begging. What is at issue in Galatia is not the experience of salvation in 
Christ or the Spirit but the meaning of these and, specifically, their implications for 
observance of the law in the church.41 Though Paul could be begging the question, 
we will pursue the possibility that his argument is valid—that he has a different 
understanding of the Christ-event. 
 This logical problem is illustrated by Sanders’ interpretation of Gal 3:21, a text 
which will also serve as an introduction to the particular theme of this study—divine 
life-giving benefaction and the gift of life. After a brief exposition of Galatians in 
support of his argument that, for Paul, solution precedes plight, Sanders concludes: 
 
                                                
37 For example, fulfilment of the covenant with ‘the advent of Christ’ (Dunn, ‘New Perspective’, 
114) excludes Torah practices only if we consider these merely cultural and not creational. 
38 J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of 
Galatians‘, ABR 58 (2010): 37. 
39 Already in Dunn, ‘The New Perspective‘, 112 – 13. 
40 Rightly noted by Dunn; ibid., 111. 
41 Barclay, ‘Battle‘, 44. 
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Throughout [Galatians], the argument is dogmatic; there is no analysis of the 
human situation which results in the conclusion that doing the law leads to 
boasting and estrangement from God. Gal. 2.21 and 3.21 seem to be substantially 
the same and to give the main thrust of Paul’s thought: if one could be righteous 
by the law Christ need not have died; if the law could make alive, one could be 
righteous by the law. The inference which the reader must draw from the last 
passage is that no law was given which could make alive and that righteousness 
must come another way. He has already said how it comes: by the death of Christ 
and by faith.42 
 
In support, Sanders appeals to the Galatians’ receipt of the Spirit (Gal 3:1 – 5): ‘the 
Spirit is the guarantee of salvation; the Spirit came by faith; therefore it cannot come 
any other way’.43 This appeal, again, does not consider that the receipt of the Spirit 
was a shared experience of the Galatians and Paul’s Jewish Christian interlocutors, 
but they fail to draw the same inference from this experience. Is Paul talking past 
them, or is there a deeper hermeneutical and theological difference?  
 Sanders’ dogmatic reading of this text has been influential. Richard Hays 
appeals to Sanders for support in his account of the ‘narrative logic’ of Galatians.44 
Likewise, though his retention of the notion of human inability is opposed to the 
interpretations of Sanders and Krister Stendahl45, Barry Matlock concedes that 
‘Sanders rightly notes’ that Gal 3:21 pertains to ‘Paul’s present view of what God’s 
plan was all along’. And, though they disagree on human inability, Matlock’s 
general explanation of Paul’s logic is identical to Sanders: ‘[I]t is not necessary to 
reconstruct either a legalistic or perfectionistic strand within Judaism against which 
Paul can be seen more cogently to be arguing. Paul's perspective on the law at this 
point, as at many others, is Christological and retrospective.’46 Thus, among both 
proponents and some opponents of Sanders’ reading of Paul’s theological logic in 
Galatians, there is fundamental agreement on the ‘dogmatic’ character of Paul’s 
argument. It is ‘Christological and retrospective’, but, again, why do Paul’s 
opponents disagree with him on the implications of Christology for observance of the 
                                                
42 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 484. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See e.g. R.B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1 – 4:11 (2nd 
ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 113, n. 89; 178 – 179; Dunn, Theology of Paul, 154. 
45 K. Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles—and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 80–
81; Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 443, nn. 4, 479, 23. 
46 R.B. Matlock, ‘Helping Paul’s Argument Work? The Curse of Galatians 3.10 – 14‘, in Torah in the 
New Testament (ed. M. Tait and P. Oakes; LNTS 401; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 177 – 78. 
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law in the church? In this connection, our argument depends on recognising another 
cluster of questions left largely unasked and unanswered by Sanders and others—
viz. what does Paul mean in Gal 3:21 by implying that the law is given to the ‘dead’, 
to people in need of being ‘made alive’ (ζῳοποιέω)? As we will argue, though they 
construe God’s life-giving benefactions differently, a recognition that Galatians, 4 
Maccabees, and 4 Ezra consider God as the giver of life-giving gifts provides an 
angle of vision that illumines the theological logic of each text. 
4. History of Research: Grace and Life, Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra 
Because our topic draws together two themes—grace and life—that have received no 
attention together and little focused attention separately in the literature on our 
texts, it will be necessary to trace the history of research so that both the gap this 
study seeks to fill is outlined and the manner in which we seek to fill it is justified. 
Thus, we must selectively survey three groups of literature: 1) studies that situate 
grace in Pauline and Jewish texts within the context of gift-giving in antiquity; 2) 
works that address ‘life’ and life texts; and 3) comparisons of Galatians and 4 
Maccabees or 4 Ezra. 
‘Grace’ as Gift in Pauline and Jewish Texts 
  Several studies that examine the Pauline and Jewish literature in the context 
of ancient systems of benefaction are germane to our review and illustrative of our 
purpose.47 Though he gives no sustained attention to the motif in Galatians, 4 Ezra, 
or 4 Maccabees, James Harrison provides an extensive survey and analysis of the 
word χάρις in ancient inscriptions, papyri, first-century Jewish literature and 
inscriptions, Greco-Roman philosophical literature, and the literature of Paul 
                                                
47 For the seminal study of ‘le système des dons éxchangés’ (197) see, M. Mauss, ‘Essai sur le don: 
forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques‘, in Sociologie et Anthropologie (Paris: Les 
Presses universitaires de France, 1950), 145 – 279; M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange 
in Archaic Societies (trans. W.D. Halls; New York: W.W. Norton, 2000). For an overview of the 
anthropology of ‘gift’ and its use within the humanities, see now Barclay, Gift, 11–65. For additional 
works on ‘gift’ relevant to biblical studies, see S. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and 
Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); Z.A Crook, 
Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of the Ancient 
Mediterranean (BZNW 130; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2004); and the essential epigraphic study F.W. 
Danker, Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field (St. Louis: 
Clayton Pub. House, 1982). 
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(focused on Romans). Though Harrison demonstrates his thesis that ‘the Graeco-
Roman [sic] benefaction context of χάρις is the backdrop for Paul’s understanding of 
divine and human grace’, his particular account of that context and the relation of 
Paul and other Jewish writers to it is problematic.48 Two interrelated problems have 
to do with Harrison’s imposition of ‘merit’ or ‘contractual’ categories and the 
understanding of reciprocity in gift-exchange. Thus, at the end of his survey of χάρις 
in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Harrison suggests that ‘a merit theology 
regarding almsgiving’ in some of these texts subverts the post-Sanders consensus in 
which ‘a unilateral and covenantal understanding of grace dominated first-century 
Judaism’.49 The fundamental problem here is Harrison’s assumption that divine-
human gift-exchange that produces reciprocity necessarily entails an economic or 
contractual relation, which thus leads him to a preference, with Sanders, for 
‘unilateral and covenantal’ grace. Thus, Harrison specifies the conceptual target of 
‘Paul’s emphasis on the unilateral nature of grace’ as ‘the idea that God was 
compelled by acts of human piety to reciprocate beneficently’.50 Relatedly, Harrison 
sometimes operates with an anachronistic concept of χάρις itself: for Paul’s very use, 
he thinks, risks misunderstanding ‘God’s unilateral grace as some kind of reciprocal 
contract’.51 On the contrary, the giving and receiving of gifts produces not economic 
or contractual but personal obligations in Paul’s context. Because the obligation to 
reciprocate is interpersonal and voluntary, God could choose not to reciprocate (and 
that for a variety of reasons)—ending the relationship.  
 The monograph of Seth Schwartz is relevant here, as he situates Jewish 
conceptions of benefaction in their Mediterranean context, while insisting on a 
significant divergence on the matter of reciprocity.52 Schwartz finds evidence of the 
rejection of reciprocity at the exact point where Harrison detects a merit theology—
viz., in Jewish almsgiving or, as Schwartz prefers, ‘charitable donation’.53 According 
to Schwartz, the Torah envisions and later Jewish literature reflects, at least ideally, a 
                                                
48 J.R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context (WUNT II 172; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1. 
49 Ibid., 113. 
50 Ibid., 18. 
51 Ibid., 35. 
52 S. Schwartz, Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society?: Reciprocity and Solidarity in Ancient Judaism 
(Princeton: PUP, 2010). 
53 Ibid., 18–19. 
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rejection of the sort of institutional interpersonal dependence entailed by Greco-
Roman schemes of ‘friendship’ and ‘patronage’ in favour of ‘pure, unreciprocated 
gift’.54 Though it is not necessary, with Harrison, to construe divine return as 
merited, it is necessary, contra Schwartz, to recognise divine return as the ground 
and driving impetus for almsgiving in some of these texts. That is, it is not that the 
beneficent do not expect a return in giving to the poor, but rather that they expect a 
return from God.55 Moreover, unlike Schwartz, we are not concerned with ‘ideal 
types’ but rather how schemes of benefaction were used in figuring God as life-giver 
in particular texts.56 Thus, as we will argue, it is the recognition of God as Benefactor 
in 4 Maccabees that enables the martyrs to reject Antiochus Epiphanes’ offer of 
friendship, in expectation that their lives, when fittingly offered back to God, would 
be fittingly returned by him. Though it is possible that divine reciprocity is rejected 
in our texts, it is more likely, if our texts differ, that they differ on the interpersonal 
logic of reciprocity. In the terms of our study, if created life is given differently by 
God in our texts, does this configure the human return of life differently, and, in 
turn, does the divine receipt and further return of that life also differ? 
 The studies of Jonathan Linebaugh and Orrey McFarland are relevant at this 
point, as they, unlike Harrison and Schwartz, are more successful in mitigating the 
risk of imposition. To mitigate this risk, both Linebaugh and McFarland produce full 
and close exegetical readings of their Jewish texts (Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, 
respectively) first, in order to allow the respective conceptions of grace in these texts 
to emerge fully, with their theological and hermeneutical bases exposed. In this way, 
the conceptions of divine benefaction (and human in McFarland) of the Jewish texts 
set the agenda for a robust conversation with Pauline texts. The general result is that 
Wisdom, Philo, and Paul each thematise grace emphatically, though each defines 
grace differently. Thus, Linebaugh summarises the difference between Wisdom and 
Romans this way:  
 
For Wisdom, the one God’s particular and discriminate acts of saving grace are 
a necessary instantiation of divine justice. For Paul, by contrast, it is because 
the saving event of divine righteousness and grace that Paul calls ‘the 
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redemption that is in Christ Jesus’ (Rom 3.24) is unconditioned by any 
criterion of human worth, including worth defined in terms of Jewish 
ethnicity or law-observance, that the Christ-gift is given to Jew and Gentile, 
male and female, slave and free.57 
 
Linebaugh further explicates the basic theological grounding of these differences in 
Wisdom’s ‘protology’ and Paul’s event-focused Christology, such that the 
anthropological differences between the two texts are rooted in Wisdom’s 
‘symmetrical structuring of the cosmos fashioned and ordered by σοφία’ and, by 
contrast, Romans’ conception of ‘the unconditioned and centrifugally significant 
divine act that is the history and proclamation of Jesus Christ’.58 McFarland comes to 
similar general conclusions, when he contrasts Philo’s conception of ‘divine 
generosity’ as ‘cosmological and causative’ with Paul’s ‘understanding of grace’ as 
‘Christological and creative’ (ital. orig.).59 It would not be fair to reduce the results of 
these nuanced and significant studies to these similar conclusions, but, for the 
purposes of this introduction, we must focus on the convergence of the conclusions 
on what Linebaugh dubs ‘the Christological fault-line’.60 For, in both studies, the 
differing construals of definitive divine gift-giving are traced exegetically to 
cosmological conceptions, for Wisdom and Philo, and Christological conceptions, in 
Romans and Paul, generally. Moreover, McFarland’s argument for Paul’s ‘creative’ 
understanding of grace, specifically in terms of ‘a saving event which effects new 
creation and new life for its recipients’, vis-à-vis the recognition of cosmological 
accounts of grace in Wisdom and Philo raises but does not resolve the very questions 
this study seeks to address.61 That is, why and in what respects are ‘new creation’ and 
‘new life’ not only effected by the Christ-gift in Galatians but needed? Moreover, does 
the cosmological/Christological fault-line hold for our comparative texts? And, if so, 
how might an examination of the conceptions of grace in Galatians, 4 Maccabees, 
and 4 Ezra with a focus on their respective conceptions of God as life-giver and life 
as a divine gift further analysis not only of the respective theological logics of these 
texts but also the particular argumentative force of Paul’s Christology in Galatians? 
                                                
57 Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 236. 
58 Ibid., 224, 226. 
59 McFarland, God and Grace, 186–87. 
60 Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 177–79, 227. 
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‘Life’ in Pauline and Jewish Texts 
 In the wake of Sanders’ dogmatic account, there has been a reevaluation and 
subsequent debate over the interpretation of ‘life’ texts (e.g., Lev 18:5; Dt 30:15 – 20) 
and what Paul and his Jewish contemporaries mean by ‘life’. Consistent with 
Sanders’ contention that ‘nomism’ is about ‘staying in’, several studies limit the 
meaning of these texts and Paul’s interpretation to their social function.62 Thus, 
Dunn argues that, in Gal 3:11 – 12 for Paul, Hab 2:4 provides the ground for 
righteousness, while Lev 18:5 specifies the manner in which that righteousness is to 
be lived out in covenant community.63 The problem Paul has with his Jewish 
Christian interlocutors is not soteriological but social: ‘his fellow Jews have put too 
much emphasis on that secondary [regulatory] stage.’64 N.T. Wright similarly 
interprets over-emphasis on life within the Torah boundaries in racial terms.65 
Though these approaches rightly highlight the social dimensions of Paul’s context 
and arguments, they are deficient on both theological and exegetical grounds. Again, 
it is not clear why, theologically, Gentiles could not be included within the church in 
Torah terms. Exegetically, Dunn’s reading of Lev 18:5 fails within both its canonical 
OT context and Galatians 3. Israel’s manner of life is not associated with regulation 
for regulation’s sake in Lev 18 but with avoiding the fate of expulsion from the land 
that awaits those whom Israel is displacing (Lev 18:24, 28),66 and such a ‘results-
oriented’ context is apparent, for Paul, from the explicit appeal to the curses of Dt 
27:26 and 21:23 in Gal 3:10 and 3:13, respectively. Nonetheless, this regulatory 
reading does raise an important issue for our study, for, if Paul does deny that life 
within the law leads to soteriological life, then this raises the question, as Wakefield 
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recognises, of the proper regulation of life that corresponds to ‘faith’ and is 
characteristic of the church.67 As we will argue in chapter 5, 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
would pose this sort of question, and Paul’s answer to it is vital to his argument in 
Galatians. 
 In contrast to this regulatory view, we should survey the essay of Shannon 
Burkes on ‘life’ in 4 Ezra and the studies of Simon Gathercole and Preston Sprinkle 
on ‘life’ in readings of Lev 18:5. Though Burkes is not interested in pushing below 
the similarities and differences between 4 Ezra and other texts to their ultimate 
theological differences, her essay illumines how 4 Ezra modulates traditional 
arguments for the relation of the Torah and Wisdom in an eschatological key.68 Thus, 
Burkes provides a clear argument for 4 Ezra’s reading of the promise of life in Dt 30 
in eschatological terms, which she attributes to the belief (arising from the 
Destruction in 70 C.E.) that ‘the creation itself is already becoming old and dying’ 
and, thus, ‘the present world no longer holds out the possibility for life in a 
meaningful sense of the word’.69 Consequently, Burkes’ essay supports the 
contention of Gathercole, who surveys a number of readings of Lev 18:5 in Christian 
and Jewish literature of the Second Temple Period and concludes that the Judaism 
Paul is arguing with thought ‘in terms of obedience, final judgment, and eternal life’ 
and not ‘sin-repentance-forgiveness or sin-exile-restoration’.70 Sprinkle expands on 
this analysis by not only examining more texts but also by considering the question 
of Paul’s theological logic. He argues that Paul’s reading of Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:12 
‘exhibits an antithesis between divine and human agency’ that is grounded on his 
conception of a humanity that is ‘in bondage to the present evil age’.71 
 Though we will find reason to agree with the position of Gathercole and 
Sprinkle that soteriological life is in view in Gal 3:12, there are remaining issues. As 
we will argue in chapter five, this position still raises the question, even for 
eschatologically-oriented Jewish readers, of the regulatory framework appropriate to 
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‘faith’. Likewise, as we will argue in chapter four, from the perspective of texts like 4 
Ezra and 4 Maccabees, Sprinkle’s Paul does not explain why divine prior action in 
creation was not sufficient to establish human agency. In this connection, Sprinkle’s 
appeal to the motif of slavery to cosmic powers as the ground for the divine-human 
agency antithesis leaves unanswered the most basic questions: why is humanity 
enslaved, what does the Torah have to do with this estate, and why, of necessity, 
should the expression of the liberty won or life created by Christ not be Torah-ordered? 
That is, why is the Torah necessarily classed as ‘a merely human way of appropriating 
eschatological life’, or, put differently, why and in what sense must ‘eschatological life’ 
be ‘created by divine action, the revelation of Christ in Paul’ and, thereby, not Torah-
ordered?72 Gathercole and Sprinkle have established the eschatological register of 
Paul’s argument, but Sprinkle’s analysis of Paul’s theological logic is limited both by 
his generalised account of divine and human agency and his focus on Paul’s citation 
of Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:12 in the context of Gal 3. In this regard, by pursuing a dialogue 
with 4 Ezra on divine life-giving benefaction and the gift of life across the textual 
territory of Gal 3 – 4, we aim to clarify the development of Paul’s theological logic 
and thus set the stage for a debate between 4 Maccabees and Paul on Gal 5 – 6 on the 
status of created human life under the law. We will argue that it is there, in the last 
two chapters of Galatians that the material ground of Paul’s theological logic is 
exposed. 
 Finally, a work by John Yates should be mentioned, because, though there are 
only two brief excurses on Galatians, it develops an argument about Paul’s 
conception of the Spirit as life-giver that is essential for our purposes.73 After treating 
the Spirit and creation in the Hebrew Bible, LXX, Dead Sea scrolls, other Second 
Temple works, the Targums and the Rabbis and then providing a focused analysis of 
the same motif in the Hodayot, Yates argues that Paul deploys the language and 
metaphors of Gen 2 and Ezek 36 – 37 in 1 Cor 15, 2 Cor 3 – 5, and Rom 5 – 8 to 
portray the Spirit, not as the agent of ethical empowerment but as the divine agent 
who brings about new creation within history. Thus, in his reading of the crucifixion 
of the flesh and life in the Spirit in Gal 5:24, 25, he concludes that, given the 
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traditions he has traced, ‘this [reference to life] must be considered in some way to 
be resurrection life. The spirit has not simply indwelt in order to empower. The 
spirit has indwelt so as to give new life’.74 The key point for the present study is that, 
though the reduction of life in the Spirit to ethical enabling begs the question of why 
ethical enabling cannot take the shape of Torah-observance, an account of the Spirit 
as giving new eschatological life opens up the possibility of thinking of created life 
and eschatological life, though related, as categorically distinct.75 In other words, if 
what the Spirit creates is a new life altogether, a life which is necessarily not 
coincident with the Torah, is there some sense in which the Torah is integral to the 
‘old creation’ but not the ‘new’? In the context of a dialogue with texts like 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, this question is foregrounded for Paul. For, as we will argue, 
these texts conceive of both creation and eschatological reality as Torah-ordered. 
Nonetheless, Yates’ work, though brief and not turned toward the question of the 
theological logic of Galatians, forces us to inquire after the entailments of Paul’s 
deployment of traditional ‘life’ motifs, a task that is central to the present work and 
which will be discussed in more detail in our discussion of metaphor below. 
Comparisons of Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra 
 Though not on our particular topic, two studies by Francis Watson offer brief 
but significant comparisons of our texts, and John Barclay’s Paul and the Gift 
addresses divine benefaction in 4 Ezra and Galatians. In an essay comparing 4 
Maccabees, 4QMMT, and Galatians, Watson argues that the Pauline antithesis 
between faith and works depends on Paul’s conception of the priority of divine over 
human agency in soteriology, a conception that is revealed in comparison to be a 
hermeneutical construction.76 That is, whether Paul’s view of Lev 18:5 ‘corresponds to 
the realities of Second Temple Judaism’ is ‘a matter of perspective’.77 This is an 
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essential point for our purposes, for, though Watson treats the various sources of 
these texts’ differing interpretations of the law’s soteriology briefly, there is a clear 
recognition here that these differences depend on the more basic theological systems 
of each text and their respective differences. Moreover, as we suggested regarding 
Sprinkle and as we shall see, given the accounts of the creational institution of human 
agency in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, we may have reason to doubt that ‘the great 
antithesis between divine and human agency’ is sufficient to explain Paul’s basic 
theological differences with his interlocutors.78 Specifically, though a comparison of 
our texts may corroborate Watson’s contention that the Pauline faith and works 
antithesis is indeed a theological and hermeneutical construction, we will explore 
the possibility that it is in their particular and differing conceptions of divine life-
giving action, not a general and only Pauline conception, that generate their 
differing perspectives on divine and human agency and the Torah’s relation to these.  
 In Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, Watson lays out in fuller detail his 
analysis of Paul and his fellow Jews as those who ‘read the same texts, yet read them 
differently’.79 Most striking for our purposes, his treatment of 4 Ezra takes pride of 
place as the climactic conversation before the conclusion to the book. Moreover, 
though mostly in comparison with Romans, Watson identifies three significant 
similarities between Ezra and Paul. Like Paul, Ezra initially resists the soteriology of 
the, as Watson rightly recognises, conceptually ‘interchangeable’ texts of Dt 30:19 
and Lev 18:5,80 he is the recipient of an apocalypse (Gal 1:16; 3:23),81 and he too 
radicalises the Deuteronomic curse (cf. Gal 3:10), such that Ezra’s view is ‘very 
similar’ to Paul’s perspective that ‘the pervasive reality of death’ rules out ‘the law’s 
conditional offer of life’ and does so ‘from the very outset’.82 These points of contact, 
in light of Watson’s further contention that Gal 3 is Paul’s reading of the Pentateuch 
‘co-ordinated with Paul’s christological proclamation’, suggest the potential 
fruitfulness of a fuller close reading of Galatians with 4 Ezra.83 For, though Watson’s 
analysis identifies a number of the similarities and differences between Paul and 
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Ezra’s ‘engagement with Moses’ final address’, his analysis of the theological basis of 
their differences is focused on his reading of Rom 5:12 – 21 and restricted to the 
observation that, for Paul, the fact that ‘the law is enclosed and limited by the 
Genesis promise…and its fulfillment in Christ’ renders ‘Ezra’s despair at the human 
predicament…without foundation’.84  
 This brief analysis of theological difference, though suggestive, leaves open 
the question of why Ezra (and 4 Ezra) reads similar sacred texts and the same 
salvation-history so differently from Paul in Gal 3 – 4. Moreover, though a debated 
matter, Watson’s contention that Ezra does not, ultimately, accept Uriel’s view but 
maintains his ‘solidarity with sinners’ is not only open to question but possibly an 
occlusion of 4 Ezra’s ultimate position on the relationship between divine mercy and 
eschatological justice.85 That is, Watson’s contention that a reading of episode four as 
Ezra’s conversion precludes ‘[c]orrelations between Paul’s understanding of grace 
and Ezra’s appeal to divine mercy’ depends on his view that such a conversion 
amounts to an ‘[abandonment of Ezra’s] former belief in the covenant with Israel 
and in the saving power of the divine mercy’.86 Yet, this position assumes that 
Uriel’s argument itself does not amount to a redefinition of the covenantal 
relationship between divine mercy and eschatological justice, such that this justice is 
itself an expression of mercy for the righteous. In other words, Watson seems to 
assume that grace/mercy is antithetical to justice, but is this the case, ultimately, for 
4 Ezra? For example, when Ezra argues that, in considering God’s ‘limit/death’ for 
her son just, the pious Mother Zion will receive him back from the dead (4 Ezra 10:15 
– 16, 24), is this not justice-shaped mercy (cf. 14:34)? Likewise, when Paul argues that 
the death of Jesus is an act of curse-bearing (Gal 3:13), is this not mercy-shaped 
justice? If these construals are correct, then the natural question is why, ultimately, 
justice and mercy in these texts are correlated differently.  
 John Barclay’s recent book is the nearest in intention and design to our study, 
as it is the only work offering close exegetical and theological treatment of 4 Ezra and 
Galatians on divine benefaction. Deploying the analytical tool of ‘perfections’ of 
grace, Barclay reads 4 Ezra as a debate over Ezra’s appeal to incongruous 
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grace/mercy and Uriel’s argument for congruous grace/mercy.87 And, unlike 
Watson, he concludes that Ezra ultimately adopts Uriel’s bi-focal hermeneutic, in 
which the principle of equity holds despite the apparent paucity of worthy recipients 
of divine mercy.88 Barclay argues that, in contrast to 4 Ezra, in Galatians Paul’s 
notion of the Christ-gift as an incongruous and unconditioned divine gift has the 
effect of subordinating and, in certain respects, subverting pre-existing criteria of 
worth.89 Thus, for Barclay, Paul’s particular Christological focus remaps reality 
without reference either to creation or Torah.90 The corresponding new taxonomies 
of reality thereby created, in turn, fund Paul’s radical missionary praxis.91 
 This cogent reading of grace in 4 Ezra and Galatians represents a considerable 
advance in scholarship, because Barclay uses the constituent features of systems of 
gift-exchange identified both by anthropologists and scholars of antiquity to 
illumine the respective and differing conceptions of divine beneficence. Moreover, 
this work avoids the formal arbitrariness of various post-Sanders ‘dogmatic’ 
readings by grounding Paul’s missionary praxis in the theological conviction that 
the Christ-gift is given without regard to worth. Paul and the Gift is a convincing 
reevaluation of Paul and select Jewish authors on ‘grace’. Yet, there are two areas 
where further work is necessary. Generally, though Barclay brings 4 Ezra in for 
comparison at several points in his reading of Galatians, he does not place the two 
texts into sustained conversation.92 Moreover, though Barclay has recognised the 
significance of the theme of ‘life’ in Galatians more than most, he does not give 
sustained attention to life as divine gift in Galatians or 4 Ezra.93 In this respect, his 
explanations of the theological logic of Galatians tend to leave the Pauline 
conception of life arising from death un- or underexplored. Thus, though he 
recognises that ‘for those whose lives are reconstituted in Christ, the supreme 
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definition of worth is not the Torah but the truth of the good news’94, this is to 
restate rather than resolve the problem of Paul’s theological logic in Galatians.  
 In fairness, Barclay notes that an account of this logic requires the drawing 
out of Paul’s ‘submerged assumption’ in Gal 3:21 – 22, concluding: ‘What is clear 
(and all that is necessary for Galatians) is that the Torah was incapable of producing 
the necessary solution: it could neither liberate people from the dominance of sin, 
nor give life to the dead’.95 But, again, this does not move materially beyond 
Sanders’ ‘dogmatic’ account, because there is still the question: why not? Likewise, 
though Barclay is correct to insist that ‘the Christ-event has subverted every other 
regime of value’ as ‘incongruous gift’, this still does not explain what either in the 
nature of the Christ-gift or the Torah precludes the ‘repackag[ing]’ of the former in 
the ‘taxonomies’ of the latter.96 In other words, why does ‘every other regime of 
value’ need subverting, and why is the Torah included within these ‘(socially 
constructed) value systems’ and not, as in 4 Ezra, the divine eschatological and 
ultimate value system?97 If, as Paul assumes, the Torah is incapable of liberating 
from sin or making alive, why is the Torah, thus, necessarily inadequate as the 
eschatological order of life in the church? These criticisms of Barclay’s work are 
posed to suggest the possibility that, in line with his own suggestion that ‘Paul’s 
logic…may overlap with [4 Ezra]’,98 further analysis of the conceptions of life-giving 
benefaction in these texts is needed. This is especially so given Barclay’s insistence 
that Paul’s ‘interpretation of this [divine] gift is Christological in focus…centered…on 
an event—the death and resurrection of Christ—that has effected a transformation of 
reality’.99 For, presumably Paul’s Jewish Christian interlocutors had a similarly 
Christological focus, but they construed reality in a decidedly different fashion from 
Paul. Why?—we will read Galatians in dialogue with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra in an 
effort to answer this question. 
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5. Comparative Method and Key Terms 
In this section we begin by explaining the value of comparative projects in general, 
addressing briefly both the benefits and risks of the comparative method. Then we 
will be in a position to give a brief justification of the texts and motif we have chosen 
for comparison, before turning to a survey and explanation of the key terms that 
undergird and inform the thesis. 
Comparative Method 
 The line from the poet Richard Wilbur that opened this chapter captures the 
basic methodological insight of comparisons: ‘Odd that a thing is most itself when 
likened….’ This thesis joins other comparative studies that use the metaphor of a 
conversation between texts in the conviction that our texts will be most themselves 
‘when likened’.100 The value of such a dialogue is that it provides an opportunity to 
gain a fresh and clearer hearing of familiar (Galatians and 4 Ezra) and somewhat 
muted (4 Maccabees) textual voices. For, in seeking to give the perspectives of the 
texts rather than those of scholars the hermeneutical and discursive priority in the 
exegesis, we aim to observe those places where 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians 
might raise otherwise unnoticed questions. That is, by reading texts in dialogue, we 
gain a sense of the rhetorical and theological force of their language and argument 
that cannot be had reading in isolation. For reading Galatians in monologue risks 
obscuring both what Paul shares and where he differs with his fellow Jews and 
Jewish Christian interlocutors, and thus his particular theological logic. By contrast, a 
good comparison, in disclosing deep shared assumptions, makes the distinctive 
emphases and thus particular theological profiles of each text stand out. This is 
neither a substitute for exegesis of the texts on their own terms, nor a depreciation of 
the value of the various exegetical debates surrounding the texts. Rather, it is a 
recognition that in attempts to read ancient texts on their own terms (esp., texts as 
contested as Galatians or 4 Ezra) we are never really reading them in isolation but 
rather through the interpreted mediation of their Wirkungsgeschichte and from our 
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own social location. Dialogical comparison, then, is useful because, in so far as the 
particular questions of the comparative texts framed in their own language succeeds 
in both exposing tacit interpretive frameworks of the reader and making the 
distinctive voices of the texts clearer, the dialogical exegesis functions as a distinct 
and illuminating mode of ‘likening’. This thesis is not, of course, divorced from 
scholarly debates on grace or the appropriation of biblical ‘life’ texts in Paul and 
Judaism. Yet, the focal task is to allow these specific texts to speak to, query, and 
clarify each other—on their own terms and in their own language—and, in so doing, 
to allow the texts to be not less but more themselves. 
 Comparisons are no panacea; they have well-known risks of their own. In the 
context of comparisons of Paul and Judaism, E.P. Sanders famously identified two—
imbalance and imposition.101 With the term imbalance, Sanders highlighted the 
problems of comparing the entire corpus of Jewish literature with the work of Paul. 
The chief pressure is to distil the former to some essence that would prove useful in 
understanding the latter, thereby potentially obscuring the particular features of the 
rhetoric and theological logic of the Jewish texts and distorting one’s understanding 
of Paul in relation to them. Our control for this risk has to do with the scope of our 
inquiry: by examining only three texts, we provide space for close readings in which 
the conceptions of divine life-giving benefaction can be explored adequately within 
their particular rhetorical contexts and theological logics. 
 With the term ‘imposition’, Sanders underlined the problem of comparative 
anachronism. In the specific context of comparisons of Paul and Judaism, the 
theologies of other Jewish texts have been unwittingly forced into and judged 
according to a supposed Pauline mold. The result is the imposition of an ‘artificial 
pattern’ on the theologies of these other Jewish texts.102 In the context of the present 
thesis, the risk of imposition has to do with allowing the frameworks or overriding 
concerns of any of our comparative texts to dictate and thereby arbitrarily determine 
the contours of the conversation. Our control for this risk has to do with the 
structure and development of the thesis, and it has two aspects. First, in order to 
avoid imposing foreign assumptions on our comparative texts, in part one, we will 
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pursue, as far as necessary and possible, a full and sequential reading of 4 Maccabees 
and 4 Ezra on divine life-giving benefaction without reference to each other or to 
Galatians.103 In this way, 4 Maccabees’ and 4 Ezra’s respective conceptions of God as 
giver of life and life as gift will emerge in the context of the development of their 
own rhetorical concerns and theological conceptions. Thus, we aim to fill a scholarly 
lacuna by offering an analysis of an unstudied, but significant, motif in 4 Maccabees 
and 4 Ezra and, in so doing, to prepare for a conversation on this topic in Galatians.  
 Second, in part two, with 4 Maccabees’ and 4 Ezra’s particular conceptions 
and terms in mind, we host a conversation between these texts and Galatians, 
focusing on Paul’s conception of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Again, we 
will pursue a full and sequential reading of Galatians to avoid both prejudging which 
texts are relevant and ignoring the development of Paul’s argument. Here, though, 
to mitigate the risk of imposition, 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra will ask the questions and 
advance the conversation. In summary, by reading Galatians in conversation with 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, we aim both to gain hermeneutical distance from our own 
assumptions and those inherited in Pauline scholarship and thereby to hear Paul’s 
own voice more clearly. By asking first what questions 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
might bring to Paul’s argument as it progresses in Galatians, we aim to illumine both 
the rhetorical and theological force of the letter and, thereby, cast both Paul’s text 
and the particular exegetical and theological debates that have arisen from it in a 
new light. 
 Finally, if comparisons risk imbalance and imposition, in general, dialogical 
comparisons carry their own risk—muting debate. That is, one drawback of the 
‘comparison is conversation’ methodological metaphor, is that, in framing a social 
discourse as open-ended and free-flowing, one can obscure conflict.104 For example, 
conversations directed toward matters of identity or ultimate concern often become 
debates. And, in debates, while convention establishes the contours of discussion, 
counter-proposals often emerge not as wholesale rejections but strategic 
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modifications.105 The risk of anachronism in these cases lies primarily, then, with the 
historian’s reconstruction of the discourse(s) that constitutes convention. Thus, 
Sanders’ account of ‘common Judaism’ under the rubric of ‘covenantal nomism’ has, 
despite his articulation of the dangers, obscured the debate about grace in Jewish 
texts. Likewise, we explore the possibility that a Christological definition of grace 
like that of Barclay, Linebaugh, and McFarland might mute a debate about the 
significance of the Christ-event as gift between Paul and Jewish Christians in Galatia. 
The basic challenge here is no different than that of historical inquiry in general: 
what is most important for understanding is typically assumed—both in the case of 
the historian and the text.106 The task is to discover not simply what texts say but 
rather the force of what they say—and in such a way that our own problematic 
assumptions about the topic of conversation are exposed and not imposed.  
 In this connection, a comment by Aristotle about the paradoxical utility of 
metaphor expresses the methodological approach of this study well: ‘Since foreign 
tongues are unknown, and known [things] are already “kings”, the metaphor 
teaches most of all’.107 For those ways of reasoning in which ‘the thought’ (ή διάνοια) 
does not come immediately but a little later, with this phenomenon emerges 
‘instruction, so to speak’ (οἷον µάθησις).108 This insight guides both the general 
(‘conversation’) and particular methodological orientation (metaphor) of this study. 
We pay attention to metaphorical constructions and puzzles arising from the texts in 
conversation in an attempt to identify possible strategic modifications or subversions. 
Are there places where our authors use the same metaphorical language but 
differently, and are these uses significant? If so, what ‘instruction, so to speak’ 
follows? Utilising the theory of Lakoff and Johnson, who define ‘conceptual 
metaphors’ as broad human modes of ‘understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another‘,109 we will use their concepts of ‘metaphorical coherence’ 
and the related concepts of ‘metaphorical entailments’ and ‘basic conceptual 
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metaphors’.110 Metaphorical entailments concern the implications of metaphors, and 
basic conceptual metaphors are metaphors that are ‘broad’ enough to contain other 
metaphors. For example, ‘life-as-existence’ is more basic than (on a Greco-Roman 
notion of gift) ‘life-as-gift’—for the latter implies a purpose and therefore a structure 
to life, while the former does not. That is, if life is a gift, in this sense, then it is given 
for a relationship and thus in expectation of the return of that life in some form. To be 
clear, this is neither a study of metaphor, nor a study of metaphor in our 
comparative texts, but rather a study that foregrounds sensitivity to metaphorical 
entailments as a methodological disposition. Illustrated in question form: if Paul 
configures the recipients of the law as ‘dead’ in Gal 3:21, do the authors of 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra consider such recipients ‘living’, and, if so, are these 
differences theologically significant?  
The Value of Comparison between Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra 
 As we have seen, the value of a comparison of texts is the ability to see each in 
sharper profile, as the comparison serves to illumine both the shared assumptions 
and distinctive emphases of each. To read Paul in isolation risks muting both what 
he shares with others and what is peculiar to him. Reading Galatians in isolation, as 
we shall see, risks obscuring the particular logic by which Paul’s theology operates. 
This comparison will, of course, be most beneficial if the texts to be compared are 
sufficiently close in theme and milieu to make comparison worthwhile. In this 
connection, we offer here a general justification of the value of comparing our texts, 
while we analyse the specific evidence for the relevance of our focal theme of divine 
life-giving benefaction in the analysis of key terms in the next section. 
 4 Maccabees has been studied relatively little in its own right and only in a 
few notable cases in relation to Paul.111 Moreover, the limited comparative attention 
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has been given primarily to Romans.112 There are good reasons, however, for 
comparing this text with Galatians. In addition to being written by a Diaspora Jew 
who was a rough contemporary of Paul, 4 Maccabees shares a number of general 
thematic concerns and specific argumentative strategies with Galatians. Both texts 
are concerned with overcoming ‘the passions of the flesh’ (4 Macc 7:18; Gal 5:13 – 
26),113 they each use the language of faith/faithfulness with respect to God in the 
context of compulsion or duress (cf., e.g., the uses of ἀναγκάζω in 4 Macc 4:26; 5:2, 27; 
8:2, 9; 11:25; 18:5 and Gal 2:3, 14; 6:12 and cognates in 4 Macc 4:7; 5:25; 7:9, 15, 19, 21; 
8:7; 15:24; 16:22; 17:2; 18:17 and Gal 1:23; 2:7, 16, 20; 3:2, 5–9, 11–12, 14, 22–26; 5:5–6, 
22; 6:10), and they each view eternal life as the ultimate context in which the 
aforementioned struggles takes place (4 Macc 17:12; Gal 6:8). Likewise, each text 
argues both by way of exemplar (Eleazar; Paul) and through appeal to biblical ‘life’ 
texts (e.g., Dt 32:39, 47 and 30:20 in 4 Macc 18:18 – 19; Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 in Gal 
3:11, 12). Finally and perhaps most generally, both 4 Maccabees and Galatians deal 
in different ways with the question of whether there are conditions under which one 
might justifiably violate the Jewish laws concerning food and circumcision (cf., e.g., 4 
Macc 4:25; 5:14 – 21; Gal 2:11 – 14; 5:3), and strikingly, in this regard, both texts share 
the rare term Ἰουδαϊσµός (4 Macc 4:26; Gal 1:13, 14). Thus, in terms of generally shared 
social world, thematic concerns, and vocabulary, these texts are good candidates for 
comparison. 
 As we have seen, whether as the problem to which Pauline Christianity is the 
solution or the exception that proved Palestinian Judaism’s rule of covenantal 
nomism, the relevance of 4 Ezra to Paul’s writings is not disputed. As with 4 
Maccabees, 4 Ezra has, however, been compared most regularly with Romans. Yet, 4 
Ezra is a good conversation partner for Galatians in several respects. Like 4 
Maccabees, 4 Ezra shares both a number of thematic concerns and argumentative 
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strategies with Galatians. Thus, though of likely Palestinian provenance, 4 Ezra was 
written not long after Galatians, arguing, like Paul, not only ‘a theological position 
shaped by…reflection on the texts of scripture’114 but one in which readings of 
biblical ‘life’ texts play a primary role in arguments about salvation history (Dt 30:19 
in 4 Ezra 7:129; Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:11, 12). Moreover, as with Paul in 
Galatians and Eleazar in 4 Maccabees, Ezra serves as the exemplary embodiment of 4 
Ezra’s argument and theology, in the end representing the one who will be saved ‘by 
faith or by works’ at the judgment (9:7) despite suffering due to the travail of the 
cosmos and Zion. In addition to these argumentative strategies, 4 Ezra shares, in 
general, the themes and language of faith/faithfulness (Gal 1:23; 2:7, 16, 20; 3:2, 5–9, 
11–12, 14, 22–26; 5:5–6, 22; 6:10; 4 Ezra 5:1; 6:5, 28; 7:34; 9:7; 13:23) and works (Gal 
2:16; 3:2, 5, 10; 5:19; 6:4, 10; 4 Ezra 7:24, 77; 8:32, 33, 36; 9:7; 13:23), accounts of 
revelatory disclosure by ‘heavenly’ figures (Gal 1:12, 16; 4 Ezra, passim), concerns 
over the identification and status of eschatological heirs (Gal 3:18 – 4:31; 4 Ezra 
episode three, esp. the framing in 6:55 – 7:18), and readings of salvation history in 
which the relation between earthly and heavenly Zion is at issue (Gal 4:21 – 31; 4 
Ezra 9:38 – 10:59). These shared themes and arguments along with Paul’s life in and 
familiarity with near-contemporary Palestinian theological circles render Galatians 
and 4 Ezra good conversation partners. 
 In summary, 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians each argue within a generally 
shared social milieu from shared scriptures concerning a number of shared themes 
and theological concerns. Moreover, as we will survey below, these texts view God’s 
life-giving activity as fundamental for understanding divine identity, the cosmos, 
human life, and the eschaton, regularly employ gift-terminology to figure God as a 
life-giver and life as divine gift. They are good candidates for comparison.  
 As we saw in the previous three sections, a number of scholars have assumed 
that 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra are either in simple opposition to or identical with Paul 
on grace. This thesis will further recent work that inquires about the definition of 
grace in these texts through an analysis of their respective theologies. Such an 
analysis is needed not only for 4 Maccabees, which has not been studied in any 
depth in this connection, but also for 4 Ezra and Galatians. For, as we have seen, the 
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recent work of McFarland and Barclay on Galatians argues that Paul defines grace 
Christologically and, thus, differently from a number of his Jewish contemporaries. 
Such a definition, however, raises afresh Horbury’s concern about Paul’s contact 
with his fellow Jews (a problem not addressed in Barclay’s treatment of 4 Ezra or 
Galatians). That is, if, for these approaches, the ultimate difference between Paul and 
some of his fellow Jews is, for Paul, Christological, which generates his different 
understanding of grace, then Horbury’s description of Sanders’ picture still applies. 
Paul and his Jewish contemporaries ‘pass like ships in the night’—not in there 
understanding of grace, where they are in controversy, but in there deeper theology. 
This raises the possibility, however, that if Paul is appealing to the Christ-event 
simpliciter, then he is begging the question in debate with his Jewish Christian 
interlocutors in Galatia. For Paul’s opponents are believers in Christ and have 
themselves experienced the Spirit. Does Paul merely appeal to the Christ-event and 
the Galatians’ experience of the Spirit and thereby assume and not argue about the 
significance of these events, or does he present an argument for a different 
understanding of Christology, one that would make contact at the level of theology 
with Jewish and Jewish Christian interlocutors alike? In focusing the conversation on 
life as divine gift, we are exploring the possibility that Paul makes contact with 
Jewish interlocutors at the theological level by construing the Christ-gift as life-
giving and that this construal represents not an appeal to but a different construal of 
Christology. Such a focus on divine life-giving benefaction does not seek to overturn 
either the work recent work on grace by Linbaugh, McFarland, and Barclay or the 
analyses of Jewish and Pauline use of ‘life’ texts in Gathercole and Sprinkle. Rather, 
by analysing the concept of life as divine gift in these texts on their own terms, we 
aim to deepen the conversation in both areas of scholarship. 
Method and Key Terms 
 This thesis is not a study of the words χάρις or ζωή, their respective cognates, 
or their translation equivalencies, but of the concepts of God as giver of life and life 
as divine gift in 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians. Nonetheless, there are several 
points of clarification necessary for the key terms of this study—both those of the 
ancient texts and my own analytic vocabulary—that should be explored here. Before 
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surveying the Greek and Latin terminology and giving an account of our own 
analytical terms, it will be necessary to make a few brief methodological points. First, 
we assume that the meaning of our key terms can differ in different contexts. The 
primary risk of this thesis, from a lexical semantic point of view, has to do with 
assuming that the same or cognate terms and their translation equivalents have the 
same senses in our comparative texts. To mitigate this risk, we seek to analyse the 
usage of these terms in each text independently of each other—i.e., with respect to 
their own specific social domains, particular syntactical relations, and distinct 
argumentative functions. Only if we analyse each text’s gift and life terminology in 
its own context will we be able to formulate a text’s particular conception of God as 
life-giver and life as divine gift, and only then will we be in a position to pursue an 
adequate comparison of these texts’ conceptions.  
 The relative variety and lack of overlap in gift terminology in our texts invites 
a related point: without assuming identity, our analysis depends on the recognition 
that these texts participate in a shared gift discourse rooted in the social practices of, 
in Danker’s words, the social ‘system of reciprocity’ that was ubiquitous in Greco-
Roman antiquity.115 That is, though our texts may reflect significant differences in 
the practices, terminology, and conceptions of gift-giving culturally, geographically, 
and across time, we are justified in comparing our texts’ gift-concepts—even given 
their varied terminology—because of the shared social phenomena of and discourse 
about gift-giving in antiquity.116 As with the key terms, we do not assume that the 
social domains related to their use in our texts are identical, but, we argue, neither are 
they alien. Rather, a comparison of 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians is interesting, 
in part, because of the particularities of their respective uses of gift language and 
conceptions in construing God as life-giver and life as divine gift. 
 Second and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, we assume that 
authors can use various words to refer to the same, similar, or related concepts. In 
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other words, conceptual analyses that focus only on shared or conventional gift 
terminology risk missing other relevant terms or muting the discourse-specific use of 
terms relevant to conceptual analysis. This point is significant because, as we will 
enumerate below, though each of our texts use Greco-Roman terminology for gift-
giving with respect to life often, the terms used, their frequencies, and their 
discourse-specific senses vary in 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians. Our general 
controls against imbalance and imposition help to mitigate these particular risks of 
arbitrary selection of data and conceptual anachronism, as we will offer full and 
sequential readings of only three texts. This will allow the necessary scope for close 
reading that recognizes references to gift-giving in non-conventional terminology 
and that considers how the particular discourse aims of our texts affect their 
respective conceptions. 
 Finally, a brief account of what we take to be the characteristic features of this 
shared ‘system of reciprocity’ in Greco-Roman antiquity is in order. Joubert’s 
warning about the character of our evidence is apposite: ‘the historical sources do 
not present us with pure, ideal types…’117 Nonetheless, even if branches spread out 
in a number of different directions, it is possible to identify a family gift-exchange 
tree. Barclay’s recent definition of ‘gift’ represents a succinct expression of the three 
basic features of Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity: they are 1) concerned with 
‘voluntary, personal relations’; 2) ‘characterized by goodwill in the giving of benefit 
or favour’; 3) ‘and eliciting some form of reciprocal return that is both voluntary and 
necessary for the continuation of the relationship.’118 Thus, in the survey of key 
                                                
117 Joubert, Paul as Benefactor, 24. 
118 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 575. Though Barclay explicitly produces this general definition with 
respect to the anthropology of gift, such a definition is not necessarily anachronistic when applied to 
Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity. Rather, the seminal studies of ‘gift’ among classicists and New 
Testament scholars bear out the heuristic utility of broad anthropological definitions in recognising 
and analysing at a structural level gift-exchange in the literary and epigraphic remains of antiquity. 
On the heuristic value of ‘gift’, in this sense, for classicsts, see M.L. Satlow, ‘Introduction’ in The Gift in 
Antiquity (ed. M.L. Satlow; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013): 1 – 6. For seminal works in Classics and 
New Testament studies that recognise the heuristic value of anthropological definitions of ‘gift’ 
indebted to Mauss, see, e.g.:  M. Finley, The World of Odysseus (London: Harmondsworth, 1978 [1954]), 
145; S. von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece (London: Duckworth, 2003), vii – ix, 6; P. Veyne, Bread 
and Circuses (ed. O. Murray; trans. B. Pearce; London: Penguin Books, 1990), xv.; R.P. Saller, Personal 
Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 72; Danker, Benefactor, 26 – 29; ibid., ‘Paul’s 
Debt’, 263; Joubert, Paul as Benefactor, 18 – 22; Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace, 17 – 22. For an 
overview of recent debates in anthropology and a critique of Mauss’ idealised account of tribal gift-
exchange vis-à-vis Western practices of property exchange, see B. Wagner-Hasel, Der Stoff der Gaben: 
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ancient terms here, we restrict ourselves primarily to a consideration of those 
instances of terms that denote ‘gift’, ‘giving’, ‘receiving’ or that designate specific 
types of gift relationships in Greco-Roman antiquity—whether patron-client, civic 
benefactor, or personal benefactor relationships.119 Where other locutions imply the 
giving of divine benefits, even without gift-terminology, we will widen our net 
accordingly, and will justify this procedure exegetically at relevant points in 
analysing our texts in the relevant chapters below. Here, after an overview of the 
Greek gift terms of Galatians and 4 Maccabees and the Latin terminology of 4 Ezra, 
we will turn to a consideration of some of our own key analytical terms.  
‘Gift’ and ‘Life-giving’ terms in Galatians 
 Although Paul uses a variety of words to refer to divine and human gift-
giving in Galatians, we treat his use of χάρις first because it provides a ready way 
into key features of his gift terminology. As we shall see, in Galatians, Paul uses χάρις 
for the gift itself: for example, it is ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ, through their receipt of the 
Christ-gift in Paul’s preaching, that the Galatians were called (Gal 1:6),120 while it is 
his refusal to reject τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ that, in his view, distinguishes Paul from his 
opponents (Gal 2:21). In this last connection, as we shall see, Paul’s particular 
identification of Jesus’ self-offering as a divine gift (Gal 2:20; cf. 1:4) implicates a 
range of terms and concepts in his account of divine and human reciprocity. For 
example, because James, Peter, and John recognize ‘the gift [of apostleship] given to 
[him]’ (τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν µοι), they return (ἔδωκαν) ‘the right hand of fellowship’ to 
him and Barnabas (Gal 2:9). Consequently, though χάρις is the only word that might 
mean ‘gift’ in Galatians,121 there are many instances of nouns, like κοινωνία, that 
figure as gifts. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Kultur und Politik des Schenkens und Tauschens im archäishen Griechenland (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000): 27 
– 76.  
119 For this broad taxonomy, see Joubert, Paul as Benefactor, 22 – 69. 
120 It is difficult to tell whether Paul means by ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ ‘through Christ’s favour’ or 
‘through Christ’s gift’. Though we will argue for the latter below, in either case the event of Jesus’ 
self-offering is evoked. 
121 The cognate adverb δωρεάν (‘freely’ or ‘to no effect’; Gal 2:21) is the only instance of a term in 
Galatians related to the nouns formed in relation to δίδωµι. 
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 These nouns are recognizable, in part, from their syntactical relations to the 
verbs Paul uses for actions related to gift-giving. In addition to four instances of 
δίδωµι (Gal 1:4; 2:9; 3:21–22; 4:15), Paul uses χαρίζοµαι with reference to the divine 
donation of the Abrahamic κληρονοµία by a promise (3:18) and a perfect passive form 
of πιστεύω for God’s act of endowing him with the εὐαγγέλιον (2:7). For the action of 
receiving a gift, Paul can use λαµβάνω (2:6; 3:2, 14), ἀπολαµβάνω (4:5), and 
παραλαµβάνω (1:9, 12), though his particular association of πίστις with the manner of 
receipt of both the good news of the Christ-gift and the Spirit (3:1, 2; cf. 3:22b!) raises 
the possibility that some instances of πίστις and πιστεύω function as gift-receipt 
terminology. With the possible exception of the aforementioned use of δίδωµι in Gal 
2:9, there are few explicit uses of gift-return terms in Galatians. As we will argue, 
however, the use of δόξα (1:5) and δοξάζω (1:24) indicate returns, and Paul’s particular 
understanding of the Christ-gift and its receipt indicates that his use of ἀγάπη (Gal 
5:6, 13, 22; cf. the use of ἀγαπάω, 2:20; 5:14) specifies the disposition that leads to a 
variety of appropriate return-actions. In this way, we will argue, Paul’s command 
that the Galatians ‘enslave themselves to one another’ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης (Gal 5:13) is one 
of his discourse-specific identifications of the appropriate return of the Christ-gift. 
Similarly, Paul’s metaphor about ‘walking in line with the truth of the gospel’ (2:14) 
and his query about what is keeping the Galatians from ‘obeying the truth’ (5:7) 
represent Pauline examples of obliged return gifts characteristic of Greco-Roman 
reciprocity systems. 
 In addition to the frequency of gift terminology in Galatians, Paul’s use of this 
terminology in argument in relation to life language underlines the importance of 
divine life-giving benefaction for understanding Galatians. The key point is that this 
conjunction of life and gift language occurs at critical moments throughout 
Galatians. Firstly, Paul’s somewhat vague opening reference to Jesus’ self-offering 
for sins to rescue from the present evil age (Gal 1:4) finds its climactic expansion in 
Paul’s paradigmatic autobiography in Gal 2:20, where he contrasts himself both with 
Peter at Antioch and his opponents in Galatia. Rather than rejecting the gift of God 
by seeking righteousness in the law (2:21), ‘the life [Paul] now lives’ (ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ) is 
Christ’s own life (ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐµοὶ Χριστός). His current ‘life in the flesh’ is, 
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thus, itself ordered ‘by faith in the Son of God who loved [him] and gave himself for 
[him]’ (ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός µε καὶ 
παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ, 2:20). Likewise, Paul’s rather compressed argument 
relating the ‘life’ texts Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 to each other in Gal 3:11, 12 finds its 
conclusion in the hypothetical counterfactual of Gal 3:21, in which Paul envisions a 
law that ‘was given’ (ἐδόθη) and capable of making-alive (ζῳοποιέω) such that 
righteousness would be ἐκ νόµου. This raises a crucial assumption of the letter: that 
life needs to be granted to humanity but has not and cannot be granted in the law, but 
rather, as we will argue in exegesis of Gal 3:22, only in the Christ-event. Relatedly, in 
the context of the Galatians’ apparently impending return to slavery to τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ 
κόσµου in the form of Jewish calendrical practices (4:1 – 11), Paul expresses his wish 
that Christ be formed in ‘[his] little children’ (4:19), and figures the receipt of the 
Spirit in the Christ-gift as birth by the Spirit from a barren mother (4:21 – 31; cf. Isa 
54:1). This not only evokes the theme of life in connection with the donation of the 
Spirit, but it provides a hermeneutic by which the promise to Abraham, the addition 
of the law, and the Christ-event might be seen in relation to a singular divine life-
giving and salvific intention. Finally, as we will see, in contrast to a ‘dead’ existence 
enslaved to the Flesh, Paul conceives of the Spirit as the gift and agent by whom 
believers have crucified the Flesh (5:24) and in whom they live and order their lives. 
That is, the proper response to their existence in the Spirit is to order their lives 
according to the Spirit (Εἰ ζῶµεν πνεύµατι, πνεύµατι καὶ στοιχῶµεν, 5:25). In summary, 
Paul regularly joins his gift and life language throughout Galatians, and the prima 
facie argumentative significance of these combinations invites a substantive analysis 
of divine life-giving benefaction in this letter. 
‘Gift’ and ‘Life-Giving’ terms in 4 Maccabees 
 Though the use of gift terminology in 4 Maccabees is not as frequent as that in 
Galatians or 4 Ezra, gift terms and conceptions arise at key points and play a vital 
role in the argument. Like Galatians, 4 Maccabees can use χάρις to refer to gifts 
themselves: Antiochus Epiphanes rebukes Eleazar for rejecting τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας 
(i.e., here pork; 4 Macc 5:9), and the fifth brother mocks Antiochus for unwittingly 
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‘[giving them] gifts’ (χάριτας ἡµῖν χαρίζῃ) in the form of opportunities to remain 
faithful to the Torah despite torture (11:12). Relatedly, in response to their summary 
rejection of his offer of φιλία (8:5; cf. the use of εὐεργετέω, 8:6) and εὐεργεσία (8:17), 
Antiochus is enraged by the brothers’ apparent ‘ingratitude’ (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). Given 
the relative infrequency of gift terms in 4 Maccabees, uncertainty about the 
provenance of the work, and the lack of a clear picture among ancient historians of 
the reception of Roman conceptions of patron-client relationships in the eastern 
Mediterranean in the early empire,122 it is difficult to be certain about the precise use 
of these terms. Nonetheless, the terms used and the asymmetrical relationship 
between Antiochus and the Jewish martyrs may indicate that these terms figure this 
relationship in political and, perhaps, patron-client terms. Antiochus is neither 
proposing to become a civic εὐεργέτης to the Jewish nation, nor is he offering to enter 
into a personal relationship of reciprocity. Rather, Antiochus’ understanding of his 
offer of φιλία as directly tied to the brothers’ receipt of leading positions with respect 
to ‘the affairs of the kingdom’ (τῆς βασιλείας…πραγµάτων, 12:5), suggests a 
relationship of public political subordination on a par with that of Jason, who agreed 
‘to give’ (δώσειν) annual tribute in exchange for the priesthood (4:17). The language 
of friendship, as is often the case in such situations in antiquity, is likely used to 
allow the brothers to save face in an otherwise humiliating act of political 
subservience. Though a precise account of the particular social practices that inform 
the use of these terms is difficult, as we shall see, the general relations between the 
divine donation of individual and political life are clear enough for the purposes of 
our comparison. 
 Turning from these nouns (and the adjective) to a consideration of the verbs 
related to beneficent action, we gain a fuller picture of the basis of the martyrs’ 
refusals of the benefactions of nature and Antiochus. For 4 Maccabees’ first use of 
δίδωµι signals the key contention, as the author holds both that ‘[God] gave the law 
[to the mind at creation]’ (τούτῳ νόµον ἔδωκεν) and that ‘if one becomes a citizen to 
                                                
122 On the question of the adoption or modification of Roman patron-client relations in the Greek 
East, Harrison (Paul’s Language of Grace, 16 – 17) remarks, ‘The interaction of the Greek and Roman 
benefaction systems, at the level of local poleis and more generally throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean, still awaits the detailed regional study of ancient historians, especially as regards the 
ethos of reciprocity.’ 
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this law, he will rule a kingdom’ (καθ᾿ ὃν πολιτευόµενος βασιλεύσει βασιλείαν) 
characterised by the cardinal virtues (2:23). Consequently, Eleazar contends that ‘the 
creator of the cosmos’ has given a law (νοµοθετέω) that is κατὰ φύσιν (5:25), and so he 
refuses Antiochus’ account of Nature as benefactor with its attendant obligations to 
eat pork. Likewise, the brothers say to each other ‘let us consecrate ourselves to God 
from a whole heart, to the one who gave (τῷ δόντι) [our] souls’ (13:13), and so they 
reject Antiochus himself as a political benefactor.  
 The verbs 4 Maccabees uses for receiving gifts further reflect these choices 
between benefactors and their respective fitting outcomes. The brothers reject 
Antiochus’ promise that ‘[they] will receive’ (λήµψεσθε) leading government 
positions (8:7), are tortured and killed, and, subsequently, the youngest brother 
reminds Antiochus that such behaviour is shameful for ‘one who has received good 
things and a kingdom from God’ (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 
12:11). In other words, like the brothers themselves, Antiochus is a recipient of 
divine benefactions and should have considered how best to return them. In this 
connection, though the logic of reciprocal obligation is often assumed in 4 
Maccabees, the author uses ἀποδίδωµι for the youngest brother’s climactic return of 
his life (presumably to God, 12:19) and ἀπολαµβάνω for God’s return of the martyrs 
souls, pure and immortal (18:23). Likewise, on the related question of the adequacy 
of return gifts, Eleazar is specifically said to receive ‘glory’ (δόξα, 7:9) for his 
exemplary death and the martyrs are deemed ‘worthy’ (ἄξιος, 18:3) of an eternal 
inheritance. 
 In summary, not only is gift terminology (perhaps, specifically patron-client 
language) used in 4 Maccabees, the terms and the conceptions they convey play a 
vital role in signalling the opposing logics at work in conceptions of God, nature, 
and Antiochus as benefactors. More specifically for our purposes, 4 Maccabees 
repeatedly figures life—whether created life or eschatological life—as a divine gift. 
As we have seen, the divine gift of the law to the mind at creation serves as the 
guide both to personal and political flourishing (4 Macc 2:23). To live in recognition 
of this is to live a ‘wise life’ (σοφίας βίος, 1:15). In other words, the primary 
undergirding of 4 Maccabees’ peculiar contention that only the Jews exhibit 
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Hellenistic virtue given in the account of his philosophical ‘starting-point’ (ὑπόθεσις, 
1:12) is this notion that the gift of the Torah properly orders the mind, and thus 
human and social life. As such, this notion is the foundation of the argument of the 
entire work. Thus, as we shall see, in a time of divine chastisement, such a wise life is 
returned in the form of an offering, as Eleazar bids God to ‘receive [his] life in 
exchange [for that of God’s people]’ (ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐµὴν ψυχήν, 6:29). 
Moreover, those who make such a return can expect, like the patriarchs, ‘that they 
do not die to God…but live to God’ (ὅτι θεῷ οὐκ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν…ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ, 
7:19; cf. 16:25). This is so because, for 4 Maccabees, God is the one who says: ‘I will 
kill and I will make alive; this is your life and length of days’ (Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν 
ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑµῶν καὶ ἡ µακρότης τῶν ἡµερῶν, 18:19; cf. Dt 32:39, 47 and Dt 30:20). 
This figuring of God as life-giver stands in stark contrast to Antiochus, who in 
offering friendship to the martyrs as a path to life while threatening torture and 
death for ingratitude ironically exposes where true life is found. As the mother 
counsels in 4 Macc 15:2, the choice Antiochus offers is really between ‘temporal 
salvation’ (πρόσκαιρος σωτηρία) and ‘eternal life’ (αἰώνιος ζωή). Thus, in light of these 
and other texts, our analysis will seek to discern how the author’s conception of God 
as life-giver and life as divine gift exposes his hermeneutical stance and his basic 
theological logic. 
‘Gift’ and ‘Life-giving’ terms in 4 Ezra 
 Any account of gift terminology in 4 Ezra must reckon with the fact that, in 
using a critical Latin text, we are working two steps removed from the language of 
the original text.123 The primary issue in this connection has to do with the potential 
for anachronism in our Latin version, as the Latin terms may (falsely) suggest or 
obscure particular senses or connotations of gift terminology in the original work. 
Fortunately, this risk is negligible in our specific case, for, as we shall see, the verbs 
related to gift-giving in 4 Ezra clearly map on to the general system of reciprocity 
common in Greco-Roman antiquity. Moreover, the senses of the nouns that might 
                                                
123 For the best overview of the scholarly consensus in favor of a Hebrew original text, see M.E. 
Stone, ‘Some Remarks on the Textual Criticism of 4 Ezra’, HTR 60 (1967): 107 – 15. For the evidence of 
the text’s early translation into Greek and a Greek translation as the ultimate source of most extant 
manuscripts, see Stone, 4 Ezra, 1 – 2. 
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indicate more specific types of gift-exchange are both clear in their respective 
contexts and far outnumbered by verbal references to the actions of gift-giving. 
Thus, the nine instances of gratia are all used in accordance with the biblical idiom 
‘to find favour in the eyes of/before’ (4 Ezra 4:44; 5:55; 6:11; 7:75, 102, 104; 8:42; 12:7; 
14:22; cf. Gen 6:8; Ex 33:12; Num 11:11; Prov 3:4; etc.), while the sole use of 
beneficium, as we will argue fully in chapter two, given the context, refers both to the 
life human beings have received from God and the law which provides its proper 
order of return (4 Ezra 9:10, 11). In contrast to nouns for ‘gift’, verbs related to gift-
giving are frequent. Verbs related to beneficent action occur more than seventy times 
in 4 Ezra, with those related to giving most often indicated with a form of do,124 
though dono (4 Ezra 5:27; 7:135, 138; 14:32) and praesto (7:134; 8:8; 12:4) are used for 
God’s granting of the law or bringing about a state of affairs, respectively. Relatedly, 
the overlapping verbs accipio (7:9, 16, 72, 109; 8:43, 56; 9:32–34, 36; 14:30, 40), recipio 
(6:26; 7:14, 96, 98, 128; 8:33; 10:16; 14:9), and suscipio (7:91; 8:59; 9:35–36; 13:14) can be 
used to refer to the action of receiving a gift, and consequor (4:24; 7:72; 9:10; 14:34) can 
be used more specifically for obtaining a gift. In addition to those places where do is 
used for the action of returning a gift (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 10:14), the general 
obligation to return can be indicated with forms of debeo (3:31; 5:30; 10:9, 11), the 
obligation to return in a fitting fashion with reddo (4:42; 7:32, 75; 8:9), and the specific 
obligation to give glory or honour with glorifico (8:49; 9:31; 13:57) or honorifico (9:45). 
In this last connection, the adjective dignus sometimes signals a concern about the 
worth of the recipient of a gift (4:24; 12:9, 36; 13:14; 14:45; cf. indignus 14:45), while 
the noun merces (3:33; 4:35; 7:35, 83, 98; 8:33, 39; 13:56) is used to refer to a gift for the 
worthy. 
 In addition to the high frequency of conventional gift terminology in 4 Ezra, 
the potential significance of a study of divine life-giving benefaction is indicated by 
the way that these terms are regularly combined with ‘life’ language and metaphors 
and at key points of the argument. For example, the resolution of Ezra’s initial 
complaint that God has not made his way of justice known (3:31) depends on 
whether ‘God will grant to [him] to live’ (tibi dederit Altissimus vivere; 5:4) to see the 
                                                
124 It is striking that, apart from those uses of do that indicate a return to God (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 
10:14), God is the explicit or implied giver in every other use of do in 4 Ezra (3:15, 19; 4:19, 21–23; 5:4–
5, 7, 48, 50; 6:51–52; 7:9, 78, 94, 100; 8:5–6; 9:45; 13:41; 14:31, 42). 
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eschatological judgment. Likewise, Ezra’s debate with Uriel/God in episode three 
reaches its climax in the assertion that humanity ‘lives having received [God’s] 
benefactions’ (viventes beneficia consecuti, 9:10) and is thus responsible for adhering to 
Moses’ command to ‘choose life for yourself that you might live’ (elige tibi vitam ut 
vivas, 7:129; cf. Dt 30:19). Our analysis will seek to explain the significance of such 
statements and others both in relation to the overall conception of God as life-giver 
and with respect to the theological logic of 4 Ezra. 
Key Analytic Terms 
 Because the various theological connotations of the word ‘grace’ can be 
misleading when applied to ancient uses of χάρις that refer to a gift or benefit, we 
regularly use the terms ‘gift’ or ‘benefaction’. Thus, unless otherwise specified, we 
use ‘gift’ and ‘benefaction’ interchangeably to refer to benefits as they functioned in 
Greco-Roman systems of voluntary and reciprocal exchange. In this connection, we 
follow Danker, who uses the terms ‘benefactor’ and ‘benefaction’ with reference to 
the broader Hellenic system of gift-exchange, while we avoid the anachronistic 
general social-scientific use of ‘patron’ and ‘client’, as those terms should be reserved 
for specifically Roman practices and relations modeled on them. The primary benefit 
of using these terms, then, is that they are general enough to refer to gifts within a 
variety of Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity, while avoiding sometimes assumed 
theological definitions of ‘grace.’  ‘Gift’ and ‘benefaction’ do not, of course, function 
as appropriate equivalents for all of the senses of χάρις, gratia, or beneficium, and they 
may carry unwanted connotations of their own. The only remedy is a precise, clear, 
and well-supported use of language in every relevant case.  
 We use the terms ‘shape’, ‘order’, and ‘disorder’ in two related ways. First, we 
use these terms to refer to the way that particular gifts and the manner of their 
donation informs their return gifts. This language seeks to convey something of 
Joubert’s notion of ‘balanced reciprocity’, wherein a gift obligates ‘returning the 
same kind of gifts, or gifts of equal value for those received.’125 Though such a notion 
may initially seem impossible to apply to divine gifts—how can one return gifts of 
equivalent value to God?—two of our texts apparently already negotiate this difficulty 
                                                
125 Joubert, Paul as Benefactor, 22. 
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by ascribing eternal glory to God (and in identical language; cf. Gal 1:5; 4 Macc 
18:24). Likewise, as we will see, the return of human life, though not equivalent, is a 
gift of the same kind—i.e., life. Second and relatedly, we use this language more 
generally to highlight how our authors conceive of divine action as constraining 
human obligation in normative or moral terms. For example, as we will argue, 4 
Maccabees’ identification of the law as a divine gift given to the mind at creation 
entails a conception of human beings as Torah-shaped, such that the appropriate moral 
return of a human life to God is Torah-ordered. This is, to adapt Senecca’s phrase, 4 
Maccabees’ account of the lex vitae (Ben. I.4.2)—the order of human conduct. 
Relatedly, we use ‘order’ or ‘shape’ with reference to both history and eschatology, 
as, e.g., 4 Maccabees’ contends that God’s saving and judging actions uphold this 
order of human conduct. Again, the primary benefit of such terms is that they bring 
to the surface general assumptions implicit in the use of gift language without being 
overly specific, which allows for recognition of similarities at a basic level and 
differences in particulars. The risk here is, again, the importation of unwanted 
connotations, requiring clarity and precision in the application of these analytic 
terms.  
 Finally, we regularly use the term ‘life’ in tandem with ‘death’ without 
assuming a fixed meaning for either term. We adopt this practice because our texts 
regularly place their terms for life and death in syntagmatic or syntactical relation 
and because the paradigmatic relation between the two in a given text makes them 
reciprocally defining. For example, a conception in which death is properly a part of 
life implies a markedly different definition of the term ‘life’ than one in which death 
is properly excluded from life. In the former, ‘life’ is the cycle of life and death, while 
in the latter ‘life’ is the absence of this cycle. Again, in order to avoid anachronism, 
we must be careful not to assume that our use of these terms is identical to that of 
our texts, but rather must clarify usage on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, as each 
of our texts argue from biblical texts that use ‘life’ (and ‘death’) language with divine 
benefaction terms, our use of these terms has the benefit of drawing attention to 
similarities and differences in the conceptions of our texts. Additionally, the 
language of life and death is susceptible to diverse metaphorical usages, some of 
which are important for the argument of this thesis. Two examples from Philo 
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illustrate the kinds of metaphorical extensions these words can represent. In Fug. 58 
Philo assumes that the binaries ‘life and death, good and evil’ (Dt 30:15) entail a 
conception of life as morally ordered. So, he translates them into virtue terms—‘good 
and virtue’ and ‘evil and wickedness’. He further specifies this order ontologically, 
interpreting the identification of the love of God with ‘life and length of days’ (Dt 
30:20) as desire for and friendship with God unencumbered by disordered desires 
and bodies. Elsewhere, Philo remarks that ‘right-thinking people’ regard the reversal 
of fortune suffered by Flaccus—from ‘lord of life’ to subject of mockery—to be 
‘worse than death’ (Flacc. 147). Even limited to two examples, Philo’s life language 
exhibits sophisticated conceptual metaphors, here from more to less basic: 1) life-as-
existence; 2) life-as-ordered-existence; 3) properly-ordered-life-as-true-life; 4) 
disordered-life-as-death. Moreover, a number of ‘life’ texts in the Hebrew Bible 
operate with respect to conceptual metaphors like these—e.g. disordered life as a 
kind of death.126 Thus, as Philo does, our authors may both utilise and modulate 
these scriptural terms in their own systems of thought. Consequently, it is necessary 
to allow our authors to define their own terms and to ask if those definitions are 
implicated in a more comprehensive theological structure. 
6. Overview of the Study 
This study has two primary aims. In part one, we examine God as life-giver and life 
as gift in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra without reference to each other or Galatians. Thus, 
we seek both to offer the first full account of divine benefaction in 4 Maccabees and 
to extend research on divine gift-giving in 4 Ezra by focusing on life as gift, while 
avoiding importing assumptions about Paul or from Galatians into the analysis. In 
part two, we place 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra in conversation with Galatians, allowing 
them to raise questions for Paul’s account of the life-giving Christ-gift. In 
conversation with 4 Maccabees, chapter three will consider the implications of Paul’s 
presentation of himself as a paradigmatic recipient of life in the Christ-gift in Gal 1 – 
                                                
126 As Jon Levenson writes, ‘death and life in the Hebrew Bible are often best seen as relational 
events and are for the selfsame reason inseparable from the personal circumstances of those described 
as living or dead. To be alive in this frequent biblical sense of the word inevitably entailed more than 
merely existing in a certain physical state’; J.D. Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The 
Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven: YUP, 2006), 154. 
 53 
2 both for his accounts of the social implications of the gospel in Jerusalem and 
Antioch (and, by implication, Galatia) and for his presentation of himself as a 
reconstituted agent. Here we enter into the debate over whether Paul’s 
autobiography is primarily apologetic or paradigmatic in character, arguing that his 
presentation of himself as a paradoxically Torah-observant yet paradigmatically 
unworthy recipient of life invites a deeper analysis of the theological rationale for 
the incongruous Christ-gift. How is it that 4 Maccabees can insist that to die for the 
law is to live to God, while Paul contends that he had to die to the law in order to 
live to God? Chapter four will then moderate a debate with 4 Ezra over Paul’s 
argument in Gal 3 – 4 about the place of the law in salvation history. In this chapter 
we contend that the major approaches to the question of Paul’s theological logic are 
unsatisfactory because they all fail to account either for his assumption that 
recipients of the law are ‘dead’ or for his argument that the law itself is fitted and 
thus confined to the ‘dying’ and ‘barren’ cosmos. These points emerge in light of the 
recognition that, in 4 Ezra, human beings are ‘living’—capable and responsible 
agents—and that the Torah is identified not with the fallen created order but with 
the eschatological order. Chapter five turns to a debate with 4 Maccabees over the 
purpose and character of Paul’s ethics in Gal 5 – 6. This chapter offers a new 
argument for the place of Paul’s ethics in Galatians, arguing that Paul presents an 
inchoate theory of the self in Gal 5:13 – 26 that undergirds is assumption of a ‘dead’ 
humanity in Gal 1 – 4, while Gal 6 offers an account of how the Christ-gift properly 
orders the church that is (at least in the view of an author like 4 Maccabees) 
necessary for theological completeness. 
 This thesis then provides a new account of the theological logic and thematic 
coherence of Galatians by highlighting the particular significance of construing life as 
a divine gift given in the Christ-gift in the context of Jewish debates about a range of 
theological topics, most notably the relation between anthropology, cosmology, 
salvation-history, and divine saving action. Thus, in allowing 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra to pose their theological questions, this study intends not only to clarify how 
each author conceived of God as life-giver and life as divine gift but also to solve a 
primary puzzle in Pauline theology. In short, why and in what respect, if Christ, 
then not Torah?
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Part 1 
God as Life-Giver and Life as Gift in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra  
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Part 1: Introduction 
Part one examines God as life-giver and life as gift in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. In 
chapter one, we explore how 4 Maccabees’ conception of God as life-giver informs 
the argument that only the Hebrews exemplify Hellenistic virtue. In 4 Maccabees, 
the pursuit of a σοφίας βίος amounts to ἡ τοῦ νόµου παιδεία (1:15 – 17), because the 
Torah is God’s gift to the mind from creation (2:22, 23). How, though, does this 
creational and anthropological understanding of the divine gift of Torah-ordered life 
relate to the development of 4 Maccabees’ ‘narrative demonstration’ (3:19)—both his 
account of the events that incite the divine justice (3:20 – 4:26) and of the climactic 
Rededuell between Eleazar and Antiochus (5:1 – 6:30)? Our answer will attend both to 
4 Maccabees’ historical hermeneutic and the sacrificial logic exemplified in Eleazar’s 
self-offering. In the remainder of 4 Maccabees, it becomes clear that Eleazar’s 
teaching and death introduces a paradoxical pedagogy for the martyrs. What, 
though, is the relation between the earlier account of creational life as a divine gift, 
Eleazar’s return of this life in self-offering, and 4 Maccabees’ account of the martyrs 
as both the recipients of eschatological life and the means of national renewal? Our 
analysis here explores how 4 Maccabees’ cosmology and eschatology fund an 
argument for the rationality of his Torah-ordered ethic—specifically, in relation to 
the notion that God gives life to the worthy individual and nation. 
 In chapter two, we explore how 4 Ezra’s particular definition of life and his 
understanding of it as divine gift informs the two-ages eschatological theodicy. For 4 
Ezra, the problem is not that God’s gift of human life as Torah-ordered at creation is 
ineffectual as Ezra’s opening salvo contends (3:1 – 36) but that, because Ezra is 
subject to death and decay, he cannot understand incorruptible life and God’s 
limitless way (4:11, 12). Thus, in our analysis of episodes one and two we attend to 4 
Ezra’s move toward theodicy—i.e., Uriel’s reframing of Ezra’s complaint about 
moral incapacity into an analysis of cosmological and epistemological incapacity. 
How, though, does this reframing relate to the subsequent debate about the basis for 
divine judgment and salvation as divine gift in episode three and the revelation of 
heavenly Zion in episode four? In our analysis of episodes three and four we focus 
on how the definition of created life as divine Torah-ordered gift informs the reading 
of scripture and the logic of Uriel’s argument for the Torah as the discriminating 
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factor in the judgment. What is the logical relation between 4 Ezra’s definition of 
created and eschatological life and the debate in episode three over whether God is, 
ultimately, a discriminate or indiscriminate giver? In the latter half of chapter two, 
then, we analyse not only 4 Ezra’s hermeneutics, ethics, and soteriology but also 
Ezra’s status as exemplar of a mortal and yet worthy witness to the eschatological 
restoration of Zion.  
 In part two, we turn to a reading of Galatians, allowing 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra to raise questions of Paul. The analysis of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra in part one 
prepares for our reading of Galatians by mapping a range of concerns that these 
different accounts of God as life-giver and life as gift raise and, in their own ways, 
resolve. With this map in mind as we read Galatians, we are prepared to recognise 
not only those places where Paul, as it were, enters into shared theological territory 
but also to get a sense of the particular significance of his chosen path through it. To 
revert to the conversation metaphor, in considering how 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
might respond to Paul’s argument, we hope to clarify the rhetorical and theological 
force of his language and concepts. How would Paul have been heard by a near-
contemporary Jewish author on this topic? What might such an author notice in the 
manner of his expression? What might Paul’s particular choices of language and 
progression of argument have indicated about the range of theological views he 
might accept or reject by implication? The aim is not, of course, to suggest that Paul’s 
meaning is determined by how he would have been heard by our conversation 
partners. Rather, we use these responses to raise issues that require further 
exegetical analysis from Paul’s text. Thus, in chapter three with our analyses of 
Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary recipients of life in mind, we re-read Paul’s 
paradigmatic autobiography in Gal 1 – 2. If the presentation of Eleazar and Ezra as 
worthy recipients of eschatological life depends on a prior account of human life as 
created and Torah-ordered gift, what might Paul’s account of his receipt of life in the 
Christ-gift without regard to the Torah entail for his theology?  
 Likewise, in chapter four with 4 Ezra’s reading of sacred text and salvation-
history in mind, we re-read Paul’s scriptural argument about the place of the law in 
salvation-history. Specifically, if 4 Ezra’s theodicy employs a Torah-ordered 
hermeneutic because, as Uriel argues, humans live in receipt of the divine gifts of 
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created life and its Torah order, then what hermeneutic and theological logic 
undergirds Paul’s portrayal of the law as an addition to the divinely given promise, 
his hypothetical portrayal of the law as a gift to the ‘dead’, his identification of the 
law with the ‘dead’ and ‘enslaving’ cosmic elements, and his conception of heirs as 
‘born’ by the Spirit? We will thus study both how Paul’s account of the Christ-event 
as life-giving addresses an account of created and eschatological life in Torah-terms 
(as in 4 Ezra) and why specifically, in Paul’s view, the theology of his opponents is 
faulty. That is, we will show how Paul’s reading constitutes not a question-begging 
appeal to a shared Christology but an argument for an alternate Christology in life-
giving terms.  
 Finally, in chapter five with 4 Maccabees’ account of the Torah-ordered self 
and society in mind, we will explore the function of Paul’s Spirit/Flesh antithesis 
and ethical guidance in Gal 5 – 6 in his overall argument. If in 4 Maccabees 
overcoming the passions of the flesh is a matter of being trained by the Torah to 
exercise one’s created reason both on a personal and social level, then what does 
Paul’s insistence on the necessity of the Spirit for properly-ordered individual and 
communal life imply about his anthropology and ethics? Here we offer a new 
reading of the argumentative function of Gal 5 – 6, contending that these chapters 
are required not only for rhetorical persuasion or social need but also for grounding 
Paul’s theological logic and for theological completeness. In other words, an author 
like 4 Maccabees would want to know why human beings are ‘dead’ apart from the 
Christ-gift and how, if not by Torah, the Christ-gift provides the norm for social life. 
It is issues like these, we argue, that Paul addresses in Gal 5:13 – 26 and Gal 6:1 – 10, 
respectively.  
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Chapter 1 
Redefining Right Reason: The Logic of Divine Life-Giving 
Benefaction in 4 Maccabees 
Seeing Jewish Tragedy as Greek (and Jewish) Triumph 
Written in Asia Minor near the end of the first century CE, 4 Maccabees is perhaps 
the boldest Jewish appropriation of Hellenistic philosophical tradition of antiquity.1 
For in 4 Maccabees Jewish piety alone is the fulfilment of the Hellenistic ethical 
vision.2 In this connection, the death of the priest Eleazar after severe torture 
provides the exemplary proof of the author of 4 Maccabees’ (hereafter, 4 Maccabees) 
peculiar claim, as it is his particular understanding of and commitment to the Torah 
that enables him to defeat the πάθη, proving the superiority of Torah-philosophy (i.e., 
the philosophy of ‘pious reason’ [ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισµός]; 4 Macc 1:1) in the arena of Greek 
virtue discourse.3 Because Eleazar’s death is framed in apparently sacrificial terms 
(6:26 – 30), theological analyses have revolved around 4 Maccabees’ conception of 
atonement, and the debate has centered on the questions of the logic of the efficacy 
of the martyrs’4 deaths as saving events and to a lesser extent the meaning of the 
                                                
1 The clearest indication of provenance is the ‘Asianic’ rhetorical style; see E. Norden, Die antike 
Kunstprosa, vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance (5th ed.; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958), 
1:419 – 20. While Jan Willem van Henten prefers a date ‘around 100 C.E. or a short time later’, David 
deSilva follows Elias Bickerman’s suggestion that the anachronistic reference to ‘Syria, Phoenicia, and 
Cilicia‘(4 Macc 4:2) could date the work to the time this region was an administrative district (i.e., 
between 19 – 72 C.E.); see J.W. van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A 
Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees (JSJSup 57; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 77 – 82; D.A. deSilva, 4 Maccabees: 
Introduction and Commentary on the Greek text in Codex Sinaiticus (SCS; Leiden: Brill, 2006), xvi – xvii; 
and E.J. Bickerman, ‘The Date of Fourth Maccabees‘, in Studies in Jewish and Christian History (AGJU 9; 
Leiden: Brill, 1976), 1:275 – 81. Given the tenuous nature of the evidence, we slightly favour a date 
soon after the destruction of the Temple, since the political implications of the author’s argument 
work best if the Temple service is suspended but hope of its restoration is not abandoned. None of the 
positions I take in this chapter, however, depend on this date.  
2 E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. - A.D. 135): Vol. III.i 
(ed. F. Millar, G. Vermes, and M. Goodman; rev. ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 590: ‘Of all the 
known Jewish philosophers [of that time], he is remarkable for his uncompromising assertion that 
distinctively Jewish religious practices could, and should, be considered by the Greeks as wisdom’. 
3 For the text of 4 Maccabees I am using A. Rahlfs and R. Hanhart, eds., Septuaginta: Id est Vetus 
Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes, Editio altera (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006). All 
translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
4 On the application of the term ‘martyr’ to the heroes of 4 Maccabees, see e.g. T. Rajak, 'Dying for 
the Law: The Martyr’s Portrait in Jewish-Greek Literature', in The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: 
Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction (AGJU 48; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 100. and J. W. van Henten, 
’Noble Death and Martyrdom in Antiquity’, in Martyriumsvorstellungen in Antike und Mittelalter: Leben 
oder Sterben für Gott? (ed. S. Fuhrmann and R. Grundmann; AGJU 80; Leiden: Brill, 2012), 92 – 94. For 
an account of the literary features of martyr texts, see van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 7–13. 
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word ἱλαστήριον (4 Macc 17:22), with both the tradition-historical and comparative 
implications for Paul’s atonement conception and language in Rom 3:25 often 
lurking in the background.5 Yet, the martyrs’ deaths are situated in the context of a 
philosophical argument that proceeds by way of narrative demonstration from 
Jewish history—with both Hellenistic philosophical concepts and Jewish scriptural 
theological frameworks and argumentation used throughout—for the purpose of 
commending a particular vision and justification of Jewish life in the Diaspora. 
 Thus, 4 Maccabees’ bold apologia presents both an interpretive problem and 
an opportunity for further theological analysis. For though it may be an 
overstatement that, in Tessa Rajak’s words, ‘there is no question of disentangling the 
Greek influences from Jewish in this text,’6 the particularly tight fit between 
influences invites a careful analysis of the author’s practice of conceptual weaving, 
while, to switch metaphors, examinations of the particular places where 4 Maccabees 
modulates Jewish texts and concepts in a Hellenistic key (or vice versa) will, in those 
places where the sound is just a bit ‘off,’ provide some access to the author’s basic 
theological melody. For it is those dissonances that are, as it were, ignored that signal 
the primary theological concerns of the author and elucidate the hermeneutic by 
which those concerns are both heard and projected.7 In this connection, the thesis of 
this chapter is that 4 Maccabees’ apologia for Judaism is also a theodicy, in which the 
belief in God’s inviolable donation of life as Torah-ordered from creation governs 
the reading of sacred text and salvation-history. Put differently, the claim of this 
chapter is that 4 Maccabees provides a comprehensive account of God’s ordering of 
the world from creation in the shape of the Torah, both in justly dealing death on the 
                                                
5 For arguments that obedience (Williams) or the mimetic effect of obedience (Seeley) rather than 
the deaths of the martyrs per se account for the atoning efficacy of their deaths, see e.g. Williams, Jesus’ 
Death, 169–96; D. Seeley, The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul’s Concept of Salvation 
(JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 84–98. For accounts of the martyrs’ deaths as atoning 
sacrifices, see, e.g., H. Anderson, “4 Maccabees,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (ed. J.H. 
Charlesworth; vol. 2; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 531–64; van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 150 – 
53; M. de Jonge, ’Jesus’ Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs’, in Text and 
Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn (ed. T. Baarda; 
Kampen: Kok, 1988), 142–51. For an argument against a conceptual parallel between the uses of 
ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25 and 4 Macc 17:22, see D.P. Bailey, Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and 
Theology of Paul’s use of Hilasterion in Romans 3:25 with an Analysis of 4 Maccabees 17:22 and Patristic 
Interpretation (Ph.D. thesis: Cambridge University, 1999). 
6 Rajak, ’Dying ’, 111. 
7 For the relation between hermeneutical ‘effect’ and theological ‘cause,’ see Linebaugh, God, 
Grace, and Righteousness, 26. 
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wicked and in giving life or salvation as reward to the righteous both in this life and 
beyond history. As we shall see, the problem with examining particular theological 
motifs in isolation in this text (e.g., 4 Maccabees’ atonement theology) is that it 
contains an integrated argument about the relation between the self, society, and the 
cosmos as given and ordered by God the benefactor.8  Consequently, in addition to 
offering the first full analysis of God as a benefactor in 4 Maccabees, this chapter will 
contribute to the debate over this text’s atonement theology by showing how it is 
implicated in a more fundamental theological position on and hermeneutical 
perspective about the character of human life as divine gift. 
 The argument will proceed in three parts. Section one argues that the author’s 
account of God’s gift of the Torah to the mind at creation subordinates Stoic ethics to 
Jewish theology, while the story of David’s thirst illustrates how pious, cult-shaped 
reason restrains the passions of leaders to enable personal and societal flourishing. 
Section two argues that the historical build-up to the martyr stories employs a cult-
focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic sourced from Lev 17 and Dt 30/32 to explain the 
integral relation between the virtue of leaders and the plight of societies, while 
Eleazar’s account of God (not Nature) as the one who gives and orders the self and 
society according to the Torah establishes the paradoxically rational piety necessary 
to vindicate Jewish law and life and elicit God’s just mercy. Section three argues that 
the account of the brothers grounds their commitment to Eleazar’s paradoxical piety 
in their expectation of God’s fitting temporal and eschatological judgement and 
salvation. Moreover, this paradoxical piety is further grounded in the mother’s 
instruction to her sons and the audience, in which she expounds the hermeneutic 
and theology of divine life-giving benefaction that undergirds the martyrs’ 
commitment. In short, only the Hebrews are invincible for virtue—and, thus, 
rational in Stoic terms (9:18)—because only they receive God’s gift of Torah-ordered 
life and expect that, if they exercise their inviolable created freedom (7:18; 12:13), 
they will receive immutable eternal life (7:19; 16:25; 18:23) and national renewal 
(6:28, 29; 9:24; 12:17; 17:10) from God. 
                                                
8 The problem of studying motifs in isolation in this text is well understood in H.J. Klauck, 
’Brotherly Love in Plutarch and in 4 Maccabees’, in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of 
Abraham J. Malherbe (ed. D.L. Balch, E. Ferguson, and W.A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 144 – 
56. 
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1.1 God the Benefactor of the Torah-Ordered Self and Society (4 Macc 1:1 – 3:18) 
Even a cursory reading of 4 Maccabees suggests some relation to Greek 
philosophical tradition. The author’s first words announce a ‘most philosophical 
subject’ (φιλοσοφώτατον λόγον), viz. ‘whether pious reason is sovereign master over 
the passions’ (εἰ αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισµός, 1:1). Yet, as 4 
Maccabees sketches the definitions, taxonomies, and examples that serve as the 
premises (ὑπόθεσις, 1:12)9 on which his ‘narrative demonstration’ depend (ἡ ἀπόδειξις 
τῆς ἱστορίας, 3:19), he retrofits his eclectic yet essentially Stoic terms with Jewish 
concepts in preparation for his subsequent apologia—most clearly stated in the 
Rededuell with Antiochus Epiphanes IV (5:1 – 38). As we shall argue, 4 Maccabees, 
generally, accepts a Greek definition of σοφία, only if the ‘divine’ and ‘human’ 
matters of which it speaks are qualified in a Jewish way (1:17), while the particular, 
material qualification he introduces construes God as the Creator of the self and 
Benefactor of the Torah to the mind (2:21 – 23). Moreover, by connecting this notion 
of the properly ordered self to the Stoic notion of the supremacy of self-rule in the 
context of David’s ideal rule of Israel (2:24 – 3:18), 4 Maccabees presents both self 
and society as inviolable and inviolably Torah-ordered, from creation. In this way, 
by presenting God as the giver of life as Torah-ordered and David as an exemplary 
rational King in recognizing this order, a necessary feature of 4 Maccabees’ 
theological logic is established. Not only can one resist the passions and obey God’s 
law, but one should do so as an appropriate return of created life. 
1.1.1 The Exordium: The Good Life and Noble Death Framework (1:1 – 12) 
 The topic of the πάθη is a familiar one in Hellenistic ethics, as it has a 
prominent place both in the first systematic subdivision of the subject in antiquity 
                                                
9 Because 4 Maccabees concerns a general question not a particular course of action, ὑπόθεσις does 
not signal the genre of the work; pace U. Breitenstein, Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut 
des Vierten Makkabäerbuchs (2nd ed.; Basel: Schwabe, 1978), 119, n. 1. Cf. D.M. Schenkeveld, 
‘Philosophical Prose‘, in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400 (ed. 
S.E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 248. The words ‘thesis’ (NETS) or ‘main principle’ (NRSV) are 
unattested, and ὑπόθεσις refers here to matters that are preliminary to demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, 3:19) 
and, thus, the usage in philosophical texts is most likely. Thus, ‘supposition’, ‘presupposition’, ‘premise’, 
‘starting-point’ (‘ὑπόθεσις’, LSJ 1881 – 82). 
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and in the Stoic account of action.10 In Hellenistic philosophical ethics the views of 
Socrates provide the starting-point for discussion and are, for most who follow, 
axiomatic.11 In Malcolm Schofield’s terms, the ‘true self’ was the supreme good and, 
thus, only the ‘conditions of the self’ (virtue or vice) can be ‘intrinsically good and 
bad.’12 In other words, Hellenistic ethics is concerned with the ‘good life’ defined 
principally in personal, rational, and ethical terms.13 The author of 4 Maccabees 
explicitly locates his work within this philosophical tradition by defending a Stoic 
elaboration of it in relation to the more general context of discussions of virtue.14 As 
Barclay observes, ‘It is important to this author that Judaism is a “philosophy.”’15 
Thus, his thesis is ‘essential to the path to knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) for everyone,’ 
important for the exaltation of the chief virtue ‘prudence’ (φρόνησις), and necessary 
for restraining the vices that hinder the remaining cardinal virtues of δικαιοσύνη, 
ἀνδρεία, and σωφροσύνη (1:2 – 4). As in Hellenistic ethics generally and Stoicism 
particularly the good life is defined in 4 Maccabees in a qualitative sense. 
Furthermore, if the good life is primarily a matter of ‘the conditions of the self’ or 
personal moral flourishing and the chief threat to this life is not external 
circumstances or the body (with Socrates) but the internal passions that arise from 
these (with the Stoics), then reason must be demonstrated to be capable of governing 
the passions. Otherwise, the good life—human virtue—is impossible. 
Yet, in order to prove that reason does rule the passions, 4 Maccabees appeals 
to the exploits of Jewish martyrs. In the exordium, the martyrs are presented as dying 
not ‘for religion’ (6:22) but ‘for the sake of virtue’ (1:8) or ‘for the sake of nobility of 
character’ (καλοκἀγαθία), and for such death they receive honours (τιµαί, 1:10). The 
                                                
10 A.A. Long, ’Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics’, in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1996), 119 – 23; M. Schofield, ’Stoic Ethics’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. B. 
Inwood; Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 236 – 39. 
11 A.A. Long, ’Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy’, in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: CUP, 1996): 1 – 34. 
12 Schofield, ’Stoic Ethics’, 234. 
13 Ibid.: ‘[I]t is historically plausible that the crucial differences between [Socrates, the Stoic Zeno, 
and the Cynic Diogenes] are to be found not in what they believed, but in how they sought to convert 
others to acceptance – practical as well as intellectual – of what they were united in seeing as the key 
to the good life.’ 
14 On the eclectic, though predominantly Stoic, philosophical character of 4 Maccabees, see R. 
Renehan, ’The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 
115 (1972): 223 – 38; R. Weber, ’Eusebeia und Logismos  : zum philosophischen Hintergrund von 4 
Makkabäer’, JSJ 22 (1991): 212 – 34.  
15 J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) 
(Berkeley: UCP, 1996), 371. 
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description is reminiscent of Hellenistic noble death traditions, in which heroes were 
celebrated for defending their cities with their lives.16 By setting noble death and 
good life traditions in relation to each other, the author frames the entire work in the 
form of a paradoxical proof. It is not the deaths of the martyrs simpliciter that proves 
that ‘reason has full control over the passions’ (1:9), but rather it is how they die. Their 
bravery (ἀνδραγαθία, 1:8) in the face of suffering and death proves the thesis. As we 
will see more clearly below, the author defends reason’s power (and, thereby, the 
possibility of the good life) by presenting cases in which the increasingly extreme 
assaults of the passions are defeated not by being removed but by being endured. 
The paradox is that it is precisely in the extreme degradation of the body and loss of 
physical life that reason is most perfectly shown to be impervious to the passions. 
This spectacle elicits wonder (θαυµάζω,1:11; cf. 6:9; 9:26; 17:16, 17; 18:3) from 
everyone, even from the torturers, and the brave deaths of the martyrs secure the 
overthrow of the tyrant (1:11) and the purification of the land (1:12). This focus on 
the maintenance of reason despite a perfect assault of the passions suggests that 4 
Maccabees is, at least in one respect, very close to Stoic conceptions of flourishing. 
The good life is the rational and virtuous life, one that, in its ideal form, is 
impervious to tragedy.  
Despite the dominance of the Hellenistic good life and noble death 
framework of the exordium, the distinctively Jewish features are not entirely absent. 
The addition of the modifier εὐσεβής to λογισµός in the statement of the thesis (1:1) 
would have seemed strange to anyone well-versed in Hellenistic philosophy.17 The 
appeal to the story of Jewish martyrs as proof of a Greek thesis is novel, as is the 
reference to the ‘purification’ (καθαρίζω) of the homeland and the ‘all-wise God’ 
(πάνσοφος θεός, 1:11, 12). The integration of these words and phrases in the exordium 
allows the Hellenistic traditions to dominate the surface, while suggesting the 
                                                
16 D.A. deSilva, ’The Noble Contest: Honor, Shame, and the Rhetorical Strategy of 4 Maccabees’, 
JSP 13 (1995): 31–57; van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 187 – 269.  
17 Pace deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 70. Though εὐσέβεια is a common topic in philosophical 
discourse, the phrase εὐσεβὴς λογισµός is not attested in Greek literature prior to 4 Maccabees and, 
therefore, to qualify reason in this way would have been verbally odd. Rightly, D.C. Aune, ’Mastery 
of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity’, in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a 
Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (ed. W.E. Helleman; Lanham: UPA, 1994), 135. That it 
is conceptually novel too becomes clear in what follows. So, S. Lauer, ’Eusebes Logismos in IV Macc.’, 
JJS 6 (1955): 170; Breitenstein, Beobachtungen, 133. 
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important Jewish qualifications and elaborations of this basic picture of the good life 
that are to come.18   
1.1.2 ‘Wise Life’: The Verbal and Conceptual Fit between the Good Life and the Jewish Law 
(1:13 – 19) 
 It is one thing to have the capacity to reason, another to be reasonable, and yet 
another to give an account of how a person comes to be reasonable. In its emphasis 
on reason’s capacity and its definition of reason and wisdom, 4 Maccabees stands 
squarely within the good life discourse of Hellenistic ethics. In this connection, prior 
to engaging his argument in earnest, 4 Maccabees considers it necessary to set out 
his ‘starting-point’ (1:12). He begins with two important definitions: 
λογισµὸς µὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν νοῦς µετὰ ὀρθοῦ λόγου προτιµῶν τὸν σοφίας βίον.  σοφία δὴ 
τοίνυν ἐστὶν γνῶσις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγµάτων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτιῶν. (4 Macc 
1:15 – 16) 
 
Though the definitions of both λογισµός19 and σοφία20 reflect standard philosophical 
coinage, the phrase ‘life of wisdom’ (ὁ σοφίας βίος) is unattested in Greek literature 
prior to 4 Maccabees. The inclusion of the term βίος could simply represent the 
characteristic concern in Hellenistic philosophical ethics with the relationship 
between wisdom, reason, and life. For example, after a discussion of the power of 
the mind via reason and argument to arrive at wisdom, Cicero attacks the 
Academics for denying this power such that ‘they overthrow the whole of life’ (totam 
vitam evertunt, Acad. 2.508). In doubting the mind’s cognitive powers, skeptics do 
                                                
18 These Jewish qualifications highlight the need to pay careful attention to 4 Maccabees’ use of 
noble death discourse, as there is a danger of missing its distinctive appropriation if too close an 
assimilation to Hellenistic models is assumed. As van Henten notes (’Noble Death’, 91), 
‘Martyrdom…is a specific type of noble death: it is part of the broader category of noble death in 
antiquity, which includes several ways of self-sacrifice and self-killings, but it differs from other types 
of noble death because of its specific motifs and the fact that it is transmitted in a corpus of specific 
Jewish and Christian writings, which can be called “martyr texts.”’  
19 Reason is a matter not only of the νοῦς but also of ὀρθὸς λόγος of the νοῦς, all of which is oriented 
towards σοφία. The ὀρθὸς λόγος was an important concept in Stoic discussions of the πάθη; cf. A.A. Long, 
‘The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue‘, in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 202 – 23. 
20  For the commonplace Socratic definition of φρόνησις as the chief virtue, see e.g. Plato, Euthyd. 
414. Seneca also gives the definition of the good man as the ‘wise man’, with Socrates as the exemplar 
(Const. 7.2 – 3). For definitions quite close to 4 Maccabees here, see e.g. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.392: 
sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; and 
Philo, Congr. 79, σοφία δὲ ἐπιστήµη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων. For the general, not 
specifically Stoic, character of this definition, see Renehan, ‘Philosophic Background‘, 228. 
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more than score epistemological points—they remove the foundations of life. In this 
connection, when the author of 4 Maccabees defines λογισµός in terms of νοῦς and 
ὀρθὸς λόγος and the ‘wise life’ he is reflecting a tradition in which being human is 
conceived in cognitive, rational, and ethical terms. Given the author’s later 
distinctions, however, between different forms of βίοι, it seems that the phrase 
introduces the word βίος as a key term by which these relations may be clarified. 
Paradigmatically, to live in 4 Maccabees is to live well in Jewish terms.21 
 It is one thing to offer a definition of the good life, another to actually live a 
good life, and the author is interested in proving reason’s rule of the passions not 
defining philosophical concepts in abstracto. Consequently, he clarifies how σοφία is 
to be acquired:  ‘[Wisdom previously defined in Hellenistic terms, v. 16], thus, is the 
instruction of the law…’ (αὕτη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ νόµου παιδεία, 1:17). This is an 
audacious equation, identifying with Greek wisdom a life ordered by Jewish social 
and cultic practices that were regular sources of controversy and conflict in 
antiquity.22 The fact that the terms σοφία and νόµος are often related in the biblical 
wisdom literature does suggest that the author is making traditional verbal 
associations, 23 though the repetition of the adjectives θεῖος and ἀνθρώπινος in v. 17 
explicitly recalls the philosophical definition, while the adverbs σεµνῶς and 
συµφερόντως qualify it. Also, the ‘forms’ (ἰδέαι) of σοφία are the cardinal virtues and, 
again, φρόνησις is the chief virtue (1:18). The introduction of this audacious 
equivalency, consequently, is not meant to overthrow the carefully articulated 
Hellenistic framework. Rather, it turns wisdom toward the ends of ‘reverence’ and 
                                                
21 The noun is used fourteen times (4 Mac 1:15; 4:1; 5:36; 6:18; 7:7, 15; 8:8, 23; 10:15; 12:18; 13:24; 
16:18; 17:14; 18:9), the verb βιόω twice (4 Mac 5:22; 17:18). For the way βίος is used in differentiations of 
βίοι, compare, for example, φιλόσοφος θείου βίος (7:7), βίοs νοµίµος (7:15) and Ἑλληνικὸς βίος (8:8). 
22 Barclay, Diaspora, 428–44. 
23 Wisdom is associated with the doing of the law or obedience to the commandments regularly 
in Ben Sira (Sir 1:26; 15:1; 19:20). Piety and wisdom are correlated in an important passage at the very 
beginning of the book of Proverbs (Prov 1:7), and there is an interesting variation from the MT in the 
LXX of Proverbs 9:10 equating knowing the law with a good mind (διάνοια). The result, Prov 9:11, is ‘a 
long life’ and the addition of ‘years to life,’ both of which are notably absent from 4 Maccabees. On 
this topic in Second Temple Judaism and Paul, see E.J. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: 
A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom, and Ethics (WUNT II 16; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1985). 
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‘profitability’, a move our author shares with Philo24 and which suggests that he 
accepts a Greek definition of σοφία, only so long as the ‘divine’ and ‘human’ matters of 
which it speaks are qualified in a Jewish way. As such, these definitions represent a 
harmony of Greek ethical categories and Jewish theology, though, admittedly, one in 
which Jewish theology decisively shapes the practice of ethics and conception of 
anthropology and cosmology.25 The result, for our author, is that the good life is 
truly embodied only in Judaism.26 Furthermore, the theology that grounds 4 
Maccabees is not amenable to Stoic conceptions of divinity. Zeno’s ‘good flow of life’ 
(εὔροια βίου) or ‘living well’ (εῦ ζῆν)27 arising from Stoic belief in the divinity of nature 
and its rational and providential ordering, is foreign to the author’s way of thinking.  
1.1.3 Torah-Shaped Σοφία and the Capacity of Reason (1:20 – 2:23) 
 If the author of 4 Maccabees is eager to present life as life lived well, he is 
equally keen on demonstrating the role of the law in reason’s restraint of the 
passions. Given the identification of wisdom with instruction in the law (1:16 – 17), it 
is not surprising that, after a general taxonomy of the πάθη in terms of pleasure and 
pain along with the various forms these take for the body and soul (1:20 – 30), 4 
Maccabees turns to exemplars of restraint from Israel’s history and general legal 
examples of restraint of the πάθη (1:31 – 2:20).28 Relying on 4 Macc 2:10 – 23, Redditt 
establishes that one of the primary functions of νόµος is that it ‘educates the intellect 
                                                
24 Philo, Congr. 80: ταῦτα λέγεται µὲν εἶναι δι᾿ αὑτὰ αἱρετά, σεµνότερα δὲ φαίνοιτ᾿ ἄν, εἰ θεοῦ τιµῆς καὶ 
ἀρεσκείας ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδεύοιτο. 
25 Scholars who emphasise the dominance of Jewish over Hellenistic thought in 4 Maccabees are 
correct at this point (e.g., ‘Das jüdische Element überdeckt das echt griechische’; Breitenstein, 
Beobachtungen, 132). Our author does not deny that nature is rational or that one should live κατὰ 
φύσιν in order to live the good life, but he insists that reverence for the Jewish God and, with it, 
instruction in the law of this God are necessary conditions for the good life. They are not sufficient, 
because they require the courageous exercise of human reason, but they are necessary. On the 
relationship between Stoic theology and ethics see, A. A. Long, ‘The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics’, in 
Stoic Studies (University of California Press, 1996), 134 – 155. 
26 Barclay, Diaspora, 372: ‘Even in the opening chapters it is clear that the author views the 
philosophical virtues as not simply illustrated in the law but dependent for their realization on its 
practice.’ 
27 Attributed by Arius Didymus to Zeno; cf. SVF 1.184, 3.16. For further discussion, see A.A. 
Long, ‘Stoic Eudaimonism‘, in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 179 – 201. 
28 P.L. Redditt, ’The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees’, CBQ 45 (1983): 249 – 70 argues 
convincingly that νόµος typically refers to the Pentateuch and serves five major functions in 4 
Maccabees—‘teaching, enabling rational living, encouraging, condemning/not condemning and 
commanding/prohibiting‘ (251). 
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to enable rational behavior’, 29 but he does not specify how. As we shall see, in this 
section of 4 Maccabees, νόµος is necessary for the good life (i.e., it enables rational 
behaviour) because it provides the shape of virtuous behaviour (Reddit’s fifth category) 
to which reason responds, and it introduces a logic (Redditt’s fourth category) by 
which the law might form reasonable people. 
The law enables rational living by providing the shape of virtue. In the 
starting-point the law ‘enables’ reason only in a formal sense—i.e., by defining the 
standard to which reason conforms.30 The idea of limits or proportion is inherent to 
discussion of the πάθη, because the emotions are problematic for the Stoics precisely 
in inciting disproportionate, excessive, or boundary-breaking behaviour.31 More 
precisely, then, in 4 Maccabees, the νόµος defines the shape of σοφία, which λογισµός 
maintains by ὀρθὸς λόγος. The emphasis throughout the ‘philosophical section’ is on 
the empirical fact of obedience to the νόµος as proof of reason’s capacity to resist the 
passions. The first general legal example is typical: the law forbids certain foods and 
reason makes it possible (δύναµαι) to forgo the pleasure (ἡδονή) of eating such foods 
(1:33, 34). The author does not here explain why it is reasonable to forgo these foods 
and their pleasures, only that restraint demonstrates the capacity of reason. In other 
words, the rationality of the law per se is assumed, not defended. Each of the biblical 
exemplars demonstrate reason’s capacity to restrain the passions: Joseph uses his 
mind (διανοίᾳ, 2:2) and reason (τῷ λογισµῷ, 2:3) to defeat lust and resist Potipher’s 
wife’s advances; Moses restrained his anger against Dathan and Abiron by reason 
(λογισµῷ, 2:17); and Jacob’s reproof of Simeon and Levi for their genocide of the 
Shechemites (an act which was µὴ λογισµῷ, 2:19) demonstrates the power (δυνατός) of 
‘the self-controlled mind’ (ὁ σώφρων νοῦς, 2:18). The ability to obey the law, in general, 
and the restraint of the biblical exemplars, in particular, specify virtue’s shape and 
                                                
29 Ibid., 252. 
30 F. Watson, ’Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and 
Human Agency’, in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment (ed. S.J. Gathercole 
and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 112. 
31 A.A. Long, ‘Harmonics of Stoic Virtue’, 209: ‘[ὀρθὸς λόγος] functions as the craftsman of impulse 
by moderating their excess and by making them commensurate with correct estimates of value.’ 
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demonstrate reason’s capacity to maintain that shape despite the assaults of the 
passions.32  
For 4 Maccabees, this relationship between reason and the law as the shape of 
virtue is materially and inviolably constitutive of human nature, rooted as it is in 
God’s creative benefaction. The ground of reason’s capacity for ruling (2:20)—e.g. 
anger—is God’s creation and ordering of the self: ‘For when God formed mankind 
(ὁπηνίκα γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατεσκεύασεν), God implanted (περιφυτεύω; cf. Gn 2:8) 
in mankind passions and habits (2:21), and ‘when he enthroned the mind as sacred 
ruler through the senses’ (τὸν ἱερὸν ἡγεµόνα νοῦν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνεθρόνισεν, 2:22), 
‘then to the mind he gave the law’ (καὶ τούτῳ νόµον ἔδωκεν, 2:23). As we shall see, the 
divine gift of the law to the mind at creation as an inviolable moral agency is the 
theological ground of 4 Maccabees. For our present purposes, we should note here 
that the conception of created life as Torah-ordered gift informs 4 Maccabees’ 
account of life in normative terms. That is, the receipt of the Torah by the human 
mind at creation entails the exercise of created reason according to Torah-norms. As 
we shall see, it is precisely this entailment that informs 4 Maccabees account of why 
they martyrs reject both Nature and Antiochus as Benefactor (5:25) and political 
‘friend’ (13:13), respectively. 
4 Maccabees’ treatment of Joseph illustrates this Torah-ordered anthropology. 
In 4 Macc 2:2 – 4, the desire of ‘self-controlled Joseph’ (ὁ σώφρων Ιωσηφ) is introduced 
as a species of the genus ἐπιθυµία (2:1), which leads to the mention of the prohibition 
against forbidden desiring in the law (ἐπιθυµέω for ‘to covet’; cf. Ex 20:17; Dt 5:21). It 
is then argued, through appeal to an abbreviated form of the tenth commandment, 
that reason rules ‘all desire’ (πᾶσα ἐπιθυµία, 2:4). The implication is that Joseph is 
following the tenth commandment before it is given at Sinai, though, unlike 1 
Maccabees, this is not explicitly stated.33 Be that as it may, it is God’s creation of the 
                                                
32 Watson, ’Antithesis ’, 113: ‘The reason that is sovereign over the passions is the human capacity 
presupposed and constituted by the law’s address. It is the law’s anthropological correlate, just as the 
law is reason’s theological correlate.’ 
33 1 Macc 2:53: ‘Joseph, in the time of his distress, kept the commandment and became lord of 
Egypt.’ Erich Gruen (E.S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: the Reinvention of Jewish Tradition (HCS 30; 
Berkeley: UCP, 1998), 79 – 80) attributes this to a belief 4 Maccabees shares with 1 Maccabees and 
Wisdom of Solomon that ‘[d]ivine inspiration gave Joseph insight into the morality of abstinence.’ 
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self and gift of the Torah that establishes the created integrity of the self and, thus, 
the possibility of virtue and flourishing. 
1.1.4 Disciplining David: How the Law Forms Virtuous and Wise Leaders (2:24 – 3:18) 
 The author’s rhetorical skill and conceptual coherence are nicely illustrated in 
the transition from this account of God’s creative benefaction to his narrative 
demonstration: for his assertion that ‘the one who becomes a citizen [to the divine 
gift of the law] will rule a kingdom’ (καθ᾿ ὃν πολιτευόµενος βασιλεύσει βασιλείαν) 
characterised by the cardinal virtues (2:23), in alluding to the Stoic paradox that 
‘[n]ur der Weise ist König’,34 prepares for an objection (2:24 – 3:5) and an exemplary 
case that, in featuring King David, both proves his theory (2:24 – 3:5) and prepares 
for its political application in the narrative demonstration (3:19 – 4:26). In short, his 
account of the ordering of the self and society are here integrally related in David’s 
example of rational kingship. Thus, David proves that ‘reason is not the destroyer of 
the passions, but their antagonist’ (οὐ…ἐκριζωτὴς τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισµός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ 
ἀνταγωνιστής, 3:5) by mastering his ‘irrational desire’ (ἀλόγιστος ἐπιθυµία, 3:11) and 
refusing to drink the water his mighty men have procured at risk of their lives (3:12 
– 16; cf. 2 Sam 23:13 - 17).35 In an amplification of the LXX version (cf. 2 Sam 23:17),36 
the author lays the accent on David’s cultic reasoning: ‘he thought to himself 
(ἐλογίσατο) “a drink reckoned (λογισθὲν) equivalent to blood is a danger to the soul” 
(3:15),’ and, thus, ‘pitting reason against desire (ἀντιθεὶς τῇ ἐπιθυµίᾳ τὸν λογισµόν), he 
poured the drink out to God’ (3:16). 37 Thus, David is an exemplar of the leader who, 
in ruling himself, properly orders a flourishing society—one that is σώφρων, δίκαιος, 
ἀγαθός and ἀνδρεῖος (2:23). Likewise, this presentation makes an implicit claim about 
the rationality of the law itself, which serves both to frame the narrative 
demonstration and set up Eleazar’s explicit defence of the rationality of the law in 
                                                
34 H.J. Klauck, 4. Makkabäerbuch (JSHRZ 3.6; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1989), 699, n. 23. 
35 On the shift from a conception of extirpation to one of control of the passions in later Stoic 
ethics, see M.C. Nussbaum, ’The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions’, in The Therapy of Desire: 
Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: PUP, 1994), 359 – 401. 
36 For a full account of the narrative shaping, see deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 104–10. 
37 The background for this reasoning is Lev 17:10 – 16; rightly, Klauck, 4. Makkabäerbuch, 702. Pace 
deSilva, (4 Maccabees: Commentary, 108) because the logic works by analogy, the fact that this seems to 
be a drink offering is irrelevant; moreover, Lev 17:13 requires the blood of non-sacrificial animals to 
be poured out. 
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the Rededuell (5:1 – 38). In other words, if the law produces virtuous societies it is, by 
implication, rational.  
 Thus, 4 Maccabees’ ‘starting-point’ (1:1 – 3:18) is a generally Stoic account of 
the good life, but this account is decisively qualified by Jewish theology. God is both 
Creator and Benefactor, ordering the self by donating the law to the mind from 
creation and ordering society by forming leaders in the wisdom characteristic of the 
cardinal virtues, though Torah-defined. With our analysis of divine life-giving 
benefaction in the ‘starting-point’ in place, a necessary component of 4 Maccabees’ 
theological logic is clarified: the particular character of the life God gives at 
creation—a created self with an enduring rational capacity and Torah order—
grounds not only the divine maintenance of the created order in the history 4 
Maccabees tells (3:19 – 4:26) but also Eleazar’s exemplary exercise of reason in a time 
of divine chastisement (5:1 – 7:23). Consequently, as we shall argue presently, any 
account of 4 Maccabees’ atonement theology must recognize its place in the more 
fundamental conception of God as life-giver and life as gift in this text. Neither a 
mere recognition of the martyrs’ deaths as atoning nor an account of this atonement 
in merely exemplary terms is sufficient to convey the text’s theological logic. 
1.2 Paradoxical Piety: the Good Life Perfected in Noble and Sacrificial Death (4 
Macc 3:19 – 7:23) 
In the ‘narrative demonstration’ each of the martyr stories serve as both exemplary 
proofs of the author’s thesis and sequential advances in his apologia for Judaism. In 
this section we argue that the historical build-up (3:19 – 4:26) to the martyrs’ stories 
introduces a hermeneutic sourced from Deuteronomy 30 and 32 to frame Eleazar’s 
Rededuell with Antiochus (5:1 – 6:30) as a debate over and test of the author’s 
conception of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, while the encomium to 
Eleazar (6:31 – 7:23) stresses the rational character of his sacrifice and its temporal 
and eschatological results. More specifically, whereas Jason’s Hellenising program 
invites the divine wrath by dismissing the Temple, the order of life it represents, 
and, ultimately, the God who gave both, Eleazar deploys an argument for the 
rationality of this order in modified Stoic terms, proves this argument by mastering 
himself despite tortures and death, and, thereby, is established both as the 
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exemplary defender of the ‘faith’ of the patriarchs and a fitting recipient of eternal 
life. In this way, Eleazar instructs the martyrs in a paradoxical political and 
eschatological piety, wherein, in a time of divine chastisement, the good life takes 
the form of mutilated bodies, and a noble death for the law is the only path to 
eschatological life and national renewal. Our argument here helps clarify 4 
Maccabees’ theological logic and resolve the debate over its atonement theology, 
because it shows how Eleazar’s sacrifice is both effective and exemplary for the 
brothers. Eleazar’s sacrifice and thus 4 Maccabees’ atonement theology is neither 
simply effective nor merely exemplary. Rather, by returning his created life in self-
offering, Eleazar both invites God’s eschatological return of his life as gift and shows 
the brothers the path to their own vindication and the restoration of the nation. 
1.2.1 Cultic Commitment as Civic Virtue and Hermeneutical Key to Historical Order (3:20 – 
4:26)  
 4 Maccabees’ build-up to the fateful contest between Antiochus and the 
Maccabean martyrs, as in 2 Maccabees 3 – 6, includes two accounts of revolution, 
one thwarted and the other successful, but the narrative here is selected, 
compressed, and shaped to serve different purposes.38 For 4 Maccabees, personal 
and political virtue is identified with the cultic commitment of the nation’s leaders, 
while history provides an accurate index of this virtue in the form of God’s blessing 
and cursing activity. The good (ἀγαθός, 4:1; cf. 2:23) indigenous leadership of Onias 
and the beneficent rule of Seleucus39 are replaced by the Hellenising (ἐκπολιτεύω, 
4:19) Jason and the ‘arrogant’ (ὑπερήφανος) and ‘terrible’ (δεινός) Antiochus Epiphanes 
                                                
38 Direct dependence is the simplest explanation, as 4 Maccabees gives little evidence of 
independent material and ample evidence of dependence and expansion; so, G.W.E. Nickelsburg, 
Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity (exp. edit.; 
HTS 56; Cambridge: HUP, 2006), 138. Freudenthal attributes the differences between 4 Maccabees and 
2 Maccabees to a partial restoration of the original perspective found in Jason of Cyrene (2 Macc 2:23) 
(J. Freudenthal, Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft (IV 
Makkabäerbuch): eine Predigt aus dem ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert (Breslau: Schletter, 1869), 72–90. 
Dupont-Sommer’s droll question is apt, ‘S’il prend de telles libertés avec un texte incontestablement 
canonique [i.e., 2 Sam 23], faudra-t-il s’attendre de sa part à plus de fidélité à l’égard d’une source 
profane?’; A. Dupont-Sommer, Le Quatrième livre des Machabées: introduction, traduction et notes (Paris: 
Champion, 1939), 30. 
39 The Seleucus in view here is not further specified in 2 Macc 3:3, and the author of 4 Maccabees 
erroneously supplies ‘Nicanor’ as the epithet, one of several historical errors in this section. (It was 
Seleucus IV Philopator.) For explanations of the mistake, see van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 80; 
deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 112. 
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(4:15). The result is that the time of peace (εἰρήνη) and harmony (ὁµόνοια, 3:21) 
experienced as a result of law observance (διὰ τὴν εὐνοµίαν, 3:20) is replaced by a state 
of utter lawlessness (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν παρανοµίαν, 4:19) and a multitude of calamities (3:21). 
Jason’s Hellenising of the Jewish πολιτεία (3:21) presented in these terms is ironic, 
with the references to εἰρήνη, ὁµόνοια, and εὐνοµία portraying the Jewish nation as a 
flourishing Greek city-state before his Hellenising program.40 Furthermore, the 
repetition of πολιτεύοµαι and cognates echoes the theme of personal and civic virtue 
just presented in the ‘starting-point’ (2:23), so that an evaluation of leaders’ 
rationality reverberates throughout the build-up. This framing ironically implies that 
it is the social order of life of the Jews that leads to flourishing that the Greeks would 
and should recognise as a fruit of civic virtue. 
As in 2 Maccabees, it is the Hellenising program’s disregard for the Temple 
that brings disaster, but in 4 Maccabees a more explicitly theological interpretation 
focused on the leadership is given.41 The attack of Apollonius, invited by the 
subterfuge of Simon the ἀντιπολιτευόµενος of Onias (4:1), and the Hellenising of Jason 
incite ἡ θεία δίκη, (4:13, 21). DeSilva suggests that portions of Deuteronomy 30 and 32 
provide the framework for 4 Maccabees’ theology of history, though he does not 
establish dependence or analyse its hermeneutical significance.42 The only citations 
of Deuteronomy in 4 Maccabees occur at 18:18 -19, where portions of Dt 32:39, 47 
and 30:20 are combined, and at 17:18 – 19 (Dt 33:3). In the former, the father of the 
martyred boys taught them ‘the song that Moses taught, which says’: Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ 
καὶ ζῆν ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑµῶν καὶ ἡ µακρότης τῶν ἡµερῶν. We will examine this use 
more fully below, but we should note the configuration of the two citations: it is the 
God, who kills and makes alive, who is their life and length of days. This theological 
conviction produces a hermeneutic that sees in historical events God’s fitting 
allocation of salvation and judgement. Thus, in the case of Apollonius, his disregard 
                                                
40 deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 112. 
41 On the influence of Dt 32 on 2 Maccabees, see e.g. D.R. Schwartz, ’On Something Biblical About 
2 Maccabees’, in Biblical Perspectives: Early Use and Interpretation of the Bible in Light of the Dead Sea 
Scrolls: Proceedings of the First International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea 
Scrolls and Associated Literature, 12 - 14 May, 1996 (ed. M.E. Stone and E.G. Chazon; STDJ 28; Leiden: 
Brill, 1998), 223 – 32 and D. Lincicum, Paul and the Early Jewish Encounter with Deuteronomy (WUNT II 
284; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 89.  
42 deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 180, 264–65. 
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for the Temple and its God, leads to divine δίκη, as angels leave him ‘half-dead’ 
(ἡµιθανής, 4:11). He is saved (διασῴζω) only after expressing regard for the Temple and 
its God, confessing his sin as worthy of death (ἄξιος ἀποθνῄσκειν), and receiving 
intercessory prayer from Onias (4:12, 13). Though this fits the basic structure of 
Deuteronomy 30:15 – 20, where regard for God leads to life and disregard death, 
there are clear signs of the influence of the Song of Moses on the language. In 2 
Maccabees, the divine warriors are not called ἄγγελοι, their weapons do not ‘shine 
like lightning’ (περιαστράπτω) and their activity is not characterised as δίκη, while all 
these words are used in 4 Maccabees. The only place in the LXX where these three 
words or cognates of them appear together is Deuteronomy 32:41 – 43. There the 
Lord provokes his sword like ‘lightning’ (ἀστραπή) in order to dispense δίκη to the 
enemies (Dt 32:41), and it is the ἄγγελοι θεοῦ who are strengthened to pay back δίκη 
(Dt 32:43). As the word δίκη itself is rare in the LXX and it occurs only twice in 2 
Maccabees (2 Macc 8:11, 13; both of which can be coordinated to a theology of 
history derived from Deuteronomy),43 it seems likely that the author of 4 Maccabees 
reads the angelic defense of the temple through a lens fashioned from the quotations 
from Dt 30 and 32—specifically, God’s death-dealing δίκη. If so, then Antiochus, 
whom the divine δίκη caused to war against Jerusalem (αὐτοῖς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐπολέµωσεν, 
4:21), would represent the ‘no nation’ (οὐκ ἔθνος, Dt 32:21) and the ‘enemies’ (ἐχθροί, 
Dt 32:41 – 43) sent to chastise the people. These will be overthrown, however, so that 
they might not say ‘Our hand is proud, and it was not the Lord who did these 
things’ (Dt. 32:27). This parallel would account for the recognition that the healing of 
Apollonius is necessary so that the divine δίκη will be recognised by Seleucus (3:13; 
cf. 2 Macc 3:32 – 33). Moreover, it introduces a theme that is repeated, in both 
historical and eschatological keys, by the brothers, who warn Antiochus constantly 
that he should expect the divine δίκη after death for his tortures (4 Macc 9:9, 15, 32; 
11:3; 12:12). 
This combined account of rational civic virtue and its Deuteronomic 
                                                
43 Of the 37 occurrences in the LXX, only 4 are in the Pentateuch: Ex 21:20; Lev 26:25; Dt 32:41, 43. 
In 2 Macc 8:11 - 13, Judas Maccabeus is the form of God the Almighty’s δίκη in response to ‘lawless 
violence against the holy place’, ‘the torture which mocked the city’ and ‘destruction of the ancestral 
polity’ (2 Macc 8:17).  
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maintenance renders the actions of Simon, Jason, and Antiochus as revolutions 
against the earthly and divine order, actions that reveal them to be irrational, vice-
ridden, and ignorant of the operations of divine justice. These leaders are the 
antithesis of rational King David—impious, power-hungry, greedy, and brutal. 
Moreover, in the case of Jason, we have a leader who is willing to give tribute to a 
foreign political ruler in exchange for the priesthood (4 Macc 4:17). Though, like 2 
Maccabees, 4 Maccabees produces its theology of history through an appropriation 
of Deuteronomy, they differ in one important respect. Unlike 2 Maccabees, the 
blame for the ascent of Antiochus lies solely on Jason and not also the priests and 
people (cf. 2 Macc 4:12, 13), and there is no suggestion that the people, in general, 
participate in his Hellenising program.44 In both Deuteronomy and 2 Maccabees, the 
nation as a whole is implicated in idolatry and disobedience, while here the blame 
falls squarely on Jason, with the people swept along in the judgement. Furthermore, 
without the Temple, there is no mechanism by which the people can be delivered 
from Antiochus’s paradoxical edict that those who adhere to the law will die (4:23).45 
The result is the monstrous dissonance of fatal law-obedience, as women and newly-
circumcised babies are flung to their deaths (4:25; cf 2 Macc 6:10).46  
1.2.2 Who Gives and Orders Life?: The Rededuell47 between Antiochus and Eleazar on the 
Rationality of Jewish Life (5:1 – 7:23) 
 In 4 Maccabees, to live is to live well in Torah-terms. Yet, in a time of divine 
chastisement, a commitment to the law may lead to death. In both his reasoned 
defense and his exemplary fidelity, Eleazar articulates and embodies the author’s 
vision of the Jewish fulfilment of the good life in a time of tyranny. Specifically, 
Eleazar argues that, because it produces individual and civic virtue, the law is 
equivalent to the order of nature and God alone is Benefactor. Thus, he grounds this 
apologia in an alternate account of theological cosmology and establishes the logic by 
which the martyrs’ deaths can be seen as effective. In this way, he explains how a 
                                                
44 Watson, ’Antithesis ’, 109.  
45 van Henten notes a similar recognition for the need for ‘an alternative offering’ in Dan 3:39, 40; 
J.W. van Henten, ’The Tradition-Historical Background of Romans 3.25: a Search for Pagan and 
Jewish Parallels’, in From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology, in Honour of 
Marinus de Jonge (ed. M.C. de Boer; JSNTSup 84; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 112. 
46 Watson, ’Antithesis ’, 109. 
47 For this term, see Klauck, 4. Makkabäerbuch, 652. 
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death that might be viewed as a tragedy is really personal and national triumph. For 
Eleazar establishes a martyrological pedagogy for the nation—one that is rational 
because it motivates them to resist the passions in the expectation that God will 
vindicate the nation through their deaths and give them eschatological life in return. 
 The portrayal of Antiochus and his verbal sparring with the martyrs is a 
fictional expansion of 2 Maccabees 6.18 – 7:42, which, like the build-up, is shaped to 
serve the author’s purpose. The basic question assumed by the first Rededuell is: is it 
reasonable to be tortured and die in fidelity to the Jewish food laws? In Antiochus’s 
offer of a chance for the elderly priest and scribe Eleazar to save (σῴζω) himself by 
eating pork (5:6), we can, therefore, detect both a practical and theological testing of 
limits. How far must one go in fidelity to the law, and are there matters on which 
one might justifiably break the law? Similarly, and more foundationally, is 
adherence to the law reasonable per se? These questions further highlight the 
connection between the accounts of Eleazar and David—with David representing 
the foundational exemplar of how the law inculcates personal and political wisdom 
via cultic reasoning, Eleazar the exemplar of the test of this reasoning in a time of 
divine chastisement. Though Eleazar will soon give an explicit answer to these 
questions, the use of echoes from the historical build-up portray Antiochus as 
ironically ignorant of the workings of divine δίκη and σωτηρία. The last thing Eleazar 
should expect, for example, is that he can save himself (cf. 4:12, 14) by disregarding 
God or his laws, as the story of Apollonius proves. This highlights the fundamental 
question of the whole debate: who gives and orders life—Nature, Antiochus, or 
God?  
 Antiochus’ argument oscillates between principled appeal to the natural 
order and pragmatic political justification. To argue the irrationality (ἀνόητος) of 
Jewish abstinence from pork, Antiochus appeals, on the one hand, to a conception of 
Nature as Benefactor (5:8, 9) and, on the other, to the folly of Jewish abstinence given 
the grave and terrible consequences (5:10). In the first criticism Nature is a 
Benefactor (φύσις) who gives (χαρίζοµαι) pork as one of ‘her’ most excellent gifts.48 
                                                
48 As deSilva points out (4 Maccabees: Commentary, 129), καλλίστην is not in the attributive position 
in the phrase τῆς φύσεως κεχαρισµένης καλλίστην τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου σαρκοφαγίαν and makes better sense 
taken as a substantive, with the emphasis lying on the excellence of the gift not its meat. 
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This frames Eleazar and the Jews as refusing the patronage and friendship of 
Nature, and since there is nothing obviously shameful (ὄνειδος) about pork, it is 
unjust (ἄδικος) to refuse τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας (5:9). This reference to Natures’ ‘gifts’ 
in the context of a debate over reason recalls 4 Maccabees’ conception of the Torah as 
a divine gift to the mind from creation. Thus, if one accepts Antiochus’ theological 
cosmology, the criticism makes sense, but the word ἄδικος reminds the reader, again, 
of an alternate account of δίκη, subtly undermining the point.49 If forgoing such 
delicacies rejects and violates Nature’s benefactions, ‘holding a vain opinion‘ 
(κενοδοξῶν) about the truth is even worse, as torture and death await such 
incorrigible disobedience to the king’s rule (5:10). Eleazar’s philosophy is mere 
gossip (φλύαρος) and his reason nonsense (λῆρος), because he is not ‘philosophising 
according to the truth of what is profitable’ (φιλοσοφήσεις τὴν τοῦ συµφέροντος ἀλήθειαν, 
5:11). The rhetoric attributed to Antiochus plays on Eleazar’s supposed pretensions 
to philosophy and his old age, suggesting that if he really wanted to adopt a 
philosophy fitting (ἄξιος) for his age (5:11), he would abandon this nonsense. 
Nevertheless, granting the dubious proposition that there is some ‘power’ (δύναµις) 
governing the Jewish religion, Antiochus asserts that it will ‘pardon’ (συγγνωµονέω) 
those who break the law under duress (5:13, cf. uses of διασῴζω and δύναµις in 2 Macc 
3:38).50 As the echoes of σῴζω and δίκη imply, however, this assertion, like everything 
else uttered by Antiochus, should be viewed with skepticism, an implication 
confirmed by Eleazar’s response.  
The threat of violence combined with the assumption of God’s pardon elicits 
a rebuttal from Eleazar that is principled and pragmatic. Though Eleazar begins by 
attacking the suggestion that adherence to Jewish food laws is a trivial matter, he 
soon broadens Antiochus’ scope, moving beyond the question of his own individual 
rationality and personal virtue to a broader philosophical and political perspective. 
                                                
49 Thus, pace deSilva (D.A. deSilva, ’Using the Master’s Tools to Shore Up Another’s House: A 
Postcolonial Analysis of 4 Maccabees’, JBL 126 (2007) 108): the ‘arrogant logic of tyranny’ exemplified 
by Antiochus is not that he does not ‘take sufficient trouble to understand the inner logic and 
“reasonableness”’ of Jewish life, but rather that he has an alternate account of nature and 
reasonableness that allows him to do as he pleases, all in defiance of divine order. In other words, his 
arrogance and irrationality consists in his godlessness. Cf. deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 133. 
50 Moses Hadas argues that the repetition and rejection of this idea of pardon and unconditioned 
mercy (cf. 8:14, 25; 9:4) suggests that it was a tempting one for 4 Maccabees’ audience; M. Hadas, The 
Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New York: Harper, 1953), 171. 
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The religious practices derided as ‘irrational’ (ἀνόητος) and ‘vain opinion’ (κενοδοξία, 
5:10; 8:19, 24), are ones the Jews cannot neglect, because, ‘having been persuaded to 
become citizens to divine law’ (θείῳ πεπεισµένοι νόµῳ πολιτεύεσθαι), they consider 
nothing more compelling than ‘ready obedience’ (εὐπείθεια) to the law (5:16). 
Antiochus’ charge of ‘vain-opinion’ notwithstanding (5:10), the Jewish philosophy is 
not merely a matter of tribal ‘opinion’ (δόξα, 5:18; cf. 6:18; 7:9), one that they might 
jettison in favour of a more suitable one.51 The consumption of forbidden food is, 
rather, an issue of grave importance, because the law does not admit of degrees of 
fidelity, as disobedience in any matter demonstrates contempt for the law in toto 
(5:17, 20, 21).52 In other words, because the law is divine it is to be obeyed in every 
detail, and, thus, abstinence from forbidden foods is part of the inviolable tapestry of 
divine order.  
Eleazar argues that Antiochus ought to recognise the truth of this order. 
Though Antiochus thinks the Jews are without ‘good reason’ in ‘living according to 
[their philosophy]’ (οὐ µετὰ εὐλογιστίας ἐν αὐτῇ βιούντων, 5:22), the Jewish philosophy 
teaches the cardinal virtues that restrain vice (5:23, 24; cf. 2:23). This replays the 
provocative theme that Jewish life fulfils the ethical conditions necessary for the 
good life with an implied argument in modus ponens form: if, as Eleazar argues, the 
law produces virtuous citizens, then the law is rational. In other words, in 
recognising the virtue of the Jews, Antiochus ought to recognise the rationality of 
Judaism per se and on his own terms, which were considered universal.53 Whether this 
sort of a posteriori argument is convincing, it is, nonetheless, how the author of 4 
Maccabees translates his tradition.54 His characteristic turn of wisdom toward God 
(cf. 1:17) is indicated, though, by the variation he introduces to the theme of the 
cardinal virtues, with εὐσέβεια here presented as the final and, therefore, chief 
virtue.55 Likewise, Eleazar’s contention that they worship ‘the only existing God’ (τὸν 
                                                
51 Though δόξα could mean ’reputation’ here (so, NRSV, NETS), ‘opinion’ is more likely since the 
debate in this context concerns the truth of the Jewish position, not the martyrs’ fidelity to it. 
52 For this principle in Stoic debate, see Renehan, ’Philosophic Background’, 229 – 32. Cf. Gal 5:3. 
53 van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 277; deSilva, ’Master’s Tools’, 115 – 16.  
54 For the ethical and rational contrast between Antiochus and the martyrs, see S.D. Moore and 
J.C. Anderson, ’Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees’, JBL 117 (1998): 252 – 265. 
55 van Henten, Maccabean Martyrs, 282. 
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ὄντα θεόν, 5:24)56 is further evidence of the Jewish philosophical register of the 
response (5:24). The God the Jews worship is the only existing God, and those who 
live according to his laws exhibit universal virtues. These virtues are crowned with 
εὐσέβεια, which teaches the Jews how to worship the only existing God properly 
(5:24). This last point subtly counters Antiochus’ previous charge of ingratitude and 
injustice to Nature. The Jews do not worship Nature as Benefactor. They worship the 
only existing God, and piety teaches them how to respond appropriately to his 
beneficence, offering worship that is a fitting match to his greatness. 
These convictions that the law is divine and that it trains the people in virtue 
form the basis (διό, 5:25) for Jewish abstinence from pork. In vv. 25 – 26, 4 Maccabees 
grounds the creational anthropology developed in the ‘philosophical’ section (cf. 
2:21 – 23) and its Torah-defined ethical content in a broader theological cosmology 
inflected in Stoic terms. Eleazar claims that ‘the Creator of the cosmos has sympathy 
[on human beings] by giving a law to us that accords with nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν ἡµῖν 
συµπαθεῖ νοµοθετῶν ὁ τοῦ κόσµου κτίστης, 5:25). The use of Stoic technical terms κατὰ 
φύσιν and the verb οἰκειόω (5:26) recall the previously defined concepts of rationality, 
though, as with the earlier definitions of wisdom, the Jewish view of God as Creator 
and Lawgiver implies a significant modification of Stoic conceptions of φύσις.57 
Nature is neither divine, nor the Benefactor—God is. Though Eleazar has presented 
a clear alternative to Antiochus’ appeal to Nature as Benefactor, arguing that Jewish 
virtue implies the truth of Jewish piety and theology, this argument is not extended 
to encompass the rest of humanity. As in the example of Joseph (2:1 – 5), it is not 
clear how the law given to the mind at creation (2:23) can be understood apart from 
its mediated instruction in history. In this connection, 4 Maccabees’ focus on the 
volitional and civic adoption of the Torah by the Jews (cf. πολιτεύοµαι in 2:8, 23; 4:23; 
5:16) occludes an account of its general accessibility. On what grounds and when did 
they gain this citizenship, and how is it gained by other nations? The civic language 
                                                
56 Though God is rarely called the ‘only God’ in the LXX (2 Kgs 19:15, 19; Isa 37:16; Dan 3:14), he 
is never called the ‘only existing God.’ For a similar phrase in Philo, see Spec. 1:332; 2:255. On ‘only 
God’ in antiquity, see D. Staudt, Der eine und einzige Gott: Monotheistische Formeln im Urchristentum und 
ihre Vorgeschichte bei Griechen und Juden (NTOA/SUNT 80; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2012). 
57 Cf. H. Koester, ‘Nomos Physeōs: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought’, in Religions in 
Antiquity: Essays in Memory of E.R. Goodenough (ed. J. Neusner; SHR 14; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521 – 41. 
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and philosophical argument could imply an ironic critique of the pretensions of 
Hellenistic tradition to universality, or it could simply underline the primarily 
apologetic interests of 4 Maccabees. In either case, there is no account of the general 
accessibility of the Torah to humanity, despite the identification of it as the order of 
nature, society, and the self. Rather, the reasoning is generally abductive and, 
specifically, a posteriori. For our purposes, this absence in an otherwise carefully 
crafted debate highlights how 4 Maccabees conception of God’s life-giving and life-
ordering activity governs his reading of the world and Israel’s salvation-history. 
What matters is upholding the Torah-shaped account of the created self and its 
proper social order, not providing an exhaustive account of these with respect to 
humanity generally. 
Thus, after giving principled reasons for doubting Anitochus’ basic charges of 
irrationality and commitment to vain-opinion, Eleazar attacks his motives. 
Antiochus’ arguments seek to justify an attempt ‘to tyrannically compel’ 
(τυραννικὸν…ἀναγκάζειν) the Jews to break the law in a fashion that would be 
repulsive to them but amusing to him (5:27). Not only will Eleazar give Antiochus 
no such satisfaction, but he provides a summary of both personal and civic reasons 
for resisting. This further wedding of civic virtue and Jewish commitment, 
suggested already with the use of the word πολιτεύοµαι (5:16), precludes reading the 
martyrs’ stories in individualising or spiritualising terms.58 Eleazar’s assertion of the 
vigour of his ‘youthful reason’ is for the purposes of defending ‘piety’ (5:31), which 
is not purely an individual matter.59 Rather, personifying and addressing his 
philosophical and political guiding principles in vv. 34 – 35, he will neither deny his 
‘friend self-control’ (φίλη ἐγκράτεια) or ‘philosophical discourse’ (φιλόσοφε λόγε) nor 
his ‘instructor the law’ (παιδευτὰ νόµε) or ‘honourable priesthood and knowledge the 
law gives’ (ἱερωσύνη τιµία καὶ νοµοθεσίας ἐπιστήµη). The rationale Eleazar provides for 
this unswerving commitment is simultaneously civic and eschatological. Eleazar 
refuses to preserve his dignity by avoiding torture and death, ‘so that through 
                                                
58 Pace van Henten, ’Background’, 122: ‘The martyrology in 4 Maccabees has become completely 
concentrated on the ideal way of life. Neither a struggle for liberation nor the institutions of a Jewish 
nation matter to the author. The martyrs defeat the tyrant in a moral and spiritual sense by their 
perseverance (ὑποµονή) until death…’  
59 Pace Moore and Anderson (‘Taking It’, 257), ‘the tyrant’s brutal physical coercion’ is not simply 
‘the graphic externalization of the internal coercion that every true ‘man’ must resist.’ 
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[himself] the ancestral law is destroyed’ (ὥστε δι᾿ ἐµαυτοῦ τὸν πάτριον καταλῦσαι νόµον, 
5:33). This is no mere Stoic acceptance of fate, however, because Eleazar is confident 
that in facing death despite tortures he will be received as pure (ἁγνός) by the fathers 
(οἱ πατέρες, 5:37). It is this dual ground—civic and eschatological—that amounts to 
‘pious reason’ for Eleazar and by which he assures Antiochus he will be mastered 
neither by words nor deeds (5:38). In other words, Eleazar must resist tyranny not 
only for the sake of his own virtue and life but also because the very life, flourishing, 
and honour of the nation is at stake. Given the Deuteronomic hermeneutic of the 
build-up, to disregard the law, as a leader of the nation, is to incite the divine δίκη 
and risk the dissolution of the nation. Consequently, even after the initial gruesome 
tortures (6:1 – 15), he will not reverse course and become a model (παράδειγµα) of 
impiety by eating the pork (6:19), but rather exhorts the ‘children of Abraham to 
come to their end nobly for the sake of piety’ (6:22). Because God creates life and the 
Torah is the divine gift that matches the created order of both self and society, only 
commitment to this order is rational. Likewise, only this commitment proves that 
reason rules the passions, because, as we shall see, it provides the confidence that a 
noble death will be met with the fitting gift of eschatological life and national 
renewal. 
 This recognition of Eleazar’s alternative account of divine benefaction along 
with the Temple-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic of the build-up suggest a way 
of resolving the longstanding debate over the force of his request in 4 Macc 6:28, 29. 
For the logic of Eleazar’s decision to die in tortures ‘for the law’ (διὰ τὸν νόµον, 6:27) is 
not fully explicable without recognising how the appeal of 6:28, 29 utilises the 
hermeneutic and theological logic thus far developed. Thus, the general request that 
God ‘be merciful to [his] people’ depends on his ‘being satisfied with my 
punishment on their behalf’ (ἀρκεσθεὶς τῇ ἡµετέρᾳ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δίκῃ, 6:28), with the word 
δίκῃ evoking the earlier Deuteronomic historical logic. Likewise, the explanatory 
request that God ‘make my blood their cleansing and receive my life as an exchange 
for theirs’ (καθάρσιον αὐτῶν ποίησον τὸ ἐµὸν αἷµα καὶ ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐµὴν ψυχήν, 
6:29) echoes David’s cultic reasoning regarding his men’s blood (3:15), introduces 
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the neologism ἀντίψυχος derived from Lev 17, 60 and, indicated by the verb λαµβάνω, 
deploys the logic of sacrificial gift-giving to present Eleazar’s death as a 
substitution.61 Consequently, though as Tessa Rajak rightly contends we should be 
wary of the potential of ‘a seriously distorting effect‘ of ‘Christian readings’ of 
Jewish martyrdom texts like 4 Maccabees,62 there are good reasons to see a doctrine 
of redemptio vicaria in 4 Maccabees. In this connection, Rajak’s methodological 
question—‘how this “doctrine” figure[s] in the work’63—and her summary answer 
are representative of other views and illustrative of the force of our interpretation. 
After observing that Eleazar’s ἀντίψυχος doctrine is confined to his prayer (6:29) and 
the closing homily (17:22) and that the use of ὥσπερ in 17:21 renders ἀντίψυχος 
metaphorical and probably original to the author, Rajak concludes that, ‘The basic 
idea in these utterances is simply that the martyrs were instrumental in breaking the 
old sin and punishment cycle by the outstanding piety manifested in their deaths.’64 
On this view, the sacrificial metaphors are mere metaphors, added to the primary 
historical framework to bolster the idea of the effectiveness of the martyrs’ sacrifice. 
Sam Williams’ interpretation is similar, as he concludes that the sacrificial metaphors 
‘cannot be separated radically from the objective historical effect of the martyrs’ 
endurance unto death (17.20)’ and, thus, do not represent ‘an independent 
affirmation’ but a ‘supplement [to the] central assertion that the deaths were 
effective and beneficial for the nation in that Antiochus departed.’65 David Seeley’s 
position modifies this account by arguing that the effectiveness of the deaths of the 
martyrs consists specifically in the mimetic process initiated by their exemplary 
obedience.66 Thus, though Williams, Seeley, and Rajak all recognise the connection 
between cultic and historical logic in 4 Maccabees, they see the former as an 
unnecessary appendage to the latter.  
 The fundamental problem with these views is methodological. Rajak rightly 
asks how cultic ‘doctrine’ works in 4 Maccabees but wrongly assumes that the cultic 
                                                
60 Cf. Lev 17:11: τὸ γὰρ αἷµα αὐτοῦ ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται. 
61 The word καθάρσιος likely indicates expiation (cf. 4 Macc 1:11; 17:21), while δίκῃ may imply 
propitiation, given the later warning that Antiochus will receive τὰς τῆς θείας ὀργῆς δίκας (9:32). 
62 Rajak, ’Dying ’, 108 – 109. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 110. 
65 Williams, Jesus’ Death, 178. 
66 Seeley, Noble Death, 84–98. 
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logic is confined to texts that feature the word ἀντίψυχος (6:26 – 29; 17:17 – 24), as do 
Williams and Seeley. What is missed is that the cultic logic is introduced in the 
account of David’s thirst, assumed in the attack and displacement of the Temple in 
the build-up, and explicitly wedded to the historical logic with the word δίκη in 
Eleazar’s prayer. One cannot understand how the ἀντίψυχος ‘”doctrine” figures in the 
work’ without recognising this development, as we will see below. The second 
problem has to do with the relegation of the cultic language in 4 Maccabees to the 
status of mere metaphor. As we have seen, David’s metaphorical reasoning is 
indicative of wisdom: he reasons analogically, via Lev 17, sees the drink as akin to 
life’s blood, and, thus, pours it out to God. Moreover, a careful reading of Lev 17 
suggests that the metaphorical use of cultic language is inherent to the presentation 
of cultic sacrifice itself. The equivalency made in Leviticus is between blood and life, 
not blood and atonement. God regards blood as atoning. It is because the life of an 
animal or person is in the blood that God gives (emphatic use of δίδωµι, Lev 17:11) the 
blood for the purposes of atoning sacrifice. Thus, God regards the blood of the 
animal as a fitting exchange—a visual metaphor for the life it represents. The 
metaphorical nature of the cultic logic of 4 Maccabees, therefore, indicates nothing 
about its significance, because all cultic logic is irreducibly metaphorical, relying on 
a ‘this-is-that’ way of seeing. When Eleazar, therefore, commands God to ‘make [his] 
blood a purification for the nation and take [his] soul/life in exchange for theirs’ 
(6:29), he is merely extending by analogy the metaphorical logic of sacrifice. The 
question, then, is not whether 4 Maccabees’ presentation of cultic logic is 
metaphorical but whether it is incidental or integral to the historical logic presented. 
This leads to the third problem: the subordination of cultic to historical logic. 
If by ‘not worked out’ Rajak means that the cultic logic is merely stated and not 
integrated with the historical framework in 4 Maccabees, as Williams and Seeley 
similarly argue, then this is simply not the case. As we saw in the exemplary 
rationality of David, the cultic vision of the divine order of value is at the heart of 
personal and political virtue and, because it constitutes the climax of 4 Maccabees’ 
‘starting-point’, is, therefore, constitutive of the logic of the remaining argument. In 
the build-up it is precisely the disregard for the cult that demonstrates the 
viciousness and irrationality of the leaders and incites the divine δίκη. Consequently, 
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without a recognition of the divine order of value represented in the cult, the 
theology of history represented in the build-up makes no sense. In other words, the 
cultic logic reveals the divine order of value, while the historical logic explains what 
happens both when this order is upheld and when it is violated. This observation 
illumines how the particular use of Lev 17 and Dt 30 and 32 represents an 
amplification of the complementarity between cult and history already present in the 
canonical texts themselves. For the particular problem is the lack of a cultic 
mechanism for atonement, as there is no method for turning away δίκη. In such a 
paradoxical situation, for 4 Maccabees, only an equally fitting ‘sacrifice’ will do. 
Eleazar is presented as this paradoxical and perfectly fitting offering, in that he 
embodies the sort of unblemished life that God regards and, in not saving himself 
despite tortures unto death, becomes an exemplary substitute for the people. 
Whether a similar cultic conception underlies the presentation of 2 Maccabees is 
another matter,67 but one of the clearest differences between 2 Maccabees and 4 
Maccabees is precisely in the latter’s ‘working out’ in sacrificial terms how and why 
the deaths of the martyrs were effective in history, not simply that they were.68 
Looking through Lev 17 and Dt 30 and 32, Eleazar’s torture and death is not a 
gruesome tragedy but a fitting and, thus, effective gift offered to God. 
In his encomium to Eleazar, our author employs numerous rhetorical devices, 
praising him from multiple perspectives, in order to describe the fitting nature of his 
sacrifice. The means of Eleazar’s triumph was ‘pious reason’ (7:1, 4, 12, 14). He is 
acclaimed, ‘O man, harmonious with the law and philosopher of divine life [θείου 
βίου, 7:7]’. Eleazar’s death serves as a fitting end to his life, exemplifying proper 
administration (δηµιουργέω) of the law under threat, confirming Jewish loyalty to the 
law (εὐνοµία; cf. 3:20; 4:24), proving the ‘divine philosophy’ of the Jews, and receiving 
proper acclaim (δόξα, 7:8, 9).69 Moreover, it is Eleazar’s unchanging reason that, like 
                                                
67 See e.g. L.E. Frizzell, ’Education by Example: A Motif in Josephus and Maccabee Literature of 
the Second Temple Period’, in Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious 
Thought in Honor of Arthur Hyman (ed. R. Link-Salinger; New York: P. Lang, 1989), 108; van Henten, 
’Background ’, 116 – 121. 
68 deSilva, 4 Maccabees, 140. 
69 Eleazar’s perseverance in correct ‘opinion’ (δόξα, 5:18; 6:18), despite Antiochus’ charge of 
‘holding a vain-opinion’ (κενοδοξέω, 5:10), secures ‘public repute’ (δόξα, 7:9). On δόξα and honour in 7:9, 
see Hadas, Fourth Maccabees, 185; H. Anderson, ’4 Maccabees’, in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (ed. 
J.H. Charlesworth; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 2:552. 
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Aaron after Korah’s rebellion (Num 16:46), Eleazar turned away God’s wrath (4 
Macc 7:11 – 12), and διὰ τοῦ λογισµοῦ that he, like Isaac who offered himself, nullifies 
the rack (7:13 – 14). Eleazar is both priest and sacrifice, facing and extinguishing the 
fire. His ‘law observant life’ (βίος νόµιµος) is made complete (τελειόω) by the ‘faithful 
seal of death’ (πιστὴ θανάτου σφραγίς, 7:15).  
 Though the stress lies on the temporal results of Eleazar’s sacrifice, eternal 
results play a subtle but key role in the encomium. The end of his voyage is ‘the 
harbour of immortal victory’ (ὁ λιµὴν τῆς ἀθανάτου νίκης, 7:3), and through his deeds 
he made believable (πιστοποιέω) the words of his ‘divine philosophy’ (7:9). In other 
words, Eleazar’s noble death is—in addition to being rational and honour-
preserving—the path to eternal life. Earlier, Eleazar expressed confidence that the 
fathers would receive him as pure as a result of his endurance of torture unto death 
for the law (5:37). At the end of his encomium, the author answers a potential 
objection to his thesis with an elaboration and explicit appeal to such confidence: 
‘What about those who cannot master the passions because they do not have 
prudent reason’ (φρόνιµος λογισµός, 7:17)? By responding that only those who attend 
to εὐσέβεια ‘from a whole heart’ (ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας) can master ‘the passions of the flesh’ 
(τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν, 7:18), 4 Maccabees makes it clear that reason’s rule of the 
passions of the body (3:1) is a moral not a constitutional issue—a matter of ‘weak’ 
(ἀσθενής, 7:20), flabby reason. The reason adduced for this is significant: πιστεύοντες ὅτι 
θεῷ οὐκ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ πατριάρχαι ἡµῶν Αβρααµ καὶ Ισαακ καὶ Ιακωβ, ἀλλὰ 
ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ (7:19).70 In other words, the result of a proper, whole-hearted attention to 
εὐσέβεια is a belief that, like the patriarchs, life not death is the final word τῷ θεῷ. In 4 
Maccabees, obedience to the Jewish law in its entirety is grounded in God’s life-
giving benefaction at creation, the exercise of created freedom in dependence on it, 
and the expectation of eternal life as a fitting return gift from God. Thus, far from 
                                                
70 The argument that the doublet formed by this statement with 4 Macc 16:25 and its 
eschatological content suggest a later Christian interpolation is belied by the repeated emphasis on 
eschatological rewards and punishments throughout the account of the brothers (4 Macc 8:1 – 12:19). 
Contra C.L.W. Grimm, ‘Viertes Buch der Maccabäer‘, in Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den 
Apokryphen des Alten Testaments (ed. O.F Fritzsche and C.L.W. Grimm; Leipzig: Weidmann, 1857), 
4:332; likewise, on 16:25, Freudenthal, IV Makkabäerbuch, 117–20. Pace Shepkaru, the eschatological 
content is so prominent throughout 4 Maccabees that there is no reason to think that, originally, the 
author expected ‘only the nation to benefit from an individual’s voluntary death’; S. Shepkaru, ‘From 
After Death to Afterlife: Martyrdom and its Recompense‘, AJSR 24 (1999): 17. 
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being an unnecessary or underdeveloped appendage to 4 Maccabees’ historical 
narrative as Rajak, Williams, and Seeley contend, Eleazar’s self-offering as return gift 
is integral to this text’s theological logic. For Eleazar’s fitting self-offering both elicits 
a divine return gift of eschatological life and provides the paradoxical pedagogy for 
the martyrs, through which the nation itself is restored. Without an account of divine 
life-giving benefaction, the deep coherence of 4 Maccabees’ atonement theology 
remains opaque. 
1.3 God the Guarantor of Life for the Nation and Martyrs and of Punishment for 
Tyrants (4 Macc 8:1 – 18:24) 
The hermeneutic and theological logic illustrated in the build-up, articulated by 
Eleazar, and exemplified in his voluntary death is further tested and elaborated in 
the accounts of the martyrdom of the brothers and their mother. The stories of the 
brothers test 4 Maccabees’ conception of fitting divine life-giving benefaction against 
the question of theodicy in the form of Antiochus’ offer of temporal friendship and 
his characterisation of the youths’ commitment to piety as futile (8:1 – 14:10). The 
account of the mother stresses how her commitment to and instruction of her sons in 
such a paradoxical eschatological piety enables her, though a ‘weak’ woman, to 
withstand a perfect storm of motherly passions (14:11 – 16:23). In other words, 
Antiochus offers temporal friendship and suggests that God will show 
unconditioned mercy to those who give in (8:10, 14, 22; 9:4; 12:6), while the martyrs 
articulate and exemplify a belief in God’s justice-shaped temporal and eschatological 
mercy. Thus, like Eleazar, the brothers offer themselves calling on God’s just mercy 
(12:17), expecting that God will give them eternal life and vindicate Israel. It is this 
conviction in God’s inviolable Torah order of created life that amounts to ‘pious 
reason;’ for to ‘know piety’ (16:23) just is to believe that, as with Isaac and Daniel, 
God delivers the righteous (16:20, 21) and, thus, that ‘those who die for the law’ will 
live eschatologically like the patriarchs (16:25). The rational exercise of this 
conviction, thus, proves the integrity of the self and, as fitting representative gift, 
serves as the instrumental means of God’s renewal of the nation and the condition of 
the martyrs’ receipt of the gift of eschatological life. Chapters 17 and 18 both 
summarise these themes in praise of the martyrs and apply them to 4 Maccabees’ 
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audience, respectively. 
 In light of the exegesis that supports the above points, in this final section of 
the chapter several important results for our thesis and the argument of this chapter 
emerge. Most generally, our analysis of the Rededuell between Antiochus and the 
brothers demonstrates that the assumption of Sanders and others that grace is by 
definition ‘groundless’ does not hold for 4 Maccabees. God’s indiscriminate 
donation of Torah-ordered life in creation is the basis of moral agency, and thus the 
precondition for the discriminating return of life as a gift to the worthy, whether 
temporally or eternally. With respect to the theological logic of 4 Maccabees, 
specifically, this section clarifies how complete fidelity to the Torah is grounded in 
the expectation of personal immortality for the martyrs and national renewal for the 
nation—both of which depend on the conviction that God gives life to the worthy. 
This conviction is further supported, finally, by the development of a hermeneutic in 
the teaching of the mother by which a consistent pattern of divine saving action 
might be recognised in scripture and salvation history. Thus, in the end, 4 
Maccabees’ atonement theology is seen to function only with reference to a deeper 
commitment to divine life-giving benefaction, wherein God gives Torah-ordered life 
at creation and governs this life both in and beyond history. 
1.3.1 What Comes After Life?: The Rededuell Between Antiochus and the Brothers on the 
Futility of Jewish Life (8:1 – 12:19) 
 In the Rededuell between Antiochus and the brothers, the focal question is not 
the rationality of Jewish commitment per se, but rather the rationality of the 
commitment (cf. µανία, 8:5) given the temporal consequences for the young men. 
Thus, Antiochus, not Nature, plays the role of benefactor, offering friendship (φιλία) 
to the obedient and punishment to the disobedient (8:6). The benefits will be ‘leading 
positions’, if only they trust him (πιστεύω) and ‘deny the ancestral rule of their polity’ 
(8:7). Two options lie before them: to change their lifestyle in exchange for a ‘Greek 
life’ (Ἑλληνικὸς βίος) and ‘carouse in their youth’ (8:8) or be tortured to death by 
Antiochus (8:9). As with the use of σῴζω and δίκη in Antiochus’ Rededuell with 
Eleazar, echoes of key words illumine the nature of the challenge and the implicitly 
negative perspective from which the reader should view Antiochus’ speech. 
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Whereas Eleazar believed in the divine origin of the law (5:25) and that those who 
live to God do not die but live as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob do (7:19) and the author 
states that those who believe in God with a whole heart can master the passions 
(7:21), Antiochus asks the boys to trust him (8:7), to have mercy (κατελεέω, 8:10) on 
themselves, and consider (διαλογίζοµαι) that nothing awaits them but death through 
torture if they disobey (8:11). After showing the boys the grisly implements reserved 
for them, Antiochus makes one last pragmatic concession: surely the δίκη they 
worship will be ‘merciful’ (ἵλεως) to them if they act contrary to the law (παρανοµέω) 
because of necessity (ἀνάγκη, 8:14). This, of course, echoes the earlier concession to 
Eleazar (5:13), but it also represents a direct contradiction of the historical logic 
presented in the build-up. It is precisely Jason’s Hellenising activity that leads to 
παρανοµία then disaster, a disaster attributed to divine δίκη. The implication is that the 
boys should not ‘trust’ Antiochus, and they should not expect mercy from the divine 
δίκη if they break the law under torture. 
 As a prelude to his account of how the brothers ‘philosophised against’ 
(ἀντιφιλοσοφέω) Antiochus and defeated him through ‘good reason’ (εὐλογιστία, 8:15), 
4 Maccabees entertains a hypothetical situation in which the brothers are ‘fearful-
souls’ (δειλόψυχοι) and ‘unmanly’ (ἄνανδροι, 8:16), in order to frame and clarify their 
unified response. Again, just as with Eleazar, the brothers are asked to entrust 
themselves (εἰ πεισθείηµεν αὐτῷ) to another benefactor—in this case, Antiochus who 
offers them εὐεργεσία (8:17). The key imaginary concession is that their obedience to 
God is ‘vain’ (κενός, 8:18), representing a mere ‘vain opinion’ (κενοδοξία, 8:19). The 
assumption, of course, is that there is no God to insure any results beyond their 
deaths, though, even if there is, they mimic Antiochus’ consolation by assuming that 
‘the Divine justice’ (ἡ θεία δίκη) will ‘forgive’ (συγγινώσκω; 8:22; cf. 5:13), and that the 
law itself would not condemn them to death for fearing the tortures (8:25). The echo 
of δίκη, of course, belies the claim. Yet, in an effort to bolster his assurance that the 
law ‘is not conceived here in a narrowly legalistic fashion’, Redditt affirms ‘the 
positive expectation of reward’ of the martyrs, while denying that they ‘face 
martyrdom out of fear of eternal punishment.’92 Besides the contradiction of this 
                                                
92 Redditt, ’Nomos ’, 253. 
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statement in 4 Macc 13:14, 1593 and the fact that the particular transgression in view 
here is apostasy,94 Redditt’s analysis misses both the ironic echoes of authorial 
dissent running throughout Antiochus’ speeches and the logic of benefaction at 
work in 4 Maccabees. In this connection, it is critical to recall Eleazar’s contention 
that the law’s divine origin both renders it inviolable in every detail and reveals it as 
the guide to the good life, the life according to nature (5:16 – 25). The implication 
drawn from this is that, because God has made mankind rational and formed 
mankind’s reason through the law, there is no excuse (7:17 – 23). The irony of 
Redditt’s position is that, by apparently assuming that saving mercy is by definition 
unconditioned (cf. ἣν σέβεσθε δίκην ἵλεως ὑµῖν ἔσται δι᾿ ἀνάγκην παρανοµήσασιν, 4 Macc 
8:14), he sides with Antiochus.95 Yet, for 4 Maccabees, the possibility of the 
exemplary fidelity of Eleazar, the boys, and the mother demonstrates its necessity. In 
other words, God’s mercy in 4 Maccabees is conditioned and congruous—justice-
shaped, as we will see next.  
The unified nature of the brothers’ response is foreshadowed in Antiochus’ 
observation that they looked like a ‘chorus’ (χορός, 8:4) surrounding their mother, but 
their song is an anthem of unified defiance (8:29): Antiochus’ ‘mercy on the basis of 
our lawless salvation’ (τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ παρανόµῳ σωτηρίᾳ ἡµῶν ἔλεον, 9:4) is worse than 
death, because through (διά + gen.) their endurance and suffering for God they will 
receive the ‘reward’ (ἄθλον) of virtue and will be with God (9:8), while Antiochus 
should expect ‘eternal tortures through fire’ from the divine δίκη for his actions (9:9). 
This justification for choosing to suffer like Eleazar, their ‘teacher’ (παιδευτής, 9:6), 
applies and expands on his account of eschatological destinies by answering the 
particular problem they faced. That is, by governing their passions in anticipation of 
                                                
93 4 Macc 13:14, 15: ‘Let us not fear the one who thinks [himself] to be killing [us]. For great is the 
contest of the soul and the danger of eternal torture for those who transgress the commandment of 
God.’ 
94 J.M.G. Barclay, ’Who Was Considered an Apostate in the Jewish Diaspora? ’, in Tolerance and 
Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity (ed. G.N. Stanton and G.G. Stroumsa; Cambridge: CUP, 
1998), 88 – 89. 
95 Rightly, Watson, ’Antithesis ’, 109. Cf. G.F. Moore, ’The Rise of Normative Judaism: I. To the 
Reorganization at Jamnia’, HTR 17 (1924): 324. For this assumption that grace/mercy is missing in 4 
Maccabees because it is by definition unconditioned, see e.g. W. Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im 
neutestamentlichen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1903), 177; R.B. Townshend, ’The Fourth Book 
of Maccabees’, in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English (ed. R.H. Charles; 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653; Hughes, Ethics, 112, 233. 
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eternal life, the question of theodicy contained in the charge of ‘vain-opinion’ (8:18 -
19, 24) and Antiochus’ taunt that ‘nothing is stored away with your disobedience 
except to die with tortures’ (οὐδὲν ὑµῖν ἀπειθήσασιν πλὴν τοῦ µετὰ στρεβλῶν ἀποθανεῖν 
ἀπόκειται, 8:11) is answered.  
Again, it is the martyrs’ particular understanding of God’s donation of 
rational, Torah-ordered life that informs their logic of fitting judgement and 
salvation. Their defiance earns the brothers diverse and gruesome tortures, as 
Antiochus flies into a rage at their ‘ingratitude’ (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). This word evokes 
the choice between Antiochus and God as benefactor, a theme which gets replayed 
in the seventh and final brother’s contention that Antiochus himself is an ungrateful 
client of God and, thus, forms an inclusio around the whole section (9:10 – 12:19). 
Thus, 4 Maccabees begins by summarising Eleazar’s teaching in the words of the 
first brother (9:15 – 24), providing the material ground for the seventh brother’s clear 
statement about the fitting destinies of God’s clients (12:11 – 18). The eldest brother 
gives perhaps the clearest expression of 4 Maccabees’ peculiar claim: far from being 
able ‘to strangle [his] reason,’ the tortures prove that ‘only the children of the 
Hebrews are invincible where virtue is concerned’ (9:18). Moreover, like Eleazar, he 
appeals to the brothers to join the fight for piety, in hopes that ‘the just and ancestral 
Providence’ (ἡ δικαία καὶ πάτριος πρόνοια) will show mercy on the nation and punish 
Antiochus (9:24). The youngest brother concludes by stating the temporal and 
eschatological logic of 4 Maccabees’ account of divine life-giving benefaction: 
Antiochus, though a ‘man,’ has acted as a ‘savage’ (θηριώδης, 12:13) by killing and 
torturing God’s servants despite  ‘receiving from God good things and a kingdom ‘ 
(παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 12:11). Thus, his ingratitude will 
receive both temporal and eternal recompense (12:18), while the brothers request just 
mercy on their nation (12:18) and anticipate eternal rewards. In short, in 4 Maccabees 
God’s mercy is justice-shaped—conditioned on following the divine order of life and 
given as a congruous gift to the worthy.  
Consequently, with Eleazar’s logic and themes as support, several of the 
brothers give statements about the fitting temporal and eschatological destinies 
awaiting them and Antiochus. While the second brother experiences ‘the joys 
accorded to virtue’ (9:31) in self-mastery unto eternal life even as he dies, Antiochus’ 
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‘arrogant reason’ (ὑπερήφανος λογισµός, 9:30) receives the fitting temporal recompense 
of seeing it defeated in the brothers’ resistance as he is tortured by ‘the threats of the 
impious ‘ (9:32). Likewise, the fourth brother cites ‘the everlasting destruction of the 
tyrant and the eternal life of the pious’ as the ground of his continued commitment 
(10:15), while assuring Antiochus that ‘God will pursue [him] quickly’ for his 
tortures (10:21). In sum, while the brothers experience their tortures and death as a 
transition to ‘immortality’ (9:22), Antiochus is assured of ‘tortures that will never 
leave’ (12:12) and ‘punishment in the present life and death’ (12:18). Consequently, 
while the references to God’s δίκη scattered throughout this section (8:14, 22; 9:9, 15, 
32; 11:3; 12:12) highlight the application of the Deuteronomic hermeneutic, the 
opening and closing appeals to just mercy restate its temporal representative logic, 
and the repeated expectation of eternal life highlights the author’s eschatological 
answer to the question of theodicy. In short, God is the Benefactor who both gives 
inviolable, and inviolably Torah-ordered, life to humans from creation and, in his 
temporal and eschatological activity, ensures the fitting judgement and salvation of 
individuals and nations.  
 It is perhaps advisable here to consider the particular character of 4 
Maccabees’ benefaction language at this point. Given the relative infrequency of gift 
terms in 4 Maccabees, uncertainty about the provenance of the work, and the lack of 
a clear picture among ancient historians of the reception of Roman conceptions of 
patron-client relationships in the eastern Mediterranean in the early empire,96 it is 
difficult to be certain about the precise social domain of 4 Maccabees’ benefaction 
terminology. Nonetheless, to this point in our analysis, Antiochus Epiphanes has 
rebuked Eleazar for rejecting τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας (i.e., here pork; 4 Macc 5:9), and 
the fifth brother has mocked Antiochus for unwittingly ‘[giving them] gifts’ (χάριτας 
ἡµῖν χαρίζῃ) in the form of opportunities to remain faithful to the Torah despite 
torture (11:12). Relatedly, in response to their summary rejection of his offer of φιλία 
(8:5; cf. the use of εὐεργετέω, 8:6) and εὐεργεσία (8:17), Antiochus is enraged by the 
                                                
96 On the question of the adoption or modification of Roman patron-client relations in the Greek 
East, Harrison (Paul’s Language of Grace, 16 – 17) remarks, ‘The interaction of the Greek and Roman 
benefaction systems, at the level of local poleis and more generally throughout the Eastern 
Mediterranean, still awaits the detailed regional study of ancient historians, especially as regards the 
ethos of reciprocity.’ 
 91 
brothers’ apparent ‘ingratitude’ (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). Thus, the specific terms used and 
the asymmetrical relationship between Antiochus and the Jewish martyrs may 
indicate that the language figures this relationship in political and, perhaps, patron-
client terms. Antiochus is neither proposing to become a civic εὐεργέτης to the Jewish 
nation, nor is he offering to enter into a solely personal relationship of reciprocity. 
Rather, Antiochus’ understanding of his offer of φιλία as directly tied to the brothers’ 
receipt of leading positions with respect to ‘the affairs of the kingdom’ (τῆς 
βασιλείας…πραγµάτων, 12:5), suggests a relationship of public political subordination 
on a par with that of Jason, who agreed ‘to give’ (δώσειν) annual tribute in exchange 
for the priesthood (4:17). Thus, though a precise account of the particular social 
practices that inform the use of these terms is difficult, the asymmetry in relations 
and the expectation of mutual obligations is enough to show that 4 Maccabees is 
operating with some form of Greco-Roman gift exchange in mind. The key point for 
our purposes has to do with the logic and contrasting construals of life-giving 
benefaction: just as Eleazar contends that ‘the creator of the cosmos’ has given a law 
(νοµοθετέω) that is κατὰ φύσιν (5:25) and thus refuses Antiochus’ account of Nature as 
benefactor with its attendant obligations to eat pork, so the brothers say to each 
other ‘let us consecrate ourselves to God from a whole heart, to the one who gave (τῷ 
δόντι) [our] souls’ (13:13) and thus reject Antiochus himself as a political benefactor. 
In this connection, the brothers reject Antiochus’ promise that ‘[they] will receive’ 
(λήµψεσθε) leading government positions (8:7), are tortured and killed, and, 
subsequently, the youngest brother reminds Antiochus that such behaviour is 
shameful for ‘one who has received good things and a kingdom from God’ (παρὰ τοῦ 
θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 12:11). In other words, like the brothers 
themselves, Antiochus is a recipient of divine benefactions and should have 
considered how best to return them. In this connection, though the logic of 
reciprocal obligation is often assumed in 4 Maccabees, the author uses ἀποδίδωµι for 
the youngest brother’s climactic return of his life (presumably to God, 12:19) and, as 
we shall see, ἀπολαµβάνω for God’s return of the martyrs souls, pure and immortal 
(18:23). 
The preceding exegesis represents two vital results for our study. First, it 
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furthers the recent reevaluation of grace in Judaism around the time of the Second 
Temple period by demonstrating that the assumption of earlier scholars and Sanders 
that grace is by definition ‘groundless’, ‘free’, ‘not earned’, and ‘unmerited’97 is false—
at least, in 4 Maccabees. The brothers give their lives as a fitting response to God’s 
prior donation of Torah-ordered life in creation, and thus they expect to receive their 
lives back as a fitting gift of immortal life from God. Thus, God’s gift of salvation in 4 
Maccabees, while voluntary, is nonetheless not ‘groundless’ but conditioned on the 
obedience of the martyrs and congruent with their prior self-offering. Second, with 
the conclusion of this Rededuell between Antiochus and the brothers, another feature 
of 4 Maccabees’ theological logic is fully exposed. The brothers’ commitment to the 
Torah unto death is not vain (8:18), for it recognises that there is an existence beyond 
temporal life in which God the Benefactor exercises fitting recompense. 
Consequently, at this point in the argument, 4 Maccabees’ theological justification of 
complete fidelity to the Torah receives one of its grounds in an account of the 
relation between individual temporal and eternal life. In the remainder of 4 
Maccabees, as we shall see, this theological justification is further and more clearly 
grounded in the prospect of national renewal and it is further supported by the 
development of a hermeneutic by which a consistent pattern of divine saving action 
may be observed in scripture and salvation-history. 
1.3.2 The Chorus of Piety: Brotherly Love Perfected in Torah-Commitment (13:1 – 14:10) 
 The author’s praise of the boys magnifies 4 Maccabees’ account of God’s 
inviolable gift of rational, Torah-ordered life by showing how their exercise of 
properly-ordered agency overcomes the extreme passions of their perfect brotherly 
love.98 Forming a ‘holy chorus of piety’ (13:8), they encourage each other to emulate 
exemplary young men like those who withstood the fiery furnace (13:9), and like 
Isaac, to offer themselves for slaughter ‘for the sake of piety’ (13:12). Moreover, the 
brothers’ chorus characterises and grounds their exemplary piety in God’s creative 
                                                
97 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1977), 394 – 96.  
98 R.D. Young, ‘The “Woman with the Soul of Abraham“: Traditions About the Mother of the 
Maccabean Martyrs‘, in ‘Women like This‘:  New Perspectives on Jewish Women in the Greco-Roman World 
(ed. A.J. Levine; SBLEJL 1; Atlanta: Scholars, 1991), 75. 
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and eschatological grace: they properly exercise their created agency, committing 
themselves ‘from a whole heart to give their lives and use their bodies as a guard for 
the law’ (13:13).  
 This self-donation and its Torah-ordered expression is grounded both 
negatively in ‘the contest of the soul and the peril of everlasting torture‘ for those 
who break God’s command (13:14) and, positively, in the conviction that, if they 
employ ‘the mastery of passion of divine reason’ (τὴν τοῦ θείου λογισµοῦ παθοκράτειαν, 
13:16), then an eschatological reception and the honours of the patriarchs await 
(13:17). In this way, the passions which attended their ideal ‘nobility of character’ 
(καλοκἀγαθία, 13:25) and ‘brotherly love’ (φιλαδελφία, 13:26)99 underline the 
surpassing fidelity of the brothers to the law, which is itself a demonstration of 
reason’s mastery of even the passions produced by brotherly love under torture.100 
Moreover, just as Eleazar is the appropriate counterpart of rational King David and 
the good Onias, and the foil of Jason, so the brothers represent the nation. For the 
application of the term ὁµόνοια (13:25; cf. 3:21) both to the Jewish polity and to the 
brothers suggests that, in Klauck’s terms, ‘the harmony (v. 25) produced by 
brotherly love is simultaneously the ideal state of the whole Jewish people (3:21)’. 
The implication is that, ‘All children of Israel should practice it toward one another 
not as an unattached moral ideal but on the basis and within the framework of the 
Torah.’101 Thus, by emphasising the unified and rational commitment of the brothers 
to the Torah-order of divine life-giving benefaction, the author provides further 
proof of his peculiar thesis and establishes the theological ground by which the 
eschatological resolution of the martyrs’ deaths is logically related to the temporal 
renewal of the nation. 
 In this connection, 4 Maccabees’ characterization of the brothers as a chorus 
provides the penultimate component of his particular theological logic. The 
obedience of Eleazar and the brothers is the appropriate exercise of the divine gift of 
created life, a sacrificial obedience that is rational both because it aligns with the 
                                                
99 Klauck, ‘Brotherly Love‘, 154: ‘Until 4 Macc 13:27 – 14:1, one could get the impression that the 
author is concerned with eulogizing the seven brothers as an example of perfect brotherly love in 
order to demonstrate the superiority of Hellenistic, Diaspora Judaism in comparison with the ethical 
standards of the surrounding non-Jewish world.’ 
100 Ibid., 155. 
101 Ibid. 
 94 
created order and because it can expect its subsequent return in eschatological life. 
Yet, this obedience, since it is a sort of perfect expression of social and communal 
order, is also representative. And thus it invites not only an eternal return for 
individuals but temporal restoration of the nation—both given by God as fitting 
return gifts. That is why Eleazar’s earlier disobedience would have meant the very 
dissolution of the nation (5:33): it would have subverted the very logic—the logic of 
divine life-giving benefaction grounded in the gift of Torah—by which the nation 
exists. With this representative aspect of his theology in place, 4 Maccabees can 
move on to an articulation of its ultimate source in his account of the mother’s 
hermeneutical teaching about God the life-giver. 
1.3.3 The ‘Adamantine’ Woman: Proof of Pious Reason, Daughter of Abraham, Mother of the 
Nation (14:11 – 16:25) 
 4 Maccabees’ assumption that women have weak minds and serve as 
instructors of youth provides an opportunity for 4 Maccabees to bring his argument 
and his hermeneutic to their climactic expression. Demonstrating ‘manliness’ greater 
than any man (15:30), the victory of pious reason shines forth most clearly in this 
Jewish mother. Moreover, it is because she is ὁµόψυχος with Abraham who offered 
Isaac (14:20), looking beyond the apparently vain deaths of her sons to the just life-
giving God who stands behind and beyond them, that she is ‘mother of the nation’ 
(16:20) in instructing them to die for the law. In other words, the mother’s particular 
piety, her belief in God’s just life-giving benefaction and its corresponding cult-
focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic, is the ground of her exemplary control over 
motherly passions, the source of Israel’s eschatological instruction, and, thereby, the 
instrumental cause of national renewal and the eschatological life of the martyrs. 
 Though the mother does not engage in a Rededuell with Antiochus or undergo 
the tortures of Eleazar and the brothers, the author dramatises her unique, motherly 
battle against the passions in a vivid and extended way. The control of reason the 
boys displayed in their tortures would be reason enough to be amazed if it were not 
for the fact that ‘even a woman’s mind’ was able to disdain manifold sufferings 
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(14:11).102 The proof of this (γάρ) is that this mother endured the ‘rack’ of each of her 
children (14:12). In order to emphasise the enormity of the victory of this mother’s 
reason over her passions, 4 Maccabees skillfully juxtaposes the depth of her natural 
and maternal feelings for her children with what she saw as they were tortured. If 
birds and bees show sympathy for their young by defending them from attack, how 
much more must this woman have felt sympathy for her children (14:13 – 20)? 
Assuming that women are more sympathetic than men and that mothers who have 
more children love their children more, the author emphasises the enormity of this 
mother’s maternal feelings (15:4 – 8).103 It is this woman, full of love and sympathy 
for her children, who watches the pile of her children’s charred flesh, severed hands, 
and scalped heads grow (15:20). Despite the enormity of her feelings for her boys 
and the gruesome nature of their deaths, she remains unmoved (14:20) with her 
reason secure (15:11). From the author’s point of view (and that of his audience), 
given the combination of the mother’s ‘weakness’ with the ‘power’ of the emotions 
released by the spectre of her brutalised children, one would expect a complete 
breakdown. The mother’s restraint, a restraint so great that she did not even weep 
for her tortured sons (15:19, 20), demonstrates reason’s capacity to master the 
passions peculiar to mothers. She has an ‘adamantine mind’ (16:12), so hard that it is 
impenetrable even to the greatest emotional attack. 
As in Eleazar and her sons, the mother’s reason is inviolable because it is 
pious reason, shaped by a belief in God’s gift of life as Torah-ordered in creation, 
history, and the eschaton. Yet, in 4 Macc 15:2, the author uses the mother’s particular 
case to make clear the formal distinction that has been operating all along. Thus, the 
mother distinguishes between the ‘temporal salvation’ (πρόσκαιρος σωτηρία) offered 
on Antiochus’ terms and the ‘eternal life’ (αἰώνιος ζωή) promised by God to the pious. 
Antiochus presents a choice between temporal life and death, while the mother’s 
reason posits an integral relationship between the immanent and transcendent 
planes. In other words, to disregard piety is not, as the tyrant would have it, a matter 
of choosing life over death. It is rather a choice between two temporal forms of life, 
                                                
102 On the topos of the weak and yet ‘manly’ woman in 4 Maccabees and antiquity, see Moore and 
Anderson, ‘Taking It‘, 266 – 269. 
103 Young, ‘Soul‘, 76. 
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one entailing eternal death and the other eternal life. Again, this does not negate the 
author’s commitment to the Hellenistic definition of the good life or the noble death 
entailed by such a life in a time of tyranny. On the contrary, the καλοκἀγαθία of the 
brothers—here equated with the fact that each is δίκαιος, σώφρων, ἀνδρεῖος, µεγαλόψυχος 
and φιλάδελφος —displayed in their death for the law deepened her love for them 
(15:9, 10). Yet, as in the case of the brothers, the mother’s love is properly ordered 
precisely in so far as that love is ordered toward not temporal but eternal ends. It is 
this understanding of the relationship between temporal and eternal loves that 
clarifies the otherwise opaque comparison of the mother with Abraham, as we shall 
see.  
Abraham and Isaac feature in 4 Maccabees in a number of ways. Eleazar twice 
refers to the Jews as ‘the children of Abraham’ (6:17, 22). The boys remind each other 
of Isaac’s self-offering as a spur to their own self-offering (13:12). Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob are the ground of hope for life with God for both Eleazar and the boys, as 
they live and die for God (7:19, 13:17, 16:25). Rajak notes ‘that the prominent national 
dimension to the martyrdom’ is a clue to the meaning of these references, while 
conceding that references connecting Abraham with the brothers and their mother 
are ‘extraordinary and still puzzling.’104  Near the beginning of the account of the 
mother, she is called ὁµόψυχος with Abraham (14:20). Rajak’s comment regarding the 
‘national’ character of the references to the patriarchs is more sharply focused when 
compared with an apt observation of Young, who writes, ‘Her status as ὁµόψυχος 
with Abraham may be seen as an echo of 13:12, and it emphasizes her high religious 
status through her bonds with the patriarch; just as her sons, nourished together 
physically and morally are ‘ὁµόνοια‘ with each other, she is ὁµόψυχος with 
Abraham.’105 It is striking that the next reference to Abraham, after a lengthy 
discussion of the tension between the mother’s motherly passions and her pious 
reason, again introduces the distinction between temporal and eternal deliverance as 
the key to her resolve. In making this distinction, she is ‘Abraham’s daughter’, 
remembering his ‘God-fearing perseverance’ (16:20). In the very next verse, she is 
acclaimed ‘mother of the nation.’ Similar to the earlier observations of Klauck 
                                                
104 Rajak, ‘Dying‘, 115 – 16. 
105 Young, ‘Soul‘, 76. 
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regarding the representative character of the brother’s love for each other, it would 
seem that the mother is ‘one-soul’ with Abraham, according to the author of 4 
Maccabees, precisely in offering her sons to God as Abraham offered Isaac, trusting 
that she would, as it were, receive them back from the dead.  
This view is confirmed by two other features of the account. First, as with the 
boys, the author imagines how the mother might have spoken to herself if she were 
‘cowardly-souled’ (δειλόψυχος, 16:5), and, again, the key theme is vanity (µάταιος,16:7; 
µάτην,16:8), though the choice of word here stresses the result of her mothering. It 
was to no purpose or result. Second, this theme of vanity is directly contradicted by 
the author’s account of the speech the mother gave the boys: ’Remember that it is 
because of the God of the cosmos that you have come to share in and enjoy life and 
on account of this you are obligated to endure all pain because of God’ (16:18).  In 
other words, the mother uses the logic of benefaction to describe the boys’ fitting 
response to God’s gift of life—viz., they should offer their lives back to God. That the 
endurance of the boys is understood precisely as an offering in which the life given 
would be returned is confirmed by the two examples she adduces in support of this 
statement. Abraham hastened to offer Isaac, and Isaac did not cower when he saw 
the knife coming down (16:19). Daniel went to the lions, and Hananiah, Azaariah, 
and Mishael went to the furnace for the sake of God (16:22). Crucially, the mother 
says that it is precisely because they have the same faith in God (τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν πρὸς 
τὸν θεὸν) that the boys should endure (16:22). In the next verse she says something 
similar: because (γάρ) they know piety (εὐσέβεια), it would be irrational (ἀλόγιστος) 
not to resist pain (16:23). These parallel verses help us see how πίστις can serve as a 
synecdoche for εὐσέβεια in 4 Maccabees, with the latter as the more comprehensive 
category.106 To know piety entails a faith like that of Abraham and Isaac, and Daniel, 
Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael.107 That is, it is to have faith in the God of life, the 
                                                
106 Contra van Henten, ’Background ’, 125 –126. The πίστις of the mother (15:24) and the πίστις she 
recognises in the biblical exemplars and commends to the boys (16:22) is not a matter of obedience 
(‘faithfulness’) but knowledge and, thus, ‘trust.’ The verses in 4 Macc 16:22, 23 are parallel, with the 
first clause as the cognitive ground of the action in the second clause: ‘Since then you have the same 
faith in God (πρὸς τὸν θεόν), do not be afraid. For it is unreasonable for those who know piety (ἀλόγιστον 
γὰρ εἰδότας εὐσέβειαν) not to resist pains.’ 
107 Deissmann and Townshend observe that the grammatical anomaly of the nominative plural 
εἰδότες in 16:25 (cf. ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν υἱῶν, 16:24) is a case of anacolouthon; A. Deissmann, ’Das vierte 
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God who delivers the pious who endure from death. That this life is conceived as a 
life beyond death is confirmed by 16:25: ‘Those who die for God live to God just as 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and all the patriarchs.’ 
1.3.4 Closing Epitaph and Theological Instruction (4 Macc 17 – 18) 
 In 4 Macc 17 – 18 the author concludes with a closing epitaph and final 
instructions in pious reason for his audience. Chapter 17 provides a fitting summary 
and conclusion of the author’s apologia. The mother’s trust in God that led to the 
endurance of her boys was effective both temporally and eternally, as she, with 
them, both defeated the tyrant and, for her immovable commitment, has received 
from God an immovable existence (17:1 – 7). For, like Abraham (17:6), she has 
received through a divine miracle her sons back and stands with them in God’s 
presence, fixed and immutable like the stars in the sky (17: 5). While the reminder of 
what the mother and boys endured causes shuddering (17:7), properly remembered, 
it causes amazement and, so, the author imagines a memorial epitaph. While the 
martyrs died because Antiochus wanted to ‘destroy the polity of the Hebrews,’ ‘they 
avenged (ἐξεδίκησαν) their people, looking to God and enduring tortures even unto 
death’ (17:8 – 10).  This epitaph naturally invites the question of how the deaths of the 
martyrs ‘avenged’ Israel, a question the author answers by reintroducing the contest 
metaphor, with an account of its temporal and eternal honours. In their contest, 
personified virtue ‘was offering rewards through testing perseverance,’ but, because 
this endurance race is divine, the prizes are ‘immortal victory in everlasting life’ (τὸ 
νῖκος ἀφθαρσία ἐν ζωῇ πολυχρονίῳ, 17:12). As the whole world watches (17:14), 
‘godliness wins, crowning its own athletes’ (17:15) leaving everyone amazed by ‘the 
athletes of the divine law’ (17:16). Temporal honours are added to eternal ones, 
however, as ‘because of them’ (δι᾿ αὐτούς) Israel avoided subjugation (17:20), the 
tyrant was punished, and the homeland purified (17:21). Again, the logic is cultic 
and substitutionary, as the martyrs are considered an ‘exchange’ (ἀντίψυχος) for the 
sin of the nation and their blood and propitiatory deaths (τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου 
                                                                                                                                                  
Makkabäerbuch’, in Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des alten Testaments in Verbindung (ed. E. 
Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900), 2:173; Townshend, ’Fourth Maccabees’, in The Apocrypha 
and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English (ed. Charles), 2:682. There is no reason, then, to 
excise v. 25 as an interpolation based on this anomaly; contra Freudenthal, IV Makkabäerbuch, 123–24. 
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αὐτῶν), though not effective per se, are the means by which ‘the Divine Providence’ 
saved Israel ‘who had been previously mistreated’ (17:22).108 In other words, it is God 
who is the material cause of this salvation, his providence that makes the martyrs’ 
‘gift’ of their lives liberating, propitiatory, and expiatory. 
 Turning from his praise for the martyrs and summary of his theology to 
exhortation of his readers in 4 Macc 18, the author addresses them as ‘Abrahamite 
offspring’ (Αβραµιαῖος) and ’Israelite children’ (παῖδες), and commands them to ‘trust 
in this law and act piously in every way’ (18:1). The appeal to their knowledge that 
pious reason rules the passions establishes their capacity to trust in the law and live 
piously (18:2), while the brief recounting of the temporal and eternal results for the 
martyrs, Antiochus, and the nation grounds this life in its expected results (18:3 – 5). 
Moreover, in both exemplars and scriptural quotations taught by their father, the 
mother reminds the boys (the nation) of the inevitability of suffering and the life-
giving power of God: Cain and Abel, the sacrifice of Isaac, Joseph in prison, Phineas, 
Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael in the fire, and Daniel in the lion’s den were all 
delivered, while the scriptural quotations, which taken together figuratively affirm 
God’s deliverance of the afflicted righteous from harm, take on new significance in 
light of the martyrs’ actual tortures. They have passed through fire from which God 
promises deliverance (Isa 43:2), suffered the many afflictions of the righteous (Ps 
34:19), done God’s will in hope of the tree of life (Prov 3:18), and been a positive 
answer to the question of whether dry bones can live (Ez 37:3). The author’s 
conflation of Dt 32:39, 47 and Dt 30:20 in 18:19 is the climax: Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν 
ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑµῶν καὶ ἡ µακρότης τῶν ἡµερῶν. 109 The peculiar configuration of 
these verses serves as a fitting summary of the author’s theological vision. It is the 
fact that God kills and makes alive, that he is death-dealer and life-giver that is, in 
the author’s view, the very basis of temporal and eternal life. Thus, echoing the 
language that began his closing exhortation, he concludes that it is the ‘Abrahamite 
children’ (οἱ Αβραµιαῖοι παῖδες), the ones who trusted that God has the power to bring 
life to the worthy dead, who along with their mother are added to the ‘chorus of the 
                                                
108 deSilva (4 Maccabees: Commentary, 250) rightly notes that the reference to the martyrs’ blood 
and divine providence implies a sacrificial frame. 
109 deSilva, 4 Maccabees: Commentary, 265. 
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fathers’ (πατέρων χορός), ’having received pure and immortal souls from God’ (ψυχὰς 
ἁγνὰς καὶ ἀθανάτους ἀπειληφότες παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, 18:23). 
 The same mother who urged her sons to endure suffering in expectation of 
God’s deliverance (16:16 – 23) taught her boys as children that God, the life-giver is 
their life and length of days (18:19). Thus, with the mother’s teaching in place 4 
Maccabees’ theological argument is complete. Eleazar grounds complete obedience 
to the Torah in an account of the divine donation of created life, seeing his suffering 
and death through a cult-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic and thus appealing to 
God to receive his life as a substitutionary gift for the nation. In complementary 
fashion, the mother grounds complete obedience to the Torah in the anticipation of 
the divine return of national and eschatological life, seeing salvation history and 
scripture through a hermeneutic that configures divine saving action as God’s gift of 
life to worthy sufferers. 
Conclusion: God of the Good Life, Torah-Defined 
The boldness of 4 Maccabees’ peculiar apologia is matched by the subtle melding of 
Stoic ethics and Jewish theology that undergirds it. The deaths of the martyrs prove 
that only the Hebrews are invincible for virtue (9:18). For if even an old man, some 
boys, and a mother are able to defeat the passions of torture and death, then God 
must have given the law to the mind from creation as the proper order of the self. 
Yet, in 4 Maccabees, the good life, the Torah-shaped life, always leads to flourishing, 
either temporally or eternally, because God is just. Thus, though the author starts 
with Stoic conceptions of the good life, he will not accept the mere pyrrhic victories 
of Stoicism but must instead explain how justice did and will prevail. Here again the 
Jewish theology of divine benefaction modifies and expands the Stoic anthropology 
and ethics. In the account of the brothers, 4 Maccabees both answers the question of 
theodicy and provides the representative ground for national renewal, as their 
united commitment to the teaching of Eleazar and their mother renders them worthy 
of God’s justice-shaped mercy in eternity and is the means by which the sin of the 
nation is removed. Throughout, the creational teaching of Eleazar and the 
eschatological instruction of the mother undergird the theological logic and provide 
the hermeneutic by which the martyrs see tragedy as triumph, death as life. For 
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God—not Nature or Antiochus—is the Benefactor, who has given inviolable 
individual and social life as inviolably Torah-ordered, and who sustains this order 
via his cult-focused and Deuteronomic life-giving and death-dealing activity in and 
beyond history. 
 Consequently, this chapter produces two important results for this thesis. 
First, it demonstrates that the assumption that divine grace is by definition 
‘groundless’ or should be conceived without respect to human activity or worth 
axiomatically is misleading. This result is significant because it supports recent 
reevaluations of grace in Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity that analyse 
differing definitions of gift in these texts.110 In 4 Maccabees, the indiscriminate divine 
donation of Torah-ordered created life provides the basis for God’s fitting return of 
life in history and the eschaton to the worthy. This is neither ‘legalistic works 
righteousness’111, nor grace that is by definition apart from obedience.112 Second, 
though analyses of the theology of 4 Maccabees have focused on its atonement 
theology, such a focus is insufficient for understanding this text’s theological logic. 
For the self-offering of Eleazar and the martyrs has logical and theological force only 
within 4 Maccabees’ deeper account of the circle of the divine gift of life initiated at 
creation and maintained by God’s life-giving and death-dealing activity in history 
and in the eschaton.
                                                
110 Cf. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness; McFarland, God and Grace; Barclay, Gift. 
111 Cf. W. Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter (Berlin: Reuther & 
Reichard, 1903), 176 – 77; and R.B. Townshend, ‘The Fourth Book of Maccabees‘, in The Apocrypha and 
Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English (ed. R.H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653; 
2:664. 
112 Redditt, ‘The Concept of Nomos’, 253. 
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Chapter 2 
Seeing (from) the End: Ezra, Exemplary Witness of Life in 4 Ezra 
 
‘I can with one eye squinted take it all as a blessing’. Flannery O’Connor1 
Introduction 
Despite the profundity and depth of its interrogation of the plight of humanity and 
Israel, 4 Ezra occupies an ironic position in current scholarship.2 Pauline scholars 
working in the shadow of E.P. Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism are prepared to 
find in this apocalypse an anomaly—an ancient Jewish text in which God’s ‘grace’ is 
absent and a theology of legalistic works-righteousness dominates3—while 
specialists are still in search of a consensus on how 4 Ezra works theologically.4 
Though the vision of episode four (4 Ezra 9:26 – 10:59) is recognised as the climax of 
the work,5 there is no consensus on the character of this climax, and it is still unclear 
how or whether the powerful debate over God’s mercy in episode three (6:35 – 9:25) 
between Ezra and his angelus interpres, Uriel leads up to it. This chapter argues that 
an examination of divine life-giving benefaction in 4 Ezra exposes episode three as a 
debate over the created integrity (i.e., freedom) of the self. Thereby, the theological 
function of the vision of episode four is a confirmation of Ezra as an exemplar of this 
created integrity and, in this way, a fitting recipient of the revelation of restoration of 
Zion at the eschaton. Despite the cognitive limitations of life in a world dominated 
                                                
1 F. O’Connor, The Habit of Being: Letters of Flannery O’Connor (New York: FSG, 1988), 57. 
2 4 Ezra is dated after the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E., near the end of the first century 
due to the apparent reference to the Flavian emperors in the ‘three heads’ of the eagle in the vision of 
episode five (cf. 11:19 – 35; 12:22 – 28); see J.M. Myers, I and II Esdras (AB 42; Garden City: Doubleday, 
1974), 129–31, 299–302; M.E. Stone, Fourth Ezra (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 9–10, 
363–65. On the unity of the text, see M.E. Stone, ‘On Reading an Apocalypse‘, in Mysteries and 
Revelations (ed. J.J. Collins and J.H. Charlesworth; JSJSup 9; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 65–78. 
3 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1977), 409 – 18. Sanders views his analysis as confirmation of Köberle, Sünde und 
Gnade, 651–57. Cf. B.W. Longenecker, Eschatology and the Covenant: a Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1 
- 11 (JSNTSup 57; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 151 – 53. Though note Longenecker’s shift from covenantal 
‘abrogation’ to ‘redefinition’; idem, 2 Esdras (GAP; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 98 – 100. 
4 See K.M. Hogan, Theologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom Debate and Apocalyptic Solution (JSJSup 
130; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 15 – 35. 
5 See e.g. E. Breech, ’These Fragments I Have Shored Against My Ruins: the Form and Function of 
4 Ezra’, JBL 92 (1973): 267–74; M.E. Stone, ’Reactions to Destructions of the Second Temple: Theology, 
Perception and Conversion’, JSJ 12 (1981): 195 – 204. 
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by the experience of sin, futility, and death, human beings remain free to live 
according to the divine gift of Torah-ordered life—a freedom paradoxically 
expressed in Ezra’s full venting yet ultimate subordination of his grief to God’s just 
mercy.  
 Consequently, this chapter will further research on divine grace in 4 Ezra by 
demonstrating how the debate over God’s generosity in this text is grounded 
ultimately in a particular account of the relationship between God’s life-giving 
activity in creation and his life-giving activity in the eschaton. If the life God gave at 
creation is properly ordered by Torah, it is not only just but necessary that the 
righteous (as defined by Torah) enter the fulfillment of life that is given in the 
eschaton. With this reading, we will build on the recent work of Barclay, by showing 
how the angel Uriel’s case for God’s discriminating distribution of eschatological life 
depends on his logically prior account of the efficacy of God’s indiscriminate 
donation of created life as Torah-ordered. Moreover, over the course of this analysis, 
we will contribute to the debate over the theological logic in 4 Ezra by showing how 
the author’s definition of life informs his theodicy and its climax in Ezra’s vision of 
heavenly Zion. That is, by attending to how 4 Ezra defines life as divine gift in 
creation and at the eschaton, we will demonstrate how the vision of episode four 
provides the (theo)logical climax of the debate over the character of divine 
mercy/grace in episode three. Specifically, we will show that neither does episode 
three end in an aporia (intentional or unintentional), as Hogan and Brandenburger 
contend, nor is the change of Ezra in episode four reducible to ‘visionary experience’ 
(i.e., non-rational or irrational; cf. Gunkel and Stone), but rather, by recognising the 
connection to and development of the seed metaphor from episode three to episode 
four, we come to see the organic logic connecting the gift of created life and its 
eschatological return. 
 The argument is tri-partite: section one contends that, in episode one, Uriel 
reframes Ezra’s accusations of 1) God’s unwillingness to use his life-giving power to 
remove his people’s moral incapacity (infirmitas, 3:20 – 22)6 and 2) God’s unjust 
favouring of his enemies (3:28 – 36) by diagnosing Ezra’s fallen condition as 
                                                
6 For the text of 4 Ezra, I am using A.F.J. Klijn, ed., Der lateinische Text der Apokalypse des Esra 
(TUGAL 131; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1983). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
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epistemic not moral (4:11) and Israel’s plight as a function of the world’s corrupted 
and limited estate not God’s capriciousness (4:26 – 32), respectively; in episode two, 
Uriel reframes Ezra’s complaint about Gentile humiliation of Israel by identifying 
the nation’s decline with the inevitable decline of the cosmos via his world-as-womb 
metaphor (5:45 – 55); section two argues that the debate over mercy in episode three 
exposes two differing accounts of God’s life-giving benefaction—one modeled on 
God’s unconditioned and incongruous sustenance of the fallen world and one on 
God’s conditioned and fitting governance of inviolable created life and its Torah-
order—accounts that find quintessential expression in strong readings of Ex 34:6 – 7 
(7:132 – 8:14) and Dt 30:15 – 20 (7:19 – 22; 7:127 – 131) by Ezra and Uriel, respectively; 
in section three, we argue that Ezra adopts Uriel’s account of the created freedom of 
the self and the two-ages framework that insures its just maintenance, which both 
renders him epistemically ready and morally fit for receiving a vision of Zion’s 
eschatological restoration. The thesis of this chapter is that the author’s reading 
(hereafter, 4 Ezra) of sacred text, salvation-history, and empirical reality is governed 
by a theological vision in which Israel’s experience of the world’s futile Sein-zum-
Tode is seen as the ontological and epistemological consequence of God’s judgement 
of creation, while God’s inviolable donation of human life as free and Torah-ordered 
from creation provides the moral basis and criterion for God’s fitting resurrection of 
the righteous and punishment of the wicked at the eschaton.7  
2.1 Learning to See Life God’s Way: The Revelatory Reframing of Ezra’s 
Understanding (4 Ezra 3:1 – 6:34) 
Piqued by a comparison of the ‘desolation’ of Zion and the ‘abundance’ of Babylon 
(3:1 – 3), Ezra’s case against God begins with an overview of salvation-history (3:4 – 
27), emphasising the futility of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction at 
both creation (3:4 - 6) and Sinai (3:17 – 19). This overview prepares for the accusation 
that God favours his enemies over Israel (3:28 – 36)—despite Babylon’s manifest 
wickedness (3:29, 33, 35) and Israel’s commitment to God (3:32, 35). While the image 
                                                
7 On Ezra and Uriel as both, in certain respects, representative of the author’s voice, see L. 
DiTommaso,’Who is the “I“ of 4 Ezra?’, in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch: Reconstruction After the Fall 
(ed. M. Henze; JSJSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 129 – 30. Cf. J.A. Moo, Creation, Nature and Hope in 4 
Ezra (FRLANT 237; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 27–34. 
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of God in the dock, harangued by his prophet is striking, we analyse how Ezra’s 
organic framing places God in a double bind. For, as we will argue, Ezra’s 
conception of the cor malignum and the infirmitas it produces implies God’s 
negligence in not removing the moral incapacity of his people, while his charge that 
Israel’s labour has borne no ‘fruit’ (fructus) questions God’s just governance of 
history (his via, 3:31). Either way, God is at fault.  
 Uriel distills Ezra’s accusations to the issues of God’s way and the evil heart 
(4:4), but rather than answering directly, his defence begins with a test of knowledge 
Ezra is bound to fail (4:5, 6). This test introduces the angel’s alternate diagnosis of 
the human condition not as morally incapacitated but mortal, finite, and, thus, 
epistemologically estranged from God’s heavenly way (4:7 – 21). Ezra’s attempt to 
redirect Uriel from heavenly to historical concerns (4:22 – 25) prepares for the angel’s 
introduction of the two-ages framework (4:26 – 32) and the elaboration of this 
alternate diagnosis of moral responsibility (4:28, 30) amidst cosmic corruption and 
limitation (4:27; cf. 4:29, 31 – 32). In short, Ezra’s problem is not God but the 
occlusion of God and his justice that results from being a ‘corrupt [human] in the 
corrupt world’ (4:11). With these clarifications in place, Ezra asks about the timing of 
(4:33, 44 – 46) and likelihood that he will see the ‘end’ Uriel announces (4:51 – 52), 
while the angel deems Ezra worthy of further instruction about the fixed timing of 
the end (4:34 – 43), Ezra’s position in the eschatological time-table (i.e., late; 4:47 – 
50), and the character of the last days (5:1 – 15).  
 For the purposes of the argument of this chapter, the analysis of this section 
establishes two points. First, with regard to the study of grace in 4 Ezra, our exegesis 
contributes to our overall contention that the outcome of the debate in episode three 
over the character of God’s eschatological grace—whether congruous or 
incongruous—depends logically on the account of God’s gift of created life as Torah-
ordered in the first two episodes. Whereas Ezra seeks to deny the efficacy of God’s 
creation gifts of moral agency and the Torah, Uriel reframes this incapacity in 
ontological and epistemological (not moral) terms. As we shall see, this particular 
understanding of the implications of the incapacity of the world and humanity 
introduces Uriel’s explanation of the inevitable decline of Israel in episode two. In 
summary, the problem is not that Ezra and Israel cannot live according to the Torah 
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but that they and the world they inhabit qua fallen and finite are not capable of 
understanding or receiving the divine gift of true eschatological life—life devoid of 
sin, sickness, and death. Yet, all is not lost, because, despite these epistemological 
and ontological limitations, both Ezra’s given moral capacity and access to the 
Torah-order of creation remain. Second, with respect to the theological logic of 4 
Ezra, the organic metaphors here introduced by Ezra and subverted by Uriel provide 
the conceptual structure that links the two ages. For, as we shall see, the debate over 
the character of God’s grace in episode three occurs through differing uses of these 
organic metaphors of life. Likewise, in episode four, it is God’s creative return of life 
as eschatological gift to the worthy that insures that the Torah given at creation bears 
fruit—thus providing the logical link between episode three and Ezra’s vision. 
2.1.1 God in the Dock: Debating the Futility of Life (3:1 – 5:20) 
 Ezra begins by presenting Israel’s history as a vicious life-sin-death cycle (3:4 
– 27), a reading that stresses the paradoxical pattern of God’s dealings. Retelling the 
magnalia Dei, from the creation of Adam to the destruction of Zion, Ezra presents 
God’s life-giving creative and elective activity as negated by sin and judgement. The 
background for this recital is the ‘covenant lawsuit’, whereby the narration of the 
mighty works of God introduces an indictment of the people.8 Yet, 4 Ezra subverts 
the traditional form to ‘[call God] to account before the bar of his own justice’.9 
Ezra’s prosecutorial strategy is clever: he implicates God in the life-sin-death cycle 
by juxtaposing his life-giving power with his apparent unwillingness to use that 
power to change the hearts of his people, preferring rather to punish them through 
his enemies. Moreover, this narration of Israel’s Unheilsgeschichte10 sets up a bold 
charge (3:28 – 36): despite their wickedness, God favours Israel’s enemies, while 
Israel’s own fidelity is futile. The framing of Ezra’s charges places God in a classic 
double bind: either he is indifferent to the plight of his people or he is unjust in his 
                                                
8 See M.E. Stone, ‘The Way of the Most High and the Injustice of God in 4 Ezra‘, in Knowledge of 
God in the Graeco-Roman World (ed. R. van den Broek, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld; EPRO 112; Leiden: 
Brill, 1988), 133 – 34; idem, Fourth Ezra, 61 – 63. Ezra asserts God’s justice in his dealings with Israel 
(3:7 – 10, 25 – 27), questioning God’s justice only in 3:28 – 36; rightly, Barclay, Gift, 284, n. 12. 
9 Stone, ‘Way‘, 134. 
10 For this term, see Barclay, Gift, 285. 
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treatment of them. Ezra’s account of God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction 
and his use of organic metaphors play a key role in framing the charges. 
 Ezra lingers at two places in his overview of salvation-history, to give fuller 
accounts of God’s life-giving and life-ordering activity. At God’s verbal command 
alone (3:4) the dust ‘gave’ (dedit) Adam, a ‘dead body’ (corpus mortuum), while God’s 
direct life-giving activity receives emphasis in a threefold description. Adam is the 
‘product’ (figmentum) of God’s hands, the one in whom God breathed the ‘spirit of 
life’ (spiritum vitae), and the one who was ‘made alive’ (factus est vivens, 3:5). As we 
shall see more fully in our analysis of episode three, the use of do with God as 
subject, esp. with reference to life and the law as gifts, is consistent with the broad 
system of exchange in Greco-Roman reciprocity, with the giving of divine gifts 
establishing a relationship and expecting a suitable return. Thus, at Sinai, the 
cosmological upset of God’s glory descending from heaven to earth is emphasised 
fourfold (3:18), while this upset is necessary: ut dares semini Iacob legem et generationi 
Israhel diligentiam (3:19). In both descriptions God’s care and power are underlined 
and he is presented as the donor (mando, 3:7; do, 3:19) of a singular law (cf. diligentiam 
unam, 3:7).11 These careful descriptions are given, however, to question their utility 
and purpose in light of God’s death-dealing judgement: for Adam transgressed 
God’s command on receiving it and God immediately (statim) ‘appointed death for 
him’ (3:7). Moreover, this Adamic heritage of transgression and death extends to ‘the 
nations born from him…that are without number’ (3:7), as ‘each nation walked 
according to its own will’ (ambulavit unaquaque gens in voluntate sua, 3:8). This is 
Israel’s heritage too: though God raised up his servant David, the residents of Zion 
transgressed in omnibus facientes sicut fecit Adam, and, thus, God handed the city over 
to his enemies (3:26 – 27). Despite God’s life-giving and life-ordering care at creation 
and Sinai, the cycle of life-sin-death he governs extends from creation to exile. 
 Ezra develops the diagnosis of the plight of humanity and Israel by extending 
the organic terminology of the creation account to created anthropology. God’s gift 
of an ordered life is futile both from creation and in Israel because he did not remove 
                                                
11 There is no evidence that this conflation is understood, as in some rabbinical literature, as a 
consequence of the rejection of the law by the nations (contra Stone, Fourth Ezra, 132). As Hogan 
argues, the view likely arises from an identification of personified Wisdom with the Torah (see e.g. Sir 
24:23; 15:14 – 15; 7:7 – 11; cf. Dt 4:6); K.M. Hogan, ‘The Meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra‘, JSJ 38 (2007): 537 – 
39. 
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the cor malignum (3:20).12 Though Ezra does not say that God gave Adam an evil 
heart, the plight of Israel is the plight of humanity, as Ezra grounds the situation 
logically (enim) in Adam’s state of ‘being burdened’ (baiolans) with the cor malignum 
(3:21). If Israel is to be judged for transgression, God is to blame: for he did not 
remove the evil heart ‘that it might produce fruit (fructum) in them’ (3:20b).13 Israel, 
like Adam and the rest of humanity, ‘having transgressed, was overcome’ 
(transgressus et victus est, 3:21). Ezra explains that Adam’s fall perpetuated ‘an 
enduring sickness’ (permanens infirmitas), and, viewing the heart as a garden, 
pictures this sickness as a situation in which ‘the law and the evil root [were] with 
the heart of people’ (lex cum corde populi cum malignitate radicis, but ‘the good (bonum) 
has departed and the evil (malignum) remained’ (3:22). Scholars have noted the 
importance of the angel Uriel’s appeals to nature and his explicit use of nature 
metaphors.14 Yet, it is Ezra’s organic language that provides the logical framework 
for his debate with Uriel over the nature of the Adamic heritage. For Ezra uses 
organic language to posit both a necessary relationship between the heart and its 
resulting behaviour (fructus, 3:20) and, given the departure of the law and the 
remaining ‘evil root’, the inability of the heart to produce good fruit (3:22).15 As 
Barclay comments, ‘Ezra here identifies a problem deeper and broader than the 
horrors of the exile: the whole of humanity is infected with a “sickness”… which 
appears to doom all human history to the futility of suffering and death’.16 Ezra’s 
understanding of the Adamic heritage and its transmission is not developed, but the 
organic metaphors do configure God’s gift of the Torah at Sinai as ineffectual.17  
                                                
12 Barclay, Gift, 284, n. 12: ‘[T]he two statements of God’s non-action (non prohibuisti, 3.8; non 
abstulisti, 3.20) imply that God could have intervened but did not’.  
13 Rightly recognised in J.A. Moo, ‘The Few Who Obtain Mercy: Soteriology in 4 Ezra‘, in This 
World and the World to Come: Soteriology in Early Judaism (ed. D.M. Gurtner; T&T Clark, 2011), 101, 104. 
14 See e.g. M.E. Stone, ‘The Parabolic use of Natural Order in Judaism of the Second Temple Age‘, 
in Gilgul: Essays on Transformation, Revolution, and Permanence in the History of Religions, Dedicated to 
R.J. Zwi Werblowsky (ed. S. Shaked, D. Shulman, and G.G. Stroumsa; SHR 50; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 298–
308; K.M. Hogan, ‘Mother Earth as a Conceptual Metaphor in 4 Ezra‘, CBQ 73 (2011): 72 – 91. 
15 Contra W.O.E. Oesterly, who imports here a ‘Pauline’ notion of the law leading to death (from 
Rom 5:2), a view which begs one question under debate; W.O.E. Oesterley, II Esdras (the Ezra 
Apocalypse) (Westminster Commentaries; London: Methuen, 1933), 26. 
16 Barclay, Gift, 284. 
17 For the view that it is Adam’s sinfulness that is inherited, see W. Harnisch, Verhängnis und 
Verheissung der Geschichte: Untersuchungen zum Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis im 4.Buch Esra und in der 
syr. Baruchapokalypse (FRLANT 97; Göttingen: Vandehoeck & Rupprecht, 1969), 54–56; Egon 
Brandenburger, Fleisch und Geist: Paulus und die dualistische Weisheit (Wissenschaftliche Monographien 
zum Alten und Neuen Testament 29. Bd; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des 
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Moreover, with this framing, as we shall see, a debate over the character of the 
Adamic heritage is initiated. 
 Ezra’s self-talk in 3:28 marks a shift in prosecutorial strategy (‘And then I said 
in my heart…’), as a consideration of Zion’s status relative to Babylon implies not 
inaction in removing evil but God’s perverse tolerance of it. Ezra has seen (video) 
‘innumerable impieties’ and ‘many sins’ during his time in Babylon (3:29; cf. 3:12), 
and, yet, he has not seen (video) judgement but ‘the manner in which [God] endures 
sinners, spares those who live impiously, destroys [his] people and preserves [his] 
enemies’ (3:30). This incongruity leads to the overarching complaint: ‘and you have 
shown nothing to anyone about how this way ought to be understood’.18 Again, an 
organic metaphor provides the logic for Ezra’s indictment. While Jacob waits in vain 
for his work (labor) to bear fruit (fructifico), Ezra sees (video) the Gentiles flourishing 
despite not remembering God’s commandments (3:33). This use of fructifico extends 
the organic logic of the relation between heart and actions to their results (merces, 
3:33), which underlines Ezra’s changed strategy, as he now expects that Israel’s 
‘labor’ should have received something from God. For, in comparison, only Israel has 
known God, trusted his covenants, and obeyed his commandments (3:32 – 35). Thus, 
Ezra implies that God’s way is not just unknown but unjust (3:34). 
 The basic defensive strategy of the angelus interpres is to deny Ezra’s capacity 
to understand the information he seeks, but in such a way that the prophet becomes 
pupil in apocalyptic instruction.19 The key aspect of the resulting dialogue, for our 
purposes, is how Uriel utilises Ezra’s organic metaphors and logic to reframe the 
sage’s opening complaint: the problem is neither the cor malignum nor the injustice of 
God’s way but that Ezra is ‘corrupted’, both epistemologically estranged and 
constitutionally incapable of understanding God’s heavenly way, and the world is 
                                                                                                                                                  
Erziehungsvereins, 1968), 35–36. For criticism of this view and the alternate suggestion that it is the 
evil inclination and death, not sinfulness, that is inherited from Adam, see Stone, Fourth Ezra, 63–66. If 
as Hogan contends (‘tôrâ’, 538) Ezra’s conflation of creation order with the law stands in the tradition 
of Sirach, there is a striking dissonance between Ezra’s picture of the evil heart in the first episode and 
Sirach’s insistence that freedom of choice is an inviolable created capacity (cf. Sir 15:14 – 15). 
18 The Latin text of 3:31 reads: et non significasti nihil nemini quomodo debeat derelinqui via haec, 
though most scholars follow the Syr., which in place of an equivalent of derelinquo (‘forsake, leave’) 
reads ‘comprehend’. Given the use of comprehendo with respect to the via of God in 4:2, the Syr. text is 
to be preferred at 3:31; so, Stone, Fourth Ezra, 59. 
19 Thus, every interaction is revelatory and authoritative; DiTommaso, ‘The ”I”‘, 127. Cf. M.E. 
Stone, ‘Apocalyptic—Vision or Hallucination? ‘, Milla wa-Milla 14 (1974): 47 – 56. 
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‘corrupted’, subject to an infirmitas that renders it unfit for and incapable of hosting 
the revelation of God’s justice in full. 
 Uriel’s first lesson concerns Ezra’s incapacity as a finite and mortal human. 
Utilising a play on the word via (3:31), Uriel’s opening gambit offers Ezra a fool’s 
errand. He cannot solve the three ‘ways/riddles’ (4:5) and secure the angel’s promise 
to ‘show’ him the ‘way’ and to teach him why the heart is evil (4:4). For knowledge 
of the weight of fire, the force of wind, or how to turn back time is beyond him (4:5). 
Ezra’s response hints at the problem: for the question ‘who of those born is able so to 
do?’ (4:6) implies a contrast with the angels who are not born20 and ties into uses of 
nascor concerning the Adamic legacy of sin and death (cf. 7:46, 57, 63, 65, 68, 127; 
9:22; 10:10). The angel’s response accepts the point and capitalises on it: he has not 
asked Ezra about things with which he is unfamiliar (e.g., the exits of Hades or the 
entrances of paradise, 4:7)21 but matters that he experiences but does not understand. 
This introduces a clear denial of Ezra’s epistemological capacity for understanding 
God’s heavenly way, and in organic and spatial terms: if he cannot understand these 
experiences, how can his ‘vessel’ (vas) receive (capio) the way of the Most High, and 
how can ‘one who is corrupt in the corrupt world’ understand ‘the way of the 
incorruptible’ (4:11).22 In addition to this distinction between mortality and 
immortality, the contrast between limited body and limitless ‘way’ contained in 
other manuscripts is likely original, for all versions except the Latin read the 
following statement after 4:11a: ‘For the way of the Most High is created 
immeasurable’.23 With these distinctions between mortal/immortal and 
limited/limitless, Uriel asserts a qualitative difference between Ezra and the 
knowledge he seeks, one that configures him as epistemologically because 
cosmologically estranged from God. In A.P. Hayman’s terms, ‘the chaos without 
                                                
20 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 84.  
21 On the implicit denial of esoteric heavenly knowledge here, see Moo, Creation, 50. Cf. Stone, 
Fourth Ezra, 84; idem, ‘Paradise in 4 Ezra iv:8 and vii:36, viii:52‘, JJS 17 (1966): 85 – 86; idem, Features of 
the Eschatology of IV Ezra (HSS 35; Atlanta: Scholars, 1989), 198 – 199, 203. 
22 The phrase ‘corrupt in the corrupt world’ is a reading found in all of the witnesses except one 
Arab. version and the Lat. The difficulty of making sense of the Latin text as it stands along with the 
relative unanimity of the other witnesses suggests a corruption of the Latin text. For the issues and 
our translation, see Stone, Fourth Ezra, 78, 85–86. 
23 Ibid., 78. 
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mirrors the chaos within—in the human heart’.24 Moreover, this diagnosis raises the 
question, if the prophet’s instruction is to continue, of how Ezra’s epistemological 
incapacity is to be transcended.25 Uriel’s next lesson provides the clue. 
 Ezra objects to Uriel’s spatial dualism, insisting on information not of ‘the 
ways above’ but the outrages experienced by Israel (4:22 – 25). Ezra’s reiteration of 
this incongruity is neither ‘specious’ nor a failure to pose ‘questions [that] clearly 
pertain to “the way of the Most High”’26 but rather a transition to the question 
whether the knowledge of God’s heavenly way is necessary for a proper 
understanding of God’s earthly ways. In Barclay’s terms, the difference is ‘between 
the unifocal perspective of “this age” and a bifocal view in which the present sad age is 
seen alongside, and with the added perspective of, the world to come (4.26 – 32)’.27 
Consequently, Uriel is not concerned in his answer with ‘eschatological events and 
the world to come’28 but rather with the relationship between the two ages, especially 
with respect to how knowledge of the world to come provides a proper perspective 
on this age. The problem introduced by Uriel’s insistence on Ezra’s epistemic 
incapacity is how to gain this eschatological perspective.29 For Ezra’s part, he is 
struck by the extreme brevity of the life of God’s people and by the apparent fact 
that ‘[they are] unworthy to obtain mercy’ (nec digni sumus misericordiam consequi, 
4:24). The challenge, then, is for Ezra to gain a perspective from which he can see 
how the worthy do receive mercy from God. 
 One way, Uriel hints, is to be alive when this saeculum comes to an end; for 
then the evil sown will be ‘harvested’ (4:28) and a new field where good has been 
sown will emerge (4:29). Again, Uriel extends Ezra’s organic terms to answer the 
challenge about the absence of justice, though with a significant modification: it is 
                                                
24 A.P. Hayman, ’The ”Man from the Sea” in 4 Ezra 13’, JJS 49 (1998): 15. 
25 DiTommaso, ‘The ”I”‘, 126. 
26 Hogan, Theologies, 122. 
27 Barclay, Gift, 285. 
28 Hogan, Theologies, 122. 
29 Contra Hogan’s contention (Ibid., 9) that ‘the author made a conscious choice to move beyond a 
rational, sapiential approach to the questions raised by the Destruction and to embrace a non-rational, 
apocalyptic solution’. The author relies, rather, on an eschatological projection of the ‘rational, 
sapiential approach’ to uphold God’s mercy and justice, the knowledge of which is apocalyptically 
delivered and rational because it conforms to the divine eschatological order. For further 
argumentation regarding the significance of sense perception for the rational, theological, and 
experiential theodicy of 4 Ezra, see R. Griggs, ’Apocalyptic Experience in the Theodicy of 4 Ezra’, in 
Evil in Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. C. Keith and L.T. Stuckenbruck; WUNT II 417; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 282 – 98. 
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not Israel per se who awaits the fruit of her labor (3:33) but the righteous (iusti, 4:27) 
who await the things God promised in this emergence of a new field.30 This 
distinction between two fields introduces Uriel’s two-ages framework, but the 
explanation of it furthers his alternate diagnosis of the plight of humanity and Israel. 
For our purposes, the key point is that the issue with the cor according to Uriel is 
cosmological not moral, a function of the world’s Sein-zum-Tode vis-à-vis the fullness 
of life to come.31 Just as Ezra cannot receive God’s heavenly way due to his corrupted 
and limited state (4:11), so this saeculum is not able to receive (capio) the fulfillment of 
God’s promises because it is ‘full of sadness…and sicknesses’ (infirmitatibus, 4:27). 
Thus, both Ezra and Uriel use the term infirmitas to refer to the structural incapacity to 
bear ‘fruit’; the question is over the proper applicability of this term, whether to the 
heart (3:22) or the world. Uriel’s use of infirmitas grounds32 Ezra’s epistemic (not 
moral) incapacity in the subjection of the present saeculum to evil, limitation, and 
death. The key point for our argument is Uriel’s expansion of Ezra’s previous 
metaphorical use of the life-cycle to both reaffirm the link between heart, behaviour, 
and results, and to justify the present incongruity. God’s gift of life and its order at 
creation and Sinai is not ineffectual, and his maintenance of it is not unjust; rather, a 
dying and constricted world is unfit both for the judgement of all of humanity with all 
of humanity’s deeds and the disclosure of immutable and limitless life. Moreover, the 
heart is not totally evil: the righteous will receive the things promised (4:27), while the 
evil sown in Adam’s heart and the innumerable amount of impieties (4:30, 32) it has 
produced will be ‘harvested’ on a ‘great threshing-floor’ (magnam aream).33 What is 
needed is a setting sufficient for so great a judgement and a new ‘field’ for the 
eschatological ‘good’ (4:29).34 
                                                
30 Barclay, Gift, 285. 
31 For the implications of 4 Ezra’s ‘two-age’ theory for its pessimism regarding the possibility of 
salvation within the fallen creation, see Harnisch, Verhängnis, 89–178. 
32 Contra Longenecker, Eschatology, 64. 
33 Uriel’s reference in 4:30 to the granum seminis mali sown in Adam’s heart does not confirm 
Ezra’s earlier picture of the cor malignum (pace Barclay, Gift, 284; Hogan, Theologies, 115); for Ezra’s 
conception of infirmitas pictured the complete evacuation of the law and good from the heart. Uriel 
states later that the righteous are capable of resisting the ‘evil thought’ and avoiding being led from 
life to death (7:92). Harnisch (Verhängnis, 48 – 50) recognises that the phrases ‘evil seed’ and ‘evil root’ 
differ from Ezra’s ‘evil heart’, as the latter denies the possibility of doing good. 
34 Stone notes (Fourth Ezra, 95) that the words ‘place’ and ‘field’ refer to both the ‘world’ and the 
‘heart’ (4:29), a fact which Moo argues (Creation, 89 – 90, 109) is due to the integral relationship 
between anthropology and cosmology, ‘human sin’ and ‘cosmic evil’. 
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 Bolstered by the prospect of seeing the resolution of his grief, the rest of the 
episode concerns Ezra’s queries about the duration (4:33 – 37) and reason for the 
delay (4:38 – 39), his position in the timeline of salvation-history (4:44 – 46), and 
whether he will see the end (4:51). The basic principle is that time is providentially 
ordered by God for the sake of the righteous—‘[God] has weighed the age (saeculum) 
in a balance and precisely measured the times and exactly numbered the times and 
he will not move or arouse until the decreed measure [of the righteous] is filled’ (4:36 
– 37; cf. Wis 11:20). This weighing of time displaces Ezra’s suggestion that God 
weigh iniquities (3:34), while Uriel’s underworld-as-womb metaphor (4:38 – 43) 
continues the organic historical logic by specifying that God himself has determined 
when Hades will ‘pay back’ (reddo) those in its care (4:42). This reference to equitable 
distribution at the end elicits a surprising confirmation of Ezra’s worth.35 For, after 
asking if he has found favour (gratia) and is fit (idoneus, 4:44), to be shown where he 
stands in this ordered history, Uriel grants the vision of the flaming furnace and 
rain, which both confirms Ezra’s worth and situates him late in salvation-history 
(4:47 – 50).  
 These disclosures provoke an overreach, as Ezra’s question whether he will 
live to see all this forces Uriel to admit that such knowledge is beyond his remit (4:51 
– 52). Nonetheless, ‘if the Most High has given to [Ezra] to live’ (si autem tibi dederit 
Altissimus vivere, 5:4), then he will see the terrors of the last days, where reason, 
wisdom, and righteousness are nowhere to be found (5:9, 11), ‘unrighteousness and 
incontinence’ have multiplied over the earth (5:10, 11), the signs of the covenant 
curses found in Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 27 – 30 and 32 are on terrifying 
display,36 and the messianic woes have emerged.37 These references to God’s fitting 
return to those in Hades (reddo, 4:42), Ezra’s inquiry about God’s favour and his 
fittingness (gratia and idoneus, 4:44), and the possibility that he will be granted a 
                                                
35 Whereas Ezra complains that Jacob’s ‘reward has not been seen and [his] labour has not born 
fruit’ (merces non conparuit neque labor fructificavit, 3:33), Uriel holds that ‘the fruit of the threshing 
floor of reward’ (fructus areae mercedis) will come for the ‘souls of the righteous’ (animae iustorum, 
4:35), the corollary of his earlier insistence that the fructus impietatis will be harvested (4:31 – 32). 
36 For ‘panic’, see Lev 26:16; 26:36; Dt 28:20; 4 Ezra 5:1; for the roaming beasts, see Lev 26:22; 4 Ezra 
5:8; on the vanity of labour in 4 Ezra 5:12; cf. Lev 26:20; 26:26; Dt 28:29 – 31. 
37 For the relationship between 4 Ezra’s account of ‘the breakdown of social and cosmic order’ 
(110) associated with the Messianic age and other traditions, see the passages in Stone, Fourth Ezra, 
110, n. 15. 
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vision of the end (do, 5:4) bring together our two themes of divine benefaction and 
divine life-giving together explicitly and in an important way. For, though they 
await further explication, we have three components that are foundational for 4 
Ezra’s theological logic: 1) that the way of God’s justice Ezra seeks (3:31) depends 
both on 2) his fittingness to live eschatologically and 3) on the fact that God’s gifts 
are assumed to be equitably distributed. Moreover, though 4 Ezra’s terms for ‘gift’ or 
‘favour’ are limited to only a few uses of gratia (4 Ezra 4:44; 5:55; 6:11; 7:75, 102, 104; 
8:42; 12:7; 14:22; cf. Gen 6:8; Ex 33:12; Num 11:11; Prov 3:4; etc.) and one use of 
beneficium (9:10, 11), the use of the verb do for God’s gift-giving activity here with 
respect to the fitting recipients of his benefactions is significant. For it is striking that, 
apart from those uses of do that indicate a return to God (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 10:14), 
God is the explicit or implied giver in every other use of do in 4 Ezra (3:15, 19; 4:19, 
21–23; 5:4–5, 7, 48, 50; 6:51–52; 7:9, 78, 94, 100; 8:5–6; 9:45; 13:41; 14:31, 42). And, as we 
shall see, it is the character of God’s gift-giving and specifically his life-giving 
activity that is debated throughout the first four episodes of this text. 
 In any case, after hearing that if he continues in his grief he will learn ‘greater 
things’ (5:13), Ezra awakens in physical and epistemic distress, while Uriel brings 
life-sustaining support. His ‘body shuddered greatly’ and his ‘soul laboured so as to 
faint’, requiring Uriel to ‘comfort’ him and ‘stand him on his feet’ (5:14, 15). Thus, at 
the close of the episode Ezra and Uriel embody its content: though worthy of 
apocalyptic instruction, Ezra requires both the tutelage and support of the angel to 
transcend his epistemic and physical incapacity for receiving God’s heavenly way. 
2.1.2 The World-as-Womb: The Gestation of Judgement and Life (5:21 – 6:34) 
 4 Ezra uses the same structure of complaint, dialogue, and revelatory 
experience in episode two, producing a similar movement in the flow of the 
argument.38 There are, however, hints that Ezra is coming to see things Uriel’s way. 
As Stone argues, Ezra ‘does not question the basic axiom of divine righteousness’ in 
                                                
38 Earl Breech (’Fragments’) identified this ‘triptych’ structure, though he wrongly implied that it 
applied, without qualification, to the first three episodes (episode three is considerably expanded; 
rightly, Hogan, Theologies, 23). The expansion of dialogue section, as Barclay rightly notes (Gift, 288), 
suggests that the author’s primary concerns are to be found there. 
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that ‘God is not charged [in episode 2], he is simply not understood…’39 
Consequently, Ezra’s complaint narrows the scope and shifts the focus: he is 
concerned now with the manner of Israel’s judgement, as the indignity of suffering 
at Gentile hands suggests that God hates his own people (5:21 – 30).40 Moreover, 
despite further proof of Ezra’s epistemic incapacity (5:31 – 40), Uriel’s promise that 
he will ‘hear greater things’ (5:13) is fulfilled, as Ezra is taught the logic of God’s 
providential order (5:41 – 55), learns of its basis in God’s agency before and at the 
end of creation (5:56 – 6:10), and receives instruction on and experiences a foretaste 
of the planned judgement and redemption (6:11 – 6:28). Two features of this episode 
are vital for our purposes: first, organic metaphors continue to clarify the theological 
logic, as Uriel extends the womb metaphor to order and explain the inevitable 
decline of Israel, while the description of salvation envisions the epistemic change of 
heart/mind concurrent with complete cosmic renewal; second, Uriel’s focus on the 
worthy recipients of salvation and esoteric revelation is both continued and further 
specified. Now that Ezra’s corrupted epistemic condition has been established, the 
author moves on to elaborate on the implications of the creation’s corrupted 
condition for Israel. God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, modulated by 
the distinction between corruptibility and incorruptibility, explains Israel’s 
inevitable decline despite the existence of those like Ezra who have maintained 
uprightness (directio) and chastity (pudicitia, 6:32) from youth. Whereas the world 
(and Israel) is like a womb and, thus, headed toward death, humans are physically 
and epistemologically but not morally incapacitated. 
 Ezra’s poetic recitation of God’s preference for his ‘one people’ over the 
‘multitudes’ (5:27) climaxes with God’s gift of the Torah, providing a sharp contrast 
to Ezra’s analysis of the current situation. If it is ‘to this people whom God desired 
that [he] gave (donasti) the law which is approved by all’ (5:27), why has God 
‘handed the one over to the many’ so that ‘those who opposed [his] promises’ have 
trod all over ‘those who believed [his] covenants’ (5:28, 29)? Ezra concludes: ‘if you 
utterly hate your people, you should discipline them with your own hand’ (5:30). 
This contrast between Israel’s receipt of the law and subsequent plight echoes that of 
                                                
39 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 135. 
40 K. Koch, ’Esras erste Vision: Weltzeiten und Weg des Höchsten’, BZ 22 (1978): 70 – 72. 
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episode one but without Ezra’s diagnosis of the infirmitas of the cor malignum (3:20 – 
22). Likewise, Uriel elicits Ezra’s confession that he does not love Israel more than 
God but is speaking out of grief (5:34). Whereas before Ezra stressed the incongruity 
between the debasement of Zion and the flourishing of Babylon, given their 
respective moral worth, now Ezra questions the propriety of God ‘handing over’ 
Israel to be punished rather than doing it himself. In other words, Ezra no longer 
questions God’s justice per se but the mode of that justice, a shift that seems 
explicable only in light of Ezra’s previous experience of the signs of the ‘end’. 41 
 As in episode one, Uriel’s denial of Ezra’s cognitive capacity leads to a test. 
Yet, now both the terms of the dialogue and the character of the diagnostic are 
coloured by Uriel’s previous ‘heavenly’ instruction. Ezra takes up Uriel’s womb 
metaphor, stating that he would rather his mother’s womb had been his grave than 
to live to see ‘the toil of Jacob and the exhaustion of the descendants of Israel’ (5:35). 
The test Uriel proposes in response, though focusing on earthly matters, is a test of 
power—‘revive for me [Uriel] the withered flowers’ (5:36). Whereas before Ezra 
attributed his lack of knowledge to his being ‘among those born’ (4:6), here he states 
that only ‘the one who does not have a dwelling with mankind’ is able to know (scio) 
these things (5:39). Thus, Ezra’s shift from the earthly to heavenly frame mirrors 
Uriel’s eschatological epistemology from episode one, while Uriel’s shift to the issue 
of creative power anticipates the subsequent focus on God’s singular and creative 
agency in salvation. Though Uriel has managed to extract two significant 
concessions from Ezra, Uriel’s conclusion that Ezra can ‘find’ neither God’s ‘justice’ 
nor the ‘end [finem] of the love [he] promised [his] people’ (5:40)42 is not the end of 
but an invitation to Ezra’s further instruction.43 In the dialogue that follows, Uriel 
                                                
41 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 127: ‘Ezra seems to have moved from his doubt about the justice of God’s 
conduct of the world to bewilderment at his actions.’ 
42 For analyses of the variegated but consistent use of ‘end’ terminology, see M.E. Stone, 
‘Coherence and Inconsistency in the Apocalypses: the Case of ”the End” in 4 Ezra‘,JBL 102 (1983): 229 
– 43; Stone, Features, 83 – 97; Stone, Fourth Ezra, 103 – 4. If one recognises that the advent of the 
Messiah is associated with the eschatological end as its prelude, then Schäfer’s argument for a 
tripartite schema is consistent with Stone’s view; cf. P. Schäfer, ‘Die Lehre von den zwei Welten im 4. 
Buch Esra und in der tannaitischen Literatur‘, in Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie des rabbinischen 
Judentums (AGJU 15; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 244 – 91. 
43 Uriel’s affirmation of God’s continued love for Israel (5:33) and eschatological purpose for his 
people (5:40) undermines Hogan’s contention that Uriel’s arguments in the dialogues are strictly 
universal and individual and, thus, her thesis that the visions of episodes four, five, and six represent 
a third theology; Hogan, Theologies, 35–40. Moreover, as we shall argue, the key problem lies in her 
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extends the earlier metaphor of the womb to explain the necessary decline of Israel, 
providing an alternative logic to Ezra’s earlier diagnosis of the Adamic heritage as 
the cause. 
 Given Ezra’s incapacity, the dialogue shifts necessarily to an interrogation of 
the angel concerning the nature and timing of God’s judgement. Exploiting Uriel’s 
eschatological role and knowledge, Ezra questions the angel about the status of 
everyone at the ‘end’—past, present and future (5:41). Scholars often note that the 
question seems to be motivated by fear that being alive at the end is necessary for 
participating in the age to come,44 a view which could be consistent with Uriel’s 
assurance to Ezra in 4:26 (‘If you are alive, you will see…’). Yet, Uriel responds by 
comparing divine judgement to a ‘crown’.45 Barclay rightly insists ‘the point is not 
that a circle has no beginning or end, but that every point on a circle is equidistant 
from its center (here, its central point of significance)’.46 Ezra recognises the 
implication and, eager to see this judgement, wonders why God could not have 
created all of humanity at once to avoid delay (5:43). Uriel’s rejection of this 
suggestion is twofold, focusing on the theme of incapacity: ‘the creation cannot 
hasten more quickly than the Creator, nor can the world endure those created in it at 
once’ (5:44). Ezra reads this statement as contradictory, because, on the one hand, 
God’s justice is equidistant to everyone, suggesting to Ezra a general resurrection 
where everyone will be alive at the same time to experience judgement, while, on the 
other, Uriel insists that it is not possible for the world to hold the totality of 
humanity. How can there be a general resurrection if the creation is not able to 
sustain the totality of humanity?  
 Though Uriel responds to the charge of contradiction by expanding on the 
world-as-womb metaphor, there has been debate on how to understand the point(s) 
                                                                                                                                                  
reading (with E. Brandenburger, Die Verborgenheit Gottes im Weltgeschehen: Das literarische und 
theologische Problem des 4. Esrabuches (ATANT 68; Zürich: Theologischer, 1981), 63 – 68) of Ezra’s seed 
metaphor in 9:26 – 37 as ironic; cf. Hogan, Theologies, 153–57. 
44 Cf. G.H. Box, The Ezra-Apocalypse: Being Chapters 3 - 14 of the Book Commonly Known as 4 Ezra (or 
II Esdras) (London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1912), 59; Myers, II Esdras, 195, 200; Stone, Fourth Ezra, 148 – 149. 
As Moo highlights, the relationship between the messianic kingdom and the ultimate ‘end’ in this 
passage is unclear. He notes, however, that, though the opening question may be motivated by 
concerns about inclusion in the messianic kingdom, Ezra’s questions throughout assume a general 
resurrection, suggesting a concern for ultimate justice; Moo, Creation, 115–16. 
45 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 141. Moo, Creation, 115, n. 39. 
46 Barclay, Gift, 286, n. 17. Pace Stone, Fourth Ezra, 151; Moo, Creation, 115.  
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of the expansion. Uriel’s point is that the fallen saeculum has a fixed, iterative, and, in 
our view, entropic historical order that is determined by God. In episode one the 
point of comparison is gestation: just as there is a fixed gestation for an unborn child, 
so there is a fixed gestation for God’s judgement. This gestation, though known only 
to God, is for the sake of the righteous (4:36, 37). Here the point of comparison is the 
capacity and life-cycle of the womb itself. Consequently, in addition to the fixity of 
the womb’s cycle of gestation, Uriel emphasises its iterative character and entropic 
nature. A women’s womb has a finite capacity that cannot be exceeded (Uriel 
chooses ten as the limit), requiring each child to be born, as Ezra admits, ‘in its own 
time’ (5:47). Likewise, God’s ordering of history is fixed and iterative, just like the 
birth cycle (5:48). Though Stone recognises the shift in focus that occurs at 5:49, he 
thinks the point of the shift is obscure, concluding that it ‘serves to strengthen the 
observation’ about the fixed ‘order and organisation’ of the world.47 Yet, Uriel gives 
a partial reason (enim) for this order: just as neither infants nor old women bear 
children, likewise God’s ordering (dispono) of his ‘created world’ (creatum saeculum, 
5:49). In other words, Uriel explains the iterative character of historical events by 
appealing to the life-cycle of the womb itself. They both have a beginning and an 
end, and the beginning always leads to the end, which is death. The point is not just 
to support the previous focus on the fixity of the historical order.48 The world is 
neither ‘simply… organized’ in an iterative fashion, nor ‘almost mechanistic [as a] 
result of how the creator has designed it’.49 It is not just that a mother’s womb cannot 
‘give ten at once’ (det decem in unum, 5:46). Rather the point is to add to the notion of 
fixity the idea that the historical order is entropic, teleologically constrained and 
ordered like the organic cycle of birth, life, maturity, decline, and death.50 Whereas 
the use of the world-as-womb metaphor in episode one is positive, explaining the 
timing of and characterising the nature of the vindication of the righteous, this use of 
                                                
47 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 146. The source of Stone’s confusion seems to be the view of Box (Ezra-
Apocalypse, 61) that Uriel should be taken literally, meaning that there were no human beings at the 
beginning of history and there will be none at the end. This keeps Stone from recognising the deeper 
connection between 5:49 and what follows—just as the womb itself is subject to the life-cycle, so is the 
world. Cf. Harnisch (Verhängnis, 300), who likewise considers 5:49 a repetition of the womb metaphor 
of episode one. 
48 Pace Stone, ‘Parabolic‘, 305; idem, Fourth Ezra, 146. 
49Contra Moo, Creation, 116. 
50 Thus, there is no ‘apparent contradiction in arguments based on nature’ with the theme that 
‘human life is a fleeting thing’ in 4 Ezra; contra Stone, ‘Parabolic‘, 306.  
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the metaphor is negative, explaining the timing of and characterising the nature of 
the judgement as the death of the present age. God both sets limits to what the 
womb might produce and he orders the womb toward death. In this way, the 
character of God’s gift of created life orders the character of its return. What Ezra 
seeks depends on the transcendence of these limits. 
 In this connection, Uriel provides an alternate rationale to the cor malignum for 
Israel’s inevitable decline by arguing for an integral relation between Israel’s history 
and that of the cosmos. The small stature of Ezra and his contemporaries suggests 
not only that the womb of the world is past maturity and in decline (5:55) but that 
Israel is approaching hospice care.51 Likewise, the justice of the cycle of life-sin-death 
is not now in question, for Ezra, but rather why God neither breaks this cycle for 
Israel nor consistently applies it to his enemies in history. The world-as-womb 
metaphor answers these questions simultaneously: the cycle will itself cease and 
justice will be done at the ‘end’, because God has ‘made the same rule for the world 
that [he] created’ (5:49). In conjunction with Uriel’s description of the character of the 
reversal of entropic conditions of the present saeculum, this resolves Ezra’s charge of 
contradiction by implying the necessity of a liminal state—a time when the 
corruptible and incorruptible overlap—for the possibility of a general resurrection 
unto judgement prior to cosmological renewal.52 
 Uriel’s reference to the decline of Israel leads Ezra to envisage the end of the 
creation (creatura, vv. 55, 56), which he associates with final judgement. Echoing his 
earlier complaint that God should do his own dirty work (5:30), Ezra’s question 
about the agent of this judgement marks the beginning of the author’s transition 
toward Ezra’s next apocalyptic experience. The focus until the end of the episode is 
God’s plan and the power that is his alone to execute it. Thus, God himself (or Uriel 
speaking as God) responds to Ezra, who learns through a series of poetical 
references to the features of God’s creation that Endzeit was planned before Urzeit 
(antequam thirteen times, 6:1 – 6). Though obscure, the Jacob (coming age) and Esau 
(present age) typology offered by God/Uriel precludes both a more precise 
eschatological clock and a separation of the ages (6:8 – 10), the latter point stressing 
                                                
51 Recognised by Stone (Fourth Ezra, 146), but he misses the integral relation to the entropic 
cosmos in the reference to infants and old women in 5:49. 
52 Pace Moo, Creation, 116. 
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both the relationship between the ages (they are like brothers) and their radical 
difference.53 It also concludes the debate on the timing of the end by giving an 
alternate frame of reference: the precise timing is not as important as the fact that it 
is God himself who has planned the end from before the beginning and it is God 
himself who will bring it about.54 Consequently, though paradox prevails now and 
Israel’s history seems a meaningless Unheilsgeschichte, there is and has always been 
an ‘end’ toward which history moves. 
 The delay of this ‘end’ has to do with its cosmological character, and Ezra’s 
revelatory experience of it concludes the initial phase of instruction. In this 
connection, the whole account is bracketed by Uriel’s warning about the earth-
shaking effects of the voice he will hear (6:13) and Ezra’s experience of these effects 
(6:29). Uriel’s explanation of this cosmological tumult--‘for [enim] [the earth] knows 
that its end [finem] must be changed’ (6:16)—marks the revelation as a preview of the 
divine re-creative word that will refashion the world. Within this cosmological 
frame, God gives Ezra a verbal preview of the final judgement and salvation. Ezra’s 
concern for justice for Zion is affirmed by God, who will judge his enemies for their 
iniquity (6:18 – 19), while signs that signal the final universal judgement (6:20 – 24) 
are thematically linked by an abrupt end to the life-cycle (e.g., infants and unborn 
children are suddenly matured, 6:21). While all will see God’s judgement in the end 
(v. 20), it is only those who survive the end who will see his salvation (v. 25).  
 The organic metaphors reach their conceptual climax and decisively reframe 
Ezra’s opening complaints here, as the cessation of the life-cycle at the judgement 
provides the necessary prelude to both the removal of death and the epistemic 
transformation of humanity. Those saved will see that ‘it is those who have not 
tasted death from birth who have been received [by God]’(qui recepti sunt homines qui 
mortem non gustaverunt a nativitate sua), while the heart (cor) of the people of the earth 
(those who survive the judgement) will be changed ‘into another mind’ (6:26). 
Though the metaphor of ‘tasting death’ may refer to those like Enoch and Elijah (and 
Ezra; cf. 14:9) who are translated without dying, it is probably a figurative way of 
                                                
53 Ibid., 118. 
54 Ibid., 117. 
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referring to moral rebellion,55 given the explanatory (enim, v. 27) function of moral 
renewal in vv. 27 – 28 and Ezra’s reference, in episode three, to the evil heart ‘having 
lead us into corruption and the ways of death’ (deduxit nos in corruptionem et itinera 
mortis, 7:48). As will become clear in episode three, the description of the epistemic 
transformation of humanity entails a rejection of Ezra’s initial configuration of the 
cor malignum in moral terms. The transformation of the cor of those who survive the 
judgement is not their moral transformation but the removal of the evil, deceit, and 
corruption that hinder faithfulness and prevent the full disclosure of the truth (6:27 – 
28).  
 In this way, the questions posed by Uriel’s reframing of infirmitas in epistemic 
and cosmological terms are partially answered. Ezra’s epistemological incapacity 
has been partially transcended through God’s verbal instruction, but the justice he 
wants to understand depends on seeing the healing of the incapacity of creation 
itself. In other words, though as Barclay writes, ‘Ezra is capable of a deeper 
appreciation of this truth because he is himself the kind of righteous person who will 
be vindicated (6.31-33; cf. 6.5)’,56 he is not yet capable of experiencing the truth of the 
end in full. To experience the yet ‘greater things’ to be revealed (6:32), he must 
humble himself (6:31), replace fear with belief, and stop being so quick to think ‘vain 
thoughts’ about the ‘former times’ so that he will not jump to vain conclusions about 
‘the last times’ (6:34). It is in episode three that Ezra’s vain thinking about ‘the last 
times’ is definitively transformed, rendering him ready to see the end. 
 Our analysis of life as gift in episodes one and two provides two important 
points for our argument. First, it shows how 4 Ezra’s two-ages theodicy depends on 
a particular account of the relation between created and eschatological life as gifts. 
Though neither Ezra nor Israel, as corrupted inhabitants of a world subjected to 
death, can understand or receive the gift of true life from God, the enduring gift of 
created moral agency and its divinely-given Torah-order make it possible for the 
righteous Ezra to receive apocalyptic instruction. Thus, Barclay’s recent account of 
Uriel’s argument in episode three for God’s character as a discriminating 
eschatological giver is deepened and supported by our account of the argument over 
                                                
55 Contra Stone, Fourth Ezra, 172. 
56 Barclay, Gift, 287. 
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its relation to God’s indiscriminate donation of the Torah and created life in episodes 
one and two. Second, the development of organic metaphors in these first two 
episodes provides the framework in which both the apparent futility of Israel’s 
history within fallen existence and Uriel’s ultimate account of the efficacy of created 
life and the Torah make sense. For, as we shall see presently, the debate over 
whether God is a discriminate or indiscriminate giver of eschatological life occurs 
through these organic metaphors and turns in Uriel’s favor because of his particular 
account of the organic relation between created life as indiscriminate gift and 
eschatological life as discriminate gift. Likewise, in episode four, though Zion and 
Mother Earth are subject to barrenness, God will give life to Zion qua the righteous. 
That is, the law will bear eschatological fruit, despite the conditions of cosmic death, 
but only as divine miraculous gift for the worthy. 
2.2 Debating God’s Life-Giving Benefaction and the Definition of Mercy (4 Ezra 
6:35 – 9:25)57 
Ezra’s complaint in episode three pivots from a discussion of God’s work in creation 
(6:35 – 54) to the question of the delay of Israel’s receipt of the world as an 
inheritance (6:55 – 59), which sets up Uriel’s attribution of this delay to the 
corruption of the present world (7:11), the necessity of traveling through its 
consequent futility toward immortality (7:1 – 16), and a subsequent debate over the 
law as the criterion of discrimination between eschatological heirs and pretenders 
(7:17 – 44). Though Uriel’s description of the Messianic prelude to the judgement is 
the most obvious addition to Ezra’s knowledge (7:26 – 44), our focus is on how the 
opening complaint, response, and further debate elaborate the themes of God’s life-
giving and life-ordering activity: for, as we will argue, Uriel’s insistence on 
humanity’s abiding cognitive capacity (7:22 – 24; 7:70 – 74) in the context of Ezra’s 
focus on God’s personal, creative, and ordering agency grounds the divine 
condemnation of the nations for rejecting the law (7:37), while Ezra’s concern for the 
                                                
57 For the structure of this episode, see W. Harnisch, ’Der Prophet als Widerpart und Zeuge der 
Offenbarung: Erwägungen zur Interdependenz von Form und Sache im IV Buch Esra’, in 
Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East: Proceedings of the International Colloquium 
Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12 – 17, 1979 (ed. D. Hellholm; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 461 – 
93; Barclay, Gift, 288, n. 19. 
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many sinners invites both Uriel’s principle of fitting judgement (vacua vacuis et plena 
plenis, 7:25) and its application to the few worthy of salvation (7:61). 
 With God’s equitable judgement in Torah-terms grounded in his inviolable 
life-giving and life-ordering activity, the episode applies this both to the question of 
the intermediate state (7:75 – 101) and to debating the question of the possibility of 
unconditioned and incongruous mercy at the judgement (7:102 – 8:62)—whether as a 
result of the intercession of the righteous (7:102 – 115; 8:15 – 36) or arising from 
God’s mercy on the unworthy (throughout 7:116 – 8:62). As we will see, while Ezra 
repeatedly appeals to God’s unconditioned activity in the creation and sustenance of 
fallen human life to fund an argument for unconditioned and incongruous mercy at 
the judgement, Uriel flips these appeals to argue that it is God’s inviolable creation 
of the self that requires his maintenance of Torah-order for the sake of justice, with 
the two ages framework ensuring the equitable distribution of salvation and 
judgement. In this connection, both the debates over competing scriptural material 
(Uriel’s reading of Dt 30:19 [7:19 – 22; 7:127 – 131] vs. Ezra’s reading of Ex 34:6 – 7 
[7:132 – 8:14]) and alternate accounts of the application of the harvest metaphor to 
the question of inheritance underline the contrasting hermeneutics that arise from 
alternate accounts of God’s life-giving benefaction. Whereas Ezra reads such activity 
from the perspective of God’s unconditioned creation of the world, election of his 
people, and sustenance of the unworthy, Uriel insists that such principles apply only 
to the present age. The choice between life and death presented by Moses (Dt 30:19) 
is the quintessential expression of the stakes of life after Adam’s fall. Thus, God will 
redeem the few on the basis of their lives ordered according to God’s covenant (9:7, 
8), while this same life-giving and life-ordering benefaction of inviolable libertas 
(8:56; 9:11) will render God’s enemies culpable for ‘having disdained [God’s] law’ 
(9:11) despite ‘living in receipt of [his] benefactions’ (9:10).58 In short, because, for 4 
Ezra, life is inviolably given and given as Torah-ordered from creation, the self is 
both capable and responsible for living according to the Torah—an order that is 
vindicated at the judgement. 
                                                
58 For a complementary argument that recognises the fitting character of mercy and the motif of 
agency in 4 Ezra but does not analyse its basis in God’s benefaction at creation, see K.B. Wells, Grace 
and Agency in Paul and Second Temple Judaism: Interpreting the Transformation of the Heart (NovTSup 157; 
Leiden: Brill, 2014), 173–86. 
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 For the purposes of the argument of this chapter, the exegesis of this section 
will provide two important results. First, as we shall see, the debate between Ezra 
and Uriel over whether God is a discriminating or indiscriminate giver in the 
eschaton turns on their respective understandings of the enduring efficacy of the 
gifts of created agency and the Torah. Thus, though Barclay’s recent work has 
helpfully raised the issue of the differing definitions of God’s grace in episode three, a 
focus on the relation between created and eschatological life as gift is necessary for 
an adequate account of the logic by which Uriel’s account prevails. Second, our 
analysis of Ezra and Uriel’s competing uses of the seed metaphor shows how the 
organic metaphors of the first three episodes constitute both the shared ground of 
theological debate and the means by which episodes three and four are logically 
coherent. Consequently, this analysis prepares for a new interpretation of episode 
four that seeks to resolve the problem of the logical coherence of the first four 
episodes without either appealing to Ezra’s experience simpliciter as the deciding 
factor or concluding that episode three ends without a theological resolution—be it 
an aporia or stalemate. 
2.2.1 Israel’s Inheritance, the Judged Creation, and the Plight of Humanity (6:35 – 7:16) 
 Arising from his foretaste of the world’s coming change (6:13 – 16, 29), Ezra’s 
complaint combines the emphasis on God’s sovereign life-giving word from episode 
one (6:38, 43, 44; cf. 3:4 – 6) with that on Israel’s election in episode two (6:56 – 58; cf. 
5:21 – 30), though without the earlier accusations, in order to pose the question of 
Israel’s delayed receipt of her inheritance. God’s life-giving word is effective in 
providing a flourishing and variegated habitat that is all for Adam (6:46, 54), whom 
God appoints as ruler (dux), while, because Israel both descends from Adam and is 
chosen by God (6:54), the world was in reality made for them. Yet, those whom God 
considers ‘nothing’, ‘spittle’, a mere ‘drop in the bucket’ (6:57) are dominating his 
people, who are his ‘first born’, ‘only begotten’, ‘zealous for [God]’, and ‘most dear’ 
(6:58).59 The juxtaposition of God’s sovereignty in creation and filial election and 
                                                
59 For the typological correspondence between Adam-Israel and the animals-Gentiles, see Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 450. 
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Israel’s current status ‘increases the dissonance’ of Ezra’s complaint.60 If the world 
was created for Israel by the God who speaks things into existence, why does she not 
have her inheritance (hereditas, 6:59)? 
 Because Ezra does not accuse but only seeks information, Uriel reframes the 
complaint not with a humiliating test but with two metaphors that explain the 
significance of the fallen creation’s incapacity for Israel’s inheritance. The metaphor 
of the narrow river and the broad sea continues Uriel’s emphasis on the spatial 
limitations of the present saeculum, while the metaphor of Israel’s inheritance as a 
city reached through a perilous journey configures the plight of heirs as a quest 
through these ‘vain things’ (vana, 7:14). The delay of Israel’s inheritance is a result of 
God’s judgement of creation: ‘For [he] made the world for their sake, and when 
Adam transgressed his statutes, what had been made was judged’ (7:11), which 
rendered the path through this saeculum a necessary journey through ‘narrow and 
vain things’ (7:14) to a city in which the ‘fruit of immortality’ awaits the heirs (7:13). 
In other words, God’s gift of the inheritance through a quest for an ‘immortal’ city 
renders it a conditioned gift, the receipt of which depends on successfully passing 
through the ‘appointed danger’ (7:9); the reference to fructus (7:13) implies that the 
conditions are moral; and the cosmologically and ontologically inflected context of 
the journey explain why it is difficult yet not impossible—and worthwhile. That 
Uriel does indeed configure the inheritance as a gift is clear from his language: that 
which ‘will be given’ (dabitur) is ‘a gifted…city’ (data…civitas, 7:9). This inheritance is 
a conditioned gift because its receipt depends on ‘having passed through the 
appointed danger’ (antepositum periculum pertransierit, 7:9). Thus, the ‘sadness and 
infirmities’ that render this world incapable of delivering ‘the things promised’ 
(4:27) are not due to the experiences of evil in this world but more fundamentally to 
God’s judicial response to evil. This judicial response subjects the entire cosmos to 
death, with all of the constricting experiences of vanity that entails, in view of the 
reversal of futility unto immutable life for worthy heirs in a renewed world. Again, 
the logic of gift to the worthy is invoked: the ‘living’ must endure ‘narrow and vain’ 
things in order to ‘receive’ (recipere) what has been reserved for them (7:14). In this 
connection, the fact that Ezra is ‘corruptible’ and ‘mortal’, Uriel insists, should lead 
                                                
60 Moo, Creation, 67. 
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him to focus not on what is now but on what is to come (7:15 – 16). In other words, 
Ezra knows that he will die, but should he not consider his experiences from the 
perspective of their coming reversal? That is, Ezra should receive the gift of 
knowledge being offered by Uriel: ‘why receive not in [his] heart what will be, but 
instead what is at hand?’ (quare non accepisti in corde tuo quod futurum sed quod in 
praesenti, 7:16). 
2.2.2 The Inviolable Law and the Plight of Fallen Humanity (7:17 – 74)  
 In the three exchanges that follow this opening (7:17 – 74), Ezra accepts both 
Uriel’s two-world framework and his advice to consider what is to come, though he 
advocates for the wicked. Adopting an aggressive tone, he responds: ‘Behold, you 
have ordained by your law that while the righteous ones [iusti] will inherit these 
things, the ungodly ones [impii], however, will perish’ (7:17).61 Thus, the righteous 
can take Uriel’s advice and bear their current ‘narrow things’ (angusta) while hoping 
for the ‘broad things’ (spatiosa), but the impious suffer and do not see the ‘broad 
things’ (spatiosa) (7:18). These comments make it clear that Ezra recognises the moral 
and cosmological frame implicit in Uriel’s preceding response (cf. fructus 
inmortalitatis, 7:13) and understands that the law defines this moral order; he simply 
objects to the implications for the impii. Uriel’s programmatic response establishes 
the inviolability of the law, initiating a debate about the implications of this 
arrangement that runs until 7:75. Most generally, Ezra is not God’s superior as judge 
or in wisdom (7:19), and, thus, (enim) it would be better that the many living at that 
time (multi praesentes) perish than ‘the law of God that has been placed before them 
be disregarded’ (7:20). The ground (enim) of this shocking statement is that God has 
commanded everyone (not just Israel)62 ‘what must be done that they might live and 
must be observed that they might not be punished’ (quid facientes viverent et quid 
observantes non punirentur, 7:21). This is apparently a paraphrase of Dt 30:19, as the 
                                                
61 Watson (Hermeneutics, 454) notes that the verbs κληρονοµῆσαι and ἀπολεῖσθε must ‘underlie the 
translator’s Latin rendering here’—hereditabunt and peribunt—thereby, confirming an echo of Dt 30:16 
– 18. 
62 Moo rightly argues (Creation, 75; cf. 76 – 79) that Elliott’s attempt to limit the scope of Uriel’s 
statement to Israel founders on an unwarranted reading of saeculum in 7:11, 12 as a reference to the 
‘land’; M.A. Elliott, The Survivors of Israel: A Reconsideration of the Theology of Pre-Christian Judaism 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 99–107, 343–44. 
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use of the verb antepono (v. 20) echoes Moses’ words (MT:  ָךֶינְָפל ִיַתָּתנ; LXX: δέδωκα 
πρὸ προσώπου ὑµῶν), the references to being ‘made alive’ and ‘not being punished’ 
map onto Moses’ life-death binary, and, of the five uses of the subjunctive of vivo in 4 
Ezra, four are associated with law observance, and each of them, if not an echo of, 
are conceptually consistent with the explicit appeal to Dt 30:19 in 4 Ezra 7:129 (cf. 
7:21, 82, 109, 129; 14:22). Obedience to God’s law is here, however, the path not to life 
in the land (Dt 30:20) but eschatological life.63 That is, the moral dualism that 
provides the basis for a Deuteronomic historical order is affirmed, but, because the 
present age is subject to death and vanity, this dualism is maintained by projecting it 
into the eschaton.64  
 One of the key points for our purposes is that Uriel’s earlier specification of 
the inheritance as a ‘gifted city’ holds (7:9), though now the conditions attendant to 
this gift are now further specified with respect to God’s personal donation of the law 
at creation. Thus, Uriel’s subsequent description of the human response to God’s gift 
of the law emphasises the integral relation between the ‘vain thoughts’ of humanity 
and their complete rejection of his ways (7:23, 24). This rejection forms the basis for 
Uriel’s principle of fitting judgement—[p]ropter hoc, Ezra, vacua vacuis et plena plenis 
(7:25)—but it also illumines the personal terms in which judgement is recompensed. 
For after introducing the concept of a Messianic Kingdom as prelude to God’s 
singular judgement (7:26 – 30), Uriel presents God’s verbal sentence on the nations 
as the climax of the judgement (7:31 – 38). Those who have spoken against God 
(contradico, 7:22) are told to ‘see and understand whom you have denied, whom you 
have not served, whose commands you have rejected’ (7:37). Uriel’s diagnosis of the 
integral relation between ‘vain thoughts’ (even atheism; cf. 7:23) and rejection of 
God’s law, framed in the context of God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, 
illumines the theological logic of 4 Ezra and, thus, the subsequent debate. For, as 
here, so in the remainder of 4 Ezra: to reject God’s gift of the law is to reject him, and to 
reject him is to forfeit immutable life. In this connection, Uriel’s description of the day of 
judgement here clarifies the cause of the suspension of the life-cycle we saw in the 
                                                
63 For an overview of this interplay of life and ‘eschatological life’, see S. Burkes, ‘“Life“Redefined: 
Wisdom and Law in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch’, CBQ 63 (2001): 55 – 71. 
64 For the implicit concept of natural law in this context, see Moo, Creation, 79–82. 
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previous episode (6:21 – 24): for that day is illumined only by ‘the brilliance of the 
glory of the Most High’ (splendorem claritatis Altissimi, v. 42), bringing evening and 
morning, summer and spring to an end (7:39 – 42). Thus, it is not simply the need for 
time to cease in order for all the facts to be reviewed (7:33), but the personal presence 
of the immortal and incorruptible God himself that inexorably includes the end and 
judgement of time in the arrival of eternity. When God arrives ‘what is corrupt will 
die’ (morietur corruptum)—whether physical or moral— giving way to the next world 
(7:31).  
 Ezra’s next two speeches lament the plight of humanity from the perspective 
of Uriel’s full rationale for and rehearsal of divine judgement. Though Ezra now 
affirms that the obedient are indeed blessed, he is concerned that the world to come 
(futurum saeculum) will mean torments for many (7:47). Ezra’s explanation adopts 
Uriel’s metaphor of the path, his focus on the relation between cognition and 
morality, and the organic language that unites these cosmologically, but he applies 
them to the damned: for (enim) the cor malum has ‘separated’ humans from the good 
things that are to come by leading them into ‘corruption’ and ‘the way of death’ 
(itinera mortis), which is ‘to us the path of perdition’ (nobis semitas perditionis, 7:48). 
The result is that ‘[the cor malum] has made us far off from life’ (longe fecit nos a vita) 
…‘almost all who have been created’ (paene omnes qui creati sunt, 7:48). At this point, 
Ezra again requires instruction, which comes in the form of Uriel’s explanation of 
the significance of the two-ages framework through the metaphor of Earth’s rare and 
common materials: just as some materials are of greater worth (gold) than others 
(clay; 7:49 – 58), so some human beings are of greater moral worth than others, and 
God will rejoice over the rare righteous and show no concern over the many wicked 
who perish (7:59 – 61).  
 This response produces Ezra’s longest speech of this cycle. The key point, for 
our purposes, is that Ezra’s lament over humanity’s cognitive capacity (sensus, 7:64) 
and his suggestion that the animals are better off because they do not look forward 
to the judgement (7:65 - 68) extends the focus on human mental capacity and 
provides the basis for Uriel’s rejoinder. In line with his earlier presentation of God as 
gift-giver, Uriel indicts humanity for ‘possessing understanding yet committing 
iniquity’ (sensum habentes iniquitatem fecerunt), which amounts to failing to observe 
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the ‘received commandments’ (mandata accipientes) and being unfaithful to the law 
‘they have received’ (acceperunt, 7:72).65 In other words, it is the human capacity to 
understand the consequences of rejecting God’s gift of Torah-order that renders them 
liable to judgement and without excuse (7:73). According to Uriel, all of humanity 
stands in receipt of the gift of God’s law, and all humanity knows this. Thus, there is 
no excuse. 
2.2.3 The Perfectly Just Intermediate State (7:75 – 101) 
 Ezra does not directly challenge Uriel, but rather exploits his reference to 
God’s patience (7:74; cf. 7:33) to test whether it extends to the intermediate state. It 
does not: while the souls of those who have rejected God wander about in seven 
‘ways’, the faithful rest in seven ‘orders’. As with the giving and receiving of the law, 
here the Most High is viewed as Benefactor, though here the giver of breath and life. 
Consequently, Ezra and Uriel figure created life as a gift that will be returned at 
death: ‘each one will return back [his] life’ (reddemus unusquisque animam, 7:75), and 
when the predetermined time comes from the Most High, a person’s breath leaves 
his body (corpus) and returns to God who gave (do) it (7:78). The criterion 
distinguishing the ‘wanderers’ from those who ‘rest’ is their respective responses to 
God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction: the wicked reject God’s law and find 
themselves without the opportunity to repent ‘that they might live’ (vivant, 7:82), 
while the righteous ‘struggle with great effort to overcome the evil thought formed 
within them that they might not be led astray from life to death’ (7:92), thereby 
‘completely keeping the law of the Lawgiver’ despite ‘enduring danger at every 
hour’ (7:89).66  
 In this connection, Uriel insists that, despite Ezra’s inclusion of himself among 
those awaiting torment (7:76), he has a ‘treasury of works’ (thesaurus operum, 7:77) on 
deposit with the Most High. Likewise, those who have believed in the divine 
                                                
65 This is not ‘the closest 4 Ezra comes to affirming a more legalistic notion’, but an alternate view 
of divine benefaction as conditioned and congruous; pace Moo, ’The Few’, 111. 
66 The explicit reference to repentance here precludes a ‘legalistic’ or ‘perfectionistic’ reading; so 
e.g. R. Bauckham, ‘Apocalypses‘, in Justification and Variegated Nomism: The Complexities of Second 
Temple Judaism (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 171 – 72; 
Moo, Creation, 80; Moo, ‘The Few‘, 113; Barclay, Gift, 282, n. 7. Contra Sanders, Paul and Palestinian 
Judaism, 416, 418. 
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covenants ‘will see the reserved reward’ (vident repositam mercedem, 7:83). After 
learning that the departed souls will have either terrifying or comforting previews of 
the Most High (7:87, 98), Ezra inquires about the duration of these experiences prior 
to being gathered into their ‘habitations’ (7:101) to await the judgement. It seems that 
the seven-day timeframe and the fact that Uriel has responded only with respect to 
the righteous, suggests an opportunity for Ezra to spend some of his heavenly 
capital. For he immediately asks whether the righteous will have an opportunity to 
intercede for the ungodly at the judgement (7:102).  
2.2.4 The Contest of Eternal Life and the Definition of Mercy (7:102 – 9:25) 
 The transition from debate over the plight of wicked humanity to the 
questions of intercession and mercy is a natural one. Uriel’s insistence on the 
inviolability of the Torah and, thus, the standard of God’s justice leaves intercession 
and incongruous mercy as the only possible means by which the wicked might 
avoid perdition. The significance of these questions for 4 Ezra is seen by the length 
and character of their treatment. For, over the course of five exchanges, Ezra and 
Uriel debate the relation between the character of God and the shape of his mercy: 
the significance of Israel’s exemplary intercessors (7:102 – 115), the proper response 
to the human plight (7:116 – 131; cf. Dt 30:15 – 20), the implications of Ex 34:6 – 7 for 
understanding God’s gracious character (7:132 – 8:3), the propriety of prayer and 
direct appeal to him for mercy for God’s people (8:4 – 41), and God’s culpability as 
Creator of humanity and Israel in light of the impending judgement (8:42 – 62). With 
the introduction of biblical exemplars and scriptural warrant for Ezra’s appeals to 
mercy, the hermeneutical significance and scriptural grounding of 4 Ezra’s 
cosmologically and eschatologically inflected conception of God’s life-giving and 
life-ordering benefaction comes to the fore, as the Deuteronomic choice between life 
and death provides the formal order through which both reality and scripture is to 
be read. In the end, Uriel’s insistence on humanity’s inviolably given libertas is the 
material ground for the divine application of this order in judgement and salvation. 
Thus, as we shall see, in the final summary account of the signs of the end (8:63 – 
9:13), it is the differing cognitive and moral responses to God’s life-giving and life-
ordering benefactions—whether faithfulness/works (9:7, 8) or disregard of God and 
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scorn for his law (9:9 – 12)—that account for God’s fitting gift of salvation and 
punitive judgement. 
2.2.4.1 The Immutable, Immortal, and Perfectly Just Future Age (7:102 – 115) 
 Ezra’s question about the possibility of intercession on the day of judgement 
receives a clear denial from Uriel. God’s judgement is ‘decisive [audax] 
demonstrating to all the seal of truth’ (7:104). In line with the two previous uses of 
the word veritas in the context of judgement (cf. 6:28; 7:34), the sense here is of 
correct evaluation, while the reference to the signaculum recalls the sealing 
(supersigno) of the age in 6:20 (cf. 6:5; 8:53) and makes this correct judgement 
definitive and irreversible. This is so, because the quality of one’s life—whether 
healthy or ill—is inextricably one’s own. A parent cannot be healed for a sick child 
(7:104).67 As the references to being ill and receiving healing suggest, this way of 
putting the point is consistent with the earlier metaphorical construction of the 
organic relationship between behaviour and results. Thus, when Uriel concludes 
that ‘everyone will bear their own righteousness and unrighteousness’ (7:105) he 
means they will bear the necessary consequences of their deeds.68 Ezra appeals to a 
long list of exemplary intercessions, beginning with Abraham and ending with 
Hezekiah, as counter-examples. The mention of Elijah’s raising of the dead child 
(7:109; cf. 1 Kgs 17:17 – 24) underscores the effectiveness of these appeals. If even the 
dead can come to life, that is, and now the righteous pray for the ungodly, why will 
there be no prayer for reversal in the coming age (7:111)? Uriel’s answer appeals to 
the moral and cosmological implications of the two-age framework, asserting that 
the judgement marks the end of the old, less than fully glorious world, and the 
beginning of the ‘immortal age’ (7:113) in which ‘corruption’, ‘intemperance’, and 
‘unbelief’ have faded and ‘righteousness’ and ‘truth’ have emerged in full (cf. 6:27, 
28). The result (ergo) is that it will be neither possible to have mercy on one ‘who will 
have been conquered (victus) by judgement, nor to sink (demergere) one who will 
                                                
67 The Latin reads intellegat for the first verb in the sequence here, which Stone (Fourth Ezra, 247; 
following Bensly, who suggests ἵνα νοσῇ as the Greek phrase; R.L. Bensly, The Missing Fragment of the 
Latin Translation of the Fourth Fook of Ezra [Cambridge: CUP, 1875], 72) judges is due to a misreading of 
the Greek verb as νοέω rather than νοσέω. 
68 For this principle in the Hebrew Bible, see Dt 24:16; Jer 31:28 – 29; and Ezek 18:20. 
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have conquered (vicerit)’ (7:115). The parallel use of forms of vinco anticipates the 
metaphor of life as a ‘contest’ (certamen, 7:127), but, notably here, the final result of 
this contest is immortal life. In other words, according to Uriel, because God’s 
judgement of the evil of the former age brings it to an end and ushers in fullness of 
life in its place, this judgement is immutable. 
2.2.4.2 The Law’s Life and Death Contest: An Eschatological Reading of Deuteronomy 30 
(7:116 – 131) 
 Uriel’s insistence on the immutability of the judgement elicits from Ezra a 
hypothetical, then a lament. Again, emphatically identifying himself with the fate of 
wicked humanity (nobis three times in 7:119, 120; nos five times in 7:119 – 124), Ezra 
reasons that humanity would have been better off either never having existed or 
having been prevented from falling—‘For what good is it that all at present live in 
sadness and after death expect punishment’ (7:117)? Repeating six of the seven 
‘ways’ and ‘orders’ of the post-mortem liminal state revealed earlier (cf. 7:76 – 99; 
omitting the vision of God), Ezra asks ‘what use’ (quid prodest, 7:117, 119) is any of 
this coming reality if ‘we’ will not experience the good but only the bad that will 
come with it. ‘For while we lived and did iniquity we did not consider what we 
might suffer after death’ (7:126). Uriel’s response is not sympathetic but rather 
compares life to a contest. Citing Moses’s words in Deuteronomy 30:19, Uriel 
presents the choice: ‘Choose life for your self that you may live’ (elige tibi vitam ut 
vivas, 7:129). Yet, because Israel did not believe Moses or the prophets or Uriel 
himself, it is their own fault that they are destroyed (7:130). There will be no grief for 
them, only ‘joy over the life of those who did believe’ (7:131).69  
 This reading of Deuteronomy 30:19 is consistent with the earlier 
eschatological projection of life and death in 7:21, though a specific citation here 
grounds Uriel’s response to Ezra in scripture. Although it may seem rather obvious, 
it is important to note that this eschatological reading denies the thrust of the 
original passage, which is to explain how national flourishing (or renewal) might be 
possible in history. This reading is necessary because of the author’s radical 
understanding of both human flourishing and cosmic decay. From the point of view 
                                                
69 For this translation, see Stone, Fourth Ezra, 253. 
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of the author of 4 Ezra, the presence of evil within and God’s judgement of the 
cosmos render it subject to a structural vanity such that sustained and complete 
human flourishing is impossible. Why the author has come to this conclusion is not 
obvious. The radical failure of Israel as a nation to live for God, as indicated in the 
Unheilsgeschichte and subsequent destruction, could have suggested the intractability 
of the problem of sin and evil in ‘this age’. Yet, if it is possible, in principle, for 
someone to follow Moses’s command, then it is possible, in principle, for the nation 
to remain faithful. Uriel’s earlier appeal to the entropic nature of the cosmos and 
history provides a sort of answer to this problem, but it is one that sits awkwardly 
with the focus on created capacity for obedience. Be that as it may, it is clear that this 
eschatological reading of Deuteronomy 30:19 plays a vital role in grounding the 
theological logic of 4 Ezra in scripture. For it ties the basic choice and destiny facing 
all of humanity specifically to obedience to the divine law.70 
2.2.4.3 Living in Receipt of God’s Gifts: why Eschatological Life is Given to the Worthy 
(7:132 – 9:25) 
 Ezra’s response introduces a series of three last ditch appeals to God’s 
character as merciful toward the unworthy, bringing the debate to its (theo)logical 
conclusion in the context of alternate construals of God’s life-giving benefaction. 
Ezra’s final basic move is to present an alternative eschatological hermeneutic via a 
reading of Ex 34:6 – 7 grounded in God’s unconditioned creation and incongruous 
sustenance of fallen humanity. God is called merciful (misericors)71 ‘because’ (quod) 
he has mercy on the unborn (7:132); one who has mercy (miserator)72 because he has 
mercy on those who repent and return to the law (7:133); patient (longanimis)73 
because he is patient with sinners ‘as his works’ (quasi suis operibus, 7:134); and 
bountiful (munificus)74 because he prefers to give (donare) rather than drive away 
(7:135). Ezra’s key interpretive move, for our purposes, occurs in the pivot toward an 
eschatological frame that begins in v. 136: for the appellation ‘great in mercy’ (multae 
                                                
70 On this reading of Dt 30 as a theodicy in the form of a ‘free will defence’, see Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 457–58. See also Moo, ’The Few’, 108 – 113; Wells, Grace and Agency, 182 – 86. 
71 Ex 34:6; MT:  םוּחַר ; LXX: οἰκτίρµων. 
72 Ex 34:6, ןוּנַּח/ἐλεήµων. 
73 Ex 34:6, ִםי ַ֖פּאַ ךְֶר ֶ֥א/µακρόθυµος. 
74 Ex 34:6, דֶסֶח־בַר/πολυέλεος. 
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misericordiae)75 is grounded both in God’s great provision of mercies that fund the 
existence of those who exist, have existed, and will exist (7:136) and (enim) in the fact 
that, without these mercies, the coming saeculum and its inhabitants ‘will not be 
made alive’ (non vivificabitur, 7:137). This shift, its appeal to mercy as God’s 
unconditioned creation and incongruous sustenance of fallen humanity, and its 
counter-factual logic, grounds a partial eschatological reading of the remainder of Ex 
34:7. For, taking the assurance that God ‘keeps steadfast love for thousands’ as a 
promise, Ezra reasons that the appellation of God as Donator depends on his 
unconditioned and incongruous donation of eschatological life; for if God ‘does not 
give out of his goodness and raise up those who have sinned from their sin, then not 
a ten-thousandth part of humanity will be able to be made alive’ (si non donaverit de 
bonitate sua ut adleventur hii qui iniquitates fecerunt de suis iniquitatibus non poterit decies 
millesima pars hominum vivificari, 7:138). In this connection, God is Iudex only as the 
one who ‘forgives those who he created by his word and blots out the multitude of 
their sins’, lest his promise be broken—‘lest a very few’ (nisi pauci valde) ‘will be left’ 
(derelinquentur, 7:139) at the judgement.  
 As in Uriel’s reading of Dt 30, Ezra’s reading runs against an important 
feature of the text of Ex 34, because it omits the statements about God’s justice—viz., 
his refusal to clear the guilty and his ‘visiting’ of the sins of parents on subsequent 
generations (Ex 34:7). Moreover, this omission, combined with Ezra’s appeal to 
unconditioned and incongruous life-giving mercy, undermines Uriel’s repeated 
emphasis on human responsibility. Thus, Uriel’s expected response is terse and clear 
(8:1 – 4): this appeal to God as Creator is invalid, because God made not one world 
but two—the former for ‘the many’, the latter for ‘the few’; the former for the 
worthless ‘clay’, the latter for the valuable ‘gold’. Thus, Uriel concludes: multi quidem 
creati sunt pauci autem salvabuntur (8:3). 
 The last two exchanges revolve around the contrasting conceptions of the 
integrity of the self these incompatible accounts of divine life-giving benefaction 
produce. Thus, in the penultimate exchange Ezra returns first to the initial theme of 
his opening complaint (3:4 – 36)—the apparent futility and meaninglessness of God’s 
life-giving action, given his death-dealing judgement. Ezra requests ‘seed for the 
                                                
75 Ex 34:6, דֶסֶח־בַר/πολυέλεος. 
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heart’ and ‘cultivation for the understanding’ for the production of ‘fruit’ unto 
eternal life (8:6), a request grounded scripturally in v. 7 in God’s own self-ascription 
as solus es (Dt 4:35; 6:4; Isa 43:7, 11; 44:6; cf. Dt 32:39) and the fact that humanity is 
‘one of the works of [God’s] hands’ (cf. Job 10:3 – 9; Ps 138:8; Isa 64:8). Ezra’s 
emphasis on God’s creative activity (vivifico) and sustenance from conception to 
maturity (8:8 – 12) only serves to underline the brutal fact that ‘it is as God’s own 
creature that he will kill [a human being] and as his own work that he will make 
[one] alive’ (mortificabis eum ut tuam creaturam et vivificabis eum ut tuum opus, 8:13). 
Thus, just as God’s sovereign care in giving life is contrasted with the immediacy of 
his judgement in episode one, so here, though the earlier implication is now stated: 
‘If, therefore, you will destroy by means of a simple command what with so much 
effort was made by you, for what was it made’ (8:14)?  
 After this question, Ezra shifts, as in episode one, from a focus on the Adamic 
heritage to God’s dealings with his elect people, but now, because ‘[he] has heard of 
the swiftness of the judgement that is future’ (8:19), Ezra intercedes for Israel. The 
petitions of vv. 26 – 20 are summed-up in the request that God not ‘look on the sins 
of the people but those who served [him] in truth’ (v. 26), while vv. 27 – 28 contrast 
their respective deeds, and the reference in v. 28b to ‘those who have voluntarily 
acknowledged that you are to be feared’ (qui ex voluntate tuum timorem cognoverunt) 
provides the bridge to their differing attitudes. God should overlook those who live 
like cattle (8:28) and think like wild beasts (8:29), regarding instead those who 
gloriously taught God’s law (8:28) and those who have always trusted in God’s glory 
(8:29). The reason given for this request is again an appeal to God’s mercy, but as 
Barclay rightly emphasises, mercy is conceived differently here: ‘Ezra has pressed 
the claims for another view of ‘mercy’ and ‘benefaction’ (for the mixture of 
terminology, see 7.132 – 38)–one where mercy is perfected as incongruous.’76 
Redeploying terminology from his earlier interpretation of Ex 34:6 – 7, according to 
Ezra, God is called merciful for his treatment of those without ‘works of 
righteousness’ (8:32), and his goodness will be proclaimed when he is merciful to 
                                                
76 Barclay, Gift, 299. 
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those without a ‘store of good works’ (8:36).77 This construal of incongruous mercy 
would introduce an asymmetry in God’s treatment of sinners and the righteous, as 
the latter will ‘receive the reward from their own works’  (ex propriis operibus recipient 
mercedem, 8:33) and the former will not (8:32), despite the fact that they (Israel and 
her ancestors) have lived ‘in a mortal manner’ (mortalibus moribus, 8:31). The logic for 
this appeal is representative in character, because God is asked to consider the 
righteous and not the sinners when looking at his people (8:26 - 29). In other words, 
Ezra asks for God to break the organic relationship between sin and death for the 
sinners of Israel on the basis of the righteous, while maintaining this organic 
relationship for those who live righteously. 
 Uriel’s response, though predictable, moves our debate toward its climax in 
an illuminating way. For Ezra’s request that God provide a ‘seed for the heart’ and 
‘cultivation for the understanding’ (8:6) and his prayer that God overlook those who 
live like cattle and think like wild beasts (8:28, 29) both prepare for Uriel’s metaphor 
of God as farmer and his justification of this metaphor in the paradoxical 
exemplarity of Ezra himself. Uriel’s penultimate response collapses Ezra’s two-fold 
emphasis on creation and election into one issue: God will show no concern for the 
life, sin, death, and destruction of sinners (8:38), while he will rejoice over the 
creation, pilgrimage, salvation, and reward of the righteous (8:39). Thus, modifying 
Ezra’s request for ‘seed’, Uriel compares God’s creative activity and its result in 
salvation and judgement to the farmer’s scattering of seed—only some takes root 
and produces a crop; only some of those born will be saved (8:41). This subversion of 
Ezra’s seed metaphor elicits from him both a charge of anachronism and a final, 
direct appeal to incongruous mercy: seeds die as a result either of neglect by the 
farmer or due to the unsuitability of the conditions (8:43), but, because human 
                                                
77 Given Ezra’s role as prosecuting attorney in episode one and intercessor here, the problem of 
the apparent contradiction between the assumption that some are righteous in 8:26 – 30 and the claim 
that all have sinned in 8:35 is lessened; for Ezra is pleading for unconditioned and incongruous mercy 
on multiple grounds, returning throughout 8:4 – 62 to a variety of arguments already advanced (e.g., 
the request for a ‘seed’ in 8:6 returns to the assumption of the cor malignum and its infirmitas in 3:20 – 
21). Thus, though Stone is correct to warn against ‘oversystematization’, this does not entail that the 
author’s conception of the self is ultimately contradictory; pace Stone, Fourth Ezra, 272. Cf. R. 
Bauckham, ‘The Conflict of Justice and Mercy: Attitudes to the Damned in Apocalyptic Literature‘, in 
The Fate of the Dead: Studies on Jewish and Christian Apocalypses (NovTSup 93; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 138; 
S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1–5 (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 138. 
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beings are made by God’s own hands after his own image, surely they are not like 
the farmer’s seed and God will have mercy (8:44, 45). Ezra’s final, desperate appeal 
receives a familiar response: Ezra must observe which matters belong to the present 
age and which to the future (8:46), while remembering that he cannot love creation 
more than God (8:47). Moreover, though Uriel insists that Ezra’s identification with 
the unrighteous must stop (8:47), his humble refusal to consider himself among the 
righteous renders him worthy of ‘the greatest glory’ (8:49), a stark contrast to those 
who, ‘though in receipt of freedom’, have rejected God, his law, and his ways (8:56). 
Thus, implicit in Uriel’s use of the seed metaphor is the earlier connection between 
behaviour and results, but now with clarification that humans have received both an 
inviolable created self and the inviolable order of creation in the law. Uriel’s 
insistence on the created libertas of the unrighteous underscores the key issue and 
grounds it in his particular account of God’s life-giving and life-ordering 
benefaction. The problem is not, as Ezra implies, that God created humans to destroy 
them (8:59) but that, despite their inviolable created freedom, human beings ‘have 
become ungrateful ones (ingrati) to the one who has prepared life for them now’ 
(8:60). Thus, as Uriel turns to a final synopsis of the judgement, salvation is 
conditioned on one’s response to God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction: the 
righteous will be saved per opera or per fidem in qua credidit78 (9:7), while the judged 
are those ‘who have not known [God] despite living in receipt of [divine] 
benefactions (viventes beneficia consecuti)’ (9:10), ‘those who have rejected [God’s] law 
despite having freedom (erant habentes libertatem)’, and ‘those who did not 
understand but rejected [this freedom] while a place of repentance (paenitentiae locus) 
was still open to them’ (9:12). It is this locus, this inviolable space of created libertas, 
that is the moral and material ground of the return gift of salvation for the ‘one 
grape’ and the ‘one plant’ (9:21, 22). In this connection, Uriel’s closing reference to 
‘those living in receipt of [divine] benefactions’ underlines the theological logic of 
the entirety of episode three. As Uriel insisted, the law as been given by God to all 
                                                
78 The conjunction vel rules out a soteriology of faith and works (contra Myers, II Esdras, 248). 
Longenecker’s translation (2 Esdras, 49) ‘through the faithfulness in which they put their trust’ is 
unlikely, given the consistent use of credo with regard to divine covenants in the rest of 4 Ezra (3:32; 
5:29; 7:83, 130) and the variable use of fides (5:1; 6:5, 28; 7:24, 34, 94, 98, 103–104; 9:7; 13:23), which 
suggests ‘through the faith by which they believed’ or ‘through the faith in which they believed’. 
Given the focus on cognition in the immediate context, we prefer the former. 
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(7:20), and all know what they must do in response in order to live (7:21). Likewise, 
Israel is obligated to heed Moses’ words and choose life (7:129; cf. Dt 30:19). Thus, 
Ezra’s appeals to God as the indiscriminate giver of life to the unworthy (7:138) or 
the one called merciful because he has mercy on those who have no works (8:32) is, 
for Uriel, mistaken because it disregards the enduring state of libertas (8:56; 9:11) 
granted in God’s benefactions to the living (9:10). 
 Thus, two critical results for the argument of this chapter arise from the 
exegesis of the previous section. First, the logical grounding of the debate over the 
character of God’s eschatological gift-giving in episode three—whether for the 
worthy or unworthy—is shown to rest in a prior commitment to a conception of the 
enduring efficacy and relevance of the divine gifts of life (specifically, human 
agency) and the Torah. Thus, a particular account of divine-human gift exchange at 
creation, in the fallen saeculum, and at the eschaton governs the theological logic: 
humans who return the gift of created freedom in observance of the Torah, receive 
eschatological life as a return gift to the worthy. The axiomatic nature of this account 
of divine-human gift-exchange in creation and the eschaton is further illustrated in 
the contrast between Uriel and Ezra’s respective hermeneutics. Whereas Ezra 
interprets Ex 34 as an expression of God’s character as one who gives to the 
unworthy, Uriel confines this reading to the present, fallen saeculum, subordinating it 
to the Mosaic choice between eschatological life and death in Dt 30. With the above 
argument, we have gone beyond Barclay’s recent analysis of gift in 4 Ezra, by 
showing precisely why Uriel’s account of gift differs from that of Ezra. And, in so 
doing, we have shown that an analysis of life as divine gift and God as life-giver is 
necessary for doing so. Second, the closing debate over the proper interpretation of 
the seed metaphor both extends the organic logic of the first two episodes and 
prepares for Ezra’s vision, in which he comes to understand how the law bears 
eschatological fruit not just for individuals but also for Zion. Thus, our analysis of 
this metaphor prepares for a new interpretation of the logical relation between 
episodes three and four —as opposed to merely experiential resolution (as most 
prominently argued by Stone) or an intentional aporia (as recently argued by Hogan). 
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2.3 Ezra’s Vision as Fitting Gift (4 Ezra 9:26 – 10:59) 
Though there has been considerable debate over the significance of episode four, 
there are good reasons to think that Ezra’s theology has changed.79 It is unnecessary 
either to construe this change psychologically or religiously rather than intellectually 
or theologically,80 or to interpret the debates of episode three as a stalemate leading 
to an intentional aporia.81 On the contrary, as we shall argue, Ezra’s further 
development of the seed metaphor indicates full theological acceptance of Uriel’s 
account of the creational freedom of the self.82 Likewise, the particular nature of the 
counsel he gives to Mother Zion demonstrates that Ezra has adopted in full Uriel’s 
two-ages account of divine life-giving benefaction, a change that proves him both 
ready for and worthy of the climactic vision of the eschatological Zion. Thus, Ezra 
receives the vision because he is a paradoxically exemplary leader, one whose grief 
has been tested and proven to arise ex toto corde (10:50) but who, in order to lead 
Israel, needs to experience the healing of Israel’s grief in a vision of the end and 
reversal of grief itself. 
 Consequently, in this closing section we will see how our focus on life as 
divine gift and our analysis of 4 Ezra’s organic metaphors exposes the logical relation 
between episodes three and four and, thus, the theological logic of the apocalypse. 
Specifically, Ezra’s puzzle over the apparent death of historical Israel in light of his 
conviction about the eschatological fecundity of the law is not an absurdity, but 
rather represents the remaining paradox this episode answers. Likewise, the fact that 
                                                
79 Barclay, Gift, 297, n. 38: ‘if it is a mistake to identify a single point of total change, it is also 
mistaken to conclude form some elements of continuity at this point that nothing is changing at all’. 
80 Herman Gunkel was the first to suggest that the debates reflect the author of 4 Ezra’s inner 
struggle; H. Gunkel, ‘Das vierte Buch Esra‘, in Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten 
Testaments (ed. E. Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900), 2:343. Cf. Breech, ‘Fragments‘, 274; Stone, 
‘Reactions to Destructions‘, 202 – 04; Stone, Fourth Ezra, 32 – 33, 36; J.J. Collins, The Apocalyptic 
Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature (2nd ed.; BRS; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998), 210 – 11; Hogan, Theologies, 38 – 40. For criticism of this line of interpretation, see 
Brandenburger, Verborgenheit, 37 – 52; P. Esler, ‘The Social Function of 4 Ezra‘, JSNT 53 (1994): 110 – 
13. 
81 Hogan, Theologies, 38, 153–57. 
82 Though some have read Ezra’s restatement of his complaint of the tiny number saved (a drop 
in a wave, 9:15, 16) as indicating his recalcitrance because Ezra’s grief has not been removed, it does 
not follow that Ezra does not accept Uriel’s position. For it was the testing, not the removal, of Ezra’s 
grief that was Uriel’s object prior to the climactic vision (10:50). Contra M.A. Knibb, ‘Commentary on 
2 Esdras‘, in The First and Second Books of Esdras (The Cambridge Bible Commentary; Cambridge: CUP, 
1979), 216; Esler, ‘4 Ezra‘, 110 – 13; Hogan, Theologies, 42; 234 – 35; Moo, Creation, 72; Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 458 – 59, 461 – 62. 
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the vision of the grieving Mother Zion twice interrupts Ezra’s puzzlement signals 
not that the theological question is being set aside but rather that it is being 
answered in the vision. In summary, Ezra’s puzzled extension of the seed metaphor 
implies the survival of Israel, his assurance that Mother Zion will receive her son 
back as a fitting gift explains the logic of this implication, and the vision of 
‘resurrected’ Zion itself shows how that logic is true. 
2.3.1 The Remaining Paradox: The Survival of Israel (9:26 – 37) 
 Though the new location, change in diet, and Ezra’s satisfaction signal that 
some change has occurred (9:26), this episode begins, as all of the others, with Ezra’s 
heart being troubled over a paradox (9:27). Ezra returns to the problem that initiated 
the opening complaint of episode one, but here the focus is narrower: he considers 
only Israel’s apparently vain receipt of the law, not her relatively unjust treatment by 
God vis-à-vis the nations.83 Recalling the giving of the law after the Exodus, Ezra 
summarizes God’s words in this way: ‘Hear me, O Israel, and pay attention to my 
words, O seed of Jacob. For behold I sow my law in you, and it will make fruit in 
you, and you will be glorified through it through the age’ (9:30, 31). The change in 
Ezra’s seed metaphor is the interpretive key: this is neither a restatement of his 
position in 3:20 – 27, 84 nor an ironic withdrawal of the assent given at the end of 
episode three85 but rather it represents both a reversal of the position in episode one 
and a response to Ezra’s own request for seed in 8:6. For Ezra’s use of the metaphor 
here both recognises the divine gift of the law and attributes the historical ‘death’ of 
Israel not to God or to the moral incapacity of the cor malignum but emphatically to 
the failure of those who received the gift of the law to keep it (9:32, 33).86  
 Moreover, Ezra does not turn, as he has repeatedly done, to the question of 
the relative righteousness of Israel vis-à-vis the nations but maintains his narrow 
focus on the survival of Israel. This narrowing and the terms in which it is expressed 
                                                
83 Longenecker, 2 Esdras, 64. 
84 Pace Stone, Fourth Ezra, 308; L.T. Stuckenbruck, ‘Ezra’s Vision of the Lady: The Form and 
Function of a Turning Point‘, in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch: Reconstruction After the Fall (ed. M. 
Henze and G. Boccaccini; JSJSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 141. 
85 Contra Brandenburger, Verborgenheit, 63–68; Hogan, Theologies, 155.  
86 Consequently, it is both formally and materially true that, in Harnisch’s words, ‘[s]tets ist es 
Uriel, der das letzte Wort behält’; Harnisch, ‘Prophet‘, 463. 
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imply that Ezra has adopted not only Uriel’s explanation of the structural incapacity 
of the present saeculum for God’s definitive judgement and salvation but also his 
insistence on God’s equitable—congruous and conditioned—judgement. Despite the 
fact that those who received the law have perished, the law’s fruit will last because 
the imperishable God guarantees its imperishability (9:32)—factum est fructum legis 
non periens; nec enim poterat, quoniam tuus erat. This is neither a misuse of the 
metaphor that unintentionally proves the intractability of the debate, 87 nor an 
intentionally absurd muddle88 but an extension of the metaphor’s logic toward the 
only remaining paradox. That is, Hogan’s rhetorical question is the point, ‘If the 
Torah was given only to Israel and the members of Israel are all going to perish 
because they have sinned, in what meaningful sense can the Torah be said to 
“survive in its glory” (9:37)?’89 The question Hogan finds absurd is the question 
being posed in all seriousness by Ezra. The eschatological inflection of the metaphor 
leads Ezra to a paradox: how can both the law (9:37) and its fruit (9:34) endure if that 
which holds them, historical Israel, perishes? The problem is that, though Ezra has 
learned to think of the self and the law, and, thus, the righteous and their ‘fruit’ in 
terms of the two-ages, he is still thinking of Israel from the perspective of her 
apparently vain and futile history.90 What he cannot understand is how Israel might 
survive. That Ezra has the conceptual apparatus, provided by Uriel, necessary to 
resolve his own puzzlement is clear from his consolation of the grieving mother, as I 
will demonstrate.91 
2.3.2 The Mother Zion: The Reversal of Temporal Grief in the Just Return of Eternal Joy 
(9:38 – 10:59) 
 Both Uriel’s absence and the fact that the vision of the grieving mother twice 
interrupts Ezra’s cogitations (9:39; 10:4, 5) suggest that the vision itself provides the 
answer to Ezra’s puzzlement. After having his thoughts of the imperishable law 
interrupted by the mother’s grieving (9:38 – 40), Ezra hears how, though ‘the Mighty 
                                                
87 Brandenburger, Verborgenheit, 63–67. 
88 Hogan, Theologies, 154–56. 
89 Ibid., 156. 
90 Barclay, Gift, 301. 
91 Stone, Fourth Ezra, 319: ‘Ezra comforts the woman…by stressing to her exactly those ideas and 
concepts which he himself has struggled to accept since the beginning of the book’. 
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One’ gave (do) her a son (9:45) after thirty years of prayers and barrenness (9:44, 45), 
he died on his wedding night (10:1). So, the woman came to the place to fast and die 
(10:2 – 4). In turning to comfort her, as the parallels with his own laments suggest, 
Ezra is both assuming the role of Uriel92 and consoling those like himself—the 
representative righteous Israelite.93 Ezra’s first attempt at consolation reframes the 
mother’s grief in the context of Zion (10:6 – 8) and Mother Earth (10:9 – 11). Though 
there is certainly irony in Ezra’s inability to identify the mother as Zion, his 
consolation is not mistaken. For his appeal to Zion’s grief affirms that it is appropriate 
for the righteous Israelite to grieve, while the reference to Mother Earth tempers 
grief and prohibits despair. That is, Zion is bereaved now, but, given the condition of 
Mother Earth, God has been habitually bereaved from the beginning (10:13, 14).94 
And, as with the Earth, so will it be with Mother Zion. So, she should ‘bravely’ 
(fortiter) forebear: ‘For if you consider righteous (iustificaveris) the limit (terminum) of 
God, then you will receive your son back in time (in tempore) and will be praised 
among women‘ (10:16; cf. 7:78). This promise of the reversal of the mother’s futility 
in the return of her son is both an affirmation of God’s justice and a sign of the 
reversal of earthly futility itself. For, if death is reversed, then the sorrow of all 
mothers, even Mother Earth, is turned to joy. In other words, Ezra’s words here 
already imply an answer to his conundrum, as Uriel’s subsequent explanation of the 
vision of heavenly Zion makes clear. Moreover, this answer upholds Uriel’s 
insistence on equity in the judgement, as the Mother both receives her son as a fitting 
gift for her long-suffering piety (9:44, 45) and receives him back as a fitting gift for 
considering God righteous in the midst of her grief. In other words, just as the gift of 
her son was due to a fitting reversal of an unjust state, so is his return from the dead.  
 Ezra’s first consolation, like the first two episodes, does not resolve the 
woman’s grief, and so he continues. After giving a long litany of the ways that Zion 
has suffered humiliation (10:1 – 23), Ezra admonishes the woman to ‘lay aside’ her 
                                                
92 W. Harnisch, ‘Die Ironie der Offenbarung: Exegetische Erwägungen zur Zionsvision im 4. Buch 
Esra‘, in SBL Seminar Papers, 1981 (ed. K.H. Richards; Chico: Scholars, 1981), 79–104; Stuckenbruck, 
‘Ezra’s Vision‘, 144. 
93 Contra W.J. Harrelson, ‘Ezra among the Wicked in 2 Esdras 3 – 10‘, in Divine Helmsman, Studies 
on God’s Control of Human Events, Presented to Lou H. Silberman (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 
1980), 36: though ironic, this is not ‘an answer that Ezra cannot accept for himself’. 
94 Ezra’s reference to national and cosmic grief does not indicate his emotional recalcitrance but 
rather relativises the grief in light of its reversal; pace Stuckenbruck, ‘Ezra’s Vision‘, 145. 
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troubles so ‘that the Mighty One might be merciful again and give [her] rest, the 
Most High a rest from her labours’ (ut tibi repropitietur Fortis et requiem faciat tibi 
Altissimus requietionem laborum, 10:24). The reference to God as Fortis echoes both the 
woman’s earlier reference to the honor she gave to the Mighty One (Fortis) who had 
given her a son despite her barrenness (9:45), and it also recalls Ezra’s admonition 
that she bear her circumstances ‘bravely’ (fortiter, 10:15). This further specifies what 
Ezra means by God being ‘merciful again’ and giving ‘rest’: the woman is to receive 
this mercy as reversal, life. There is a congruity between her grief-bearing and God’s 
response, a fact that further emphasises God’s role as the Benefactor who gives 
fittingly (God sees [pervideo] and gives [do] in 9:45). That Ezra expects reversal to be 
the form that the mother’s ‘rest’ will take is confirmed by her transformation before 
his eyes and while he speaks. 
 The numerous indications that Ezra progressively adopts Uriel’s two-world 
eschatological framework and his subsequent interpretation of the necessary 
congruity and definitive nature of God’s judgement reach their climax in Ezra’s 
consolation of the mother. As with Ezra’s speech, the transformation of the woman 
interrupts him, and the nature of the interruption as a vision of heavenly Zion, the very 
reality Uriel has been urging him to contemplate, highlights the importance of his 
words. Ezra’s appeals to both God’s justice and mercy as the reversal of personal, 
national, and earthly futility provide the answer to his own puzzlement. Whatever the 
law vivifies now, though it die, God will return to perfect life in the age to come. 
This is so because God ‘s mercy is justice-shaped—fitting. In commending this point 
of view to the woman, Ezra opens up the possibility of seeing its reality himself.95  
 The most peculiar feature of this whole episode is that Ezra’s inability to 
comprehend what he sees nearly kills him. Fear seizes him, he cries out for Uriel, 
certain that he is about to die (‘my end is made into corruption’, 10:28). Uriel finds 
him lying ‘as though dead’ (ut mortuus, 10:31), raises him up and strengthens him. 
Ezra’s begs: ‘…do not leave me so that I will not die in vain, since I have seen what I 
do not know and I hear what I do not know’ (10:35). The references to God’s seeing 
Ezra bracketing Uriel’s interpretation of Zion’s history are striking—‘he has seen 
your upright way since without ceasing you have been sad for your people and 
                                                
95 Barclay, Gift, 302. 
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mourned for Zion’ (10:39) and ‘now the Most High, seeing that you are sad in mind 
and suffer from a whole heart for [Zion], he has shown you the brightness of her 
glory and the beauty of her grace’ (10:50). This produces another paradoxical 
evaluation of Ezra’s moral worth. Just as his inclusion of himself among the damned 
is the pinnacle of humility and leads to the highest divine praise, his faithful grief 
renders him worthy to see divine reality and ‘to be with the Most High as few have’ 
(10:57) despite his corrupt state and relative inability to take in with his ears and 
eyes the divine building (10:55, 56). In this way, Ezra’s journey is a hopeful one for 
humanity and the people he represents. Despite the corrupted and blinkered human 
condition, there is a paradoxical path to perfect knowledge and communion with the 
Most High for the righteous.96  
Conclusion: Ezra as Exemplary Human and Fitting Witness of Life 
In 4 Ezra the profound grief of the destruction is consecrated in a sophisticated and 
finely-crafted theological debate over its significance. Ezra’s initial reading of text, 
salvation-history, and world presents an anti-theodicy in the form of a prosecutorial 
double bind: either God is culpable for the Unheilsgeschicte of Israel because he 
created Adam with a cor malignum and refused to take it away (3:1 – 27), or, in 
favouring his enemies over his people, he is capricious in exercising justice in history 
(3:28 – 36). Either way, God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction at creation 
and Sinai is rendered futile by his own death-dealing judgement. Utilising tests of 
knowledge (4:1 – 6) and power (5:36 – 40) to humble him, the angel Uriel enrolls 
Ezra on a course of apocalyptic instruction, reframing and, thereby, refuting his 
denials of the efficacy of God’s benefactions. Ezra’s first problem is not God but the 
occlusion of God’s heavenly way: human incapacity is not moral (infirmitas, 3:22) but 
epistemological, a function of ‘one who is corrupt in the corrupt world’ trying to 
understand the ‘incorruptible’ and God’s ‘immeasurable way’ (4:11). Ezra’s second 
problem is not God’s capriciousness but the infirmitas of the present saeculum 
(4:27)—a world that is incapable of hosting either God’s judgement of the manifold 
                                                
96 The visions of episodes five and six do not materially alter the theology developed in the first 
four episodes, a point confirmed by Ezra’s recapitulation of Uriel’s two-ages account in the 
Abschiedsrede (14:28 – 36) of episode seven (cf. Brandenburger, Verborgenheit, 32, 148 – 53; Harnisch, 
’Prophet ’, 461 – 64). Thus, our analysis covers only the first four episodes. 
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fructus impietatis (4:31) or the ‘good things’ (bonum, 4:29) that have been promised to 
the ‘righteous’ (iusti, 4:27). Likewise, the decline of Israel is due to the fixed, iterative, 
and entropic history of the judged cosmos, which is headed toward death like a 
woman’s womb, yet destined for transformation and renewal because of God’s life-
giving power (5:20 – 6:34). 
 Spurred on by Ezra’s advocacy for the unworthy, the debate reaches its 
climax in two alternate accounts of God’s life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. 
Whereas Ezra defines mercy as incongruous and unconditioned, reading Ex 34:6 – 7 
from the perspective of God’s creation and sustenance of the unworthy (7:132 – 
8:14), Uriel reads Moses’ command to ‘choose life that you may live’ (7:129; Dt 30:19) 
from a theological vision committed to the inviolable libertas (8:56; 9:11) of the 
created self and, thus, entailing God’s equitable distribution of judgement and 
salvation. Ezra’s account of the seed metaphor (9:26 – 37) and his consolation of 
Mother Zion regarding God’s just mercy (10:16, 24) show that he has adopted Uriel’s 
account in full. Thus, after commending God’s justice-shaped mercy, Ezra sees its 
revelatory confirmation in the vision of heavenly Zion (10:25 – 28). Paradoxically, it 
is the grieving yet ultimately faithful sage who proves the possibility of human 
commitment to God ex toto corde (10:50) in the midst of a world dominated by sin 
and death.  
 Consequently, though Barclay’s analysis of 4 Ezra establishes the fact that 
Ezra and Uriel operate with differing definitions of God as gift-giver, a focus on the 
relation between created and eschatological life is needed to ascertain the deep 
theological logic of this apocalypse. For Uriel’s account of God as a discriminating 
giver at the eschaton is materially grounded in his earlier insistence on the efficacy 
of the gift of moral agency and its Torah order at creation. Likewise, this focus on 
divine life-giving benefaction raised the crucial issue of the development of organic 
metaphors in 4 Ezra. In this connection, we demonstrated that, given a careful 
analysis of the development of the seed metaphor from episode three to episode 
four, it is not necessary either to construe Ezra’s vision as an appeal to mere 
experience or as an alternative, non-rational solution to a supposed aporia in episode 
three. Rather, the organic metaphor establishes the connection between dying 
historical Zion and resurrected eschatological Zion, while the account of God as a 
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one who gives life to dead Zion qua the righteous supplies the logic by which the 
connection holds. Put differently, 4 Ezra’s organic life metaphors posit a necessary 
relation between the life one lives in history and the results of that life beyond 
history, while the logic of divine life-giving benefaction provides the theological 
ground of this relation. For those who order their lives according to the gift of 
created, Torah-ordered life, they will receive back resurrection life, despite death 
and decay, as divine gift to the worthy. Thus, for 4 Ezra, God’s good gifts of created 
life and its Torah-order are not wasted—either individually or nationally—as Ezra 
argues in episode one. For Ezra himself, a righteous man, has seen through grief to 
the fruit of the law—a life he has not known, a city he has not visited, and a joy he 
cannot describe.
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Part 2 
Galatians in Conversation with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra on God as 
Life-Giver and Life as Gift  
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Chapter 3 
Living to God: Exemplary Recipients of the Gift of Life in 4 
Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians 1 and 2 
 
Part two of this thesis will place Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra in conversation 
on the topic of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. This chapter will query Paul’s 
presentation of himself as a paradigmatic recipient of life in Galatians 1 and 2 from 
the perspective of the presentations of Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (4 Ezra) as 
exemplary recipients of divine life-giving benefaction. In this conversation a formal 
anthropological divergence is exposed: whereas Paul identifies the singular Christ-
gift as the sole source and order of human life, 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra consider as 
inviolable God’s singular gift of the created and Torah-ordered self (and society). 
Chapter four will moderate a debate between Paul and 4 Ezra over their readings of 
scripture and Israel’s history, with the dispute over Gal 3 - 4 clarifying the formal 
differences between their conceptions of divine life-giving activity and grounding 
these differences in their divergent hermeneutics and theodicies. Chapter five will 
argue through debate primarily with 4 Maccabees over Gal 5 – 6 that the differing 
conceptions of divine life-giving and life-ordering in these texts find their material 
ground in divergent conceptions of the (re)constitution of human agency, which 
exposes the material and hermeneutical basis of Paul’s theological disagreement 
with his Jewish-Christian opponents and provides the formal shape of his ethics. 
The Resurrection, Paul as Paradigm, and the Theology of Galatians 
Of the many controversies about Galatians, the centrality of the cross is not one. 
Paul’s focus on the cross became problematic in the wake of Ernst Käsemann’s 
identification of apocalyptic as the origin of Christian theology, with its 
corresponding focus on the cosmological and eschatological framework of Pauline 
Theology.1 Thus, for J. Christian Beker, ‘the virtual absence of the resurrection of 
Christ’ is a theological problem in Galatians and for the apocalyptic interpretation of 
Pauline Theology, because here, in a core Pauline text, a key apocalyptic theme of 
                                                
1 E. Käsemann, ‘Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie‘, ZTK 57 (1960): 162 – 85; E. Käsemann, ‘Zum 
Thema der urchristlichen Apokalyptik‘, ZTK 59 (1962): 257 – 84. 
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the gospel is muted.2 In a seminal essay, J. Louis Martyn granted Beker’s assumption 
that the paucity of references to the resurrection (Gal 1:1) entailed the lack of 
significance of the resurrection for the theology of the letter, but Martyn transformed 
this liability into a virtue.3 Rather than seeing Paul’s apparently myopic cruciform 
vision in Galatians as a problem, Martyn reads Jesus’ death on the cross as the 
apocalyptic event. The cross is the revelation of the divine invasion of the old cosmos 
and the emergence of the new—thus, the inauguration of the age of humanity’s 
rescue. What is crucial for our purposes is that, despite considerable diversity in 
interpreting Paul’s theology in Galatians, most scholars either assume with Beker 
and Martyn that Paul’s focus on the cross excludes the resurrection and parousia as 
significant factors or they fail to integrate Paul’s explicit resurrection reference and 
subsequent ‘life’ language in their accounts of the theology of the letter.4 
 The work of John Barclay is an anomaly in this connection. For him, Paul’s 
paradigmatic autobiography reaches its climax in the account of the reconstitution 
and reordering of Paul’s self in the Christ-gift.5 Thus, while Martyn and others place 
the theological accent on the cross,6 Barclay sees Jesus’ resurrection ‘presupposed 
throughout [Galatians] as the source of the “life” (cf. 2:19-20; 3:21; 5:25; 6:8) or “new 
creation” (6:15) generated by the Christ-event’.7 Thus, for Barclay, the impact of the 
                                                
2 J.C. Beker, Paul the Apostle: the Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 
58. 
3 J.L. Martyn, ‘Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians‘, NTS 31 (1985): 410 – 24. 
4 See e.g. B.R. Gaventa, ‘The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians‘, in Pauline 
Theology, Vol. 1 (ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 157, n. 28: ‘Paul‘s reference to the 
cross or crucifixion or death of Christ are multivalent …but that multivalence does not mean that 
cross for Paul includes resurrection.’ Cf. M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2011), 29; J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 43. 
5 A spate of studies over the last forty years have displaced the old consensus that reads Galatians 
1 and 2 as Paul’s apology for his gospel and apostleship arguing rather that Paul tells his story in 
paradigmatic terms, presenting himself as an example of, in Gaventa’s terms, ‘the working of the 
gospel’; B.R. Gaventa, ‘Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm‘, NovT 28 (1986): 313; cf. G. 
Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding (Atlanta: Scholars, 1985); B. Dodd, Paul’s 
Paradigmatic ‘I‘: Personal Example as Literary Strategy (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 
1999); J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony‘, in Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical 
Assessment (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 133–56. For a defense of 
Galatians 1 – 2 as apologia, see H.D. Betz, ‘The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to 
the Galatians‘, NTS 21 (1975): 353 – 79; idem, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in 
Galatia (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 14 – 15. 
6 Cf. Barclay’s own earlier description of the cross as the locus of ‘recreative divine life’; Barclay, 
‘Paul’s Story‘, 143, n. 28. See now, slightly differently, his contention that the emphasis in Galatians 
‘signals the disjunction created by the Christ-event’; Barclay, Gift, 352–53,  7; cf. 378. 
7 Barclay, Gift, 352–53, n. 7. 
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Christ-event is death and resurrection shaped—effecting ‘a radical disjunction’ from 
the authority of the Torah in Paul’s co-crucifixion with Christ, ‘a change of vision 
and value’, and ‘a change of “self”’ through Christ’s resurrection life.8 Yet, while 
Barclay insists on the integral relation of Jesus’ death and resurrection in Paul’s 
paradigmatic climax, for him, Paul’s theological logic is explicable in terms of its 
character as incongruous gift: ‘Because [the Christ-gift] is incongruous, this gift 
bypasses and subverts preexisting norms; it does not fit any pre-constituted system 
of value’.9 
 Paul’s framing of this death to life movement, however, invites a 
reconsideration of both its theological logic and the story he tells in Gal 1 – 2 leading 
up to it. For the new life Paul lives to God is preceded necessarily by his death to the 
law—ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόµου νόµῳ ἀπέθανον, ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω (Gal 2:19). It is not that Paul, unlike 
his opponents knows the proper answer to the question ‘What time is it?’ or ‘In what 
cosmos do I live?’10 It is not simply that the Christ-gift has a singular character 
somehow by definition.11 It is not even that ‘the Torah no longer defines what [a life 
to God] entails’ (italics added) because the Christ-gift is given without regard to 
Torah parameters.12 Paul’s opponents, presumably, recognised both the redemptive-
historical change and its effects in divine incongruous gift-giving; they just 
disagreed about the implications of these for the Torah. Rather, however one takes διὰ 
νόµου, Paul’s death and life configuration indicates categorically that one cannot live 
to the law and to God. The rhetorical punch of Paul’s paradoxical statement in Gal 
2:19—a faithful Jew is not living to God, somehow, by definition—and Paul’s 
‘crucifixion’ and ‘resurrection’ shaped explanation of it in Gal 2:20 invite a different 
analysis of the theological logic at work in Galatians 1 – 2, a reading alert both to the 
particulars of Paul’s narration of the Christ-gift and the logical entailments conveyed 
in that story as the paradoxical receipt of life from the dead through, in some sense, 
crucifixion and resurrection. 
                                                
8 Ibid., 386. 
9 Ibid., 387. 
10 J.L. Martyn, Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 23. 
11 Gaventa, ‘The Singularity of the Gospel’. 
12 Barclay, Gift, 386. 
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 With the recognition of Paul’s climactic presentation of himself as the 
recipient of a life-giving gift, then, our argument will proceed by way of a 
conversation with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra over the textual terrain of Galatians 1 – 2, 
focusing on the question of the life-giving significance of the Christ-gift. Given their 
respective presentations of Eleazar and Ezra as, like Paul, recipients of divine life-
giving gifts, a conversation with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra will serve to illumine both 
the rhetorical force and theological significance of Paul’s particular narration of the 
Christ-gift. We will argue that Paul’s bestowal of the blessing of the singular Christ-
gift (not the Torah) (Gal 1:1 – 5), his pronouncement of anathemas as an ironic 
witness to truth (Gal 1:6 – 10), his identification with the Galatians as a recipient of 
the Christ-gift (1:11 – 24),13 his account of the recognition under threat of the new 
social order implied by this gift in Jerusalem (2:1 – 10), and his response to the threat 
posed to the order of the gift in Antioch/Galatia (2:11 – 21) all lead up to a reading of 
Gal 2:18 – 20 in which Paul rhetorically and theologically subverts an account of the 
inviolable integrity of the Torah-ordered self (and society) by presenting the Christ-
gift as the singular life-giving and life-ordering gift. Such a gift is necessary, Paul 
implies, because the created self, and even the Torah-ordered, created self, is not 
free. Rather, the Christ-gift alone effects the ‘resurrection’ of such a ‘dead’ self and 
reordering of ‘dead’ agents. Thus, Paul does not appeal to but begins to explain the 
unconditioned and incongruous character of the Christ-gift and, thereby, subverts an 
alternate account of God’s life-giving benefaction. By presenting humans—Jew and 
Gentile alike—as recipients of properly-ordered life only in the Christ-gift, Paul 
subverts an account of self and society, like those in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, as 
inviolably Torah-ordered from creation. To be clear, we shall argue that this 
subversion is formal in Gal 1 – 2, receiving its material grounding in Paul’s 
arguments in the remainder of the letter. Thus, whereas the debates in 4 Maccabees 
and 4 Ezra serve to establish both the worth of Ezra and Eleazar as recipients of 
                                                
13 Though differing on matters of exegetical detail, the present argument coheres with Barclay 
and McFarland on the character of the Christ-gift. What is unique is the argument that, in Gal 2:17 – 
21, Paul begins an account of the necessarily incongruous and unconditioned character of the Christ-
gift in the context of a debate over divine life-giving action, in general, and human agency, in 
particular. See Barclay, Gift, 351 – 87; O. McFarland, ’“The One Who Calls in Grace“: Paul’s Rhetorical 
and Theological Identification with the Galatians’, HBT 35 (2013): 151 – 65; idem, God and Grace in 
Philo and Paul (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 104 – 12. 
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salvation and the Torah-ordered created integrity of the self as the necessary 
precondition of this worth, Paul presents himself as an unworthy recipient of the 
death-dealing and self-reordering Christ-gift in order to begin to call into question 
both the created integrity of the self and the Torah-order of self and society. 
 Consequently, in this chapter we contribute to research that contends, in 
Gaventa’s terms, that Paul presents himself as a paradigm of ‘the working of the 
gospel’, by beginning to clarify the precise senses in which this is the case. Paul’s 
autobiography in Gal 1 – 2 reaches its formal climax in his presentation of himself as 
the recipient of a new and newly-ordered agency for a new community. Likewise, 
we begin to go beyond Barclay’s research by showing not simply that Paul conceives 
of divine benefaction in the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous but, by 
focusing on the life-giving and life-ordering aspect of this gift in conversation with 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, how this conception is implicated in deeper questions about 
created and eschatological life in relation to the Torah. Specifically, we show that the 
particular character of Paul’s autobiography implies a rejection both of accounts of 
the enduring efficacy of created agency and of identifications of the Torah with the 
created order, like those used to present Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary worthy 
recipients of eschatological grace. In the next two chapters, we argue that this 
implied rejection of an alternate scheme of divine life-giving benefaction is made 
explicit in Paul’s argument about the shape of salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4), the 
existence and proper ordering of the self in Christ and the Spirit (Gal 5), and the 
proper ordering of the church (Gal 6). 
3.1 Singular Divine Gifts and Exemplary Recipients (Gal 1:1 – 24) 
Paul begins by contrasting the benefits of the Christ-gift with the dire consequences 
of defecting from it. On the one hand, the event of Jesus’ death and resurrection is 
the source and catalyst of a new dynamic (1:1 – 5): Paul’s receipt of apostleship 
initiates a cycle of divine-human gift exchange that effects blessing in Galatia and 
elicits praise to God.14 On the other hand, the Galatians are on the verge of ‘deserting 
the one who called [them] in grace’, a rupture in relationship precipitated by their 
                                                
14 Debates over the referent of Γαλατία (1:1) are inconclusive but inconsequential for our 
argument. For a recent review of the issues and evidence, see D.J. Moo, Galatians (BECNT; Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2013), 3–8. 
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consideration of a different version of the ‘good news’ (1:6 – 10).15 Thus, in sharp 
contrast to his pronouncement of blessing on the Galatians as a group, Paul delivers 
a double-anathema on anyone, either on earth or in heaven, who preaches ‘another 
gospel’.16 This startling juxtaposition of ‘grace and peace’ and double-‘anathema’ 
establishes a basic rhetorical and theological tension that runs throughout the rest of 
the letter, concluding in Paul’s pronouncement of grace in 6:18.17  For our 
conversation partners, however, it is not the tension itself but its source that raises 
troubling questions. For in identifying with the Galatians as a recipient of the Christ-
gift and narrating the effect of this gift not as a confirmation but a subversion of his 
commitment to Torah, Paul implies the displacement of the Torah as the singular 
life-ordering gift. 
 In this connection, the dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 here serves the overall 
argument of this chapter by showing how Paul’s presentation of Jesus’s self-offering 
as a divine gift for sins, his characterization of this gift as singular, and his 
characterization of himself as a fellow, unworthy recipient with the Galatians of this 
gift all raise deep questions in the minds of authors like 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. 
Specifically, Paul’s presentation raises questions about God’s gift of created life and 
the Torah as its divinely given norm, the answers to which themselves have a range 
of logically related theological implications. It could be, of course, that our 
conversation partners (or we) are mishearing Paul. So, in the exegesis that follows 
we will need to determine whether and, if so, how Paul explicitly addresses the 
questions that arise in the dialogical exegesis of this opening section. 
                                                
15 Because Paul gives carefully selected and framed information, it is not possible to determine the 
precise issues involved in the Galatian crisis. For the consensus reconstruction, arguing that Paul’s 
opponents in Galatia were advocating circumcision (Gal 5:2 – 12; 6:12 – 13) and observance of the 
Torah (Gal 4:21; 5:3; cf. 4:10; 6:13a), see J.M.G. Barclay, Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s Ethics in 
Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 37 – 74. 
16 On the Pauline anathemas in light of the curses on false prophecy in Deuteronomy 13 (LXX), 
see K.O. Sandnes, Paul - One of the Prophets?: A Contribution to the Apostle’s Self-Understanding (WUNT 
II 43; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 70 – 73.  
17 The initial ἄνθρωπος/θεός antithesis and his subsequent development of it suggests that Paul’s 
status as a Jewish apostle to Gentiles does not constitute the particular tension of the letter; contra 
Dunn, Galatians, 5. For the letter as an explication of the tension between ‘amen’ (1:5) and ‘anathema’ 
(1:8, 9), see Martyn, Galatians, 92, 106. 
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3.1.1 The Christ-Gift and the Cycle of Divine-Human Gift Exchange (1:1 – 5) 18 
 From the outset Paul places himself on the divine side of a fundamental 
divine-human polarity—Παῦλος ἀπόστολος οὐκ ἀπ᾿ ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι᾿ ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ διὰ 
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Thus, with the second word 
ἀπόστολος and his subsequent specification of Jesus and God as both source and 
means of this role, Paul presents himself as God’s ‘authorized envoy’,19 
commissioned for a specific work.20 The initial message Paul and his companions are 
to deliver is one of blessing21—‘grace and peace’22 that flows from not only from the 
risen Christ but ‘from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ who gave himself 
for our sins’ (1:3, 4). By reversing the temporal sequence of the Christ-event here, 
Paul presents this blessing in phenomenological terms: he and his message come 
from the risen Christ and God, but the precondition of this reality is ‘the will of our 
God and Father’ and the resulting self-giving of ‘the Lord Jesus Christ’. This careful 
definition of himself in relation to God and God, in turn, in relation to Jesus (and 
vice versa) has the effect of locating Paul within the dynamic created by the Christ-
event, a dynamic which, as de Boer concludes, is ‘integral to the identity and activity 
of God’.23 Moreover, the focus of this divine activity, for Paul, is Jesus’ self-giving 
‘for our sins to rescue us from the present evil age’ (1:4), a gift that is the 
precondition for Paul’s apostolic announcement of ‘grace and peace’, the impetus for 
his solemn ascription of eternal glory to God (1:5), and, as Bryant notes, a 
‘remarkable amplification’ of the typical greeting that ‘decidedly shifts the 
customary salutation’s focus away from both sender and recipient’ onto Christ.24 
Though Paul can use δίδωµι in the more general sense ‘to convey’ (cf. Gal 4:15), Gal 
1:4 is his first use with respect to Jesus’ death, an event which he configures as the 
                                                
18 For Paul’s prescript as polemical preparation for the rebuke of 1:6 – 10 and the themes of the 
letter, see R. E. Van Voorst, ‘Why Is There No Thanksgiving Period in Galatians? An Assessment of 
an Exegetical Commonplace‘, JBL 129 (2010): 153 – 72. 
19 de Boer, Galatians, 21. 
20 The letter is, thus, not merely a personal letter but an ‘Auftragsarbeit’; so, L. Doering, Ancient 
Jewish Letters and the Beginnings of Christian Epistolography (WUNT I 298; Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 398. 
21 On the literary form and meaning of this blessing, see J. Lieu, ‘”Grace to You and Peace”: the 
Apostolic Greeting‘, BJRL 68 (1985): 161 – 78. 
22 Doering, Letters, 414: χάρις ‘references God’s gift’ and εἰρήνη ‘designates the state constituted by 
grace, that is, life in wholesome communion’.  
23 de Boer, Galatians, 28. On the ‘dynamic’ character of this gift, see Barclay, Gift, 352. Cf. Martyn, 
Galatians, 90. 
24 R.A. Bryant, The Risen Crucified Christ in Galatians (SBLDS 185; Atlanta: SBL, 2001), 118. 
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‘gift of God’ (2:21). Thus, Paul is the conduit of the Christ-gift, a gift that initiates an 
ongoing cycle of blessing and praise, for which he praises God and invites the 
Galatians, if they can, to share in the communal ‘Amen’.25 
 Of the numerous places where the authors of 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees might 
engage, three related points require attention. First, Paul’s designation of Jesus as the 
risen Christ (i.e., a Messiah resurrected within and not at the end of history) and his 
further identification of him as Lord would be curious to 4 Ezra. For, in 4 Ezra, only 
God is ‘Lord’, the general resurrection occurs not within but at the end of history, 
and it would thus be odd for anyone to be an ‘apostle…through [a somehow risen] 
Lord Jesus Christ and God’. Second, though 4 Maccabees’ conception of immortality 
might suggest a different cosmology from Paul’s, he would, however, understand 
this resurrection as following from Jesus’ self-giving for sins ‘according to the divine 
will.’ For the martyrs themselves receive the lives they offer to God back, perfected 
as a fitting divine return gift of immortality. Yet, for 4 Ezra, this focus on Jesus’ self-
giving for sins as a rescue from the present evil age would suggest two potentially 
troubling lines of inquiry. This self-giving might fall afoul of Uriel’s prohibition on 
eschatological intercession (4 Ezra 7:102 – 115), and the ‘us’ for whom Jesus gives 
himself is here undifferentiated, while intercession in 4 Ezra is of the strong for the 
weak, the righteous for the unrighteous. We could imagine 4 Ezra asking, ‘What, 
Paul, does this imply about both Jesus, the self-giver, and the recipients, ‘us’—i.e., 
what is this gift and who precisely are we as recipients of it?’ Likewise, in asking the 
latter question, it would likely occur to 4 Ezra that Paul says nothing here of the law 
or of its status as the singular divine gift of a ‘narrow’ way through this evil age (4 
Ezra 7:6 – 9, 19 – 21) but rather he presents Jesus alone as deliverer in his self-gift. 
Though recognising the faithful death and subsequent vindication pattern, 4 
Maccabees would be similarly troubled by Paul’s failure to specify Jesus’ self-giving 
as obedience to the ‘divine law’ (4 Macc 5:16). Thus, the third and final concern: this 
gift—without mention of the law—coincides with the divine will and, for Paul, 
elicits eternal praise to God. From the perspective of both 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees, a 
fundamental worry arises from the outset: does the Christ-gift represent, in some 
                                                
25 Van Voorst, ‘No Thanksgiving? ‘, 171: ‘His implied meaning can be paraphrased: “Can you 
bless God with me for providing the death of Jesus Christ as the act that rescues us from the present 
evil age?“’ 
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respect, an instance of God’s singular Torah-ordered gift of created life, are these 
gifts somehow in competition, or is Paul trying to subordinate Torah-ordered life to 
the Christ-gift? 
3.1.2 The Irony of Paul’s Singular Gospel (1:6 – 10) 
 This worry is not eased but intensified with Paul’s about face from ‘grace and 
peace’ to double ‘anathema’ in Gal 1:6 – 10.26 To be sure, Uriel makes definitive 
negative statements that, like Paul’s, both amount to curses and occur in the context 
of an appeal to revelation from God.27 Likewise, Ezra’s journey of illumination 
assumes a similar spatial configuration of his relationship to God to that in Paul’s 
presentation of the Galatians’ impending apostasy28 in v. 6: the Galatians are 
‘turning [themselves]’ (µετατίθεσθε) from God, while, in 4 Ezra, God shows mercy to 
the those who ‘effect a turn’ (conversionem faciunt) to his law (7:133), and Ezra himself 
‘turned’ (conversus sum) from his puzzlement to Mother Zion (9:39).29 Yet, Paul’s 
references to ‘the one who called you in the grace of Christ’ (τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑµᾶς ἐν 
χάριτι Χριστοῦ)30 and his opponents’ misrepresentation of ‘the good news of Christ’ 
(τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) makes no mention of the law,31 and thus, intensifies, for 4 
                                                
26 Despite the ongoing uncertainty about the flow of Paul’s argument, it is generally recognised 
that v. 10 is transitional, and, since vv. 11 – 13 are each linked by a postpositive γάρ, we treat 1:1 – 10 
and 1:11 – 24 as distinct units; cf. Betz, Galatians, 44–46; de Boer, Galatians, 63–65, 76. 
27 Thus, 4 Ezra 7:20: ‘Let the many at present in fact perish rather than the law of God that is set 
before them be neglected.’ On the cursing function of Paul’s anathemas, see K.A. Morland, The 
Rhetoric of Curse in Galatians: Paul Confronts Another Gospel (Atlanta: Scholars, 1995), 63–67, 151–54.  
28 J.H. Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (SNTSMS 26; London: CUP, 1975), 117 – 
118: ‘The defection is not from Paul who preaches, but God who calls.’ 
29 See 4 Ezra 6:26, for the eschatological revelation of those ‘human beings who have not tasted 
death from birth’ (homines qui mortem non gustaverunt a nativitate sua) and, thus, whose ‘heart will be 
turned into another mind’ (cor…convertetur in sensum alium). Likewise, in 4 Macc 2:18 the ‘wise mind’ 
is capable of ‘turning’ (δυνατὸς…µεταθεῖναι) the passions. For the steadfast refusal to ‘change’ one’s 
mind, 4 Maccabees prefers µεταβάλλω (6:18; 6:24; 5:14), while to indicate the refusal to ‘change’ the 
regulatory framework of one’s life (from Jewish to Greek), he coins µεταδιαιτάω (8:8). 
30 Even if strong external evidence (e.g., 𝔓51, א, A, B, Ψ, 33, 81) does not entirely remove doubt 
cast on the originality of Χριστοῦ due to its absence from several important manuscripts (𝔓46vid, G, 
Hvid, ar, b), as de Boer remarks (Galatians, 38), ‘the immediate context makes it plain that the grace at 
issue pertains to Christ (‘the gospel of Christ’ in v. 7)’. 
31 Given the challenges of mirror-reading (see J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: 
Galatians as a Test Case‘, JSNT 31 (1987): 73 – 93) and the limited and obscure nature of the evidence, 
it is difficult to say much about the background of ‘the ones troubling’ the Galatians, beyond the fact 
that Paul’s accusation that they are ‘desiring to distort’ the good news (1:7) in order to avoid 
persecution (6:12) indicates that they are Jewish Christians; rightly Barclay, Gift, 335, n. 12. Contra 
M.D. Nanos, The Irony of Galatians: Paul’s Letter in First-Century Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 
52–59, 285–316. 
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Ezra, the issues raised by the prescript. For Paul equates this ‘calling…in the grace of 
Christ’ with the good news the Galatians heard about Christ: his anathema is against 
those who preach ‘contrary to what [the Galatians] received’ (παρ᾿ ὃ παρελάβετε). The 
parallel Paul draws suggests that by ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ Paul means not ‘in Christ’s 
favour’ but ‘in Christ’s gift’—i.e., the event of their reception of this gift in his 
preaching.32 In other words, just as the conent of his message is about a gift, so the 
message itself is a gift to be received (cf., the language of Paul being ‘entrusted’ with 
the gospel, Gal 2:7). Even if, however, ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ should be rendered ‘through 
Christ’s favour’, the expression of that goodwill is his self-offering. Thus, for 4 Ezra, 
we have not just another troubling reference to the event of Jesus’ self-offering but 
Jesus is in Gal 1:6 - 10 the gift from which one may not turn without becoming 
accursed. For our conversation partners, Paul’s insistence on the singular good news 
ironically places the Christ-gift in potential competition with their own singular 
conception of divine life-ordering benefaction in God’s gift of Torah. Moreover, the 
intensity of Paul’s argument and our conversation rises in v. 10, as Paul, in framing 
the story of his own call, brazenly claims the debating high ground.33 Paul, like 
Eleazar, insists that he is implacably committed to God, but: whereas Eleazar 
represents the Jews who ‘[have] been persuaded to become citizens to the divine 
law’ (θείῳ πεπεισµένοι νόµῳ πολιτεύεσθαι, 4 Macc 5:16), Paul, as a ‘slave of Christ’, 
recognises not the Torah but a superior divine norm.34 For our conversation 
partners, the full effect of Paul’s claim that, with these warnings, he is aiming to 
‘persuade’ and ‘please’ God and not human beings will be felt as his story in vv. 11 – 
24 unfolds. For with the word ἔτι, Paul indicates that his people-pleasing days are 
past, consigned to the time when he, like his opponents, was a champion of the 
law.35 With this appeal to the ideological and moral high ground, Paul frames a 
                                                
32 For the classic and still convincing argument for χάρις as event, see Bultmann, Theologie, 289–92. 
33 Paul may be anticipating or responding to an accusation here (so, E.D. Burton, A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1921], 30 – 34; P. 
Esler, Galatians [London: Routledge, 1998], 67; de Boer, Galatians, 64), but, if so, he flips the accusation 
on its head both rhetorically and theologically. 
34 Though, as we will see, there are a number of conceptual and verbal parallels with Maccabean 
texts, our argument about the rhetorical and theological force of Paul’s argument in Gal 1:6 – 2:21 
does not require dependence on Maccabean tradition. For a cumulative and somewhat uneven case 
for Pauline dependence on Maccabean tradition in Gal 1 – 2, see Cummins, Crucified Christ. 
35 de Boer, Galatians, 64. 
 158 
narrative illustration of the receipt of the good news that begins with an account of 
himself as an exemplary recipient of the Christ-gift. Thus, our conversation shifts to 
debate, as Paul’s story formally contradicts those of Eleazar and Ezra, his fellow 
exemplars of the receipt and service of divine revelation. Paul presents himself as a 
sincere witness to the truth not to buttress the superiority of the Torah as God’s 
ultimate life-ordering norm, as Eleazar and Ezra do, but to set up his qualification of 
it. 
3.1.3 Paul, Eleazar, and Ezra as Exemplars of the Gift: but which One? (1:11 – 24) 
 Along with his presentation of the Christ-gift, Paul’s identification of himself 
as ἀπόστολος (1:1) suggests another discussion topic for 4 Ezra. For the idea of being 
sent from the risen Christ and God (1:1) in itself sounds like an appeal to revelatory 
experience, a suspicion which Paul confirms in Gal 1:12. Likewise, the apostolic 
blessing pronounced by Paul (1:3) and the subsequent framing of his calling in 
prophetic terms (1:3; 1:15) are sufficiently similar to both the message and function 
of Ezra to suggest overlapping revelatory purposes and roles.36 Thus, Paul’s implied 
epistemological point in v. 1 is made explicit for 4 Ezra here in v. 11: the good news 
has a heavenly and divine not an earthly and human source, and, as such, this good 
news is definitive. For in denying that he received or was taught the good news παρὰ 
ἀνθρώπου but rather δι᾿ ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:11, 12; cf. the denial of 
consultation with ‘flesh and blood’, 1:17), Paul is depending on a distinction that 
bears a striking resemblance to that of Uriel in episode one (4 Ezra 4:1 – 12). As 
Ezra’s corrupted and limited mind needs angelic instruction and divine revelation to 
transcend its limitations, Paul needed good news not sourced from ordinary human 
modes of transmission (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, Gal 1:11)37 but δι᾿ ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 
(1:12).38 Though the revelatory scheme does not require an appeal to special 
                                                
36 Ezra is the only one who remains alive ‘among the prophets’ (prophetis, 4 Ezra 12:42), and he 
assures the people that ‘the Most High’ remembers them (12:47).  
37 For this qualitative reading of the phrase, see B.C. Lategan, ‘Is Paul Defending his Apostleship 
in Galatians?: the Function of Galatians 1:11 – 12 and 2:19 – 20 in the Development of Paul’s 
Argument‘, NTS 34 (1988): 419 – 21. 
38 It is not clear whether Paul’s denial that he received or was taught the good news by human 
beings implies that he both received and was taught it by the risen Christ. Given Uriel’s vital 
instructional role and Paul’s anathema on any opposing ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in v. 8, 4 Ezra, at least, 
would assume as much. What is clear is that Paul is discounting both human (and angelic!) sources 
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revelation (angelic interference confirms the deliverances of pious reason; 4 Macc 4:1 
– 14), Eleazar too is presented as a faithful recipient and custodian of the gift of 
divine wisdom, acclaimed ‘O man in harmony with the law and philosopher of 
divine life!’ precisely as the ideal type of one who ‘administers the law’ (τοιούτους δεῖ 
εἶναι τοὺς δηµιουργοῦντας τὸν νόµον, 4 Macc 7:7, 8). Yet, in his characterization of the 
immediate effect, the circumstances surrounding its receipt, and the character of his 
‘calling through the gift’, Paul presents himself as an exemplary recipient and 
custodian of a gift that does not confirm but overturns his commitment to the Torah. 
Thus, Paul’s story raises questions not only about the Torah-order of life but about 
his understanding of the created integrity of self and society. For, as we have seen in 
both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, God’s gift of the Torah at creation is the means by 
which individuals and communities resist ‘the evil thought’ (4 Ezra 7:88 – 92) or ‘the 
passions of flesh’ (4 Macc 7:18) in order to return the gift of created life to God. If, 
though, Paul’s commitment to the Torah leads him to oppose God, this could raise 
doubts about the status of the Torah as created gift, the sufficiency of the created self 
(or society) for obedience, or both.  
 The irony of Paul’s insistence that he (and not his opponents) is an exemplary 
‘slave of Christ’ emerges most clearly for our debate partners in the immediate and 
paradoxical effect of the Christ-gift. What stands out, however, is not the paradoxical 
character of Paul’s story per se—that ‘his former life in Judaism’ (ἀναστροφήν ποτε ἐν 
τῷ Ἰουδαϊσµῷ) had negative consequences—but that this negative experience did not 
confirm but rather subverted his ultimate commitment to the Torah.39 ‘Judaism’, for 
                                                                                                                                                  
and modes of instruction, not per se but in relation to the divine source, which is ultimate and 
ultimately the risen Jesus Christ; cf. Barclay, Gift, 355–56. 
39 Despite recent arguments that Ιουδαῖος and Ἰουδαϊσµός are essentially ethnic and geographic 
terms and should, thus, be translated ‘Judean’ and ‘Judeanism’, respectively (see e.g., S. Mason, 
Josephus, Judea, and Christian Origins: Methods and Categories (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2008), 141 – 84; 
though, cf. D.R. Schwartz, ‘“Judean“ or “Jew“? How Should We Translate ioudaios in Josephus? ‘, in 
Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World (ed. J. Frey, D.R. Schwartz, and S. Gripentrog; Leiden: Brill, 
2007), 3 – 28), we retain the translation ‘Judaism’ here for Ἰουδαϊσµός for three reasons: 1) uses of this 
rare term in the Maccabean literature (2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38; 4 Macc 4:26) all relate to the religious 
challenge and disaster attending the adoption by the High Priest Jason of customs delimited with the 
term Ἑλληνικός (2 Macc 4:10, 15; 6:9; 11:24; 13:2; 4 Macc 8:8), a phenomenon termed Ἑλληνισµός (2 Macc 
4:13); 2) Paul’s phrase αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις bears clear similarities to phrases deploying the adjective 
πάτριος that refer to the practice of the Torah as such (see below; cf. 2 Macc 6:1); 3) Paul’s self-
presentation as one intent only on ‘persuading’ God (1:10) and subsequent stance against the adoption 
of Jewish norms in the church indicate here that he is dealing with religious norms in general. 
Relatedly, Matthew Novenson’s restriction of Ἰουδαϊσµός to ‘political activism’ (37) and ‘not the 
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Paul, is both given and pursued, and whatever else the term ζηλωτής indicates,40 it at 
least implies that a half-hearted pursuit risks a negation of what is given.41 Ezra and 
Eleazar agree, but the paradox they experience is different, as commitment to the 
law is perfected only in extremis—in either grief and near insanity-producing 
puzzlement (Ezra) or brutal torture and untimely death (Eleazar). Yet, for Paul, his 
existence as someone zealous for Jewish ancestral traditions (περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς 
ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν παραδόσεων, 1:14) leads him to seek the destruction of the 
ἐκκλησία θεοῦ (Gal 1:13) and, thus, paradoxically through the revelation of Jesus 
Christ to a decentering of these norms and a new form of life.  By contrast, 4 
Maccabees is committed to the view that Eleazar’s refusal to ‘destroy the ancestral 
law through [himself]’ (δι᾿ ἐµαυτοῦ τὸν πάτριον καταλῦσαι νόµον, 4 Macc 5:33) 42 is 
confirmed both in his receipt of eternal life and in the reversal of the nation’s fortunes 
as fitting return gifts from God (18:3 – 5, 23). Likewise, 4 Ezra portrays Ezra’s receipt 
of the gift of divine revelation as paradoxical confirmation of his commitment—
despite the enormity of his grief and puzzlement—to God’s Torah-ordered way (4 
                                                                                                                                                  
[practice of the] ancestral religion itself’ (34) in the Maccabean literature and Galatians is belied both 
by a reading of 2 Maccabees that does not assume a dichotomy between religious observance and 
political action, and by 4 Macc 4:26, in which Antiochus tries to compel not a select few radicals but 
‘each one of the people to renounce Judaism in the tasting of polluted food’ (ἕνα ἕκαστον τοῦ ἔθνους 
ἠνάγκαζεν µιαρῶν ἀπογευοµένους τροφῶν ἐξόµνυσθαι τὸν Ιουδαϊσµόν). Nonetheless, see his excellent 
overview of the debate in M.V. Novenson, ‘Paul’s Former Occupation in Ioudaismos‘, in Galatians and 
Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in Paul’s Letter (ed. M.W. Elliott et al.; Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2014), 24 – 39. Likewise, though his distinction between two ‘political’ and ‘religious’ 
senses of Ἰουδαϊσµός is anachronistic, Shaye Cohen does argue that 2 Maccabees contains the first 
‘religious’ uses of the terms Ιουδαῖος (6:6; 9:17) and Ἰουδαϊσµός (2:21; 8:1; 14:38); S.J.D. Cohen, The 
Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (HCS 31; Berkeley: UCP, 1999), 90–93, 105–
6, 109–10. 
40 Dunn’s characterisation of the form of Paul’s Jewish life as ‘fiercely nationalistic’ is speculative; 
see J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered: Vol. 1 of Christianity in the Making (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 
262; idem, New Testament Theology: An Introduction (Nashville: Abingdon, 2009), 102. 
41 For a recent review of the literature and a similar argument, see D.C. Ortlund, Zeal Without 
Knowledge: The Concept of Zeal in Romans 10, Galatians 1, and Philippians 3 (LNTS 472; London: T&T 
Clark, 2012), 137 – 150. 
42  Paul’s language of αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις in Galatians is significantly similar to ‘the ancestral 
custom’ in 4 Maccabees (τὸ πατρὶον ἔθος, 4 Macc 18:5). In this regard, contra Ortlund, Josephus does not 
associate αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις with the Pharisees at ‘numerous points’, but only twice—Antiquities 
13.297 and 13.408; ibid., 141. Paul is not referring to Pharasaic ‘halakoth’, as he makes no such 
distinction, and the related theme of the ‘ancestral custom’ in 4 Maccabees demonstrates that 
Hellenistic Jews could and did identify Torah-observance per se with ‘ancestral custom’; rightly, 
Barclay, Gift, 358, n. 21. Contra Ortlund, Zeal Without Knowledge, 143; Dunn, Galatians, 60; R.N. 
Longenecker, Galatians (WBC 41; Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 30; R. Schäfer, Paulus bis zum 
Apostelkonzil: ein Beitrag zur Einleitung in den Galaterbrief, zur Geschichte der Jesusbewegung und zur 
Pauluschronologie (WUNT II 179; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 86 – 87. 
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Ezra 4:23; 10:50). Though neither 4 Ezra nor 4 Maccabees would necessarily approve 
of the violent expression of Paul’s zeal (though, cf. 4 Ezra 12:33 and 4 Macc 4:10), 
they would not abide the notion that a divine revelation would warrant a setting-
aside of the Torah’s normative force, even for Gentiles. For, as we argued in the 
previous chapters, in both texts the Torah is the divinely given norm not just for the 
life of Israel but for creation as a whole. In this connection, our conversation partners 
would want to know how αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις for which Paul was zealous are not 
simply traditions but also ‘the divine law’ (4 Ezra 7:20; 4 Macc 5:16) and how and 
why the Christ-gift could warrant setting aside the divine order of life it represents. 
 Paul’s answers to these questions begin to emerge for debate when we 
recognise the relation between this ironic and paradoxical reversal he narrates and 
the circumstances surrounding his receipt of the revelation that produces it. God is, 
in relation to Paul, ‘the one who separated me from my mother’s womb and called 
me through his gift’ (ὁ ἀφορίσας µε ἐκ κοιλίας µητρός µου καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, 
1:15). It is well known that Paul shapes this presentation of the origin of his 
apostleship here by echoing prophetic call narratives (Jer 1:4 -5; Isa 49:1 – 6), a move 
which applies Israel’s eschatological hopes to Paul’s specific ministry.43 As the story 
of Ezra shows, however, this framing does not preclude a significant, even 
revelatory change in Paul’s theology and life, a change which might adequately be 
called a ‘conversion’.44 Yet, unlike either Ezra or Eleazar, Paul’s worth as an 
exemplary steward of revelation is not accounted in Torah-terms. His commitment 
to Torah neither renders him, like Ezra, ‘worthy’ (dignus, 4 Ezra 12:9, 36; 13:14) of 
eschatological revelation nor produces, like Eleazar, acclaim as the ideal 
administrator of the Torah, one acclaimed ‘worthy of the priesthood’ (ὦ ἄξιε τῆς 
ἱερωσύνης, 4 Macc 7:6). Rather, Paul receives revelation as a gift destined for delivery 
                                                
43 Sandnes, Prophets?, 59–70. Cf. M.S. Harmon, She Must and Shall Go Free: Paul’s Isaianic Gospel in 
Galatians (BZNW 168; Göttingen: De Gruyter, 2010), 76–86. 
44 S.J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian 
Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003), 77: though the Septuagint is the source of Paul’s calling 
language, ‘this does not mean that Paul uses the concept in an identical way.’ Contra Stendahl, Paul 
Among Jews, 10. 
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from birth—a gift that is unconditioned (taking no account of Paul’s zeal) and 
incongruous (given despite his persecution of the church).45 
 Paul’s status as the recipient of such an unconditioned and incongruous gift 
would confirm for our debate partners that he considers Jesus’ self-offering as in 
some sense either a substitution, analogous to that given by the martyrs for the sin of 
the nation (4 Macc 6:26 – 30; 17:21), or, in 4 Ezra’s terms, an intercession for the 
unrighteous (4 Ezra 7:102 – 115). In other words, both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra have 
categories for divine gifts that go to the unworthy, and would have no trouble 
recognizing the Christ-gift as such a gift. They would expect further clarification of 
the precise character and need for such a gift, a topic we will address in the next 
chapter in relation to the relevant material of Gal 3:10 – 14. 
 What they would not understand is how Paul can present himself as an enemy 
of God and his church precisely in his Torah-zeal for God or why God might give a 
gift, much less a revelation and apostleship, to such a person. For with this 
presentation of himself as, in their view, a chimera—a ‘faithful’ enemy of God—and 
the recipient of a divine gift, Paul implies the irrelevance or unreliability of Torah-
reckoned distinctions of worth—whether between the weak/righteous and 
strong/wicked (4 Ezra) or pious/virtuous and impious/vicious (4 Maccabees). In 
this way he formally contradicts the Torah-criterion of worth defended by our 
debate partners. Consequently, 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees would raise two significant 
questions, questions which are foundational for all subsequent debate: ‘How, Paul, 
could your commitment to the Torah lead to an unworthy status, and how is it 
possible that God would give the gift of eschatological revelation to such an 
unworthy person?’  
 These questions are interrelated for 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees, grounded in the 
theological axioms that God gave life at creation as Torah-ordered and, thus, justly 
judges human beings and nations based on their obedience to this order. Thus, Paul 
cannot be zealous for the Torah and unworthy, much less a recipient of divine gifts—
that is, unless Torah is not identical to the divine created order and God gives gifts 
to the unworthy. In this connection, Paul’s ‘calling’ language points in precisely this 
                                                
45 Barclay, Gift, 357: ‘By combining these statements, Paul indicates that it was not “Judaism” that 
qualified him for the divine call; it was his conduct “in Judaism” that set him directly against, not for, 
God.’ 
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direction in two respects. First, in applying the language of ‘calling’ and ‘gift’ to 
himself and the Galatians, Paul makes explicit what was implicit in the 
undifferentiated ‘us’ of Gal 1:4: he includes himself among the sinners who have 
been delivered by Jesus’ self-gift.46 Paul is called ‘through the gift’ (διὰ τῆς χάριτος 
αὐτοῦ, 1:15), while the Galatians are called ‘in the grace of Christ’ (ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ, 
1:6), a phrase that mirrors the revelation of God’s Son ἐν ἐµοί (1:16).47 If, as we argued 
above, Paul is thinking in concrete terms in Gal 1:6, such that God’s calling of the 
Galatians in the gift of Christ occurred in Paul’s preaching of the good news, then his 
selection of differing prepositions for these parallel phrase implies a similarly 
concrete force for his autobiography. The Galatian calling ‘in grace’ is a calling 
through Paul’s preaching (cf. 3:1 – 5), while his own call is given ‘through God’s 
gift’, which is to say personally in the revelation of Christ, the Gift, himself. Thus, 
Paul’s story, unlike those of both Eleazar and Ezra, is not that of an ideal to be 
imitated but of a divine action and human response that is repeated.48 It is the divine 
bestowal and human receipt of a life-giving gift.  
 Second and relatedly, Paul’s use of the verb καλέω here may evoke the 
connotation of God’s creative voice. In other words, God’s ‘calling’ of Paul and the 
Galatians is a calling into existence.49 Despite the likelihood that the ultimate Vorlage 
of 4 Ezra was written in Hebrew, such an understanding might be indicated in Ezra’s 
statement that God has ‘called [Israel] first-begotten [and] only-begotten’ (quem 
vocasti primogenitum unigenitum, 4 Ezra 6:58), especially given the concept of God’s 
creative voice in 4 Ezra 3:4. Though it is impossible to say whether 4 Ezra would hear 
the connotation at this point in Paul’s argument, we will argue below that both of 
                                                
46 For the integral relation between Paul’s paradigmatic conversion and his call, see McFarland, 
‘One Who Calls‘. For the link between Gal 1:6 and 1:15, see Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 134; Barclay, 
‘Paul’s Story‘, 137. 
47 Given his use of καλέω elsewhere in Galatians (5:8, 13; cf. Rom 4:17; 9:7, 12, 24 – 26), in both 
cases, God is the subject who ‘calls’. 
48 Contra Lyons, Pauline Autobiography, 136. Rightly, Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 114–58. 
49 McFarland, ‘One Who Calls‘. McFarland’s argument, building on Chester, Conversion, depends 
on the recognition of Paul’s death-and-resurrection-shaped paradigmatic ‘I’ in Gal 2:18 – 20, and is, 
thus, retrospective. For a convincing argument for this connotation of the verb in Romans 9, see B.R. 
Gaventa, ‘On the Calling-into-Being of Israel: Romans 9:6 – 29‘, in Between Gospel and Election: 
Explorations in the Interpretation of Romans 9 – 11 (ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; WUNT I 257; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 255–69. Cf. S.J. Gathercole, Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s 
Response in Romans 1 – 5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 243: on Rom 4:3, ‘God’s declaration of 
Abraham as righteous was not a descriptive word (pace 1 Maccabees) but the creative word of the 
God who calls “nonentities” into being as “entities”.’ 
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our debate partners would raise the issue of the meaning of Paul’s life and death 
language at Gal 2:19 – 21 in creative terms. And, if we should hear a creative 
connotation in Paul’s use of καλέω, then the life-giving character of the Christ-gift 
contains a basic theological challenge.50 For this construal of the Christ-event as 
creative gift provides a significant point of contact and debate as a rival account of 
God’s definitive creative activity. For, in both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, individual and 
social life is inviolably given at the creation of humanity as Torah-ordered. 
Moreover, this commitment is axiomatic, securing the integrity of human agency for 
the proper ordering of self and society in view of the consistent operations of divine 
justice. Thus, if Paul is construing the Christ-gift not just in life-giving and life-
ordering terms but in specifically creative terms, we should be open to the possibility 
that the integrity of the self and society emerge as topics of debate over the course of 
Galatians. In other words, Paul’s formal collapse here of the operative 
anthropological distinctions of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra inevitably raises deeper 
questions for them about human agency, community order, and eschatological 
order. That is, Paul’s story of the exemplary reversal of a Torah-ordered and 
unworthy life challenges at multiple theological levels the sort of ultimate 
commitment to Torah demonstrated in the stories of the martyrs and Ezra’s 
revelatory journey.51 
 If Paul’s understanding of his story as initiated by the receipt of the 
unconditioned, incongruous, and creative Christ-gift raises the possibility of a 
number of significant theological departures from 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, it also 
separates him from his Jewish-Christian opponents in Galatia. This is evident from 
Paul’s emphasis on what he did not do upon receiving the Christ-gift— he ‘neither 
                                                
50 Paul’s story is not about a change in direction but a transition from one status to another. 
Rightly, Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 134.  
51 In so far as the Christ-gift represents an alternative life-ordering norm to that of the Torah, as in 
4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees, the subordination of the latter to the former is, on their terms, a repudiation 
of Judaism per se and, thus, either an apostasy or conversion. Rightly, A.F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The 
Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven: YUP, 1990); D. Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and 
the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: UCP, 1994); contra Stendahl, Paul Among Jews, 7–23; Dunn, Galatians, 3. 
One cannot assume that Paul’s identity as a Jew precludes the end of his commitment to the Torah as 
definitive norm; rightly Barclay, Gift, 359 – 60, n. 26; contra e.g. C.E. Johnson Hodge, If Sons, then Heirs: 
a Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul (New York: OUP, 2007); P. Eisenbaum, Paul Was 
Not a Christian: The Original Message of a Misunderstood Apostle (New York: Harper Collins, 2009); M.D. 
Nanos, ‘Paul and Judaism: Why not Paul’s Judaism? ‘, in Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the 
Apostle (ed. M.D. Given; Hendrickson Publishers, 2010), 117 – 60. 
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immediately consulted with flesh and blood, nor did [he] go into Jerusalem to those 
who were apostles before [him]’. Rather, he went into Arabia and then on to 
Damascus, visiting Peter and James only three years later (1:17 – 19). In other words, 
Paul’s gospel is not κατὰ ἄνθρωπον in that it was not subjected to the immediate 
scrutiny or oversight of those in Jerusalem after he received it. It seems that Paul 
assumes that he is being attacked at this point by his opponents, as he has to deny 
before God that he is lying (1:20). In any case, he stresses the immediate result of this 
reversal: the Judean churches who did not know him in person (τῷ προσώπῳ) hear 
that he is ‘preaching the faith he once tried to destroy’ and end up praising God ‘in 
him’. Thus, like the Christ-gift itself, Paul’s apostleship becomes an opportunity for 
returning praise to God (1:24). 
 In summary, the dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 has raised a number of 
theological questions, some of which Paul is beginning to resolve. As we have seen, 
by characterizing both the Galatians and himself as objects of God’s call and 
recipients of his benefaction in Christ, Paul presents himself as a zealous Jew who, 
nonetheless, needs Jesus’ self-offering. Unlike Ezra, his identification with sinners is 
not for the sake of intercession, but is rather in earnest—as one who needs the 
intercessory or substitutionary gift of another. If, however, Paul is not a paradoxical 
exemplar of the worthy like Ezra but rather paradoxically zealous and unworthy, 
this raises the question, for 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, of the enduring efficacy of the 
divine donation of life and its Torah order at creation. It may be that Paul’s very use 
of καλέω betrays an awareness of this implication, with him viewing God’s calling as 
a calling into existence. Be that as it may, for the purposes of the present chapter, the 
preceding dialogical exegesis shows how Paul’s characterization of the Christ-gift 
and its recipients might go beyond a mere recognition of either the gift’s singularity 
or its unconditioned and incongruous character to an analysis of why, paradoxically, 
Paul himself is an exemplar of one who needs such a gift despite living in receipt of 
the Torah. As we shall see in the next section, the remainder of Paul’s autobiography 
raises similarly deep theological questions in the realms of social order and moral 
agency, questions which both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra answer ultimately with 
conceptions of life as divine, Torah-ordered gift from creation.  
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3.2 Recognising the Christ-Gift, Debating Divine Life-Giving Benefaction (Gal 2:1 
– 21) 
After the second mention of glorifying God (1:24; cf. 1:5) and another claim to 
receiving a revelation (2:2), Paul jumps forward in his story to his second visit to 
Jerusalem (2:1 – 10).52 Within Paul’s story running from 1:11 – 2:21, we can clearly 
distinguish between his account of the Jerusalem agreement (2:1 – 10) and the 
Antioch incident (2:11 – 14), but it is notoriously difficult to determine just where 
Paul shifts from rebuking Peter to addressing the Galatians (2:15 – 21). This 
ambiguity invites us to read Paul’s account of the Antioch incident and his apparent 
summary response to the Galatian crisis together.53 Yet, there are also good reasons 
to read the Antioch incident itself in light of Paul’s account of the Jerusalem 
agreement. In addition to the repetition of the phrase ‘the truth of the gospel’ (2:5, 
14), Paul uses the verb ὁράω (2:7, 14) to establish the connection between perception, 
evaluation, and action in relation to the gift (2:9, 21) in both Jerusalem and Antioch.54 
By narrating the proper recognition and reception of the gift in Jerusalem, Paul 
provides a strong contrast to the situation in Antioch and thus Galatia.55  
 For 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, Paul’s characterization of events in Jerusalem 
confirms their suspicions: this man is witness of a world turned upside down, a 
world where a Greek man, without being circumcised and thus committed to the 
law, can be deemed free and worthy of intimate friendship by Jews in God’s 
                                                
52 Paul goes to Jerusalem for the second time in Galatians, that is; given that the issue is 
circumcision, Paul most likely refers here to the Jerusalem Council (cf. Acts 15:1 – 29); see J.B. 
Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians (10th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1890), 123–28; M. Silva, 
Interpreting Galatians: Explorations in Exegetical Method (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 132–36; de Boer, 
Galatians, 107. It is unlikely that Paul has reversed the chronological sequence of events (pace G. 
Lüdemann, Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 75 – 77), as 
the intensity of Paul’s rebuke at Antioch makes better sense if the Jerusalem agreement is already in 
place; so, J. Murphy-O’Connor, Paul: A Critical Life (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 132. 
53 Dunn, Theology of Galatians, 73: ‘Galatians is what [Paul] should have said to Peter at Antioch 
had time and sufficient reflection allowed it.’ 
54 F. Vouga, An die Galater (HNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck), 48. 
55 Whatever the political realities in Jerusalem, Paul does not present the events there as a bilateral 
agreement but a mutual recognition of God’s gift-giving activity, which forms the basis of 
unconditioned fellowship. That is, it is clear that the treatment of Titus and the fellowship extended 
to his team is crucial for Paul (rightly, S.J. Gathercole, ’The Petrine and Pauline Sola Fide in Galatians 
2’, in Lutherische und neue Paulusperspektive: Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselproblem der gegenwärtigen 
exegetischen Diskussion (ed. M. Bachmann; WUNT I 182; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 314 – 15), but 
not because it is entailed by the agreement but by the gift (pace R. Bauckham, ’James, Peter and the 
Gentiles’, in The Missions of James, Peter, and Paul: Tensions in Early Christianity (ed. B. Chilton and C.A. 
Evans; NovTSup 115; Brill, 2005), 122). 
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assembly.56 Thus, the actions of Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians in Antioch 
look like a return to sanity: by insisting on Jewish norms of commensality in their 
meals with Gentiles, Peter and his fellow Jews are apparently repenting of their 
brazen disregard of the divine Torah-order of social relations.57 Paul, of course, takes 
the opposite view. Moreover, by narrating the recognition (Jerusalem) and denial 
(Antioch) of the Christ-gift in the social sphere in rhetorically charged terms, Paul 
both completes the setup of his argument for and launches our debate about its life-
giving and life-ordering significance. For by asserting that the proper social 
recognition of the Christ-gift precludes the Torah as the proper order of the church, 
Paul makes it clear that receipt of the Christ-gift outside of Torah conditions entails 
the ordering of social life unrestrained by those conditions. Thus, the Torah neither 
orders the exemplary self nor the ideal social order, for Paul—a position which 
demands, for 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, both explanation and justification. 
 Consequently, this section will produce two important results for the 
argument of this chapter. First, it shows how Paul’s application of the rhetoric of 
tyranny, slavery, and compulsion to the observance of Torah in Jerusalem and 
Antioch entails a structural theological problem with Torah-ordered social life. 
Second, it shows how Paul’s paradigmatic refusal to submit to Torah norms in the 
church is grounded, formally, in a deeper conception of the structural disorder of his 
life in the Torah and the reconstitution and reordering of his self in the Christ-gift. 
Thus, with respect to research both on Paul’s paradigmatic autobiography and grace 
in Galatians, we show how a consideration of the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-
ordering accounts for the deep theological connection between the social 
implications and individual significance of Paul’s gospel in Gal 1 – 2. It is neither 
                                                
56 Though it is not the case that every Jew considered Gentile conversion via circumcision possible 
(on eighth day circumcision, see M. Thiessen, Contesting Conversion: Genealogy, Circumcision, and 
Identity in Ancient Judaism and Christianity [Oxford: OUP, 2011]), Paul did. Thiessen’s reading of οἱ 
περιτεµνόµενοι αὐτοί in Gal 6:13 as a ‘reflexive middle’ and thus referring to Judaising Gentiles 
depends, as we will argue in a subsequent chapter, on a misunderstanding of the force of Gal 5:2 – 12 
and an unwarranted distancing of this phrase from ἡ περιτοµή and οί ἐκ τῆς περιτοµῆς in Gal 2:7 – 9, 12. 
The participial phrase in 6:13, with most commentators, should be taken as passive and thus referring 
to Jewish Christians; contra M. Thiessen, Paul and the Gentile Problem (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 95 – 96; cf. 
G. Howard, Paul: Crisis in Galatia: A Study in Early Christian Theology (2nd ed.; SNTSMS 35; Cambridge: 
CUP, 2004), 17 – 19. 
57 Bauckham (‘James, Peter and the Gentiles‘) argues that the concern was moral impurity arising 
from intimate association. On this relation between ritual and moral impurity, see Jub. 22:16; Let. Aris. 
142; Acts 10:28. 
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simply that the Christ-gift is singular, admitting no additions by definition, nor is it 
the mere fact of the unconditioned and incongruous manner of the donation of the 
Christ-gift that accounts for Paul’s formal theological logic. Rather, Paul considers 
himself an exemplar of the working of the gospel as one who needs and has received 
a comprehensively new life—a new and newly-ordered agency for a new and 
newly-ordered community. With this result, we also prepare for an account in the 
next two chapters of how Paul’s formal picture of himself as an unworthy recipient 
of divine life-giving benefaction in the Christ-gift is grounded in his material 
argument from salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4) and his inchoate theory of the self (Gal 5 
– 6). 
3.2.1 The Community Ordering Gift: Circulated in Jerusalem, Disrupted in Antioch (2:1 – 
14) 
 With a clear structural break occurring only at Gal 3:1, Paul frames, in effect, 
both his accounts of Jerusalem and Antioch in Gal 2:2: though by a miracle 
(ἀποκάλυψις)58 Paul’s nightmare (the possibility of his work coming to nothing) was 
averted in Jerusalem, it became a reality in Antioch (and is materialising in 
Galatia).59 In both stories Paul is troubled by the potential imposition of Jewish social 
norms on Gentile converts and, thus, the church as a whole: whereas his Greek 
companion Titus was not circumcised in Jerusalem (2:3), Peter did withdraw from 
eating with Gentiles in Antioch (2:12).60 Paul is not concerned in either case with 
                                                
58 That Paul connects his trip to Jerusalem κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν and the subsequent activity there 
(ἀνεθέµην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν) with καί and not ἵνα, suggests that he means not 
‘for the purpose of a revelation’ but ‘as the result of a revelation’, contra de Boer, Galatians, 108–9. So, 
NRSV and NIV: ‘in response to a revelation’. 
59 Barclay, Gift, 366: ‘The Antioch dispute is important for Paul not merely as a historical datum, 
but because it allows him to explicate the ‘good news’ in precisely these terms [i.e., the terms of Gal 
2:14 – 21].’ 
60 de Boer (Galatians, 138) rightly recognises that the theme of compulsion creates parallels 
between Paul’s opponents in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Galatia, though his argument that this 
necessitates circumcision as the goal of the separation in Antioch is unpersuasive. Though it was not 
customary for Jews to refrain from all social contact with Gentiles (see M. Bockmuehl, Jewish Law in 
Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 57 
– 61), it is clear that Paul considered Peter’s previous table fellowship to be ‘living not like a Jew’ (οὐχὶ 
Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, 2:14), and the imperfect active συνήσθιεν suggests that eating with Gentiles in a fashion 
that contravened Jewish norms was Peter’s regular activity; cf. Martyn, Galatians, 232; contra J.D.G. 
Dunn, ‘The New Perspective on Paul‘, BJRL 65 (1983): 121 – 22. 
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Jewish ‘national imperialism’61 or the supposed category mistake inherent in the 
idea that a Gentile could become a Jew through circumcision,62 much less in Antioch, 
with the precise table-fellowship arrangements before Peter’s withdrawal, 63 the 
status of Gentiles at these shared meals,64 or the observance of an emergency 
measure that allows Jewish ‘teachers’ to associate intimately with Gentiles.65 He is 
focused on the proper recognition and thus social circulation of the Christ-gift. This 
concern is signaled by the circular movement of ‘gift’ Paul traces in Jerusalem: the 
recognition of ‘the divine gift given to [Paul]’ (τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν µοι) by God66 
elicits from the pillars a fitting return (again, δίδωµι) of κοινωνία (2:9) and a request for 
ongoing relationship in the form of poverty relief in Jerusalem (2:10). Thus, whereas 
those in Jerusalem resisted Jewish social pressure (2:3, 4), recognised the divine ‘gift’ 
of Paul’s apostleship (2:7, 9),67 and initiated a reciprocal relationship with Paul and 
his team (2:9, 10), Paul observed the disruption of fellowship in Peter’s imposition of 
Jewish table-norms in Antioch and rebuked him for the failure to live according to 
the good news (2:11 – 14). If we take these two stories with Paul’s own testimony of 
reversal, the implication is clear: Paul’s (and the Galatians’) exemplary receipt of the 
Christ-gift as an unconditioned and incongruous gift entails the ordering of the 
social group created by that gift on the same terms. In other words, Paul’s metaphor 
about ‘walking in line with the truth of the gospel’ (2:14) is a context-appropriate 
way of spelling-out the sort of social return to which the Christ-gift obligates 
                                                
61  Dunn’s term (Galatians, 267) for the problem identified in Gal 5:2 – 6, but equally applicable 
here.  
62 Thiessen, Gentile Problem, 78–82. 
63 For debates over reconstructions of the precise arrangements of table fellowship in Antioch, see 
J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus, Paul, and the Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1990), 156, 158, 179; M.D. Nanos, ’What Was at Stake in Peter’s “Eating with Gentiles“ at Antioch?’, in 
The Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical and Historical Interpretation (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2002), 282–318; M. Zetterholm, The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social-Scientific 
Approach to the Separation between Judaism and Christianity (London: Routledge, 2003), 129 – 166. 
64 Nanos, ’What Was at Stake? ’, 300 – 11. 
65 Johnson Hodge, If Sons, Heirs, 58, 123–25. 
66 That is, his apostleship: they saw that ‘[Paul] had been entrusted with the gospel of the 
foreskin’ (πεπίστευµαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας , 2:7).  
67 On the syntax of Gal 2:7 – 9a and originality of 2:7b – 8, see de Boer, Galatians, 119–21. The aside 
of 2:7b – 8 manages both to acknowledge Peter’s mission to ‘the circumcised’ and, essential for Paul’s 
purposes, subordinate that mission to ‘the One working’ (ὁ ἐνεργήσας ) in both missions. That ‘the 
good news of the foreskin’ (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας) could be and was recognised by ‘the pillars’ 
precisely as divine gift (2:9) is, for Paul, a rather shocking subversion of his opponents’ position. 
Barclay (Gift, 363, n. 32) deems it ‘the Galatian equivalent to “the justification of the ungodly” (Rom 
4:5)’.  
 170 
recipients. And, the return gift of κοινωνία to Paul in Jerusalem outside—indeed, 
despite pressure to observe—Torah-confines, for Paul, proves that those in 
Jerusalem know this. 
 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra would expect this integral relation between 
exemplary reception of the Christ-gift and the social order it entails: both Eleazar 
and Ezra are, as exemplary individuals, microcosms of the ideal social order. What is 
odd is not the relation between the ordered self and the ordered social group but 
that the Christ-gift necessarily requires indifference to Torah norms in both spheres: a 
proper recognition of the gift requires that the fellowship extended must flow 
without insistence on circumcision for Paul’s Greek team-member, Titus, while 
Peter, in imposing Jewish food norms, must be rebuked for not walking according to 
the truth of the gospel. What 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra would not have expected is 
that the incongruous and unconditioned Christ-gift would produce a necessary 
indifference to Torah-norms rather than repentance and conformity to them.  
 For our conversation partners, the rhetoric Paul deploys to characterise 
himself, his opponents, and the imposition of Jewish social norms suggests a reason 
for the Christ-gift’s necessarily unconditioned social circulation. For in deploying the 
language of tyranny, slavery, and freedom, Paul implies a structural problem with 
Torah-ordered social life. It is not simply that Torah norms are a matter of 
indifference, but insistence on them amounts to tyrannical enslavement. The ‘false 
brothers’ in Jerusalem seek to ‘compel’ (ἠναγκάσθη, 2:3) Titus to be circumcised, 
Peter’s withdrawal from table-fellowship amounts to ‘[his] compelling’ (ἀναγκάζεις) 
the Gentiles to act like Jews (ἰουδαΐζειν, 2:14).68 Though Barnabas and his fellow 
Jewish Christians are ‘carried away’ (συναπήχθη, 2:13) by Peter’s example in Antioch, 
earlier Paul and Titus (and, by implication, Barnabas) did not ‘withdraw in 
submission [to the false brothers] even for an hour’ (οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαµεν τῇ 
ὑποταγῇ, 2:5). To do so would have meant that the plans of the false brothers to 
observe ‘the freedom we have in Christ Jesus, in order to enslave us’ (τὴν ἐλευθερίαν 
                                                
68 Again, irrespective of Paul’s rhetorical intentions, theologically speaking, Cummins’ comments 
are apposite (Crucified Christ, 94 – 95): ‘In essence, Paul is recasting his former self and his current 
Jewish-(Christian) detractors as akin to those Jewish apostates who aligned themselves with 
Antiochus IV Epiphanes and his cause’, and thus, in essence ‘the Galatian scenario may be seen as a 
remarkable inversion of the Maccabean crisis’. 
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ἡµῶν ἣν ἔχοµεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα ἡµᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν, 2:4) would have succeeded. 
Moreover, this inclusive ‘we’, along with Paul’s biography of reversal, suggests that 
circumcision represents a state of enslavement from which the Christ-event frees the 
Jews themselves and, thus, into which Gentiles need not enter.69  
 This rhetoric would be theologically provocative for our conversation 
partners. For, in 4 Ezra, the zone of libertas established by God for humans at creation 
is precisely for obedience to the law (4 Ezra 9:11) and, in 4 Maccabees, the inviolable 
commitment of the martyrs to Jewish food laws proves that only the Jews are really 
free (4 Macc 9:18). Paul’s characterisation of Jewish norms as somehow structurally 
enslaving would, thus, raise the question of the created integrity of the Torah-
ordered self. Moreover, Paul’s identification of circumcision with slavery and the 
observation of Jewish food laws as tyrannical oppression is, likewise, a complete 
inversion of the witness of the martyrs, who resist tyranny and fear and shun 
hypocrisy out of fidelity to Torah (specifically food laws): Eleazar says the Jews 
recognise no ‘compulsion’ (ἀνάγκη) greater than immediate obedience to ‘the divine 
law’ and, therefore, ‘[they] do not consider it worthy to transgress the law in any 
manner’ (κατ᾿ οὐδένα τρόπον παρανοµεῖν ἀξιοῦµεν, 4 Macc 5:16, 17). Paul’s portrait of 
Peter in this connection is, however, like a grotesque image of Eleazar seen in a fun 
house mirror: whereas Eleazar is tempted by fear ‘to play a hypocritical part’ (δρᾶµα 
ὑποκρίνασθαι, 4 Macc 5:17) in eating pork and thereby ‘become an example of impiety 
for the young’ (γενοίµεθα τοῖς νέοις ἀσεβείας τύπος, 4 Macc 6:19) in pretending to eat the 
pork, Paul accuses Peter of actually being an exemplar of hypocrisy by removing 
himself from the table-fellowship of Gentiles as a result of ‘certain men from James’ 
(τινας ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου) arriving and thereby placing him in a state of ‘fear of those of the 
circumcision’ (φοβούµενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτοµῆς, Gal 2:12).70  
                                                
69 de Boer, Galatians, 114. 
70 Given Paul’s characteristic use of ἐκ to define a group or class (N. Turner, Syntax, [vol. 3 of A 
Grammar of New Testament Greek; ed. J.H. Moulton; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963], 260) and the fact that 
περιτοµή refers to the act of circumcision, ἐκ περιτοµῆς should be translated ‘those of the circumcision’; 
rightly, Burton, Galatians, 108; F. Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective 
(rev. and exp. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 106 – 07. It is unclear whether those ‘from James’ 
and those ‘of the circumcision’ are the same group. 
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 Paul takes no account of ‘those who seem to be pillars’ (οἱ δοκοῦντες στῦλοι εἶναι, 
2:9),71 and, in fact, he rebukes one ‘to his face’ (κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ, 2:11), because 
‘God does not regard the face of a human being’ (πρόσωπον θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαµβάνει, 
2:6).72 What matters in Paul’s view is not who someone is but how he aligns with who 
God is and what he is doing.73 Moreover, in his autobiography of reversal and 
accounts of events in Jerusalem and Antioch, Paul has made it clear that his 
exemplary reception of the unconditioned and incongruous Christ-gift entails a 
social order that is necessarily indifferent to the Torah’s social norms. Thus, for our 
conversation partners, Paul has formally denied the Torah as the divine order of the 
created self and society. The question now is how he can and why he must do this. 
3.2.2 Constructing an Antithesis, Debating Divine Order and Evaluation (2:15, 16) 
 The question Paul poses to Peter in Galatians 2:14 represents the rhetorical 
climax of the story he has been telling since 1:11: how can a Jew who has played fast 
and loose with the Jewish norms of commensality now compel the Gentiles to live 
like Jews?74 This rhetorical climax, however, invites a series of deeper theological 
questions. Paul begins his explicitly theological gambit by playing on a commonly 
held Jewish belief that he shares with Peter: ‘We are Jews by birth and not from 
among the Gentile sinners.’75 It was precisely Ezra’s thirty years lived among ‘many 
                                                
71 On the breakdown in syntax at 2:6 as Paul interrupting himself to ‘relativize the pillar apostles’, 
see de Boer, Galatians, 117. Cf. Burton, Galatians, 87. 
72 Paul is not concerned with being personally ‘acknowledged by Jerusalem’ but rather that the 
divine action and evaluation in extending the Christ-gift to and through him be acknowledged; contra 
B. Holmberg, Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline 
Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 15. Neither is Paul ‘ready to acknowledge the authority of the 
Jerusalem leadership to pronounce on issues related to the gospel and its proclamation among 
Gentiles’; contra Dunn, Galatians, 4.  
73 Schütz, Apostolic Authority, 142: ‘For him…their position depends on their submission to the 
truth of the gospel and nothing else.’ 
74 There can be no question of two distinct churches—Jew and Gentile—for either side; rightly, de 
Boer, Galatians, 136. This does not, however, entail that Peter is actively putting pressure on Gentiles 
to convert (cf. Josephus Ant. 13.257 – 58 and 1 Macc 2:46), requiring a conative force for ἀναγκάζεις 
(contra Dunn, Galatians, 129). For Paul’s language of hypocrisy suggests inconsistency in thought and 
practice. It is Peter’s status and behaviour itself that does the compelling; so F. Mussner, Der 
Galaterbrief (2nd ed.; HTKNT 9; Freiburg: Herder, 1974), 145. 
75 Though the punctuation of vv. 15 – 16 is uncertain, depending on whether δέ should be read at 
the beginning of v. 16, the meaning in either case is the same, as the verses share the same subject. The 
point is that even the Jews seek justification in Christ. Though, since the ‘polemical setting’ does tell 
against the idea that Paul here refers to ‘ready-to-hand agreement’ (R.B. Matlock, ’The Rhetoric of 
Pistis in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9’, JSNT 30 (2007): 199, n. 26), we 
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sinners’ (delinquentes multos) and ‘impious deeds without number’ (impietates quorum 
non est numerus) of the Gentiles that led to his failure of heart, doubts about God’s 
justice, and indictment of God (4 Ezra 3:29, 30). Likewise, for 4 Maccabees, Gentiles 
are by definition vicious because wisdom just is instruction in the law (4 Macc 1:15, 
6; cf. Onias’ scruples in interceding for the would-be temple robber Apollonius, 
4:13). So, when Paul asks whether ‘Christ is a servant of sin’ (ἆρα Χριστὸς ἁµαρτίας 
διάκονος) if those ‘seeking justification in Christ are also found to be sinners’ by 
fraternising with Gentiles (ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ εὑρέθηµεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁµαρτωλοί, 
2:17) both Ezra and Eleazar would answer with an emphatic ‘yes’. For Paul this 
equally emphatically (µὴ γένοιτο) cannot be the case, but why?76  
 The answer is implicit in something else that Paul and his fellow Jewish 
Christians know—viz., ‘that no human being is justified by the works of the law but 
through faith in Jesus Christ’ (ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόµου ἐὰν µὴ διὰ πίστεως 
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 2:16a).77 In other words, at one level, as Paul illustrated in his 
conversion and the reception he and Titus received in Jerusalem, his fellow Jewish 
Christians recognised the divine evaluation in the divine act. Those who receive the 
Christ-gift offered in the good news, whether Jew or Gentile, are considered 
righteous by God and thus worthy of fellowship without Torah-constraints. 
Consistent with what we have argued above, both the context of Paul’s story 
extending from 1:11 through to 2:14 – 16 and the comparison with 4 Maccabees 
suggest that ἔργα νόµου refers here not simply to the boundary-marking function of 
Torah norms but rather to their status as constitutive expressions of the order of 
Jewish life.78 Thus, the phrase ἔργα νόµου only further specifies the Torah as the norm 
                                                                                                                                                  
are inclined to see a shift toward Paul’s own framing of the Galatian crisis in v. 15. In either case, Scott 
is correct: Paul ‘lays the situation in Antioch alongside the situation in Galatia, to see the crises as 
parallel and the true solution as the same in both cases’; I.W. Scott, Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of 
Paul: Story, Experience and the Spirit (WUNT II 205; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 180.  
76 The Pauline µὴ γένοιτο indicates that v. 17 is a question, and thus ἆρα not άρα is the original 
reading; so de Boer, Galatians, 141. 
77 For a convincing argument that an adversative sense of ἐὰν µή is possible in Greek literature in 
antiquity and required in Galatians 2:16, see D. Hunn, ’Ἐὰν µή in Galatians 2:16: A Look at Greek 
Literature’, NovT 49 (2007): 281 – 90. Likewise, Matlock, ’Rhetoric ’, 197 – 8, n. 25. Contra Dunn, Jesus, 
Paul, and the Law, 195 – 98; M.C. de Boer, ’Paul’s Use and Interpretation of a Justification Tradition in 
Galatians 2.15 – 21’, JSNT 28 (2005): 189 – 216; A.A. Das, ’Another Look at ἐὰν µή in Galatians 2:16’, 
JBL 119 (2000): 529 – 39.  
78 On ἔργα νόµου as boundary markers, see, e.g., J.D.G. Dunn, ’Works of the Law and the Curse of 
the Law (Galatians 3:10 – 14) ’, NTS 31 (1985): 523 – 42; idem, ’Yet Once More—“the Works of the 
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of the life Paul both renders indifferent in his biography of reversal and presents as 
subordinated to the life normed by ‘the truth of the gospel’ in his accounts of 
Jerusalem and Antioch.79 Like Eleazar, Paul considers these ἔργα νόµου a package 
deal: circumcision entails obedience to the entirety of the law (Gal 5:3), and Eleazar 
considers the food laws to be inviolable (4 Macc 5:17). The difference is that Paul 
subordinates the ‘works of the law’ to a life characterised by ‘faith in Christ’ (see 
below) as the sort of life God considers ‘righteous’, and so he considers Peter’s 
imposition of Jewish norms in Antioch to put him in a ‘condemned state’ before God 
(2:11).80 
 Though neither 4 Maccabees nor 4 Ezra would recognise initially the norm by 
which Paul could make such a judgement, the theological force of the judgement 
itself would be clear. Like Paul, our debate partners see divine evaluations in divine 
acts: in 4 Maccabees it is the operations of ‘the Divine Justice’ (ἡ θεία δίκη, 4 Macc 4:13, 
21; 8:22; 9:8–9, 32; 18:22) that vindicate the Torah-order in acts of judgement, while, 
in 4 Ezra, Ezra’s apocalyptic instruction is aimed precisely at enabling him to see 
through the contradictions of history to the perfect revelation of Torah-shaped 
justice beyond history—specifically, in the salvation of those who are ‘righteous’ 
(justi, 4 Ezra 8:33; 9:13) in Torah-terms. Thus, given Paul’s terminology for ‘sin’ and 
‘righteousness’ in the context (2:15, 17, 21) and his ongoing focus on recognising the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Law“: a Response,” JSNT 46 (1992): 99 – 117; idem, ’Noch einmal “Works of the Law“: the Dialogue 
Continues’, in Fair Play: Diversity and Conflicts in Early Christianity. FS H. Räisänen (ed. I. Dunderberg 
et al; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 273 – 90. For critique of Dunn’s view, see F. Watson, Paul and the 
Hermeneutics of Faith (2nd ed.; London: T&T Clark, 2015), 307 – 08, n. 40; R.B. Matlock, ’Sins of the 
Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn’s New Theology of Paul’, JSNT 72 (1998): 67 – 90. For a full 
bibliography generally related to the New Perspective on this issue, see M. Bachmann, ’Keil oder 
Mikroskop? Zur jüngeren Diskussion um den Ausdruck ”Werke des Gesetzes”’, in Von Paulus Zur 
Apokalypse - und Weiter: exegetische und rezeptionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Neuen Testament 
(NTOA/SUNT 91; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 100 – 101, n. 5. 
79 Noting the different purposes of the parallel phrase in 4QMMT and Galatians, Lutz Doering 
concludes: ‘MMT is about disagreement in halakhic opinion, whereas Paul addresses the question 
whether Gentiles are, in the first place, obliged to observe halakhah or not. If the argument about the 
formative role of ἐκ πίστεως holds, Paul must be seen as having creatively adapted the previous phrase 
to fit a new discourse, inspired by his reading of Scripture’; Lutz Doering, ‘4QMMT and the Letters of 
Paul: Selected Aspects of Mutual Illumination‘, in The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pauline Literature (ed. J.S. 
Rey; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 79. Thus, we have in Galatians an antithesis between two forms of life; 
rightly, M. Bachmann, Anti-Judaism in Galatians?: Exegetical Studies on a Polemical Letter and on Paul’s 
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 1–18. For the argument regarding the role of ἐκ πίστεως in 
Paul’s phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόµου, see F. Watson, ‘By Faith (of Christ): An Exegetical Dilemma and its 
Scriptural Solution‘, in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies (ed. M.F. Bird 
and P. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 147 – 63.  
80 R.B. Hays, The Letter to the Galatians (NIB XI; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 233. 
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divine evaluation in the divine action, it seems virtually certain that our debate 
partners would take δικαιοῦται in Gal 2:16 as a divine passive referring to God’s 
verdict.81 This evaluative sense fits both the standard usage of the verb82 and its 
particular application in the present context of the debate in Antioch about the 
standard of divine evaluation.83 Moreover, the debate between Eleazar, the martyrs, 
and Antiochus is over the divine standard of eschatological evaluation: ‘the Justice 
they revere’ (ἣν σέβεσθε δίκην) will not, as Antiochus claims, ‘be merciful to [the 
brothers] on account of their violating the law under compulsion’ (ἵλεως ὑµῖν ἔσται δι᾿ 
ἀνάγκην παρανοµήσασιν, 4 Macc 8:14). Likewise, despite Ezra’s persistence, ‘[the 
Lord’s] righteousness and goodness’ (iustitia tua et bonitas tua Domine) will not be 
acclaimed ‘when [he] shows mercy on those who have no substance of good works’ 
(cum misertus fueris eis qui non habent substantiam operum bonorum, 4 Ezra 8:36). It is 
not clear at this point in Galatians that Paul intends a reference to the future 
judgement with the phrase ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόµου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ, though 
references to ‘the hope of righteousness’ (5:5) and the warning ‘that those who 
practice [‘the works of the flesh’ (τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός, 5:19)] will not inherit the 
kingdom of God’ (ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες βασιλείαν θεοῦ οὐ κληρονοµήσουσιν, 5:21) 
make this likely, as we will argue in chapter five.84  
                                                
81 Barclay (Gift, 375, n. 65 and 375) rightly appeals to the two other passive instances of the verb in 
v. 16 and the related phrase δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in Gal 3:11. 
82 See the overview of Paul and select literature in S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on 
Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 261 – 84 (276) , who 
concludes: ‘In its “ordinary usage”—in Paul as elsewhere—the dikaio-terminology may be said to take 
its cue from the noun δικαιοσύνη, “what one out to do,” or “what the one who does what one ought 
thereby possesses.” The dikaios (δίκαιος) is the one who does δικαιοσύνη, and to dikaiosify (δίκαιοῦν) is 
“to treat as one ought to treat the dikaios,” “to declare innocent,” “to acquit” (though the object of the 
verb may well be one who ought not to be given such treatment).‘ To identify justification with the 
effect of the Christ-gift, as Gorman does in claiming that ‘co-crucifixion is what Paul means by 
justification’, given Paul’s forensic use of δικαιόω, is to confuse the divine verdict with its evidential 
basis; M.J. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative 
Soteriology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 67. 
83 To reduce justification to social terms, defined as ‘to be reckoned by God a true member of his 
family’ (N. T. Wright, Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision (Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), 96 – 101), is 
to confuse the divine norm that orders and evaluates the community with the community itself, and, 
for both Paul and our conversation partners, to occlude the integral relation between that order and 
the properly ordered self. For a recent evaluation of this construal of righteousness in covenantal 
terms, see C.L. Irons, The Righteousness of God: A Lexical Examination of the Covenant-Faithfulness 
Interpretation (WUNT II 386; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015). 
84 Cf. the parallel in Rom 3:19 – 20, specifically, the eschatological reference in v. 19b: ἵνα πᾶν στόµα 
φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσµος τῷ θεῷ. 
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 Such a reference to future judgement would, however, make sense to our 
debate partners formally if not materially. For, like Paul, they argue for a certain 
evidential standard by which God deems a person or group of people righteous now 
and, thus, by which he will render post-mortem judgement. They merely disagree 
with Paul about the evidential standard. Paul denies that ‘a human being [even a 
Jew]85 is considered righteous on the basis of the works of law’ or that ‘all flesh’ will 
be so considered by God (2:16).86 Both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra affirm this standard. 
For Eleazar’s ‘law-observant life, the faithful seal of death perfected’ (βίου νοµίµου, ὃν 
πιστὴ θανάτου σφραγὶς ἐτελείωσεν, 4 Macc 7:15). Likewise, Uriel convinces Ezra that 
those ‘who will be made safe and who will be able to escape [judgement]’ (qui salvus 
factus fuerit et qui poterit effugere) will do so ‘on account of his works or the faith by 
which he has believed’ (per opera sua vel per fidem in qua crediditis, 4 Ezra 9:7). Thus, 
with Paul’s denial that ‘all flesh will be considered righteous on the basis of the 
works of the law’, theological hostilities commence.87  
 Yet, from the point of view of our debate partners, the contest does not 
necessarily come to an end here. For Paul’s antithesis between ‘works of the law’ and 
‘faith in Jesus Christ’ invites several related angles of approach. First, it is clear from 
his identification of his opponents’ position as ‘another good news’ (1:6) that Paul is 
                                                
85 There is no lexical evidence for taking ἄνθρωπος to refer only to Gentiles; contra L. Gaston, Paul 
and the Torah (2nd ed.; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 66; J.G. Gager, The 
Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity (Oxford: OUP, 
1983), 233. 
86 Thus, Matlock (’Rhetoric ’, 199): ‘here the Jewish Christian experience of the gospel is placed 
within a common human narrative’ as Paul and his fellow Jews are situated between ἄνθρωπος and 
σάρξ. 
87 It is unclear whether Paul’s switch of σάρξ for the substantive participle ζῶν in his allusion to 
LXX Ps 142:2 is simply a conflation from memory of the related phrase in the Psalter (πᾶσα σάρξ, LXX 
Ps 64:3; 135:23 – 25; 144:21), a substitution of the more for less common word (M. Silva, ’Galatians ’, in 
Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament [ed. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson; Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2007], 790 – 91; for the data, see R.E. Ciampa, The Presence and Function of Scripture in 
Galatians 1 and 2 [WUNT II 102; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998], 183, n. 94), a veiled allusion to 
circumcision (Dunn, Galatians, 140), or an attempt to avoid ζῆν/ζωή, which he uses ‘im theologisch 
gefüllten Sinn zur Bezeichnung des neuen Lebens der Glaubenden’ (H.J. Eckstein, Verheissung und 
Gesetz: eine exegetische Untersuchung zu Galater 2,15 – 4,7 (WUNT I 86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 
28). Given the status of σάρξ as a key term and Paul’s earlier reference to ‘flesh and blood’ (1:16) in 
contrast to God, Paul may be hinting at his particular understanding of the reason for the truth of the 
phrase ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόµου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ—viz., the ‘die Hinfälligkeit, die Ohnmacht, und 
Sterblichkeit des Menschen’ (ibid. on σάρξ in Gal 2:20; cf. 1 Enoch 81:5). On the parallels between the 
antithetical structure of thought in LXX Ps 143 and Gal 2:16, see H. Hübner, Biblische Theologie des 
Neuen Testaments: Die Theologie des Paulus und ihre neutestamentliche Wirkungsgeschichte (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 65 – 66.  
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not simply interested in the works of the law as Jewish practices but as a part of an 
alternative message to be rejected. Likewise, Paul’s subordination, by implication, of 
these Jewish practices to walking straight (ὀρθοποδέω) ‘according to the truth of the 
gospel’ (πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 2:14) is purely negative in his story; these 
practices do not provide the chief social norm in the church; but, Paul has not 
addressed, positively, what this ‘walking straight’ amounts to (cf. πνεύµατι καὶ 
στοιχῶµεν, 5:25; ὅσοι τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ [i.e., καινὴ κτίσις] στοιχήσουσιν, 6:16). Finally, as a 
fellow Jew, Paul must give an account of the law’s relation to this normative divine 
Christ-gift.  
 The key point, for our purposes, is that Paul’s application of the language of 
gift to Jesus’ self-offering and, at this stage in the argument, the introduction of the 
phrase ‘faith in Christ’ in antithesis to ‘works of the law’ as the standard of divine 
evaluation raises not the general questions of the relation between belief and action 
or even the priority of divine action over human action but the particular question of 
God as life-giving Benefactor—specifically, the nature, rationale, and effects of his 
life-giving activity.88 Though we will have more to say on the πίστις Χριστοῦ debate in 
the next chapter, the present discussion of divine benefaction will proceed with the 
primary theological objections to the objective genitive reading in view, in order to 
illustrate both why they are unfounded and how reading Paul’s ‘faith’ language in 
the context of a debate over divine benefaction supports the semantic case for the 
objective genitive reading.89  
 In the context of our debate, the objective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ is 
parallel, in one respect, to the language of ‘faith’ and ‘works’ in 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra. That is, in our debate partners, Ezra, Eleazar, and the martyrs are materially 
dependent on God’s causal creative and saving action: they exercise created freedom 
according to the divine, Torah order of created life (faith), in order to meet the 
condition (obedience) necessary to receive the divine reconstitution of life as a fitting 
                                                
88 The concrete context of divine gift-giving helps explain why it is difficult, on the one hand, for 
Moo (Galatians, 146) to claim that ‘Paul does think that the truth of the gospel is at stake’, while 
asserting on the other that ‘the difference is not fundamentally over theology’ but ‘the implications 
for a specific form of conduct’. Such a divorce of theology and ethics is not conceivable if God’s gift-
giving and, specifically, life-giving and life-ordering activity is determinative qua theology and ethics, 
as we will argue below. 
89 For a complementary treatment of this issue in Romans, see Linebaugh, God, Grace, and 
Righteousness, 154–60. 
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return gift. In 4 Ezra, it is the zone of created libertas that enables both the few fit to 
receive salvation per opera or per fidem (9:7) and the many liable to judgement because 
they ‘did not acknowledge [God] despite living as a result of receiving [his] benefits’ 
(non cognoverunt me viventes beneficia consecuti, 9:10) and ‘scorned [God’s] law when 
they still had freedom’ (fastidierunt legem meam cum adhuc erant habentes libertatem, 
9:11). In 4 Maccabees, the martyrs prove the efficacy of the Torah-ordered mind to 
rule the self because they exercise ‘the same faith in God’ (τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, 
16:22) as the patriarchs because they know ‘that those who die for God live to God’ 
(ὅτι οἱ διὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀποθνῄσκοντες ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ, 16:25; cf. 7:19). Thus, in denying the 
works of the law as the condition of justification, Paul, in effect, calls into question 
our conversation partners’ systems of belief in which God’s life-giving and Torah-
ordering activity in creation and the eschaton is the causal ground of salvation.  
 In this connection, when Paul opposes ‘faith in Christ’ and the ‘works of the 
law’, our debate partners would wonder not about faith as the condition or cause of 
divine saving action but about the object of faith—specifically, the Christ-gift’s 
relation to divine creative and saving action. That is, as in Paul, in 4 Ezra and 4 
Maccabees faith is instrumental, and, thus, concerns that the objective genitive 
reading makes faith a condition of salvation in Paul are misguided.90 Moreover, the 
Pauline opposition of ‘faith in Christ’ to ‘works of the law’, in the context of a 
discussion of divine life-giving benefaction, potentially calls into question our 
conversation partners’ commitment to the inviolable Torah-ordered donation of the 
created self. In this respect, the construal of the objective genitive reading as an 
anthropocentric as opposed to Christological account of justification misses the mark 
also.91 For, rather than presuming an anthropocentric construal of justification, ‘faith 
in Christ’ invites the question of the anthropological significance of Paul’s 
                                                
90 Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 156, n. 106: ‘This fear [that the objective genitive 
interpretation renders faith a material condition for divine action] is based on an historical 
misreading. Calvin for example, while never referring to faith as a causa materialis, speaks of faith as 
the causa instrumentalis only in connection with the word that invokes it (Rom 10.17): “verbum cum fide 
instrumentum.”’ Cf. J. Calvin, ‘Acts 14 – 28 and Romans 1 – 6’, in Calvin’s Commentaries, Volume XIX 
(trans. J. Owen; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 138, n.2. For the concern, see, e.g., D.A. Campbell, The 
Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 77 – 
78; P.M. Sprinkle, ‘Pistis Christou as an Eschatological Event‘, in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, 
Biblical, and Theological Studies (ed. M.F. Bird and P.M. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 166. 
91 See, e.g., R.B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1 – 4:11 (2nd 
ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), xxix; J.L. Martyn, ‘The Apocalyptic Gospel in Galatians‘, Int 54 
(2000): 250. 
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Christology—and specifically in terms of his conception of the inviolability of 
created human agency—and then the question of what it means for Christ to be the 
ground of justification.92 Despite the challenges of the passions and 
corruptions/limitations of human existence, respectively, Eleazar and Ezra are living 
proof of the instrumental exercise of the created freedom of the Torah-ordered self 
and, in this way, the fitting recipients of the divine gift of salvation. Consequently, 
when Paul states that it is ‘faith in Christ’ and not ‘works of the law’ that constitutes 
the evidential basis for God’s verdict, he invites a debate about God’s life-giving 
activity in creation and salvation.93 As we will see, Paul enters directly into this 
debate in his paradigmatic account of the reconstitution of the self in Gal 2:17 – 21. 
3.2.3 Paul as Paradigm of the Crucified and Resurrected Self (2:17 – 21) 
 If the ironic distance between the phrases φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι and ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁµαρτωλοί 
in Gal 2:15 adds rhetorical weight to Paul’s emphatic theological point that it is 
Jewish Christians themselves who seek God’s approval by faith in Christ, then the 
repetition of the word ἁµαρτωλοί in 2:17 redirects this force against the Jewish 
evaluative framework itself.94 Thus, in v. 17, Paul’s emphatic rejection of the 
possibility that Christ is a ‘servant of sin’ (διάκονος ἁµαρτίας) renders the judgement 
that ‘those seeking justification in Christ’ could be classified (εὑρίσκω) as ‘sinners’ 
suspect. The conditional of v. 18 supports this judgement by stating what would be 
the case were Paul to follow Peter’s path, recognise the moniker ‘sinner’, and change 
his behaviour.95 That Paul’s target here is not the exposure of Jews and Gentiles alike 
as ‘sinners’ but the Torah-reckoning of sinner qua Gentile is clear from his 
terminology in v. 18: ‘these things [plural!] which [Paul] destroyed’ (ἃ κατέλυσα 
                                                
92 That is, why must it be that in Watson’s terms (‘By Faith [of Christ]‘, 159) ‘faith constitutes the 
righteousness of the generic individual only insofar as it is oriented towards and grounded in Christ 
and the saving divine action enacted in him’?  
93 From a semantic perspective, the chief points in favour of the objective genitive reading of πίστις 
Χριστοῦ are: 1) the fact that Paul never uses the verb πιστεύω with Jesus as the subject; and 2) Paul 
tends to pair the noun πίστις with scriptural citations that use the verb πιστεύω (e.g. three times ἐκ 
πίστεως follows Paul’s quotation of Gen 15:6, ἐπίστευσεν τῷ θεῷ; see Matlock, ‘Rhetoric‘). Both of these 
suggest that in Gal 2:16 Paul’s use of the verb πιστεύω disambiguates the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ. 
94 Barclay, Obeying, 78–80. 
95 Moo rightly notes (Galatians, 166) that Paul has Peter and his fellow Jews in mind. Barclay’s 
gloss (Obeying, 80) catches the sense of the relation indicated by the γάρ connecting vv. 17 and 18: ’by 
no means, in fact, the case stands just the opposite’. 
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ταῦτα) and is now being pressured to ‘again rebuild’ (πάλιν οἰκοδοµῶ) most likely refer 
to the Jewish practices indicated by ἔργα νόµου, which in turn suggests that by 
παραβάτης he means not the violation of the norms of the Christ-gift but of the Torah 
(cf. 3:19). Likewise, given the reference to these practices and the fact that, from the 
context, Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians have been, as of late, successfully 
following them in Antioch, it is unlikely that this violation has to do with the 
impracticability of the Torah and thus its role as ‘revealer’ or ‘provoker’ of sin.96 Paul 
is exposing a category mistake here, not the status of Jew and Gentile alike as 
sinners,97 though the former is the ground of the latter, as we will argue (cf. 3:10 – 12; 
3:22). One is not ‘found to be a sinner’ by seeking justification in Christ with ‘sinners’ 
outside of Torah confines, because Christ is not a servant of sin. On the contrary, 
having enjoyed commensality with Gentiles, to return to Torah confines is the 
problematic move, because to do so is to ‘prove’ oneself to be a ‘transgressor’. 98  
That is, it is to admit that, in this respect, one was wrong to associate with Gentiles 
without regard to the norms of Torah. And that Paul will not do.  
 We can easily imagine our conversation partners interjecting, ‘You should do 
it!’ For they will see in Peter’s behaviour not hypocrisy but repentance, and thus in 
Paul’s case a proper realignment with the Torah order is preferable to the folly of 
misguided consistency.99 In other words, Paul’s way of framing the issue is 
prejudicial. Neither his opponents in Galatia nor our debate partners would concede 
his assertion that seeking justification in Christ necessitates living like a Gentile and, 
                                                
96 Rightly, Burton, Galatians, 124–30; Dunn, Galatians, 141–42; Martyn, Galatians, 254–56. Contra 
Lightfoot, Galatians, 116 – 17; J. Lambrecht, ’The Line of Thought in Gal. 2.14 b  –  21’, NTS 24 (1978): 
484–95; J. Lambrecht, ’Once Again Gal 2,17 – 18 and 3,21’, ETL 63 (1987): 148 – 53; J. Lambrecht, 
’Paul’s Reasoning in Galatians 2:11 – 21’, in Paul and the Mosaic Law: The Third Durham-Tübingen 
Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism, Durham, September, 1994 (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 53 – 74. 
97 Pace Eckstein, Verheissung und Gesetz, 30–41. 
98 Contra T. G. Gombis, ‘The ”Transgressor” and the ”Curse of the Law”: The Logic of Paul’s 
Argument in Galatians 2 – 3‘, NTS 53 (2007): 89: Paul’s language of ‘transgression’ here is 
hypothetical, not actual. It was obedience to the Torah that led to his ‘death’ to it as a norm in his life, 
as this obedience drove him toward the revelation of the truth of the gospel in the revelation of 
Christ. As Lightfoot recognised (Galatians, 119), there is a shift in the metaphorical references to death 
from Galatians 2:19, ‘freedom from past obligation’, to 2:20, ‘annihilation of old sins’.  
99 Ironically, by deploying the language of hypocrisy, Paul leaves open the possibility of a 
realignment with the good news—a repentance, if you will. Lightfoot, Galatians, 113: ‘The idea at the 
root of ὑπόκρισις is not a false motive entertained, but a false impression produced’. On Paul’s attempt 
to recover Peter, see B. Holmberg, ‘Jewish Versus Christian Identity in the Early Church? ‘, RB 105 
(1998): 397 – 425. 
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thus, taking on the moniker ‘sinner’.100 For thus far Paul has appealed to the divine 
action in the Christ-gift against the authority of those norms. But his opponents do 
not see the entailment, and the response of our conversation partners might indicate 
why: for they recognise the propriety of intercession and/or substitution for the 
unworthy (even Gentiles!, 4 Macc 4:13 ; cf. 4 Ezra 7:102 – 112) that leads to not against 
repentance and reordering according to Torah norms.101 Paul can paint himself as 
the principled witness with Peter and his opposition as hypocrites and tyrants all he 
likes, but our debate partners would demand an argument for this paradox: ‘How 
exactly, Paul, is Peter a tyrant for obeying and encouraging others to obey the Torah, 
the created order of human and social life?’ The shift from plural (2:15 – 17) to 
singular verbs (2:18 – 21) marks the beginning of Paul’s personal and paradigmatic 
summary answer. 
 Paul will neither accept the label ‘sinner’ nor prove himself a ‘transgressor’:  
‘for through the law to the law I died, in order that to God I might live’102 (2:19). It is 
clear from the immediate context and his subsequent references to life ‘under Torah’, 
that by ‘death to the law’ Paul means at a minimum the end of the Torah as the 
definitive moral norm in his life. Thus, in terms of the debate over divine life-giving 
benefaction Paul invites in Gal 2:15, 16, he would reject the identification of the 
Torah with the created order that is axiomatic for our conversation partners.103 It is a 
mistake, however, to end our analysis of the metaphor here, because the significance 
of this ‘end’ of the Torah’s authority depends on the nature of the authority ended. 
For to assert as Paul does that the end of the Torah’s authority over his life came διὰ 
νόµου is potentially to imply much more than a recalibration or even negation of so-
                                                
100 Though Paul is ‘making explicit what he takes to be implicit in the practice of the gospel’, it is 
doubtful (pace Matlock, ‘Rhetoric‘, 199, n. 26) that this amounts not to ‘a matter…of formal logic, but 
of belonging to a common life’. For the very practice of such a common life, for a Jew like Paul, 
requires a judgement regarding its legitimacy. The argument this thesis develops is that Paul presents 
this argument in nuce in Gal 2:17 – 21, and develops it in Gal 3:1 – 5:26. 
101 4 Ezra 7:133: ‘[God is called] gracious in that he is gracious to those who make a turn to his law’ 
(miserator in eo quod miseretur illis qui conversionem faciunt in lege eius). 
102 Mussner, Galaterbrief, 178: ‘Das Ich des V 18 visiert noch einmal Petrus an, das betonte ἐγώ des 
v 19 dagegen Paulus; beide aber sind dabei exemplarische Repräsentanten oder Typen eines 
bestimmten Tuns bzw.’ 
103 Pace Gombis (‘”Transgressor”‘, 86), the problem is not that a ‘universal gospel’ is contrary to a 
‘particular gospel’. This is question-begging, as is clear from the fact that some Jews (like those 
represented by 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Jubilees) could conceive of Israel and its Torah as the 
particular expression of God’s universal design for human life and flourishing. Rather, there are 
competing conceptions of divine, universal order here. 
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called ‘cultural’ norms. That is the reason why there are multiple parallels within 
Paul’s own writings that might fill out the logic here. If we allow the immediate 
context to govern interpretation, we note that Paul mentions nothing of the law’s 
cursing function in his autobiography104 and, if his experience among the Gentiles 
played a role in the Torah’s subversion, he gives no indication.105 Rather, Paul’s 
entire story has been generated and framed by the juxtaposition of his zealous life 
for the Torah and his calling through the unconditioned and incongruous gift that 
made this life irrelevant.106 Moreover, as we will argue presently, given the 
rhetorical and theological force of Paul’s death and life language in Gal 2:19, 20, it 
seems that by διὰ νόµου Paul means the Torah’s role in leading him to Christ and, 
therein, to the realization that his former agency in Torah was disordered.  
 In close dialogue with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, the likelihood that Paul has 
human agency in mind in these verses becomes almost certain. Both 4 Maccabees 
and 4 Ezra resist the subversion of the Torah as a norm not simply because of 
questions of Jewish identity or as even as the order of created life. Rather, the law is 
also constitutive of the created self—being ‘with the heart of the people’ (lex cum 
corde populi, 4 Ezra 3:22) and ‘given to [the mind by God]’ (τούτῳ [τὸν ἱερὸν ἡγεµόνα 
νοῦν, v. 22] νόµον ἔδωκεν, 4 Macc 2:23) at the constitution of human beings at creation. 
This interpretation in terms of human agency illumines Paul’s careful language in 
vv. 19 – 20.107 The obscurity our interpretation will clarify has to do with the 
interpretation of Paul’s life and death metaphors. For, in conversation with the 
presentations of exemplary figures in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, we see not only the 
sense of what Paul means by saying that he has died and now lives in Christ but also 
why this necessarily has implications for his life as a Torah-observant Jew. For, as we 
will argue, Paul’s insistence that, in order to live to God a death to the law was 
                                                
104 Martyn, Galatians, 257. A related option is the role of the law in provoking and disclosing sin 
(cf. Rom 7:7 – 25). 
105 It is not clear how Paul would ever have experienced the challenge of his Jewish norms in 
Gentile company if he did not recognise the validity of participating in such unconditioned social 
groups from the outset; pace Barclay, Gift, 361, 385. 
106 Similarly, de Boer, Galatians, 160. 
107 For treatments of divine and human agency in this passage in the context of the ‘reconstituted’ 
and ‘converted’ self, respectively, see J.M.G. Barclay, ‘”By the Grace of God I Am What I Am”: Grace 
and Agency in Philo and Paul‘, in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment (ed. 
S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T. & T. Clark, 2006), 140 – 57; T. Engberg-
Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 157 – 61. 
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necessary (2:19), esp. followed by language of a new existence in Christ (2:20), 
represents a clear denial of an account of the Torah as the order of the created self. 
Without these recognitions, we run the risk of simply repeating Paul’s metaphors or 
possibly inappropriately filling in the logic from elsewhere in his letters.  
 Generally speaking, the most striking feature in these verses is the clear 
parallel between Jesus’ own death and resurrection and Paul’s application of death 
and life language to himself. Though Paul reserves the vocabulary of resurrection for 
either the bodily resurrection of Christ or the bodily general resurrection at the 
eschaton, the transition from one existence here (‘I myself no longer live…’) through 
death (‘I have been crucified with Christ.’) to new life (‘Christ lives in me. The life 
which I now live…’) is deliberately resurrection shaped. It is not certain that Paul is 
evoking the discourse of Maccabean martyrdom in Gal 1:10 – 2:21, but this shaping 
is both rhetorically provocative and theologically puzzling for authors like 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, nonetheless.108 For example, rhetorically speaking, there is a 
vital difference between Eleazar and Paul, in so far as, unlike the martyrs, Paul has 
presented himself neither as worthy of this gift of life nor as willingly dying to 
secure it. That is, the perfect passive verb in the phrase Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωµαι matches 
perfectly Paul’s passive role in being called by God through the gift (1:15). His zeal 
for Torah did not intend his crucifixion with Christ but its opposite. Nevertheless, 
God’s call turned him around—or better, ‘raised’ him from the ‘dead’—without 
regard either to his intentions or his previous actions. 
 Theologically, this passive framing indicates not only the new norms of life in 
the Christ-gift but the need for such a new and newly-ordered life. Paul clarifies this 
need by specifying just what he means by the general transition from life in the law, 
through death to the law, and to life to God (v. 19a – b): it is the death of one subject 
(vv. 19c, 20a) and the life of another subject who is the risen Christ (v. 20b), with the 
result now being that both Christ and Paul, somehow, live in this subject (v. 20c). The 
most obvious force of this metaphorical configuration in our context is, again, 
ethical—viz., what has ended is the order of Paul’s old life. But there are two other 
intriguing and, in our view, likely additional entailments. The first is evident from 
                                                
108 If Paul is evoking Maccabean martyrdom, we have here the provocative ‘resurrection’ of the 
unworthy self in the Christ-gift. 
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the recognition of the theological impossibility, from the perspective of 4 Maccabees, 
of Paul’s metaphorical configuration here. It is precisely the Torah-zealous Paul, the 
subject prior to co-crucifixion with Christ, who is most like Eleazar—the exemplar of 
the inviolable integrity and proper order of the created self. Such a properly ordered 
self does not need to be ‘crucified’ and ‘raised’. Unless, that is, on Paul’s view, such a 
self does not retain its created freedom and/or is not properly ordered by Torah. In 
other words, Paul’s movement from one agency, through a divinely wrought end of 
that agency in ‘crucifixion’, to active agency in ‘resurrection’ looks not only like the 
re-ordering but the reconstitution of the self.109 As we shall see in the next two 
chapters, this implication of the formal statement here is materially defended by 
Paul both with respect to his reading of salvation-history and his understanding of 
the condition of human life apart from the Spirit. 
 Such a metaphorical construction does not amount to a denial of agency in 
Paul’s former ‘life’. Rather it is a denial of properly-ordered agency. Paul used to live—
just not to God. Moreover, given the active subject (ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐµοὶ Χριστός) between the 
‘crucifixion’ of his old life and the new life he lives ‘by faith’, Paul seems to be 
denying the possibility of properly-ordered agency apart from this life in Christ. For, 
given the parallel with v. 19, it is in Christ’s living that one lives to God. Thus, again, 
in terms of the questions Paul invites in discussion of divine life-giving benefaction, 
Paul’s rejection of the supremacy of the Torah-order would seem to be grounded in 
a rejection of the created integrity of the Torah-ordered self—and that rather 
perversely. Paul’s Torah-ordered self, far from coinciding with a properly-ordered 
life to God, is rather the very context in which his disordered self exists. 
 This appeal to Christ’s active agency invites its own set of puzzles 
surrounding how to account for the apparent realism of Paul’s language, a topic that 
has dominated the interpretation of these verses virtually since they were penned.110 
For our purposes, however, the effect of Christ’s life in Paul raises the question of the 
singularity and singular worth of the Christ-gift in specifically creative terms. For 
                                                
109 Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story‘, 142 – 46. 
110 For a survey of the history of interpretation, see J. Riches, Galatians Through the Centuries 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 137 – 43; on the possible ‘relational ontology’ undergirding this realism, see 
E.L. Rehfeld, Relationale Ontologie bei Paulus: die ontische Wirksamkeit der Christusbezogenheit im Denken 
des Heidenapostels (WUNT II 326; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 
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rather than ‘rebuild’ his Torah life (v. 17), Paul will not ‘reject the gift of God’ (2:21), 
but rather expresses a new and newly-ordered agency in living ‘by faith’111 in Jesus, 
the self-giver who loved him (2:20).112 (Given the reference to the event of Jesus’ self-
offering in Gal 2:20 and his subsequent consideration of that death as, on his 
opponents’ view, ‘to no effect’ [δωρεάν], it is most likely that Paul refers not to divine 
favour but to divine gift with τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ in Gal 2:21). This juxtaposition places 
Jesus’ self-offering not just in the position of the divine gift of supreme worth but of 
the singular divine life-giving gift. Moreover, given Paul’s earlier anathemas on 
‘another good news’ (1:6 – 9) and insistence on receipt of his good news via divine 
revelation of it in the person of Jesus Christ (1:11 – 17), this asymmetrical 
juxtaposition—disordered life to the law/new and newly-ordered life in Christ—
invites a rather pointed query from 4 Ezra. For Uriel’s instruction of Ezra in bifocal 
eschatological hermeneutics is aimed at defending as supreme divine gift precisely 
what Paul denies here—Torah-ordered life. It is ‘the law of life’ (4 Ezra 14:30), given 
by God as the path through life (7:10 - 25) and thus the standard by which all human 
belief and activity will be judged (9:7 – 13). Moreover, because it is God’s gift it 
shares in his eternal attributes: its ‘fruit’ does not and is not capable of perishing 
‘because it is [God’s]’ (fructum legis non periens nec enim poterat quoniam tuus erat, 9:32) 
and the law itself, likewise, ‘does not perish but remains in its glory’ (lex non perit sed 
permanet in suo honore, 9:37). It is toward this reality Uriel bids him look, from this 
reality that Ezra serves as prophet in Israel. Thus, Paul’s earlier troubling reference 
to Jesus’ self-giving for sinners as a ‘rescue from the present evil age’ emerges 
clearly, for 4 Ezra, in Gal 2:20, 21 as the rival to the Torah as God’s singular and 
singularly valuable divine life-giving gift. What Ezra experiences as a visionary 
experience of future reality and looks forward to in hope, Paul claims to have seen 
both in the risen flesh of Jesus Christ and the effect the preaching of this gift has 
                                                
111 On Luther’s account of the anthropological negation and Christological confession of Christ as 
the ground of justification inherent in the Pauline sola fide, see J.A. Linebaugh, ‘The Christo-Centrism 
of Faith in Christ: Martin Luther’s Reading of Galatians 2.16, 19 – 20‘, NTS 59 (2013): 535 – 44. 
112 Paul’s paradigmatic account of himself as a crucified and resurrected agent increases the 
likelihood that the locative phrase ἐν σαρκί is theologically pregnant, referring to ‘human 
susceptibility to the sway of evil’, though, as we will argue in chapter five, it is not necessary to 
interpret such evil with reference to ‘cosmological powers’, as in M.C. de Boer, The Defeat of Death: 
Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5 (JSNTSup 22; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 
1989), 131–32. 
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among Jew and Gentile alike. Like Eleazar and Ezra, Paul refuses to reject the gift; he 
simply differs on what that gift is and does.  
 And, like Eleazar and Ezra, Paul’s refusal to reject divine life-giving 
benevolence is grounded in the recognition that the divine gift of life is ordered, and 
as such necessarily related to ‘righteousness’. What Paul means by ‘righteousness’ in 
this context and how the Christ-gift relates to it vis-à-vis the law is not entirely clear. 
At a minimum, the divine approbation of those who live ‘by faith’ in Jesus entails an 
alternate standard of righteousness to that of the Torah,113 but, given the multiple 
entailments created by Paul’s metaphorical life language in this context, δικαιοσύνη 
could also refer to a new source and quality of life exhibited by believers.114 For, if it 
is only in the crucifixion and resurrection of the self in the Christ-event that one 
exists as a properly-ordered agent, then actually being called in or through the gift 
and subsequently living by faith entails a new and qualitatively-new life. Whether 
Paul uses δικαιοσύνη in this sense depends essentially on the anthropology and 
cosmology in which this term operates. For in the context of 4 Maccabees’ 
fundamentally optimistic anthropology there is no observable ‘gap’, in principle, 
between ideal human obedience and its eschatological goal: the perfectly ordered 
self is fixed in this perfection in immortality. In 4 Ezra, the apparent opacity of divine 
judgement in history combined with the constitutional fragility of humanity’s Sein-
zum-Tode and limited understanding, renders the full measure of human δικαιοσύνη 
recognisable only in light of the divine disclosure of its telos—when in the ‘immortal 
age’ inaugurated by divine judgement (7:113) ‘unbelief is brought to an end while 
righteousness has increased and truth has appeared’ (7:114). Paul may have such an 
eschatological and, in his case, inaugurated sense of δικαιοσύνη in view here, but 
clarity on this point awaits our exegesis of Gal 3:21 – 22 and 5:2 – 6.  
Conclusion—Debating Divine Life-Giving Benefaction 
Though we cannot discern the full material significance of Paul’s concluding 
statement in v. 21 without his development of it in subsequent chapters, the formal 
logic is clear. Paul will not reject the gift, because to revert to Torah norms is to deny 
                                                
113 Barclay, Gift, 387. 
114 For an account of such ‘extraordinary righteousness’, see Westerholm, Perspectives, 273–84. 
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that Jew and Gentile alike—even he himself and the Galatian Gentiles—have 
received Jesus’ self-giving without regard to antecedent conditions and despite 
previous sins. It is to reject the divine verdict on Jew and Gentile in the divine act of 
recognising them as righteous on the basis of receipt of the Christ-gift. Paul will not 
reject the gift, because unlike the situations in Antioch and Galatia, this gift was 
properly received and circulated in Jerusalem, as Jewish missionary teams 
acknowledged God’s action in the Gentile mission and accepted the Gentiles into 
fellowship in social terms unconditioned by Torah norms. To insist on Torah norms, 
as Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians in Antioch hypocritically did, would have 
been to reject those whom God had accepted in the gift, and thus to reject the divine 
standard implicit in this divine verdict. Not only that, but such a reversion to the 
authority of Torah norms proves one to be a transgressor of those norms and implies 
that, by promoting fellowship among Jews and Gentiles alike, Jesus himself 
promotes sin. Paul will do neither, because it is precisely in Jesus’ self-giving and not 
the authority of the Torah that he and all believers are reconstituted and reordered 
as new and newly-ordered agents within a new community. With these three 
moves—the recognition of calling in the gift apart from Torah norms, the subsequent 
subordination of Torah norms to this unconditioned gift, and the grounding of both 
in the reconstitution and reordering of a new self for a new society in the Christ-
gift—Paul, at least formally, calls into question the accounts of divine life-giving 
benefaction in texts like 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. For if the Christ-gift is the singular 
and singularly supreme life-giving and life-ordering gift, then life cannot be 
inviolably donated as Torah-ordered at creation.  
 Consequently, our dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 – 2 has contributed to research 
on the force and meaning of Paul’s paradigmatic autobiography and extended recent 
studies of divine gift. Paul neither appeals to the singularity of the gospel (Gaventa) 
nor to the unconditioned donation of the Christ-gift (Barclay), but rather he begins to 
make arguments for his particular conception of both. These arguments reach their 
formal presentation in Gal 2:18 – 21, as Paul presents himself as the recipient of a 
new and newly-ordered individual and social life. Such a presentation is in formal 
opposition to the theology of divine life-giving benefaction that undergirds the 
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presentation of exemplary figures like Eleazar and Ezra in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, 
respectively.  
 Yet, this formal opposition does not bring our conversation to an end but 
rather initiates further debate. For there are a number of remaining questions Paul 
must address for our conversation partners, chief among them: what relation the 
‘divine law’ has to this Christ-gift; why, given the divine donation of the law attested 
in Scripture, this Christ-gift was necessary; and, given answers to these two, how, 
specifically, this Christ-gift positively orders the self and society. In our next chapter, 
we turn to these first two questions in debate with 4 Ezra, arguing that Paul answers 
the first question materially and the second only formally. The material answer to 
both the second and third questions, awaits our debate with 4 Maccabees in the final 
chapter.
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Chapter 4 
What Makes Alive?: The Gift of Life and the Order of History in 
Galatians 3 – 4 and 4 Ezra 3 – 10 
 
‘Who ain’t a slave? Tell me that.’—Ishmael, Moby Dick 
‘Reading’ Texts and Experiences Differently 
In our texts, Paul, Ezra, and Eleazar are exemplary recipients of the divine gift of life, 
yet this divine life-giving benefaction is construed differently. Chapter three argued 
that Paul’s presentation of himself as an exemplary yet unworthy recipient of divine 
life in the Christ-gift contrasts with the accounts of the divine donation of life in 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra. For in presenting his Torah-observant life as structurally 
disordered, Paul both displaces the Torah as the order of life and raises questions 
about the freedom of the created self. This introduces, however, another point for 
debate: if the Torah does not order self and society, what is its status as ‘divine law’ 
and gift as attested in scripture (4 Ezra 7:20; 4 Macc 5:16), and what is its relation to 
the Christ-gift? Thus, as Paul turns to his own reading of sacred text and salvation-
history, we turn to consider a key hermeneutical question: not only why do these 
authors construe divine grace differently but also why do they read the same 
scriptural texts and salvation-history differently?1  
 This chapter reintroduces the Deutoronomic theodicy of 4 Ezra to answer this 
hermeneutical question, but also to serve a larger aim. By staging a debate between 4 
Ezra 3 – 10 and Galatians 3 – 4 over their respective readings of sacred text, 
salvation-history, and world, we aim to further disclose the submerged Pauline 
assumptions and clarify the theological logic of Galatians. For Paul is not only 
engaged in a debate over a ‘single intertextual field’,2 he is also providing an 
argument about the meaning of early Christian experience. Consequently, when 
Richard Hays asserts the ‘hermeneutical priority of Spirit-experience’, for Paul, over 
‘the normative constraints laid down by the text’ this does not resolve but magnifies 
                                                
1 For this methodological question, see Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 22, 177–78.  
2 Watson, Hermeneutics, 3.  
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the hermeneutical questions.3 For both these scriptural texts and experiences are 
held in common in Galatia: Paul and his opponents read the same scriptures 
differently, and they interpret the receipt of the Christ-gift and the experience of the 
Spirit differently. Thus, what is needed is an account of the interrelation between 
Paul’s textual and his Christological and pneumatological hermeneutic.4 
 This chapter argues two interrelated theses, in this regard: 1) as with the 
paradigmatic differences between Eleazar, Ezra, and Paul, the hermeneutical 
differences are attributable to Paul’s conception of the Christ-event in life-giving and 
life-ordering terms; 2) Paul’s teleological Christ-ordered reading of text and 
redemptive-history depends on a Christ-shaped understanding of reality. Whereas 4 
Ezra reads text, salvation-history, and world(s) as Torah-shaped because the Torah 
represents the divine order of created and eschatological life within history (9:7 - 13), 
Paul’s reading is Christ-shaped because he sees life created and ordered in the 
Christ-gift by the Spirit in the midst of the ‘dead’ cosmic conditions to which the 
Torah confines humanity and is itself confined. Thus, it is Paul’s creative, 
christomorphic, and pneumatological hermeneutic that excludes the Torah as the 
order of self and society; for the Torah serves the promises (3:6 -9) and their 
eschatological order by confining and confirming humanity in its cursed (3:10) and 
dead estate in view of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift (3:11 – 13; 3:21, 22). 
Likewise, to answer our other hermeneutical question, Paul differs from his 
opponents because, for him, God’s raising of Jesus from the dead is not simply the 
event of salvation, to which Torah-ordered life may be appended, but the creative 
pattern of salvation and salvation-history (Gal 4:21 – 31). Thus, his reading of sacred 
text, salvation-history, and world is Christ-shaped—figured by Jesus’ death and 
resurrection—because both text and world are inevitably oriented to Christ. 
                                                
3 R.B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: YUP, 1989), 108. Dunn, reduces 
the hermeneutical function of the Spirit to its ‘existential power’; Dunn, Theology of Galatians, 95. Cf. 
J.M.G Barclay, ‘Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of 
Galatians‘, ABR 58 (2010): 44: ‘[i]t is the connection Paul draws between the Galatians’ experience and 
the Christ-event (3:1 – 5; 4:4 – 6) that needs explaining.’ 
4 E.P. Sanders ‘dogmatic’ account of Paul’s argument is also question-begging, assuming a 
univocal understanding of the Christ-event when this is under dispute in Paul’s scriptural 
argumentation; E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977), 484. 
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 The argument of this chapter produces two important results for our thesis. 
First, it contributes to debates over the theological logic of Paul’s reading of scripture 
and salvation-history in Gal 3 – 4 (and thus Galatians, in general) by showing why 
the current range of interpretive options do not adequately convey the logic of Paul’s 
argument. Specifically, in debate with 4 Ezra, we show that the current 
interpretations do not account both for: 1) how Paul can announce a necessary and 
inevitable curse on those who are ‘of the works of the law’ when the scriptural curse 
he appeals to in Dt 27:26 is contingent; and 2) why the law itself cannot itself provide 
the proper order for the life of the church. Second, in this connection, we go beyond 
Barclay’s analysis of gift in Gal 3 – 4 by showing how, in debate with 4 Ezra, a 
consideration of the Christ-gift as life-giving exposes, in his words, the ‘submerged 
assumption’ in Gal 3:21 – 22. 5 Specifically, we show both how the Torah confines 
humanity to a ‘dead’ existence in view of the divine donation of life in Christ and the 
Spirit and why the law itself is confined to ‘dead’ cosmic conditions. 
 Yet, as we noted in the previous chapter, further debate between our 
conversation partners and thus further clarification of Paul’s argument in Galatians 
is possible still. For Paul’s assumption that the recipients of the law are ‘dead’ (Gal 
3:21) does not indicate why this is the case or what, specifically, he means by it. 
Moreover, if the Torah itself does not order the community of God, 4 Maccabees 
would want to know what does and how this relates to Paul’s account of the life-
giving Christ-gift. Thus, our account of the formal structure of Paul’s theological 
logic in this chapter prepares for an argument about its material grounding in Gal 5 
– 6, which, in turn, serves as a new argument for the thematic coherence of the letter. 
4.1 Debating the Broken Middle: The Gift of Life at the Beginning or in the Midst 
of History? (Gal 3:1 – 22) 
‘It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backward. But 
then one forgets the principal proposition, that it must be lived forward.’6  
Kierkegaard’s statement leads to a paradox: understanding life is impossible, 
                                                
5  J.M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 407. 
6 S. Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks (ed. B.H. Kirmmse et al.; Princeton: PUP, 
2007), 179. 
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because there is never a stable point from which to look back.7 In Galatians 3 and 4, 
Paul assumes a rupture in the flow of life, a definitive vantage-point from which 
both to evaluate the past and to live forward. This place is the Christ-event. Why, 
though, has the history of Israel and the cosmos inevitably converged on this point? 
 By the time Galatians and 4 Ezra were written, Jewish thinkers had developed 
an array of strategies for dealing with the tensions between past revelation and 
present experience.8 In diverse texts like 1 Enoch, Jubilees, 2 Maccabees, 1 QS, the 
Wisdom of Solomon, and De Bello Judaico, authors employed varied exegetical practices 
to discern in shared authoritative writings the patterns of divine dealings with 
human beings and nations, to explain the application of those patterns to current 
affairs and future prospects, and to seek after fresh and sometimes hidden revelatory 
insight into God’s ways.9 Galatians 3 – 4 and 4 Ezra 3 – 10 are instances of this 
common discourse, and they exhibit not only extensive overlap in the texts they use, 
themes they develop, and cognate vocabulary they employ but they also share a 
similar overriding problem and, at a deep level, a similar logically structured way of 
solving it. Most generally, Galatians and 4 Ezra deal explicitly with or assume the 
problems and solutions of revelatory theodicy10—how is the suffering experienced 
by God’s people to be explained given his specific commitments, power, goodness, 
and fidelity? In this connection, the constraint of antecedent divine revelation 
introduces an additional problem: how does the new, definitive revelation relate to 
                                                
7 Ibid.: ‘Which principle, the more one thinks it through, ends exactly with temporal life never 
being able to be properly understood, precisely because I can at no instant find complete rest to adopt 
the position: backward.’ 
8 Cf. M.E. Stone, ’Reactions to Destructions of the Second Temple: Theology, Perception and 
Conversion’, JSJ 12 (1981): 195 – 204. 
9 See the careful analysis in M. Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline 
Christianity (WUNT II 36; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990). 
10 Given Paul’s use of the noun ἀποκάλυψις twice (1:11; 2:1) and the verb ἀποκαλύπτω twice (1:16; 
3:23) and, if we do not view ‘apocalyptic eschatology’ monolithically, it is fair to describe Galatians as 
exhibiting ‘an apocalyptic construction of reality’, in which the transcendence of cosmic, temporal, 
and spatial dualisms through revelation plays a key role in the argument. Cf. G.W.E. Nickelsburg, 
’The Apocalyptic Construction of Reality in 1 Enoch’, in Mysteries and Revelations: Apocalyptic Studies 
since the Uppsala Colloquium (ed. J.H. Charlesworth and J.J. Collins; JSP 9; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 51 – 
64. For the state of the question on ‘apocalyptic’ and 4 Ezra, see J.A. Moo, Creation, Nature and Hope in 
4 Ezra (FRLANT 237; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 9 – 21; on Paul, J.P. Davies, Paul 
Among the Apocalypses?: An Evaluation of the “Apocalyptic Paul” in the Context of Jewish and Christian 
Apocalyptic Literature (LNTS 562; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2016), 1 – 38. 
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its antecedents, and why is it necessary at all?11 Both texts resolve these problems by 
identifying a pattern of divine saving action that is common to both ‘proto-‘ and 
‘meta-revelation’. 12 That is, God’s previous revelatory commitments only seem to be 
contradicted by present experience. They have a deeper and fuller meaning, the 
fulfilment of which will resolve and explain the apparent conflict and reveal God’s 
intention present in nuce all along.  
 In this section, we begin to trace the correspondence Paul identifies between 
‘proto-’ and ‘meta-revelation’, arguing that he denies exegetically and theologically 
an identification of the Torah as the created and eschatological order of life. This 
becomes clear in debate with 4 Ezra in four moves in Gal 3:1 – 22—presenting the 
gospel as pre-preached and pre-figured in Abraham (Gal 3:1 – 9); tracing exegetically 
the necessary movement from blessing, through inevitable curse on the Torah’s 
practitioners, to the terminus of promised blessing and curse in Jesus’ life-giving 
curse-bearing (Gal 3:10 – 14); limiting the Torah’s horizon to history and denying its 
status as direct divine gift (Gal 3:15 – 20); and construing the Torah’s cursing word 
as cosmic in scope and, thereby, integral to securing a ‘dead’ humanity in 
anticipation of the singular life-giving Christ-event (3:21, 22). Thus, whereas 4 Ezra 
reads sacred text, salvation-history, and the cosmos in light of his conception of the 
divine gift of life as Torah-ordered and, thus, as the path through the present dying 
cosmos to its reversal in a coming saeculum, Paul identifies the Torah’s function with 
confining humanity within the fallen, ‘dead’ cosmos and, thus, views it as integral 
but not identical to the divine life and its order prefigured in Abraham and given 
within history in the Christ-event. In this way, Paul argues exegetically against a 
creational and eschatological identification of the Torah as the order of life and 
invites questions about the hermeneutic by which he identifies the stable pattern of 
divine action within history, questions which he answers in Gal 3:23 – 4:31. 
 Consequently, the dialogical exegesis of this section produces two important 
general results for the argument of this chapter. Most importantly, it shows why 
                                                
11 N.A. Dahl, ’Contradictions in Scripture’, in Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian 
Mission (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977), 175. 
12 Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery, 126: ‘New and old stand in a reciprocal relationship: new 
revelation is always meta-revelation, given shape and texture by a charismatic reading of the old; yet 
once accepted and accorded its rightful status, this new disclosure becomes in turn instrumental for 
the understanding of the old, the “proto-revelation”’; see further ibid., 29, 41, 110, 122, 229.  
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current construals of Paul’s argument do not capture the logic of his argument. 
Sanders’ contention that Paul argues dogmatically (and, as we shall see, the 
materially identical arguments of Martyn and de Boer) only exacerbates the problem 
of Paul’s logic. For a mere appeal to divine saving action in the Christ-event only 
intensifies the problem of the cursing function of the law: why did things, given 
God’s providence, have to be this way? Likewise, readings that appeal to the mere 
fact of Israel’s failure as a nation to obey the law (Hays and Barclay), to the 
experience of the Spirit simpliciter (Hays and Dunn), or to Paul’s pessimistic reading 
of salvation-history arising from Deuteronomy (Watson) do not explain why the 
curse was inevitable. In this connection, the initial contribution of this chapter has to 
do with clarifying what is required for a valid construal of Paul’s theological logic. 
What needs explaining, in other words, is the logic that deems as necessary and 
inevitable the particular pattern of salvation-history in which the Abrahamic promise, 
the Deuteronomic curse, and the Christ-event are integrally related. As we shall see, 
such a pattern raises, for an author like 4 Ezra, the question of the moral inability of 
the recipients of the law and divine culpability in not removing it—an issue that, we 
argue, Paul clearly addresses in assuming that recipients of the Torah are ‘dead’ (Gal 
3:21). Second and in this connection, through exegetical dialogue with 4 Ezra, this 
section shows how attention not just to the definition of gift in Galatians but a focus 
on the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering lays bare Paul’s theological logic. 
For, we argue, Paul does not simply appeal to the unconditioned and incongruous 
character of the Christ-gift in Gal 3 – 4. Rather, by contending that the law by divine 
design confines its recipients to a ‘dead’ humanity in view of both the promise to 
Abraham and its fulfillment in the life-giving Christ-gift, Paul provides an argument 
for the necessary pattern of salvation-history. That is, Paul gives an argument for why 
the Christ-gift is necessarily a gift for the unworthy 
 Yet, this result does not signal a return without qualification to the various 
‘traditional’ approaches to Paul’s logic. For one must account for the reason, once 
inability is removed, that the law cannot provide the proper order of church life. In 
the next section, we argue that, by contending that the law itself is fitted for and 
confined to the ‘dead’ cosmic conditions of the fallen creation, Paul avoids begging 
the question of why the Christ-gift necessarily excludes the Torah as the proper order 
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of the church community. Likewise, by inviting 4 Ezra to interrogate Paul’s reading 
of the Pentateuch from the perspective of the Hagar and Sarah story, we present the 
hermeneutic by which Paul sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in history. 
In this last connection, we begin an account of the theological purpose of Gal 4:21 – 
31, which prepares for our reading of this section in Chapter five as a thematic 
bridge to Gal 5 – 6. That argument is important because, in modifying Engberg-
Pedersen’s reading of the thematic coherence of the letter,13 it is necessary both for 
our new account of that coherence and of the letter’s theological logic. 
4.1.1 Abraham: Righteous Recipient of Revelation or Prototype of the Good News? (3:1 – 9) 
 Galatians 3:1 marks the end of Paul’s paradigmatic and indirect approach to 
the problems in Galatia: turning to address the Galatians directly, Paul states what 
was left unstated in 1:6 – 13. The one who called them in the gift (Gal 1:6) did so in 
the presentation of the good news of Christ crucified (Gal 3:1), and their receipt of 
the Spirit was conditioned not on observing the works of the Torah but through 
‘hearing in faith’ (Gal 3:2, 5).14 As in Jerusalem, so in Galatia: the Galatians should 
recognise the divine evaluation in the divine act and live accordingly. In Gal 3:1 – 5, 
however, Paul clarifies how this divine evaluation is recognised: it is the receipt 
(λαµβάνω, 3:2) of the Spirit (3:2) and observation of the Spirit’s powers (δύναµις, 3:5) 
that signals the divine approbation. (That Paul configures the Spirit here as a gift is 
clear from his use of forms of λαµβάνω for the receipt of the good news [παραλαµβάνω, 
1:9, 12] and the receipt of benefit’s arising from the Christ-gift [λαµβάνω, 3:14; 
ἀπολαµβάνω, 4:5]. In other words, Paul uses receipt verbs for the good news about 
and the benefits that flow from the Christ-gift, and, for him, the Spirit is the gift 
promised to Abraham and received by faith in the Christ-gift [3:14].) Yet, as we 
argued in the previous chapter, the logical force of Paul’s antithesis and, thus, the 
                                                
13 T. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34. 
14  Given both Paul’s other uses of ἀκοή (1 Thess 2:13; Rom 10:16 – 17) and the explicit parallel here 
with Abraham’s receipt of a promise from God and the public placarding of Christ crucified (3:1), ἐξ 
ἀκοῆς πίστεως in Galatians 3:2, 5 should be translated ‘the message received by faith’ or ‘the message 
that elicits faith’ not ‘the hearing of [i.e., that Christians call] faith’; pace S.K. Williams, ’The Hearing of 
Faith: AKOH ΠІΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3’, NTS 35 (1989): 90. For the numerous ways of translating and 
interpreting the phrase, see H. Schlier, Der Brief an die Galater (14th ed.; KEK 7; Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 121–22. 
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rhetorical question in Gal 3:3 are not entirely clear: why should the Galatians not 
view the works of the Torah as the shape of repentance, but rather as a refusal to 
continue in the Spirit in favour of ‘being completed by the flesh’ (σαρκὶ ἐπιτελεῖσθε)? It 
could be that Paul’s answer is implicit in the very terms—πνεῦµα and σάρξ—he 
employs.  
 Be that as it may, he embarks on an exegetical argument in Gal 3:6 – 9 that 
begins with an identification between the Galatians and Abraham: just as Abraham 
believed God and it was counted to him as righteousness, so the Galatians hear the 
gospel in a trusting manner and receive the divine approbation. Thus, they are ‘sons 
of Abraham’ (3:7), the man to whom the good news was pre-preached—‘in you shall 
all the nations be blessed’ (3:8).15 Likewise, Abraham is the one in whom the good 
news was prefigured—‘those who are of faith are blessed with Abraham, the 
believing man’ (3:9).16 In the context of our debate with 4 Ezra, this renders Abraham 
not a prototypical ideal to be imitated—a fitting recipient of divine revelation 
regarding the future, eschatological saving action like righteous Ezra—but, similar to 
Paul’s exemplary calling (1:11 – 17), a prototypical recipient of and respondent to the 
unconditioned divine saving message as gift. Thus, whereas in 4 Ezra Abraham’s 
descendants are the ‘righteous’ in Torah-terms, for Paul, Abraham’s descendants are 
those who depend on the divine promise and receive its fulfilment announced in the 
good news of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ.17 As we observed in 
the previous chapter, however, Paul’s antithetical argument—faith in Christ/works 
of the Torah—is a prejudicial construction. 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra each define the 
‘righteous’ in terms of faith. They simply define that faith differently—i.e., as faith in 
God’s Torah-ordered, life-giving benefaction in creation and salvation. So, Paul still 
                                                
15 On promise as pre-preaching, see e.g. S.K. Williams, ’The ”Righteousness of God” in Romans’, 
JBL 99 (1980): 264; J.R. Wisdom, Blessing for the Nations and the Curse of the Law: Paul’s Citation of 
Genesis and Deuteronomy in Gal 3.8 – 10 (WUNT II 133; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 142 – 43.  
16 On pre-preaching and pre-figurement, see G. Howard, Paul: Crisis in Galatia: A Study in Early 
Christian Theology (2nd ed.; SNTSMS 35; Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 54–56. 
17 O. Wischmeyer, ‘Wie kommt Abraham in den Galaterbrief? Überlegungen zu Gal 3,6 – 29‘, in 
Umstrittener Galaterbrief  : Studien zur Situierung und Theologie des Paulus-Schreibens (ed. M. Bachmann 
and B. Kollmann; BThST 106; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2010), 161: ‘Abraham ist nach der 
Septuaginta der Stammvater Israels, und Israels Geschichte wird hier nicht aufgehoben, sondern im 
Gegenteil als Teil der Geschichte Gottes mit der Menschheit interpretiert. Abraham ist der Vater 
Israels und der „Vater vieler Völker.”’ 
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owes an account of why this antithesis is necessary, the logic of which begins to 
emerge in exegetical and theological argument in Gal 3:10 – 14. 
4.1.2 The Formal Shape of Salvation-History: From Promise, through Inevitable Curse, to the 
Christ-Gift (3:10 – 14) 
 Interpreters have long struggled to make sense of the flow of Galatians 3:10 – 
14, but, as we will see, this difficult section of Paul’s argument raises key issues for 
an eschatological reader of salvation-history like 4 Ezra, issues which Paul is 
addressing formally seriatim. In tracing the logic of these developments, I aim to 
expose the implied connections and assumptions of Paul’s argument until we arrive 
at, as I will argue, the core disagreement over the manner of divine life-giving 
benefaction and its implications for humanity, society, and the cosmos.18 This 
disagreement concerns Paul’s conception of Jesus’ death, not the Torah-ordered 
creation, as God’s definitive life-giving and life-ordering gift. In vv. 10 – 14, Paul’s 
configuration of those ἐξ ἔργων νόµου as inevitably cursed raises the question of moral 
inability for 4 Ezra, while in Gal 3:19 – 22 Paul’s restriction of the law’s function to 
transgressions (not the criterion for discriminating righteous from unrighteous) and 
his assumption that the recipients of the law are ‘dead’ implies an affirmative 
answer to this question.  
 In Galatians 3:10, the language of curse naturally follows that of blessing (cf. 
Gen 12:3, Dt 30:19), but Paul uses this curse language as a logical support (γάρ) to his 
previous argument in Galatians 3:6 – 9. Thus, Abraham’s blessing rests on those who 
are ἐκ πίστεως, because those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόµου are under a curse (3:10). 
Likewise, as a number of scholars recognise, this curse language is only one aspect of 
what might be called the Deuteronomically inflected language of the argument in 
3:10 – 14, as the initial motifs of blessings/cursing are combined in vv. 11 and 12 
with the life/death19 pair they share only in Dt 30:19.20 The rhetorical force of this 
                                                
18 R.B. Matlock, ’Helping Paul’s Argument Work? The Curse of Galatians 3.10 – 14’, in Torah in the 
New Testament (ed. M. Tait and P. Oakes; LNTS 401; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 176: ‘Any reading of 
these verses will have to contend with gaps in Paul’s argument, however it is construed.’ 
19 Though Wakefield is correct to point out that the intertextual ‘ungrammaticality’ in vv. 11 – 12 
is not self-interpreting (149, 172 – 74), the absence of the ‘death’ term (142 – 43) does not necessarily 
support his conclusion that we have here a choice not between ‘death and life’ but between ‘life and 
life’ (173)—viz., an emphasis on the order of life (ethics) rather than the gaining of life (soteriology). 
As we observed with eschatologically inflected texts like 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, the pragmatics of 
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inflection matches a theological purpose, for, not only are the promises (3:6, 8) now 
filtered through a Deuteronomic frame, but the curse now lies between the 
promise(s) and fulfilment in the Chirst-event (3:10 ‘blocks’ vv. 13 – 14). Finally, we 
should note that Paul’s activation of this Deuteronomic curse motif21 is very 
carefully constructed, involving at least the citations in 3:10 – 13 in a chiastic pattern 
with the language of ‘life’ at the center.22 These three features of the structure of 
Paul’s argument—the overlap of Abrahamic blessing and Deuteronomic curse as an 
extension of the antithetical relation between those ἐκ πίστεως and those ἐξ ἔργων 
νόµου, the transposition of the Abrahamic language into a Deuteronomic key with 
the language of life/death, and the chiasm with the keyword ζήσεται at the center—
produce not only a relation between Abrahamic promise and Deuteronomic curse 
(3:9, 10) but a corresponding relation between these two and the Christ-event. In 
other words, in Paul’s way of constructing his argument and his citations, there is a 
carefully choreographed movement—from the combination of the divine crediting 
                                                                                                                                                  
these syntagms entails that one term in these binaries implies its opposite. Thus, the alternatives life 
and life are significant because of their respective eschatological ends—either salvation (life) or 
condemnation (death). Wakefield struggles with this issue when he concedes that ‘where one lives’ 
has soteriological implications (144, n. 44; 173, n. 128; 174; 176 – 77, n. 141), but he never spells these 
out and continues to strongly separate soteriology from moral order in numerous places (e.g, 144 – 45, 
167, 170, 176, 177, 184). If, however, we place Paul’s argument in the context of various construals of 
divine life-giving benefaction, then the integral relation between life as existence and life as order 
becomes clear. ‘Where one lives’ is a function of where and how one receives life, for Paul and the 
authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. On ‘ungrammaticality’, see A.H. Wakefield, Where to Live: The 
Hermeneutical Significance of Paul’s Citations from Scripture in Galatians 3:1 – 14 (AcBib 14; Atlanta: SBL, 
2003), 122 – 30; for his account of Gal 3:10 – 14, see ibid., 131 – 88. 
20 On the pairs ‘life/death’, ‘good/evil’, and ‘blessing/curse’ in Dt 30:15, 19 (LXX), see Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 466–67. On the Deuteronomic inflection of language in 3:10 – 14, see, e.g., J.M. Scott, 
‘Paul’s Use of Deuteronomic Tradition‘, JBL 112 (1993): 657 – 59; idem, ‘”For as Many as Are of Works 
of the Law are Under a Curse” (Galatians 3:10) ‘, in Paul and the Scriptures of Israel (ed. C.A. Evans and 
J.A. Sanders; JSNTSup 83; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 195; A. Gignac, ‘Citation de Lévitique 
18,5 en Romains 10,5 et Galates 3,12: Deux lectures différentes des rapports Christ-Torah? ‘, EgT 25 
(1994): 384 – 85. 
21 For the argument that Paul cites Dt 27:26 here in the context of a Deuteronomic interpretation of 
Israel’s history, see Scott, ‘For as Many‘, 194 – 195; N.T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and 
the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 137 – 156. Watson’s analysis (Hermeneutics, 
394 – 96) of Paul’s adapted citation demonstrates that Paul’s phrase ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόµου adapts 
phraseology from Dt 28:58, 61; 29:20; and 30:10 in such a way that, with Deuteronomy, Paul affirms 
that ‘the law’s curse represents the destiny of the entire people, and not just of individual law-
breakers’. On Paul’s modifications in this citation, see also C.D. Stanley, Paul and the Language of 
Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature (SNTSMS 74; Cambridge: 
CUP, 1992), 238–43; D.A. Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung 
und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus (BHT 69; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 164–65. 
22 On the chiasm, see e.g. Gignac, ‘Citation de Lévitique‘, 381; Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge, 120; 
Stanley, Paul and Language, 239. 
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of Abraham’s righteous status based on faith (3:6) and the pre-preaching of the 
gospel to Abraham (3:8) through the Deuteronomic curse (3:10) to the ‘resolution’ of 
both blessing and curse in the Christ-event (3:13, 14).  
 One significant result of Paul’s movement from blessing to cursing in vv. 9 
and 10 is that it produces two mutually exclusive general classes of people. This is so 
because the blessing on those who are ἐκ πίστεως and the curse on those who are ἐξ 
ἔργων νόµου, though assigned to general classes and not specific people or groups 
here, are themselves realised23 and categorical24 in character—Ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόµου 
εἰσίν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσίν. The parallels between Paul’s biblical citations and the current 
states they produce combine to create this actual and categorical textual logic. Just as 
the Abrahamic blessing will be for πάντα τὰ ἔθνη (3:8), so it is οἱ ἐκ πίστεως who are 
blessed (3:9). Likewise, though with an inversion of the order of statement and 
citation, ‘as many as are’ ἐξ ἔργων νόµου are under a curse, because Dt 27:26 proclaims 
‘accursed [are] all who do not remain in all the words in the book of the law to do 
them’ (ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὃς οὐκ ἐµµένει πᾶσιν τοῖς γεγραµµένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόµου τοῦ 
ποιῆσαι αὐτά, 3:10). Yet, while the promise and fulfilment structure in v. 8 that leads 
to the blessed status of οἱ ἐκ πίστεως in v.9 depends on the activity of God—‘the 
Scripture’ pre-preached the gospel in the promise because it foresaw (προοράω) God’s 
justification of the gentiles by faith—the cursed status of ἐξ ἔργων νόµου depends not 
on a divine promise but on the contingent curse of Dt 27:26.  
 This leads us to the second major feature emerging from Paul’s construction 
of statement and citation in 3:10 – 14. Both blessing for those ἐκ πίστεως and curse for 
                                                
23 This is not the threat of a curse. Contra C.D. Stanley, ‘“Under a Curse“: a Fresh Reading of 
Galatians 3:10 – 14’, NTS 36 (1990): 481 – 511. As Avemarie observes, ὑπὸ κατάραν is an ‘inversion’ of 
the LXX phrase κατάρα ἐπί (τινα) (cf. Gn 27:12f; Dt. 28:15, 45; Jdg 9:57; Mal 2:2; Dn 9:11)—the latter 
referring to actual cursing, the former to the actual state of being cursed; F. Avemarie, ‘Paul and the 
Claim of the Law According to the Scripture: Leviticus 18:5 in Galatians 3:12 and Romans 10:5‘, in The 
Beginnings of Christianity: a Collection of Articles (ed. J. Pastor and M. Mor; Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 
2005), 139, n. 48. Moreover, however one construes the saving significance of Jesus’ death in 3:13, that 
death resolves an actual curse ‘for us’, and, thus, as Watson observes (Hermeneutics, 392, n. 29), 
‘show[s] the curse to be a reality that had to be removed in order for the blessing to be realized’. 
Wakefield and Hays follow Stanley on this issue to the detriment of their readings; Wakefield, Where 
to Live, 179–80; Hays, Galatians, 258. 
24 Since, as we argued in the previous chapter, Dunn’s reduction of ‘works of the law’ to 
boundary markers is not convincing, we should not make relative that which Paul has deemed 
categorical. For critique of Dunn’s interpretation of 3:10 – 14, see Matlock, ‘Helping? ‘, 162 – 66. 
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those ἐξ ἔργων νόµου are inevitable.25 Because the story Paul is telling is universally 
encompassing—including not only all humans, but all things (3:22)—if it is true, it is 
necessarily true. In this respect, because both the Abrahamic promise and the 
Deuteronomic curse reach their telos in the Christ-event (3:13, 14), and Christ’s 
‘resolution’ of the curse in his death is necessary for the distribution of the blessing, 
then, not only is the curse inevitable, but it is necessarily so. That this is Paul’s 
perspective is clear from the fact that he includes in his reading of salvation-history 
the blessing promised through Abraham for the gentiles as a matter of divine 
unconditioned promise and saving intention.26 Moreover, since Paul has aligned the 
oppositions ἐκ πίστεως and ἐξ ἔργων νόµου to the categorical oppositions of blessing 
and curse, respectively, and since blessing is inevitable for the former, curse must 
likewise be inevitable for the latter. Yet, this raises a question: how is it that Dt 27:26 
functions, for Paul, like his mixed citation of Gen 12:3 and 18:18, in the realm of 
necessity when the former curse is contingent (based on human obedience) and the 
latter blessing is necessary (based on divine action)? That is, what is needed in order 
to understand Paul’s logic is an account of why the contingent curse of Dt 27:26 on 
those who do not observe the law is inevitably realized for those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόµου. 
This logical gap between Gal 3:10a and 10b requires explaining not only for modern 
interpreters but also for would-be ancient Jewish debating partners like 4 Ezra. 
 On the logical relation between Galatians 3:10a and 10b, Luther famously 
remarked, ‘Sunt ergo omnino duae pugnantes sententiae Pauli et Mosi.’27 Paul places 
those who do the works of the law under a curse, while Moses curses those who do 
not do the law.28 To provide a comprehensive overview of the various ways of 
handling this ‘conflict’ is neither possible nor necessary here. There are several 
excellent accounts of the options,29 and, for our purposes, we are concerned only 
                                                
25 Rightly, Watson, Hermeneutics, 395. 
26 Matlock, ‘Helping? ‘, 171: ‘Whether the ‘blessing’ would reach the Gentiles was never in doubt 
or jeopardy—unless the divine promise (v. 8) is to be doubted.’ 
27 W.A. 40.I. Band, 2, 396. 
28 Given the assumption of the integral relation between identity and practice we have seen thus 
far in Galatians and the clear emphasis on observing the law’s commandments in the two citations Paul 
uses to support his argument (Dt 27:26; Lev 18:5), Hays’ (Galatians, 258) reduction of the curse to 
‘those whose identity is derived from the works of the law‘ to the exclusion of the law’s practices is 
unconvincing.  
29 On 3:10 – 14, as a whole, see Stanley, ’Under a Curse’, 481 – 86; Wakefield, Where to Live, 11 – 56; 
Matlock, ’Helping? ’, 154 – 176. On 3:12, see Sprinkle, Law and Life, 142–52. 
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with surveying how various interpretations construe the logic of necessity at work in 
Paul’s argument in order to show how comparison with 4 Ezra illumines Paul’s 
logic. Since Luther, the dominant interpretation of these verses has posited an 
unstated premise30 between 10a and 10b regarding the impossibility of the fulfilment 
of Dt 27:26 due to a pessimistic view of human nature, either in a ‘quantitative’ sense 
(no one can do all that the law requires), a ‘qualitative’ sense (no one does the law 
properly), or both.31  
 This view still has defenders,32 but has been displaced since the work of 
Krister Stendahl and E.P. Sanders. Not only did the law itself not require sinless 
perfection (cultic atonement!),33 but Paul, given Philippians 3:6, seems to think that 
he was quite capable of meeting the law’s requirements.34 Sanders himself 
interpreted Gal 3:10 – 14 in line with his broader assessment that Paul’s arguments 
about the law were ‘dogmatic’ in character,35 arguing that the citation of Dt. 27:26 
serves as a proof-text by which Paul buttresses his main argument that 
righteousness and life are by faith in Christ.36 J. Louis Martyn and Martinus de Boer 
have recently argued along similarly dogmatic lines: on the assumption that Dt 27:26 
is likely a threat from the Teachers, for Martyn, Paul here ‘removes the distinction’ 
between those who obey and those who do not and construes the law’s function as 
only to curse.37 For de Boer, the citation of the curse of the law, given its universal 
                                                
30 Burton, Galatians, 164. 
31 For the language of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ fulfilment, see H. Hübner, Law in Paul’s 
Thought (trans. by J.C.G. Greg; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 18 – 24, 37 – 41, 82, 105, 122. Reading Gal 
3:10 in light of 5:19ff., Hübner concludes: ‘Quantitative fulfillment is not possible because the Torah 
contains stipulations which must be ‘qualitatively’ fulfilled’ (41, ital. orig.). Bultmann combined both, 
though the latter was the anthropological basis for the former. R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen 
Testaments (7th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), 1.264 – 5: ‘kein Mensch kann seine ‘Gerechtigkeit’ 
durch Gesetzeswerke erlangen—nämlich eben weil er diese nicht vorweisen kann’ and ‘weil das 
Bemühen des Menschen, durch Erfüllung des Gesetzes sein Heil zu gewinnen, ihn nur in die Sünde 
hineinfürht, ja im Grunde selber schon die Sünde ist‘. 
32 R.H. Gundry, ‘Grace, Works, and Staying Saved in Paul‘, Bib 66 (1985): 1 – 38; T.R. Schreiner, 
‘Paul and Perfect Obedience to the Law: An Evaluation of the View of E.P. Sanders‘, WTJ 47 (1985): 
245 – 78; G.P. Waters, The End of Deuteronomy in the Epistles of Paul (WUNT II 221; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2006), 93 – 100. 
33 E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 28: ‘It would…be 
extraordinarily un-Pharisaic and even un-Jewish of Paul to insist that obedience of the law, once 
undertaken, must be perfect. Such a position would directly imply that the means of atonement 
specified in Scripture itself were of no avail.’ 
34 Stendahl, Paul Among Jews, 7–23. 
35 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 483, nn. 37, 484. 
36 Sanders, Paul, the Law, 21–27. 
37 J.L Martyn, Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 311. 
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jurisdiction, suggests that Paul’s opponents themselves are under the law’s curse!38 
Unlike Sanders, for Martyn and de Boer, Paul is reverse proof-texting here—gliding 
over the contingent nature of the curse in his use of his opponents’ citation—in order 
to buttress his previous and real argument. As de Boer states it, ‘The curse falls on 
observers as well as nonobserver [sic] (or imperfect observer) of the law…thus on 
everyone who is not “in Christ Jesus” (v. 14a), and ‘[t]his either/or has been created 
by the coming of Christ and his Spirit…’39  
 James Scott and N.T. Wright have advocated another cluster of approaches 
that accepts the critique of Stendhal and Sanders yet still seeks to explain the logical 
gap in Gal 3:10 by what might be termed a ‘Deuteronomic’ or ‘Redemptive-
Historical’ approach to the presumed plight in which Paul sees in the present reality 
of Israel the historical realization of the curse of exile in Deuteronomy.40 Thus, those 
who are ‘of the works of the law’ are cursed, as Hays remarks, ‘not because 
obedience is theoretically impossible, but because Israel historically has failed and 
has in fact incurred the judgement of which Deuteronomy solemnly warns.’41 On 
this reading, the inevitability of incurring a curse for those who are ‘of the works of 
the law’ is a function of Israel’s present cursed state—in Hays’s problematic terms of 
‘joining a losing team.’42 Francis Watson made a significant advance on this 
                                                
38 M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 200 – 01. 
39 Ibid., 201–2. This way of reading Galatians 3:10 in the context of vv. 1 – 14 is, formally, quite 
similar to that of Sanders (Paul, the Law, 22), who concludes that v. 10 ‘announces the negative proof 
of the positive statement of 3.8’. 
40 See e.g. Scott, ‘For as Many‘; Wright, Climax, 137 – 56. For Scott’s development of this 
typological understanding elsewhere in Paul, see J.M. Scott, Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical 
Investigation into the Background of υἱοθεσία in the Pauline Corpus (WUNT II 48; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1992); Scott, ‘Paul’s Use of Deuteronomic Tradition‘. Two significant forerunners of this family of 
approaches are M. Noth, ’For All Who Rely On Works of the Law Are Under a Curse’, in The Laws in 
the Pentateuch and Other Studies (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), 118 – 31; O.H. Steck, Israel und das 
gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten: Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung des deuteronomistischen 
Geschichtsbildes im Alten Testament, Spätjudentum und Urchristentum (WMANT 23; Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1967).  
41 Hays, Galatians, 258–59. 
42 Ibid., 259. Though the argument for a wide acceptance of the view has been rightly criticised, it 
is the case that a number of Jewish groups in antiquity considered Israel to be still, in some sense, 
under God’s ‘curse’ or in ‘exile’. For example, Philo, at the end of De praemiis et poenis (164 – 72), uses 
Deuteronomic exile-restoration categories to envision a time of the diaspora’s return from exile both 
in terms of the flourishing of virtue and the restoration of flourishing in the land. On the significance 
of exile and restoration as categories of thought in Paul, see Wright, Climax, 137 – 156; Scott, ‘Paul’s 
Use of Deuteronomic Tradition‘. For a recent critical elaboration, see R.J. Morales, The Spirit and the 
Restoration of Israel: New Exodus and New Creation Motifs in Galatians (WUNT II 282; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2010), 78–114. 
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approach by arguing that Paul’s interpretation of the curse as universal, necessary, 
and inevitable arises both from his reading of the present state of the Jewish people 
and from his reading of Deuteronomy itself, which, Watson argues, already 
envisions the inevitable spread of the curse on individuals to the nation as a whole.43 
Paul is not the only, or even the first, pessimist!  
 How might our debate with 4 Ezra help us understand the logic of Galatians 
3:10? In most general terms, Paul’s announcement of a necessary and inevitable 
curse on those who are of the works of the law is quite similar to Ezra’s opening 
construal of Israel’s plight. 4 Ezra rarely uses the language of blessing, never the 
language of curse. But the reality of curse is evident and debated throughout.44 
Moreover, as we saw in the chapter two, Ezra’s opening salvo articulates an 
indiscriminate and inevitable infirmitas, but, unlike Gal 3:10, 4 Ezra seeks to explain 
its inevitability in explicitly anthropological and theological terms. It is the moral 
inability of human beings arising from their Adamic heritage combined with God’s 
refusal to remove the cor malignum that leads inevitably to a cycle of life-sin-
judgement in Israel’s history (3:8 – 27). This does not, of course, prove that Paul is 
implying moral inability here, but it does highlight that, in a reading of sacred text 
and salvation-history that seeks to identify a stable pattern, it is not enough simply 
to identify the pattern. The author of 4 Ezra, feels the need to explain why things had 
to happen this way, and Ezra’s anthropological pessimism provides the opening 
explanation that is simultaneously a chief catalyst for the intricate debate that 
follows. Moreover, as we have demonstrated, the angel Uriel establishes two key 
points in his initial reframing of Ezra’s opening charge: the first is anthropological-- 
the deficiencies of the human condition are mortality and epistemological 
incapacity, not moral inability (4:10, 11; cf. 7:72, 73, 92; 9:11); the second is national 
and cosmological—the decline of Israel is a function of the present fallen cosmos 
(4:26 - 32), which, like an ageing mother whose womb is beginning to die, is likewise 
producing weaker and feebler children (5:51 – 55). Thus, 4 Ezra would be very likely 
to hear Gal 3:10 in anthropological, national, and cosmological terms, and Uriel 
                                                
43 Watson, Hermeneutics, 394–96. 
44 As Uriel summarises: ‘when Adam transgressed my [God’s] ordinances, what was made was 
judged’ (quando transgressus est Adam constitutiones meas iudicatum est quod factum est, 4 Ezra 7:11). 
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would be keen to force Paul not only to clarify the relations between these three, but 
would also require an account of the necessity of these relations.  
 The resolution of these matters, if it is possible, depends on a convincing 
reading of the remainder of Paul’s argument, but there are a few preliminary 
observations that can be made about the interpretive options outlined above. The 
apocalyptic or ‘dogmatic’ reading would only compound the problems of 4 Ezra, for 
an appeal to divine sovereignty only exacerbates the problem of the law’s cursing 
function. We might imagine, Ezra asking, ‘Why did things have to happen this way, 
O God?’ As we will argue below, the attempt to evade the force of this question by 
separating the law from God is not convincing. The Deuteronomic reading, 
especially the pessimistically inflected version of Watson, might suggest sin as the 
cause, but again, this would invite the question of necessity. Even granting an 
extension of Dt 27:26’s curse on individuals to the nation itself,45 this Deuteronomic 
hermeneutic (even if given an inherently pessimistic pattern) does not explain why 
the nation itself was inevitably cursed. (This logical problem was obvious to the 
author of 4 Ezra, who introduces the world-as-womb metaphor to explain the 
decline of Israel in the terms of the declining cosmos). As John Barclay remarks of 
Paul, we could have here ‘simply a sense that Israel’s history proved her collective 
and persistent incapacity to be obedient.’46 But this is where Ezra begins, and, for 
him, it invites the further explanations of moral incapacity and divine negligence in 
removing it. In other words, it seems that Paul is not only applying the 
Deuteronomic pattern to interpret the present realities of Israel vis-à-vis the Christ-
event or even that he is making the prophetic connections, but rather he is arguing 
for the necessity and inevitability of the particular pattern in which the Abrahamic 
promise, the Deuteronomic curse, and the Christ-event are integrally related. An 
appeal to historical fact or even prophetic pessimism is not sufficient for producing 
an inevitable redemptive-historical pattern. For we must ask: why did Israel 
inevitably end up in this position, and why is repentance and restoration within the 
terms of the Torah not possible? Thus, 4 Ezra would very likely assume that Paul, as 
in the ‘traditional’ interpretations, is implying moral inability in Gal 3:10, for that is 
                                                
45 Watson, Hermeneutics, 396. 
46 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 405 – 06, n. 39. 
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where Ezra begins. And, as we will see, (definitively in the next chapter), there are 
good reasons to think that this assumption is correct, though not for the reasons 
typically given by the family of ‘traditional’ explanations. For it is not just that the 
recipients of the law are ‘dead’ (3:21) but that the law itself is fitted to and ‘expects’ 
this estate, being for transgressions (3:19), for cursing (3:22), and confined to, in certain 
respects, the ‘weak and worthless elements’ (4:9).47  
 From the perspective of 4 Ezra, Paul’s antithetical expansion on v. 10 in vv. 11 
and 12 and the scriptural support he adduces for it only adds to 4 Ezra’s previous 
suspicion that Paul is assuming moral inability. In Gal 3:11 Paul makes the 
eschatological result of the inevitable curse explicit, but it is the alternative that is 
‘clear’ (δῆλος) for him that is his main point: ‘Because by the law no one will be 
justified by God, it is clear that the one who is righteous by faith will live (ὅτι δὲ ἐν 
νόµῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται).48 Given the 
inevitable curse, Paul’s statement that justification will not be ‘by law’ would not 
surprise the author of 4 Ezra, though he would resist it. The implication Paul 
identifies, however, in Hab 2:4 would be more than a little puzzling, and this 
puzzlement would turn quickly into bewilderment upon hearing Gal 3:12. For there 
Paul places those characterised by faith in antithesis not only to those by law, but he 
proves this with a quotation of Lev 18:5: ‘the law is not of faith’ (ὁ δὲ νόµος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ 
πίστεως, 12a) ‘but the one who does these things will live by them’ (ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ 
ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, 12b). As we have seen, for 4 Ezra, a person is justus/ δίκαιος precisely 
per fidem or per opera as a matter of trust in and obedience to God’s gift of Torah-
ordered life (4 Ezra 9:7 – 13). Thus for interpreters and for 4 Ezra, one of the key 
                                                
47 Thus, though he recognises the significance of Paul’s death and life language and places the law 
with the old, weak age, Morales interpretation of Gal 3 – 6 (Spirit and Restoration, 78 - 163) does not 
account for the logic of Paul’s argument. 
48 This translation follows the growing list of interpreters who place the comma before rather than 
after δῆλον, primarily due to the long gap between the first ὅτι and the tendency of δῆλος to precede 
and modify the nearest ὅτι; cf. R.B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 
3:1 – 4:11 (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 207; F. Thielman, From Plight to Solution: A Jewish 
Framework for Understanding Paul’s View of the Law in Galatians and Romans (NTSup 61; Leiden: Brill, 
1989), 127 – 28; Wakefield, Where to Live, 162 – 67; 207 – 14; S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on 
Paul: The ‘Lutheran‘ Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 303, n. 15. For the argument 
that ἐκ πίστεως derives solely from Paul’s citation of Hab 2:4 and cannot, therefore, be interpreted 
messianically, see F. Watson, ‘By Faith (of Christ): An Exegetical Dilemma and its Scriptural Solution‘, 
in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies (ed. M.F. Bird and P. Sprinkle; 
Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 147 – 63. Contra Hays, Faith, 137–38, 177–81. 
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questions in the interpretation of these verses concerns the inferential logic of verse 
12: why is ‘the doing of the law’ not ‘of faith’?  
 The answer, as we argued in the previous chapter, depends on the fact that 
‘faith’, in Paul, is typically ‘faith in Christ’.49 What a debate with 4 Ezra illumines is 
the particular logical force of Paul’s christocentric definition of faith. In other words, it 
helps us see why Hab 2:4 is the natural alternative, for Paul, to the recognition that 
justification is not by the law.50 In episode three of 4 Ezra, the debate centers on two 
alternate conceptions of God’s eschatological benefactions: Ezra appeals to God’s 
care for the unworthy after the fall to argue for the unconditioned gift of 
eschatological life, while Uriel insists on strict equity at the judgment according to 
the law and thus the gift of eschatological life only for the Torah-worthy. With 
respect to the former, Ezra alternates between sheer appeals to undeserved mercy 
and appeals for mercy on the unworthy on the basis of the substitution or 
intercession of the righteous. Thus, 4 Ezra’s conception of God’s donation of 
eschatological gifts has a logically binary structure. In this connection, in the context 
of Gal 3:11, 12, Paul’s appeal to Hab 2:4 is an appeal to a text that does not predicate 
righteousness on the condition of observance of the Torah, which allows him to read 
Hab 2:4 as an unconditioned ascription of righteousness. This ascription is, for Paul, 
on the basis of the intercession or substitution of the Christ-gift received by faith. 
Thus, what the debate in 4 Ezra shows us is that Paul’s Christocentric definition of 
faith is simultaneously a denial of the possibility of Torah-reckoned conceptions of 
worth for an eschatological interpreter of ‘life’ texts. That is, for Paul to place 
unconditioned righteousness by faith in Christ in opposition to works of the law 
necessarily precludes the possibility of the sort of Torah-righteousness an 
eschatological reader of ‘life’ texts like 4 Ezra depends on to argue for strict equity at 
the eschaton. For this reason the author of 4 Ezra would resist Paul’s definition of 
faith to the exclusion of doing the law because of what he believes both about the 
                                                
49 Eckstein, Verheissung und Gesetz, 138. 
50 Avemarie’s contention that Paul does not make anything of an eschatological and soteriological 
reading of Lev. 18:5 at this point in his argument is well taken, but his own recognition that Paul 
explicitly denies this interpretation in 3:21 belies Avemarie’s assertion (’Claim of the Law’, 140 – 1) 
that Paul ‘consciously ignored’ [ita. orig.] this soteriological perspective. Rather, Paul presents an 
argument against this view throughout Gal 3:15 – 4:7, the formal structure of which is summarised in 
Gal 3:6 – 14. 
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enduring efficacy of God’s gift and ordering of creational life and the just return of 
that life at the eschaton for the worthy. If Paul is arguing against such an 
eschatological reader of Lev 18:5, as we shall argue in the remainder of this chapter, 
this means that Paul’s logic in Galatians is not reducible to a general antithesis 
between divine and human agency.51 4 Ezra is as emphatic as Galatians on the 
priority of divine saving action; they differ in their identification of which divine act 
constitutes the donation of life (creation or Christ-event) and, thus, how recipients of 
that life are configured. The force of Paul’s Christocentric definition of faith for the 
author of 4 Ezra is that, in construing the divine donation of eschatological life as an 
act of unconditioned mercy, Paul configures human recipients, even those who have 
the law, as unworthy. In this way, he makes a Torah-righteous exemplar like Ezra 
impossible by definition. 
 The force of Gal 3:11, 12 is further clarified when we analyse how ‘faith’ and 
the ‘doing the law’ function in the logic of the divine gift of life at work in 4 Ezra. As 
we have argued, in 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees, to believe is to recognise the divine 
order of created and eschatological life in the covenantal relationship and to act 
according to it. Conversely, as Uriel’s apparent gloss on Deuteronomy 30:19 in 7:21 
suggests, failure to do what has been commanded is akin to neglect of the ‘law of 
God’ (Dei lex) set before all humanity (7:20). Thus, when Paul articulates a strong 
antithesis between faith and doing the law, he both destabilises 4 Ezra’s account of 
created and covenantal life and invites the deeper question of how he understands 
the divine donation and ordering of life.52 If Paul is correct, however, and all who are 
of the works of the law are under an inevitable curse, then, as we saw in Paul’s 
paradigmatic story in Gal 1:11 – 2:21, either the law is not the standard of 
                                                
51 Pace Sprinkle, Law and Life, 133–64. 
52 This question exposes the chief problem for most redemptive-historical readings of Galatians 3 
– 4, including those that adopt an Exile-Restoration schema. For the receipt of the eschatological Spirit 
is not self-interpreting (3:1 – 5), appeal to the receipt of the Spirit by faith does not explain why the 
Torah itself does not represent the proper order of pneumatological life (3:6 – 9), and appeal to the 
Christ-gift as the removal of the curse and the inauguration of eschatological salvation does not 
explain how the Torah is related to this or why Torah-order is excluded from it (3:10 – 14). See, e.g., J. 
Willitts, ’Context Matters: Paul’s Use of Leviticus 18:5 in Galatians 3:12’, TynBul 54 (2003): 105 – 22. 
Scott Hafemann seeks to integrate the anthropological and cosmological realities that make the 
historical pattern necessary, but with mixed results, as he regularly mentions the ‘dawn’ of the new 
age without explaining why the law was an integral factor in the problems of the old age; S.J. 
Hafemann, ’Paul and the Exile of Israel in Galatians 3 – 4’, in Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian 
Conceptions (ed. J.M. Scott; JSJSup 56; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 329 – 71. 
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eschatological order, or no one meets this standard, or both. From 4 Ezra’s point of 
view, if the curse remains on those who received the law, then we are back with Ezra 
in episode one, viewing salvation-history as an inevitable cycle of divinely ordered 
and governed perdition. Moreover, it is possible that a critique of an eschatological 
reading of Lev 18:5 (or Dt 30:15 – 20) in terms very similar to those of 4 Ezra is 
implicit in Paul’s argument, thus far. For it is Uriel’s argument for the created 
freedom of the self and the two-ages framework that leads Ezra to recognise that the 
problem was Israel’s failure to ‘keep’ (servo, 4 Ezra 9:32) the law that had been given 
to and sown in them (semino, 9:33); Ezra’s recognition that the law, nevertheless, 
produces enduring fruit (for those who keep it) prepares for the vision of righteous 
(9:32), vindicated Zion. So, in announcing an inevitable curse (3:10) in relation to 
keeping the law (3:12) and in the context of a denial that justification is on the basis 
of the law (3:11), Paul, at least implicitly, denies the creational and eschatological 
framework Uriel struggled to get Ezra to adopt. As we shall see, this denial becomes 
explicit in Paul’s rejection of the hypothetical possibility that a life-giving law had 
been given in Gal 3:21, 22. 
 In any case, by the end of v. 12, 4 Ezra would be insisting that, if faith is not 
trust in and obedience to the Torah-ordered created life that leads to eschatological 
life as a return gift from God, then what is the object of faith and how is this related 
to the divine donation of life? 53 Paul’s answer to this fundamental question is found 
in nuce in Galatians 3:13, 14, and a comparison with 4 Ezra helps us see how. For 
Paul, the Christ-gift removes the curse and releases the eschatological blessing, and, 
thus, it is this gift that reveals the order of covenantal history and eschatological destiny. For 
it is only in and through Jesus’ curse-bearing death that the Abrahamic blessing 
‘might come’ (γένηται) to the gentiles and that ‘we might receive’ (λάβωµεν, 3:14) the 
promised Spirit through faith. Given the fact that the removal of the curse is ‘for us’ 
(3:13),54 it is very likely that Paul considers the law’s curse universally applicable 
                                                
53 Dahl (’Contradictions ’, 171), notes that the contradiction in 3:11, 12 would not have been 
problematic for most Jews in antiquity. The contradiction is created, for Paul, because ‘faith’ means 
‘faith in the crucified Messiah’. 
54 Contra T.L. Donaldson, ’The ”Curse of the Law” and the Inclusion of the Gentiles: Galatians 
3:13-14’, NTS 32 (1986): 94 – 100; Wright, Climax, 143, Paul does not have Jewish Christians in view, 
but Jewish and Gentile believers. As we will argue below, the key conceptual linkage between Jewish 
experience of life ὑπὸ νόµον and Gentile life is that they have a fallen existence in common, a life that, 
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and, thus, inevitable. Likewise, Paul’s configuration of the receipt of the Spirit as the 
focal benefit of the receipt of the Christ-gift in fulfillment of the Abrahamic promise 
raises the issue of how exactly Paul understands the universal and inevitable curse. 
As we shall, argue that issue is resolved by Paul, formally, in his hypothetical 
consideration of the law as a life-giving gift in Gal 3:21. 
 With Paul’s identification of the Christ-gift as the divine saving action in 
history, the scope and complexity of our debate with 4 Ezra widens considerably. 
But at just this point the debate also clarifies several fundamental features of Gal 3:10 
– 14. For the author of 4 Ezra’s first objection to Paul here would concern the 
representative and substitutionary character of the Christ-gift. In response to Ezra’s 
query about the possibility of the righteous interceding for the ungodly on the day of 
judgement (7:102 – 103), Uriel appeals to the biblical prohibition55 against vicarious 
blessing and punishment to argue that, on the day of judgement, even intercession 
will cease (7:105 – 115). This principle both raises the stakes of the Mosaic choice 
between life and death and forms the basis of Uriel’s denial of divine mercy on the 
unworthy in episode three, but, in a debate over Gal 3:13, it would provide the 
primary thrust against Paul’s construal of the pattern of salvation-history: how can 
one person die in the place of another? Moreover, why is this necessary for Jew and 
Gentile alike? 
 As we saw in our discussion of 4 Maccabees, one way of construing the logic 
of divine saving action in history, specifically when mercy for the unworthy is 
required, is by seeing it through a cultic lens. The Maccabean martyrs, following the 
exemplar Eleazar, died noble deaths not only for the sake of piety (6:20) but also, 
appealing to the divine mercy (ἵλεως, 6:28), as an exchange of life (ἀντίψυχος). The 
martyrs received the divine punishment the people deserved (6:28), while the people 
received the ‘life’ (ψυχή) the martyrs deserved (6:29). The vital point for our 
purposes, and as a hypothetical Pauline response to 4 Ezra, is that these 
representative and substitutionary deaths are self-offerings and that they, thus, extend 
                                                                                                                                                  
apart from the Christ-event, is conducive only to sin, futility, and death. For a related argument 
without this specific support, see Westerholm, Perspectives, 414–17. 
55 Cf. Dt 24:16; Jer 31:30; and esp. Ezek 18:1 – 32. If we note that words ἀδικία and ἀνοµία are 
synonymous in the context, the language of the last two clauses of 4 Ezra 7:105 seems inspired by the 
end of Ezek 18:20: δικαιοσύνη δικαίου ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸν ἔσται, καὶ ἀνοµία ἀνόµου ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸν ἔσται. 
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by analogy the divinely ordained gift economy of sacrificial mercy. In other words, 
Paul might rebut the author of 4 Ezra’s objection by noting that the prohibitions 
against vicarious blessing and judgement serve the normal course of divine justice 
by protecting against its perversion (the innocent should not be forced to die for the 
wicked), but Jesus gave himself ‘for our sins’ (Gal 1:4), ‘for [Paul]’ (2:20), and ‘for us 
‘(3:13) precisely in accord with his own will56 and that of God the Father (1:4). In 
short, just as in Lev 17, it is a matter of the divine prerogative to have mercy on 
sinners, so in the Christ-gift the same divine prerogative is at work. Yet, this is still 
just. It is just that sacrificial justice is representative and substitutionary and, thus, 
mercy-shaped justice. 
 As we pointed out in our preliminary observations on Gal 3:10 – 14, Paul 
traces a movement from Abrahamic promise, through Deuteronomic curse, to the 
Christ-event in such a way that both blessing and curse reach their telos in the Christ-
gift. Moreover, Gal 3:11, 12 represents a textual ‘moment’ within this movement that 
requires explanation, especially regarding the use of the term ζήσεται. In the 
interpretation of Gal 3:10 – 12, a scholarly debate has arisen over whether the word 
ζήσεται is soteriological or, for lack of better terms, social—gaining life or living it.57 
These dichotomies would have been confusing if not nonsensical to the authors of 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra. As we have seen, one of the particular challenges of 
interpreting ancient Jewish life discourse is that there is an inseparable connection 
between life as existence and life as order. Life is never merely given by God, but, 
because it is given by God, it is always simultaneously ordered. Moreover, as we 
noted in the introduction, this intrinsic relation between the donation of the gift, the 
circumstances of its donation, and the ordering of its return reflects what Joubert 
calls a concern for ‘balanced reciprocity’.58 Gifts expect either an equivalent return or 
a return of the same sort. In short, as in gift-giving in general, so with the divine 
                                                
56 S.J. Gathercole, Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2015), 25. 
57 For an overview of the options extending back to the Patristic period, see Avemarie, ’Claim of 
the Law’, 130 – 37; he concludes: ‘The problem with the vast divergence of interpretations is not the 
narrow-mindedness of the exegetes; it is rather the Pauline text itself’ (137). For recent ‘social’ 
accounts, see e.g. J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 152 – 
54; 374 – 75; idem, The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays (WUNT II 185; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2005), 65 – 67; Wakefield, Where to Live. 
58 S. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection 
(WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 22. 
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donation of life in particular: where and how life is divinely given, there it is 
divinely ordered…and evaluated. In 4 Ezra, eschatological life is given as a return 
gift to the Torah-worthy because human beings receive divine benefactions of life 
that are ordered according to the Torah and they are, thus, capable and responsible 
for living according to this order. In Galatians 3:10 – 14, by contrast, life is given in 
the Spirit through the Christ-gift received by faith by the unworthy—Jews and 
Gentiles alike. This way of reading Gal 3:10 – 14 and its context suggests that Paul 
reads Hab 2:4 in a soteriological, christocentric, and pneumatological fashion: the 
‘one who is righteous by faith’ is the one who receives the righteous life of Christ 
offered in his self-giving and, thereby, ‘by faith lives’ in the receipt of the 
eschatological Spirit.59  
 Yet, because this eschatological life is received and ordered through the Spirit 
within history, we should resist the temptation to dichotomise and read this life solely 
soteriologically, as eschatological existence but not order. The one who begins with 
the Spirit continues in the Spirit (3:3), for where eschatological life is given, there it is 
ordered. In this connection, though there is compelling evidence that Lev 18:5 was 
frequently read in eschatological and soteriological terms (as we have seen, a sister 
text, Dt 30:19 clearly plays a key role in 4 Ezra’s eschatological scheme and is 
possibly conflated with Lev 18:5 at 4 Ezra 7:21),60 it is unlikely that Paul is citing the 
text as a real eschatological alternative to Hab 2:4 here. He is arguing for a necessary 
pattern of redemptive-history in which this text plays a key role, but Paul considers 
that role to be consistent only with Dt 27:26 and, thus, the ‘life’ described in Lev 18:5 
(3:12) is synonymous with the cursed existence from which Christ delivers (3:13).61 
That is, the problem with doing the law is not the problem of human doing per se 
                                                
59 I follow Martyn in taking ἐκ πίστεως as both an adverb modifying ζήσεται and an adjective 
modifying ὁ δίκαιος (Martyn, Galatians, 314), because, as we argued in the previous chapter, πίστις 
Χριστοῦ is both the mark of the one who receives the divine approbation (2:16) and the mode by which 
one lives (ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός µε καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ, 2:20). For an 
overview of the options and literature, see Sprinkle, Law and Life, 139. 
60 S.J. Gathercole, ’Torah, Life, and Salvation’, in From Prophecy to Testament: The Function of the Old 
Testament in the New (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 131–
50; Sprinkle, Law and Life, 25 – 130. 
61 Watson, Hermeneutics, 18: ‘The Torah has Christ indirectly in view when it finally announces 
that its own conditional offer of life to the one who observes its prescriptions (Lev. 18:5) issues only in 
the universality of the curse (Deut. 27:26) – thereby creating space for the very different soteriological 
logic of “faith” (Hab. 2:4; cf. Gal. 3:10 – 12).’ 
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but, as we will see below in our discussion of Gal 3:19 – 22, the problem of human 
transgressions and sin—that the law itself does not, ultimately, expect its recipients 
to do what it requires and, thus both the Torah and its practitioners are, in this 
respect, like all other humans, ‘dead’. What is striking about our debate between 
Galatians and 4 Ezra, in this connection, is that both texts emphasize divine priority 
and sovereignty in God’s saving action. They simply configure this action 
differently—4 Ezra as a return gift of impervious resurrection life to those who 
properly order their created lives according to Torah-norms; Galatians as the divine 
gift of life out of the conditions of curse in the Christ-gift, received by faith, and 
ordered by the Spirit. It is crucial to recognise that Gal 3:10 – 14, in explicitly denying 
Torah-ordered life, calls into question created life as Torah-ordered for our 
conversation partners. This invites us to ask whether Paul thinks of the divine 
donation of life in the Christ-gift not just in soteriological and ethical but also in 
creative terms. 
4.1.3 The Inheritance of Life: The Promise Fulfiled as Resurrection Beyond or ‘Resurrection’ 
Within History?  (3:15 – 22) 
 In Galatians 3:15 Paul returns to Abraham in order to begin a more expansive 
explication of salvation-history running to 3:22, 62 and in so doing, he begins to 
produce the material theological logic that further fills out and supports the formal 
accounts of Gal 2:15 – 21 and Gal 3:6 – 14. In Galatians 3:15 – 18, the analogy Paul 
deploys from the realm of human covenantal relations clarifies the relation of the 
Torah to the Christ-gift by locating the Torah not as the order of but within salvation-
history. Though the precise analogue of Paul’s argument κατὰ ἄνθρωπον remains 
unclear, the fundamental point of the analogy is certain: it is axiomatic, for Paul, that 
the initial terms of the Abrahamic covenant cannot be altered. In this connection, 
Paul’s reading of scripture underlines two points that are critical for his argument. 
Though it is difficult to determine precisely which promise Paul has in view, his 
repetition of the word ἐπαγγελία (six times in Gal 3:14 – 22; eleven total in 3:14 – 4:28) 
underlines his insistence on the promissory character of the covenant, while the 
                                                
62 Paul’s consideration of the relation between the law and the promise as divine gifts marks out 
3:15 – 22 as a coherent unit, contra those who see a break at v. 19, as e.g. Mussner, Galaterbrief, 244–45; 
Martyn, Galatians, 294–95. 
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clarification of the singular ‘seed’ as the recipient with Abraham of the promises and 
that seed’s identity as Χριστός underlines the salvation-historical horizon of 
significance of those promises. For Paul, since the covenant was promissory in 
character and made to the Christ, the Torah that came along many years later cannot 
alter those initial terms or provide the conditions by which the inheritance is 
determined, for: τῷ Ἀβραὰµ δι᾿ ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ θεός. (Given Paul’s earlier 
specification of Jesus’ self-offering as God’s gift [χάρις, Gal 2:21] and connection of 
the promise to Abraham with Christ, it is clear that he uses χαρίζοµαι to refer to the 
act of divine gift-giving.) In other words, what is vital for Paul is not simply that the 
inheritance is a gift, though it is, but rather that the manner of the divine donation of 
the inheritance was promissory.  
 A comparison with 4 Ezra illumines the rhetorical and theological force of this 
reading. Rhetorically, Paul’s silence about Abraham’s obedience is deafening; 
theologically, Paul’s understanding of Abraham and the Messiah without regard to 
the Torah and his location of the Torah within history subverts 4 Ezra’s account of 
the Torah as coincident with the created order. For, in 4 Ezra, Abraham is the 
righteous recipient of esoteric revelation regarding the eschatological judgement and 
salvation (4 Ezra 3:13, 14); 63 the Messiah’s judgement of the ungodly and wicked 
provides the historical preamble to the definitive eschatological judgement at the end 
of history (12:31 – 33). Because 4 Ezra could and did conceive of the Messiah in 
Torah-terms, we see that the key here for Paul is the figural correspondence not 
between the promise and the Christ, in general, but the covenant as promise and the 
Christ-gift as its fulfilment, in particular. In other words, in 4 Ezra the righteous 
Abraham receives a preview of the eschatological judgment, which the Messiah will 
inaugurate in Torah-terms—the correspondence between preview and event being 
the Torah-righteousness of both the recipient of the promise and the agent of its fulfilment. In 
Paul’s reading, the particular gift God gave to Abraham as promise requires an 
unconditioned and incongruous gift as its fulfilment—one received by faith in the 
                                                
63 Abraham is an implied figura of the righteous one who receives eschatological salvation in 4 
Ezra, as Ezra emphasises that God chose Abraham ‘from among [the many peoples and nations]‘ (ex 
his) ‘while they were committing iniquity in his sight’ (factum est cum iniquitatem facerent coram te, 
3:13), and, in Uriel’s view, God only chooses the worthy—‘one grape from a cluster’ (9:21). 
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Christ-event.64 Thus, Paul’s understanding of the differing phenomenologies of 
promise as gift and Torah as gift are vital to the logic here; for both promissory and 
substitutionary gifts configure recipients as unconditioned recipients. Paul’s view is 
not reducible to a general antithesis between divine and human agency, for both 4 
Ezra and Paul are emphatic in subordinating human to divine agency. The issue is 
the particular account of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. For Paul, 
there is a necessary inner-connection between God’s gift of the inheritance to 
Abraham based on a promise and God’s fulfilment of this promise in the divine gift 
of Jesus’ self-offering and resurrection, one in which, as we will argue below, the 
receipt of life out of conditions of barrenness and death provides the theological and 
figural connection.65 Whereas 4 Ezra configures Abraham as prefiguring the Torah-
righteous who trusts in God’s created Torah-order, lives according to it, and receives 
eschatological life as a fitting divine gift, Paul considers Abraham the prototype of 
the one who receives an unconditioned and incongruous divine gift of inheritance in 
the Christ-event.66 Moreover, this means that, with respect both to the receipt of the 
promise and its fulfillment in the Chist-event, Paul uses πίστις and πιστεύω as gift-
receipt terminology. In this connection, Paul’s careful limitation of gift terminology 
to the promise and its fulfilment in the Christ-event67 and the inheritance raises the 
                                                
64 Paul’s historical argument here demonstrates that his use of citations in 3:6 – 13 is not merely 
textual but a figural and, thus, logical correlation of divine actions. The emphasis in figural reading is 
‘performative’ not ‘semiotic’—about what God will and is doing, not the ‘allegorical meaning’ of the 
words being used. For these distinctions in the context of a critique of Daniel Boyarin’s semiotic 
reading of Paul’s construction of Jewish identity in Gal 4:21 – 31, see J.D. Dawson, Christian Figural 
Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley: UCP, 2002), 24–27. 
65 Ibid., 85: ‘“Figuralness” denotes the status of things as significant—not in themselves and not in 
their meanings—but insofar as they are, in all of their concrete reality, the enacted intention of 
God…Discerning that intention in oddly congruent literary narratives, the figural reader makes 
explicit the similarities by which otherwise separate events are related to one another as moments in a 
single, divine utterance. The similarity discerned in otherwise incongruent historical events bears 
witness to the singularity of the divine identity and purpose that permeates them.’ 
66 Paul’s continued focus on the particular divine gift-giving activity as it configures human 
reception belies Donaldson’s argument that ‘the contrast is between Christ and law, not faith and 
works’ or that the antithesis is between ‘two objective means of righteousness—Christ or Torah’ and 
not ‘two subjective human attitudes’; T.L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s 
Convictional World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 116. Yet, Westerholm is too general in his criticism 
that ‘a command is scarcely a fit object for belief’ (Westerholm, Perspectives, 279, n. 43). For, in 4 Ezra 
and a number of cosmologically and eschatologically inflected texts of the period (e.g., Wis 2:17, 18; 
3:9 – 11), the command represents a choice between eschatological life and death and to choose life 
and obey is to believe, according to their interpretation, that what God says about the law (e.g. in Dt 
30:15 – 20) is eschatologically true. 
67 Barclay, Gift, 403. 
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question not only of the Torah’s status as divine gift but also the character of the 
Christ-gift itself. For in denying the Torah-conditioned character of the Abrahamic 
covenant and its fulfilment, Paul configures Abraham as the prototype of one who is 
in need of a life-giving and life-ordering gift, and he invites the question, likewise, of 
the relation of the Torah itself to such a gift. 
 Having established that the promissory terms of the Abrahamic covenant 
entail fulfilment in the unconditioned and incongruous Christ-gift, Paul spends the 
remainder of Galatians 3 and 4 specifying the integral place of the Torah in 
salvation-history and the cosmos. Relatedly, Paul continues to use gift language with 
care: unlike the promise, the law was not given by God but ‘added’ (προσετέθη), being 
‘arranged’ (διαταγείς) through angels by the mediator Moses;68 unlike the promise (v. 
20), the law was not given as the basis of the receipt of the inheritance but ‘for the 
sake of transgressions’ (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν, v. 19).69 Moreover, in Gal 3:21 Paul 
considers a counter-factual that would frame the Torah not just as a divine gift but as 
a divine life-giving gift. We will argue presently that the compressed and enigmatic 
passage in Gal 3:19, 20 prepares for this counter-factual and its negation in vv. 21 – 
22 by both limiting the function of the Torah to transgressions and by gesturing 
toward a salvation-historical and ontological subordination of the Torah to the 
unitary divine purpose disclosed in the Christ-gift. 
 After Paul’s refusal to identify the Torah with either Abrahamic or creational 
order and the careful dissociation of it from divine gift, the question he posses in Gal 
3:19 is the question the author of 4 Ezra would ask: ‘Why therefore the law?’ (Τί οὖν ὁ 
νόµος). This is so because in 4 Ezra the Torah is given either to lock Israel into a 
national cycle of life-sin-death, as in episode one, or to provide the path through the 
present sick and dying cosmos to the eternal city, as in episode three. Thus, by 
locating the Torah within history and denying its place as the condition of the 
receipt of eschatological inheritance, Paul seems to invite a reading of salvation-
                                                
68 Stefan Nordgaard’s assertion that ‘Paul emphasizes the mutual exclusivity of the law and 
promise’ and his conclusion that, since God clearly gave the promise, he could not have ‘added’ the 
law, is question-begging. For the question of the relation between law and promise depends here on 
supplying an argument to identify who ‘added’ (προσετέθη) the law; S. Nordgaard, ‘Paul and the 
Provenance of the Law: The Case of Galatians 3,19 – 20‘, ZNW 105 (2014): 68. 
69 For early Jewish and Christian sources on angelic participation in the giving of the law, see Dt 
33:2, LXX; Jub 1:27 – 2:1; Philo, Somn. 1.141 – 143; Josephus, Ant. 15.136; Heb 2:2; Acts 7:38, 53. 
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history like that of Ezra in episode one or an account of salvation from some other 
means. In either case, the question of the divine intention for the law arises naturally. 
If the law is not the condition for the receipt of the eschatological inheritance, why 
was it given? Paul’s response is Christological: ‘[the law] was added for 
transgressions’ until the rightful recipient of the promise should come (Gal 3:19). A 
lack of clarity about what it might mean that the Torah ‘was added for the sake of 
transgressions’ (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη) has produced two basic 
interpretations of the preposition χάριν: Paul is either referring here to the positive 
function of the Torah as it addresses ‘transgressions’ already in progress (a causal 
χάριν, ‘because’),70 or more negatively to the ‘transgressions’ the Torah discloses 
under its watch (a telic χάριν, ‘for the purpose’).71 Given Paul’s association of the 
noun παράβασις with the Torah (Rom 2:24; 4:15; 5:13, 14) and his location of the Torah 
within history, the latter option is more likely. In this connection and in the context 
of our debate with 4 Ezra, a preliminary observation is clarifying. The law is not 
given for transgressions in the way that 4 Ezra would read this—i.e., as identical 
with the creation order and thus the means of discriminating between the 
eschatologically righteous heirs and the unrighteous in and beyond history. Paul has 
blocked such an interpretation both implicitly (Gal 3:10 – 14) and explicitly (3:15 – 
18). From the perspective of 4 Ezra, then, this leaves Paul with only one other way of 
configuring divine saving action—as mercy for the unworthy. Yet, if the Torah is 
limited to the historical situation of its recipients and serves only to render them 
transgressors, then, on 4 Ezra’s terms, Paul needs to explain how the Christ-gift 
relates to the gift of created life and what order vis-à-vis the Torah it provides.  
 Paul begins to address issues like these with the counterfactual of Galatians 
3:21. Yet, in vv. 19 – 20, by introducing a distinction between the divine and direct 
giving of the promise and the divine but indirect addition of the Torah, Paul 
gestures towards an ontological rationale for the Torah’s relation to the Christ-gift. 
One alternative and extreme way of reading the force of v. 20 is to see in it a 
                                                
70 Dunn, Galatians, 189; F. Vouga, An die Galater (HNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 82. 
71 Mussner, Galaterbrief, 246; Martyn, Galatians, 354; de Boer, Galatians, 230. 
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dislocation of the purposes of the angels and Moses from those of God.72 The view 
taken here is that the force of the distinction in verse 20—ὁ δὲ µεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ 
δὲ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν—is not to dislocate the Torah from the divine purpose but to indicate 
why the law must have both an integral negative function and an ultimately positive 
subordination to the promise.73 The point is neither that Moses or the law have been 
co-opted by ‘anti-God powers’ nor that God was somehow absent from Sinai,74 
much less that the angels were ‘tampering with God’s promises’.75 Rather, just as 
neither Moses nor the angels are God, so the Torah God added76 and, through them, 
arranged and mediated is not the ultimate expression of the divine purpose but 
serves it. In short, the ontological subordination of ὁ µεσίτης indicates the salvation-
historical and eschatological subordination of the Torah to the Christ-event. Paul 
exploits the contrasting manner of direct receipt of the promise from God and 
mediated delivery of the Torah to gesture toward the eschatological and ontological 
horizons of the promise’s fulfilment.77 
 Stephen Nordegaard and John Barclay have drawn attention to important 
parallel ontological reflections in Philo’s argument that, in creating human beings, 
God used assistants to distance himself from human sin (cf. Opif. 69 – 75; Conf. 168 – 
183; Fug. 68 – 72; Mut. 30 – 32).78 And, as we have seen, sensitivity to the relation 
between moral and ontological issues is evident in our debate partner 4 Ezra, arising 
                                                
72 See, e.g., A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (London: A&C Black, 1931), 70–75; 
Mussner, Galaterbrief, 245–50; Martyn, Galatians, 352–72; de Boer, Galatians, 225–36. 
73 Rightly noted by Hays (Faith, 199 – 200), but wrongly attributed only to ‘the shape and 
sequence of the gospel story’. 
74 For the language of ‘anti-God powers’, see J.L. Martyn, ‘God’s Way of Making Things Right‘, in 
Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), 152; on God’s absence from Sinai, 
Martyn, Galatians, 370. 
75 de Boer, Galatians, 228–31. 
76 Burton, Galatians, 188: ‘προσετέθη marks the law as supplementary, and hence subordinate to the 
covenant.’ Cf. F.J. Matera, Galatians (SP 9; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992), 128; Dunn, Galatians, 
189. Contra Martyn, Galatians, 364–70; de Boer, Galatians, 228–29. As we will argue below, the rejection 
of προσετέθη as a divine passive depends on a misreading of v. 20 and ignores the careful modulation 
between passive and active voice, with the former clearly applying to God, in the immediate context 
of vv. 21 – 22. 
77 The ecclesiological ramifications of this configuration of salvation-history are not in view here; 
pace Wright, Climax, 157–74. 
78 Barclay, Gift, 403 – 404; Nordgaard, ’Provenance ’.  The present argument, though similar to 
Barclay, differs in seeing the Torah as not just ‘less immediate and less direct’ (404) but subordinated 
and integral (pace Barclay, 404) to the fulfilment of the promise. Unlike Nordgaard, we do not read 
Paul as suggesting that God is, via the angels and Moses, avoiding responsibility for the Torah. The 
Torah is a concession to the fallen order, not an abdication of it. 
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from the question of why the promises have not been fulfiled within history. In this 
connection, Ezra’s ideal moral exemplarity has ontological ramifications. Not only 
does Uriel’s divine instruction enable him to transcend his epistemological and 
ontological limitations and experience the heavenly Zion, it also leads to Ezra’s 
transcendence of death itself. Paul’s limitation of the purpose of the Torah to 
transgressions calls all of this into question, because it precludes the possibility that 
Ezra is eschatologically righteous in Torah-terms. In other words, though the law may 
in fact limit or even atone for transgressions in history,79 for Paul, neither eliminates 
transgressions. The cultic system itself (if one wants to appeal to it) rather supports 
this point: it is not in place in case transgression should occur but because it will.80 
This renders the law both subordinate and integral to the fulfilment of the promise in 
its negative function: it presumes and discloses transgressions, and, thus, from an 
eschatological point of view, there is need for a gift not only for transgressions (or 
sins, Gal 1:4) but also for eschatological life to the transgressor.81 Paul identifies the 
mechanism by which the Torah serves this integral negative function in Galatians 
3:22. 
 On the above reading, it is Paul’s limitation of the Torah to transgressions in 
v. 19 not the digression of v. 20 that invites the question of v. 21.82 Because, for an 
eschatological reader of Lev 18:5 or Dt 30:15 – 20 as in 4 Ezra, Paul’s careful refusal to 
apply the language of gift to the Torah combined with his specification of it as being 
‘for the sake of transgressions’ invites a reading of the Torah as ultimately negative. 
That is, Paul assumes that his interlocutors will hear him saying that the purpose of 
the law is not to distinguish between the righteous and the unrighteous, as in 4 Ezra, 
but for transgressions simpliciter. This way of hearing, in Paul’s view, in which the 
Torah either orders the created self or discloses Unheilsgeschichte, would introduce a 
cleavage between the angels and Moses on the one hand and God on the other, a 
cleavage that would suggest a bifurcation in the very deity (v. 20). For Paul and our 
                                                
79 Rightly, Matlock, ’Helping? ’, 177. 
80 Bultmann, Theologie, 1.265: ‘der Mensch immer schon Sünder ist…’ Cf. Longenecker, Galatians, 
138. 
81 This is its ‘Offenbarungsfunktion’; Mussner, Galaterbrief, 246. 
82 Contra Nordgaard, ’Provenance ’, 69, it is difficult to see how the appeal to divine oneness in v. 
20 could give rise to the question and emphatic rebuttal of v. 21. It is better to take the οὖν of v. 21 as 
referring to 19a and 19b, the clauses where the law and promise are explicitly related, and to take 19c 
as the beginning of a digression that ends in v. 20. 
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debate partners this cannot be the case, for: ὁ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν. Consequently, Paul’s way 
of answering the question of the possible antithetical relation between the Torah and 
the promise is to call into question the assumptions of his opponents. On Paul’s 
terms, it is his opponents who, reading texts like Lev 18:5 and Dt 30:15 – 20 in life-
giving and life-ordering terms eschatologically, have a problem of scriptural 
contradiction.83 This is not, however, a ‘dogmatic’ assertion. For Paul does not 
simply deny that the Torah ‘makes alive’ (v. 21), but rather he argues that the Torah 
confirms its recipients as ‘dead’ in view of the life-giving Christ-gift (v. 22). In short, 
the problem with post-Sanders ‘dogmatic’ readings of Gal 3:21 is their failure to ask 
what Paul might mean by implying that the recipients of both the Torah and the Christ-gift 
are ‘dead’ and to find the answer in Gal 3:22.84 
 In addition to the above reading of vv. 19 – 20, three additional exegetical 
observations support this reading of vv. 21 – 22 in terms of divine life-giving and 
life-ordering benefaction. The Pauline order of argumentation is crucial: rather than 
proceeding directly to his negative but integral reading of the purpose of the Torah 
in vv. 21 – 22, Paul begins with a counter-factual in which the Torah is considered a 
divine life-giving gift. The Torah would, contrary to fact, be against the promises if 
the law given were ‘able to make-alive’; ‘righteousness’ in Torah-terms would, then, 
follow as a logical result (εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόµος ὁ δυνάµενος ζῳοποιῆσαι, ὄντως ἐκ νόµου ἂν ἦν ἡ 
δικαιοσύνη, 3:21a). As in Gal 2:21, the counterfactual of Gal 3:21 takes away the 
assumption that produces the false inference: by reversing the order—life leading to 
righteousness—Paul takes away the assumption, of 4 Ezra for example, that the 
recipient of the law is ‘living/free’ and thus capable of following the Torah-order 
                                                
83 Matlock, ’Helping? ’, 171: for Paul, ’[the Law] enforces the original terms of the promise…’ 
84 Sanders’s reading of 3:21 (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 495) in relation to his ‘dogmatic’ reading 
of the Christ-event vis-à-vis the law (and his assertion in particular, that ζῳοποιέω and δικαιοσύνη are 
equivalent in meaning (i.e., both mean ‘life’) in Gal 3:21) has been influential in the secondary 
literature. Cf. Sanders, Paul, the Law, 26–27. For example, Hays (Faith, 178 – 79) follows Sanders 
explicitly, though with his own messianic reading of 3:11. Even his critics, like Westerholm grant the 
‘parallel’ between ζῳοποιέω and δικαιοσύνη (see also, Sprinkle, Law and Life, 139, n. 27), though he 
(Perspectives, 294) tries to explain it by glossing δικαιοσύνη as ‘an acquittal from sin [that] brings life’, 
but the hypothetical here, given the legal framework, suggests, in Westerholm’s terms, ‘ordinary’ 
positive righteousness not ‘extraordinary’ acquittal. Likewise, Matlock (‘Helping? ‘, 177) concedes 
Sanders’s ‘dogmatic’ attribution of 3:21 to Paul’s ‘present view’ of the law, assigning the differences 
between 3:12 and 3:21 to ‘different moments of Paul’s argument’ without arguing for how these 
moments are related. What is needed, by contrast, is an explanation of why and in what respect Paul 
considers the recipients of the law ‘dead’ and, relatedly, in what respect their being ‘made-alive’ 
might lead to ‘righteousness’.  
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and worthy of receiving ‘life’ as a gift soteriologically. Thus, as in Gal 2:17 – 21, a 
reversion to Torah norms is a rejection of the gift because it is a failure to recognise 
where life is given and ordered—the Christ-gift, not the Torah. That is, for Paul, the 
law would be contrary to the promises if in fact the law itself led to righteousness 
and eschatological life, because, in Paul’s way of reading salvation-history, God gave 
life (inheritance) on the basis of a promise and credited righteousness as trust in that 
promise. There cannot be two mutually exclusive paths to righteousness—one via 
the law, the other via the promise. The singularity of the gospel is not self-
interpreting for Paul. Rather, the law is a paradoxical path to righteousness, only in 
so far as it serves the promise and its fulfillment in the Christ-event (3:22). 
 This reading in terms of divine life-giving benefaction is further supported by 
the shifts in vocabulary and verbs from vv. 21 to 22. The strong adversative ἀλλά 
introduces what Paul thinks is in fact the case: ‘but the scripture imprisoned all 
things under sin’ (συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφὴ τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν, 3:22). Crucially, Paul’s 
change from passive to active then back to passive voice in vv. 21 – 22 marks the 
distinction between God’s hypothetical giving of the law, the law’s actual cursing 
function, and God’s actual giving of the promise’s fulfillment in the Christ-gift. 
Unlike his counterfactual in v. 21 where Paul uses the divine passive and breaks his 
custom by applying gift terminology to the law and imagining that God gave the 
law, in v. 22 he specifies that what ‘the Scripture’ actually does is imprison. Thus, 
Paul’s personification of ἡ γραφή allows him to distinguish amongst and among the 
functions of various divine speech-acts.85 Just as, in 3:8, the Scripture pre-preaches 
(aorist of προευαγγελίζοµαι), so the Scripture also imprisons (aorist of συγκλείω). The 
particular ἡ γραφή of 3:22, however, imprisons, ‘in order that the promise…might be 
given’ by God (ἵνα ἡ ἐπαγγελία…δοθῇ, 3:22). Paul does not specify ‘the Scripture’ he has 
in mind here, but the parallel with Gal 3:8 suggests that he has the curse of Dt 27:26 
in view in 3:22.86 For, just as in Gal 3:8—where the curse and its biblical anchor 
                                                
85 J R. Dodson, ‘The Voices of Scripture: Citations and Personifications in Paul‘, BBR 20 (2010): 
430: ‘[T]o say that Paul could have just substituted the word “God” for the personification misses the 
point: the significance lies in the fact that Paul does use personification, γραφή, rather than the divine 
Person, θεός.’ The significance is not, however, that ‘the original speaker (that is, God) is not 
highlighted’ (431), but rather, for Paul, that what ‘Scripture’ has spoken and speaks both pre-figures 
and serves what God is doing now; similarly, Watson, Hermeneutics, 40.  
86 Watson, Hermeneutics, 475. 
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support the primacy of the promise and its particular modes of delivery and 
reception—in 3:22 ‘the Scripture’ places all things ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν in service of the 
fulfillment of the promise. Likewise, in both Galatians 3:8 and 4:30 ‘the Scripture’ 
which speaks is a particular text associated with a particular event.87 The Torah is not a 
life-giving and ordering gift (v. 21) but, by divine dispensation, a death-dealing jailor 
(v. 22).88 
 Relatedly, we must consider the entailments of two critical shifts in 
vocabulary from vv. 21 to 22. First, with the shift from the implied object of ζῳοποιέω 
to the explicit object of συγκλείω, Paul marks a shift from a human to a cosmic frame 
of reference—from the ‘living dead’ to τὰ πάντα. Second, combined with the shift in 
moral terminology from δικαιοσύνη to ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν, this shift in frame not only implies 
some logical relation between human and cosmic order but it also emphasises the 
cosmic scope and devastating effect of the Torah’s curse. Far from leading to 
δικαιοσύνη for human beings, ἡ γραφή places τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν.89 Thus, the 
inevitability of the curse resting on those who are ἐκ νόµου is grounded in the reality 
that they, along with τὰ πάντα, are ‘under Sin’. Moreover, the logic of 3:21 indicates 
that, had this not been the case, then those who are ‘of the Torah’ would not be 
‘under Sin’. In Paul’s view, however, the curse the Scripture voices has placed not 
just those ‘of the law’ under a curse. But, in contrast with 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees, it 
has placed them in the same ‘occupied’ space as all things—the space ‘under Sin’. 
 Finally, in this connection, Paul’s association of ‘death’ in v. 21 with being 
‘under Sin’ in v. 22 entails a corollary relation between the receipt of the ‘life’ in the 
Christ-event and ‘righteousness’ conceived in creative terms. In vv. 21 and 22 there is 
a functional equivalence, for Paul, between Sin and death. God did not give a law 
that could make alive, but rather he added one that, not only did the opposite, but 
confined all things under Sin and, thus, ‘death’. In other words, the assumption of 
                                                
87 Ibid., 257: ‘At each point, Paul is dependent on quite specific scriptural sources.’ 
88 B. Byrne, Sons of God, Seed of Abraham: A Study of the idea of the Sonship of God of all Christians in 
Paul against the Jewish Background (AnBib 83; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1979): ‘In Paul’s theology God 
did not simply substitute a new way of salvation in place of the Law. There is an intrinsic connection 
between the failure of the Law way and the death of Christ.’ We would change the word ‘failure’ to 
‘success.’ 
89 Barrett notes that the choice of neuter τὰ πάντα stresses the universality and comprehensiveness 
of the reality in view; C.K. Barrett, Freedom and Obligation: A Study of the Epistle to the Galatians 
(London: SPCK, 1985), 34.  
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3:21 is a ‘dead’ humanity in an eschatological sense (the living whose end is death), 
in a moral sense (the living whose existence is qualitatively ‘death-like’), or, likely, 
both. The relation between the counterfactual of v. 21 and the reality of v. 22 makes 
this ‘dead’ humanity, however conceived, equivalent to life ‘under Sin’. Moreover, 
the same logic works on the ‘life’ side of this binary. As elsewhere in his writings, 
Paul deploys the verb ζῳοποιέω exclusively with reference to the effect of the Christ-
event (Rom 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor 15:22, 36, 45) and often with reference to the Spirit’s role 
in that event both within and beyond history (Rom 8:11; 2 Cor 3:6), and here he has 
the life-giving activity of the Spirit in view, as the ‘promised Spirit’ received 
‘through faith’ (3:14) is equivalent to ‘the promise’ (i.e., the promise’s content, 
inheritance, 3:18) given to believers ‘by faith in Jesus Christ’ (3:22). For our purposes, 
the key point is that Paul’s historical argument about the Torah configures its 
recipients as ‘dead’ in history, which suggests, as in the reconstitution of his self in 
Gal 2:19 – 20, that the sort of life-giving activity Paul has in view here pertains not 
merely to the receipt of eternal life at the eschaton but to the Spirit’s creative and life-
ordering work for eschatological righteousness within history.90 
 Thus, our focus on divine life-giving benefaction furthers research on the 
theological logic of Galatians, in particular, and on gift in Paul, in general. First, it 
shows why construals of the ‘dogmatic’ character of Paul’s argument, his pessimistic 
Deuteronomic reading of salvation-history, the experience of the Spirit in the Christ-
event, the assumption of human ability, or even the recognition of the Christ-gift as 
incongruous and unconditioned—none of these is sufficient for conveying the logic 
of Paul’s argument. In Gal 3:15 – 22, Paul argues that the logical twin of the 
promised inheritance is a singular ‘dead’ humanity. This the law delivers. Thus, 
contra Sprinkle the law is not excluded from the eschatological order of life either 
because it is a ‘merely human way of appropriating eschatological life’ or simply 
                                                
90 For Paul, δικαιοσύνη here is an eschatologically ‘perfected’ term, having to do with the absence of 
sin and the fullness of divine life as in 4 Ezra. To modify Westerholm’s categories slightly 
(Perspectives, 261 – 96), the term δικαιοσύνη, given the mention of the Torah in v. 21, refers to ‘ordinary 
righteousness’ but defined by the eschatological norm disclosed in the Christ-gift, while the 
‘emergency measure’ (284) of righteousness as divine acquittal in the Christ-event was, for Paul, the 
point all along. Consequently, though I would add that eschatological order is implied in this positive 
use of δικαιοσύνη, I agree with Käsemann who places Paul’s use of the term, generally, in the context of 
the indivisibility of divine power and gift; E. Käsemann, ‘Gottesgerechtigkeit bei Paulus‘, in 
Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen (dritte Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 187. 
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because that life must be ‘created by divine action, the revelation of Christ in Paul’, 
but rather because, by divine design, the law itself confines (and, as we will argue 
below, is itself conformed and confined) to the morally ‘dead’ estate of humanity.91 
Yet, this does not, as it would in 4 Ezra, lead to an irremediable Unheilsgeschichte; for 
the Christ-gift ‘resurrects’ and reorders humanity in the Spirit unto eschatological 
righteousness for all who receive this divine gift by faith. Thus, the Christ-gift is 
necessarily a gift for the unworthy because the Torah encloses all things under a 
‘dead’ existence by divine design. Second and in this connection, we show why one 
must go beyond a recognition of the definition of divine gift as incongruous and 
unconditioned in Galatians. For, as we have seen, Paul’s account of sacred text and 
salvation-history does not beg the question of the redemptive-historical significance 
of the Christ-gift. It is not simply that the Christ-gift was given without regard to 
worth that its receipt entails indifference to Torah norms in the church. Rather, it is 
because the law itself is integral to producing the negative conditions in which the 
Christ-gift is given that it cannot provide the proper order of church life. In Paul’s 
view, the law itself requires an account of the Christ-gift in life-giving terms. 
 Yet, this recognition of the law’s integral function in confirming humans in 
sin is not a simple return to ‘traditional’ readings of Gal 3 – 4. For, as we shall see 
presently, Paul argues that the Torah’s confining function is a sign of its own 
confined status. In other words, the law cannot provide the proper order of the 
church even after its salvation-historical function has ended and humans are ‘made-
alive’ in the Christ-gift because the law itself is conformed and confined to the ‘dead’ 
existence of the fallen creation. Thus, in the next section, by inviting 4 Ezra to 
interrogate Paul’s development of a variety of metaphors to configure the role of 
Torah in salvation-history (Gal 3:23 – 4:11) and his reading of the Pentateuch from 
the perspective of the story of Hagar and Sarah (Gal 4:21 – 31), we show why he 
considers the Torah to be fitted and confined to the fallen creation and we clarify the 
hermeneutic by which he sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in history. 
                                                
91 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 155 – 56. 
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4.2 Two Tales of Two Cities: Debating Christotelic History, Disclosing 
Christomorphic Reality (Gal 3:23 – 4:31) 
In this section we will continue our debate with 4 Ezra by tracing Paul’s further 
metaphorical specification of the place of Torah within salvation-history (3:23 – 29; 
4:1 – 11) to its conclusion in his figural summary of the voice of the νόµος in his 
interpretation of the story of Sarah and Hagar in Genesis 16 – 21 (4:21 – 31). We will 
argue that whereas Paul’s metaphorical statements about the law in Gal 3:23 – 4:7 
reveal the Christotelic shape of salvation- and cosmic history, his Christomorphic 
figural reading of the Pentateuch discloses the hermeneutic by which he sees why 
salvation and cosmic history necessarily takes this pattern. Thus, our debate with 4 
Ezra leads us directly to the hermeneutical problem Paul faced in the Galatian 
crisis—viz., how to see the implications for the Torah of their common receipt of the 
Christ-gift and common experience of the Spirit. The key is Paul’s Christomorphic 
eschatological hermeneutic: the Torah is itself a part of the order of death of the 
fallen creation from which the Christ-gift redeems dead humanity, but this 
redemption is nothing less than a ‘birth’ to eschatological life within the ‘barren’ 
conditions of fallen history. Thus, from Abraham to the Galatians, the heirs of God 
are born according to the Spirit, whether in the form of children born of barren 
wombs or the equally miraculous ‘birth’ of heirs of the living God born among 
slaves to sin and death.  
 Consequently, this reading of Paul’s metaphors and the Hagar and Sarah 
allegory shows how Paul’s reading of the logic of salvation-history is grounded in his 
conception of the Torah as confining and confined to ‘dead’ fallen existence, while his 
understanding of God’s saving activity as creative provides the hermeneutic by 
which he sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in promise and fulfillment. 
Thus, we contribute to research on the theological logic of Galatians by 
demonstrating that Paul does not beg the question of the relationship between 
Torah-order and the Christ-event by appealing to the Christ-gift simpliciter. Rather, 
he argues that the Christ-gift is life-giving and life-ordering, while the Torah itself is 
fitted and confined to the ‘dead’ existence from which this gift delivers.  
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4.2.1 Life as Slaves: Under the Law, Under the ‘Child-Minder’, Under Administrators and 
Managers, Under the Cosmic Elements (3:23 – 4:11) 
 In Gal 3:23 – 25, Paul continues to specify the relation of the Torah to the 
Christ-event in historical terms, while the reintroduction of the language of 
‘justification by faith’ (3:24) indicates that the same fundamental issue about divine 
evaluation is being addressed. The difference here is that Paul’s redemptive-
historical and forensic framework is being turned to the question of the proper 
identification of ‘sons’ (3:26) and ‘heirs’ (v. 29). Though Paul’s general intentions are 
clear, the logical and theological mechanisms that secure these ends are rather 
opaque. In this connection, two longstanding debates have occupied interpreters—
the precise force of Paul’s παιδαγωγός metaphor in relation to the Torah’s function as 
the norm of self and society92 and the implied subjects of his first person plural verbs 
(ἐφρουρούµεθα, 3:23; ἐσµεν, 3:25) and their corresponding personal pronoun.93 The 
latter debate is of little ultimate consequence, for, as we have seen, the law’s curse 
encompasses ‘all things’ (τὰ πάντα, v. 22) and, as we will see, life within the law’s 
domain is theologically equivalent to subjection to the cosmic conditions that obtain 
ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου (4:3, 9). Even if the Torah custody Paul has in view pertains 
only to Israel, Israel is, for him, in no ultimately privileged position with respect to 
the rest of humanity; for the Torah’s curse insures that she, given her ‘dead’ 
condition, is, like all else, under sin.94 The terms in which Paul’s παιδαγωγός 
metaphor have been discussed—whether negative or positive—are overly general 
and, thus, in certain respects question-begging;95 for evaluations of this metaphor 
                                                
92 The best overview of the role and issues in Galatians is N. H. Young, ‘Paidagogos: The Social 
Setting of a Pauline Metaphor‘, NovT 29 (1987): 150 – 76. For a recent confirmation of his 
understanding from the inscriptional evidence, see C. Laes, ‘Pedagogues in Greek Inscriptions in 
Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity‘, ZPE 171 (2009): 113 – 22. 
93 For the argument that Paul refers to humans in general, see, e.g., Martyn, Galatians, 362; de 
Boer, Galatians, 238; for reasons to restrict the referent to Jews, see, e.g., Matera, Galatians, 143–44; 
Dunn, Galatians, 198. 
94 de Boer (Galatians, 238): ‘Paul may perhaps have Jews particularly in view…but if so he uses 
their situation “under the Law” to be representative of the situation of all humankind (cf. 3:10 – 4; 
4:5)’. 
95 For assessments that stress the negative associations with the παιδαγωγός, see e.g. H.D. Betz, 
Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1979), 177 – 78; Martyn, Galatians, 363. For positive interpretations of the παιδαγωγός as ‘tutor’, 
see, e.g., Burton, Galatians, 200; Dunn, Galatians, 198–99. 
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depend on identifying Paul’s point of comparison, which in turn depends on a 
construal of the theological framework in which the metaphor operates. 
 In this connection, the key exegetical observation is that Paul carries over the 
terminology and framing of vv. 21 – 22: the explanatory passive participle 
συγκλειόµενοι borrows the main verb of v. 22a, thereby signaling that the phrase it 
explains—‘we were held prisoner under the law’ (ὑπὸ νόµον ἐφρουρούµεθα) is Paul’s 
shorthand for the reality described in v. 22a. Consequently, if, as we have argued, 
Gal 3:21 – 22 discloses Paul’s polemical target as those who read Torah as the 
eschatological order of divine life-giving benefaction, then Paul’s παιδαγωγός 
metaphor introduces a filial focus that is quite provocative and illuminating. For 4 
Ezra’s discussion of heirs and the nature of their inheritance occurs in a similarly 
cosmological and eschatological context. Yet, whereas Uriel’s world-as-womb 
metaphor structures salvation-history toward national decay and cosmic death and 
its reversal for the righteous at the eschaton, Paul’s reading of the Torah’s inevitable 
curse structures salvation-history toward its curse-bearer, Christ, and the 
eschatological blessing that results for those who receive this gift by faith within 
history.96 Thus, when Paul portrays the Torah as a παιδαγωγός and identifies sons and 
heirs with reference to faith in the Christ-gift, he closes off the path Uriel charts 
through futility and death toward the city where ‘the fruit of immortality’ (4 Ezra 
7:13) awaits and he subverts Ezra’s description of those who will inherit the world as 
‘your people [i.e., Israel] whom you have called first-begotten, only-begotten, 
zealous, beloved’ (populus tuus quem vocasti primogenitum unigenitum aemulatorem 
carissimum, 6:58). For he configures sons and heirs not as identified in history and 
disclosed at the eschaton in Torah-terms, as Uriel does throughout episodes three 
and four, but as constituted within history among Jews and Gentiles who receive the 
Christ-gift by faith.97 Moreover, given the context of divine life-giving and life-
                                                
96 Though Paul’s είς + acc. phrases may pick up a temporal nuance here, they are likely consistent 
with the majority of Paul’s uses, which are telic in character—‘unto the coming faith to be revealed’ 
(εἰς τὴν µέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, 3:23); ‘unto Christ’ (εἰς Χριστόν, 3:24, 27); rightly, Moo, Galatians, 
242–44. 
97 Since Paul’s use of πιστεύω disambiguates the phrase ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in v. 22 (R. B. 
Matlock, ’The Rhetoric of Pistis in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9’, JSNT 
30 (2007): 192), his anaphorous phrase ‘this coming faith’ (τὴν µέλλουσαν πίστιν, 3:23) refers not to the 
faithfulness disclosed by Christ (contra Hays, Galatians, 269 – 70) but to the particular character of 
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ordering benefaction of both accounts, Paul’s παιδαγωγός metaphor begins to clarify 
the logic by which he views the receipt of the Christ-gift as the necessary end of the 
Torah’s custody; for it suggests that Paul identifies the Torah not as 4 Ezra does with 
glory and imperishability (lex non perit sed permanet in suo honore, 9:37) as the 
heavenly and eschatological order of God ‘the Lawgiver’ (legislator, 7:89) but with 
the order of the fallen creation. Likewise, impervious commitment to Torah-norms 
despite the experience of futility and death is not the height of wisdom and maturity 
(Ezra’s suffering ex toto corde, 10:50), but, given Paul’s παιδαγωγός metaphor, a state of 
immaturity to be left behind.  
 In Gal 4:1 – 11 Paul continues his discussion of the proper identification of 
heirs, introducing two additional metaphors to explain and support his account of 
Christotelic redemptive-history and his Christological identification of heirs.  
The point of comparison is established by the experience of a minor heir, who 
‘though lord of all is no different than a slave’ (οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου κύριος πάντων ὤν, 
4:1). Such heirs are ‘under administrators and managers’ (ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους καὶ 
οἰκονόµους, 4:2) just as (οὕτως) ‘we also, when we were children, were enslaved under 
the elements of the cosmos’ (καὶ ἡµεῖς, ὅτε ἦµεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου ἤµεθα 
δεδουλωµένοι, 4:3).98 The use of the noun δοῦλος and the verb δουλόω in combination 
with these ὑπό + acc. phrases makes it clear that his earlier phrases—ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν, ὑπὸ 
νόµον—indicate enslaving realities. 
 In this connection and in the context of our debate with 4 Ezra, a point of 
contention arises not with the use of slavery language per se: Ezra, like Paul (Gal 
1:10), describes himself as a ‘servant/slave’ of God without any hint of irony (4 Ezra 
                                                                                                                                                  
faith once its proper object in the Christ-gift is disclosed. On πίστις as the typical term for receipt of the 
gospel message, see Bultmann, Theologie, 1.91-94. 
98 For a compelling recent defense of the traditional Greco-Roman source domain of this 
metaphor, see J.K. Goodrich, ‘Guardians, Not Taskmasters: The Cultural Resonances of Paul’s 
Metaphor in Galatians 4.1 – 2‘, JSNT 32 (2010): 251 – 84. For the critique of the traditional source 
domain in favour of a Deuteronomic paradigm, see Scott, Adoption as Sons. In this debate, the 
concession of Hafemann (‘Exile‘, 367), who is an enthusiastic proponent of the exile-restoration 
paradigm, is telling: ‘The first thing to be said concerning the topic at hand is that Paul never 
mentions the exilic judgment of Israel directly. Indeed, the Septuagintal vocabulary for exile never 
occurs within the Pauline corpus in reference to the exile’. 
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5:45, 56; 6:12; 7:75, 102; 8:6, 24; 9:43, 45; 10:37; 12:8; 13:14), a self-description that is 
not uncommon in either the Hebrew Bible or ancient Judaism.99 
 Rather, for Paul ‘the heir is no different than a slave’, while, for 4 Ezra, the 
heir is different. Though Uriel praises Ezra’s humility in excluding himself from the 
company of the righteous (8:49), he is the exemplary heir in the exercise of his 
created freedom. Thus, despite his grief, he has sought to understand God’s 
heavenly way, while the wicked ‘despite receiving freedom, have rejected the Most 
High and despised his law and forsaken his ways’ (4 Ezra 8:56). Consequently, 
though 4 Ezra recognises the four constituent elements (4 Ezra 3:19; cf. 7:7, 8), 
envisions their transformation at the eschatological judgement (6:13 – 16), and even 
conceives of the limitations of the corruptible and estranged cosmos as something 
from which the righteous are set free (7:96), he could not concede that minor heirs 
are no different than slaves. Moreover, he could not allow the implication of Paul’s 
metaphorical configuration of life ὑπὸ νόµον as equivalent to life ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ 
κόσµου and, thus, as an estate from which the Christ-gift redeems in τὸ πλήρωµα τοῦ 
χρόνου. For, by specifying Jesus’ redemption as an adoption, Paul envisions not a 
disclosure of the Torah-righteous as heirs but a change in status of those under 
Torah from slaves to heirs. Likewise, Paul here identifies existence under the law with 
the conditions of the fallen cosmos rather than construing it as the path through that 
cosmos. 
 In light of our cosmologically and eschatologically inflected debate with 4 
Ezra over the identification of heirs, Paul’s identification of life ὑπὸ νόµον with life ὑπὸ 
τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου illumines theological differences underlying his otherwise 
shocking characterisation of the Galatian adoption of Jewish worship as akin to a 
return to paganism in Gal 4:8 – 11. Recent research seems to have settled the long 
debate over the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου in favour of the translation ‘the 
                                                
99 For the sometimes relatively positive connotations of slavery in Rabbinic contexts, cf. Betz, 
Galatians, 176, n. 126. Likewise, Marcus draws attention both to Josephus’s positive use of the phrase 
‘to live under…the laws ’ (ὑπὸ τοὺς νόµους ζῆν) in C. Ap. 2.210 and to the paradoxical rabbinical 
assertion that slavery ‘under the yoke of the Torah’ is the path to freedom; J. Marcus, ‘“Under the 
Law“: The Background of a Pauline Expression‘, CBQ 63 (2001): 73 – 75. Thiessen’s reduction of Paul’s 
ὑπὸ νόµον phrase to Gentile Judaising, dependent on this parallel with Josephus, is unconvincing 
because it does not recognise that Paul’s phrase is shorthand for the universal and cosmic curse 
rendering ‘all things’ ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν in 3:22; Thiessen, Gentile Problem, 97. 
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elements of the cosmos’—viz., earth, water, air, and fire, the four constitutive 
elements of ancient cosmology.100 And, as de Boer notes, the sole point of contact in 
Paul’s analogy is the formal similarity of Jewish and pagan calendrical practices.101 
Yet, rather than asking how Paul’s theology might allow for this rather scandalous 
identification, de Boer considers it merely rhetorical.102 In light of our debate with 4 
Ezra, we contend that Paul’s analogy is not merely rhetorical but depends on the 
cosmological and theological linkage between a view of the present cosmos as 
subject to the ongoing cycle of life and death and a view of calendrical practices as 
ordering human life according to this ‘dead’ order. That is, whereas, as we saw in 
chapter, 4 Ezra conceives of the law and its fruit as imperishable and thus as the path 
through the present, dying saeculum, Paul identifies the calendrical practices of the 
law with the ‘weak’ cosmos and thus confines the law itself to the present evil age. 
Unlike 4 Ezra, the law does not encapsulate ‘the way of the Most High’ (cf. 4 Ezra 
4:11 – 13; 7:79; 7:129) but is itself enslaved and, as we shall see, thus producing 
children for slavery. There are three exegetical observations in support of this 
interpretation. 
 First, Paul’s use of the adjectives ‘weak’ (ἀσθενής) and ‘poor’ (πτωχός, 4:9) to 
describe the elements along with his expression of fear that his work among the 
Galatians might be in ‘vain’ (εἰκῇ, 4:11) invite the question: in what respect? The 
immediate context suggests that the ‘vanity’ Paul has in view is with respect to the 
Galatians’ relationship to God, who has come to know them through Paul’s work 
(4:9).103 Though he uses a different word in Gal 2:2 (κενός), there Paul both expresses 
                                                
100 For arguments and evidence in support of this meaning, see J. Blinzler, ‘Lexikalisches zu dem 
Terminus τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου bei Paulus‘, in Studiorum Paulinorum Congressus Internationalis 
Catholicus 1961 (AnBib 17 – 18; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1963), 2.429 – 43; E. 
Schweizer, ‘Slaves of the Elements and Worshipers of Angels: Gal 4:3, 9 and Col 2:8, 18, 20‘, JBL 107 
(1988): 455 – 68; D. Rusam, ‘Neue Belege zu den stoicheia tou kosmou (Gal 4,3.9; Kol 2,8.20)‘, ZNW 83 
(1992): 119 – 25; M.C. de Boer, ‘The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου in Galatians‘, NTS 53 
(2007): 204 – 24. For an alternative approach, see C.E. Arnold, ‘Returning to the Domain of the 
Powers: ”Stoicheia” as Evil Spirits in Galatians 4:3,9‘, NovT 38 (1996): 55 – 76. For a thorough 
overview of the literature, see T. Witulski, Die Adressaten des Galaterbriefes: Untersuchungen zur 
Gemeinde von Antiochia ad Pisidiam (FRLANT 193; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 83 – 
152. 
101 de Boer, ‘Meaning‘, 222 – 24. 
102 Pace ibid., 224, Paul’s rhetoric is grounded in his theology at this point.  
103 Though there is irony in these verses, the references to knowledge of God and vanity preclude 
the view that he is engaging here in nothing more than ‘a bit of satire and mock[ery]’; contra 
Nordgaard, ‘Provenance‘, 78. 
 230 
a similar fear about the possible vanity of his labour among the Gentiles and 
employs the slavery metaphor to describe the state of those Gentiles who adopt 
circumcision. Likewise, in Gal 3:4, Paul wonders if the sufferings of the Galatians 
were ‘in vain’ (εἰκῇ).  
 Second, in light of this thematic parallel of fear of vanity with Gal 3:1 – 5, 
Paul’s rhetorical question in verse 3:5 stands out as a potent contrast to Gal 4:9 – 10. 
For it was not the ‘works of the law’ (ἐξ ἔργων νόµου) but ‘the message received by 
faith’ (ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως) that was the means through which God supplies (ἐπιχορηγέω) 
the Spirit who ‘works powers’ (ἐνεργῶν δυνάµεις) among the Galatians. That is, in the 
context of Gal 4:9 – 10, the weakness, poverty, and vanity of observance of the 
Jewish calendar suggests that, as one aspect of the works of the law, not only do 
these practices not lead to the receipt of the Spirit or the miracles that accompany it, 
but they are of a different, entropic order altogether.  
 Third, this way of reading Paul’s conception of the weak and impoverished 
life of the Jewish (and pagan) calendar as cosmically weak in comparison with the 
experience of the Spirit is supported by the immediately preceding context. In Gal 
4:4 – 6, it is the receipt of the Spirit in the hearts of believers and the resulting cry of 
adoption that proves that believers are no longer enslaved to the cosmic elements 
(4:3). This reading suggests a rationale for Paul’s necessary antithesis between the 
works of the law and faith in Christ. Though Paul and his opponents share the 
experience of the Spirit, only Paul sees in the experience the creation of 
eschatological human life. This suggests that, for Paul, to be a recipient of the Spirit 
is to be separated from the enslaving entropic order through the receipt of 
eschatological life and to be included within the eschatological order this life 
represents. That is, if, as we have argued, Paul is arguing against a conception of the 
law as a life-giving gift, similar to the one held by 4 Ezra, then, by highlighting the 
shared cycle of life and death at the heart of the calendars of the law and pagan 
religion, Paul confines the law theologically to the ‘weak’ and enslaved cosmos. In 
short, he denies that the law is life-giving and attempts to show why the law is also 
necessarily not life-ordering. We noted above Paul’s frequent identification of the 
Spirit as the means of divine life-giving (the Spirit as ‘life-giver’ per se, 2 Cor 3:6; cf. 
Rom 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor 15:22, 45), and below we will see that it is this recognition of 
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the Spirit as life-giving agent that provides the hermeneutical frame for Paul’s 
argument in Galatians 4:21 - 31. 
4.2.2 Two Tales of Two Cities: Disclosing Christomorphic Reality in Pneumatological Birth 
(4:21 – 31) 
 Paul and 4 Ezra read sacred text and salvation-history differently because 
they construe God’s life-giving benefaction differently: whereas 4 Ezra considers the 
created donation of Torah-ordered life as the inviolable life-ordering gift, Paul 
identifies the Torah with the ‘dead’ order of fallen existence from which 
eschatological life emerges and to which the order of life of the Christ-gift is 
necessarily indifferent. These theologies and their hermeneutics arise from differing 
accounts of revelation—for 4 Ezra, the observation of reversal at the eschaton for the 
Torah-worthy, for Paul, the revelation of the risen Christ and the donation of the 
Spirit within history for the unworthy. Yet, this leads us to a crucial issue in the 
interpretation of Galatians; for it is one thing to recognise the competing appeals to 
revelatory experience of Paul and Ezra, but the Galatians and their Jewish Christian 
mentors share both Paul’s commitment to the risen Messiah and his experience of 
the Spirit. Yet, they differ over the Torah. What is needed, then, is not an appeal to 
Paul’s revelatory experience but insight into the hermeneutical framework in which 
he finds it to have the precise intelligibility articulated in Galatians. In this 
connection, in Galatians 4:21 – 31 Paul articulates the creative pneumatological 
hermeneutic that differentiates his reading of the Torah from his opponents and 
enables him to see the stable pattern of divine saving action.  
 Scholars have puzzled not only over the content and form of Paul’s summary 
message in Galatians 4:21 – 31 but also, more basically, over the reason he felt 
compelled to offer it at all. It could be the case, as C.K. Barrett argued, that Paul is 
offering his own counter-reading of Genesis 16 – 21 in response to his opponents.104 
Nonetheless, if, as we have argued, Paul’s account of the Torah as death-dealing in 
character in light of the life-giving and ordering Christ-gift refutes an eschatological 
reading of Leviticus 18:5 in benefactory terms, then his reading of the Sarah and 
                                                
104 C.K. Barrett, ‘The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians‘, in 
Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann zum 70. Geburtstag (ed. J. Friedrich, W. Pöhlmann, and P. 
Stuhlmacher; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 1 – 16. 
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Hagar story provides an essential piece to his reading of salvation- and cosmic 
history. For he has sought to refute a scriptural hermeneutic by which one might see 
the consistency of divine saving action despite the experience of futility in a 
corrupted cosmos, but he has not offered his own. Paul’s reading of the Pentateuch 
via an interpretation of Genesis 16 – 21 is, thus, neither an ‘afterthought’105 nor an 
occasion for ‘offensive and heretical’ statements that amount to ‘hermeneutical 
jujitsu’,106 but the display of the lens through which one might see the donation of 
the promise, the addition of the Torah, and the Christ-event as expressing one 
singular saving purpose. That lens is creative and Christomorphic, as Paul sees 
prefigured in the births of Isaac and Ishmael two manners of birth—one according to 
‘natural’ human means (κατὰ σάρκα) and, thus, confined to slavery and death, and 
one by the miraculous power of the Spirit and thus eschatologically free (κατὰ 
πνεῦµα, 4:29). 
 The first indication of Paul’s creative and christomorphic hermeneutic is the 
shift from personal to impersonal address at the start of his reading in Gal 4:21 – 31. 
In Gal 4:19, Paul’s concern is for his ‘little children’, his experience is akin to the 
anguish of birth pangs, and the reason for both is that Christ is not yet ‘formed 
among [them]’, while, in v. 21, the problem is that ‘those who want to be under the 
law’ do not listen to what the Pentateuch says.107 The implication is that they should 
listen to their ‘mother’ Paul in this connection, who playing off of the more 
restrictive (Sinai law) and the expanded senses (Pentateuch) of νόµος, personifies the 
Pentateuch and places a message in its mouth for this class who is considering 
entering life ὑπὸ νόµον.108 It is crucial to recognise that what the Pentateuch ‘says’ is 
not a particular text, as in all of Paul’s other personifications of ἡ γραφή (3:8; 22; 4:30), 
                                                
105 Dunn, Theology of Galatians, 124. 
106 Hays, Echoes, 112, 115. 
107 For the connection between Paul’s role as ‘mother’ and his interpretation of the children of Gal 
16 – 21, see B.R. Gaventa, ‘The Maternity of Paul: an Exegetical Study of Galatians 4:19‘, in The 
Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul & John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn (ed. R.T. Fortna and B.R. 
Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 189 – 201; idem, Our Mother Saint Paul (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2007), 29 – 39; S.G. Eastman, Recovering Paul’s Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in 
Galatians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 89 – 126. 
108 We should resist the temptation to gloss Paul’s use of νόµος here as ‘Scripture’, because Paul 
reserves the personification of ἡ γραφή for particular passages (Gen 12:3 in Gal 3:8; Dt 27:26 in Gal 
3:22; Gen 21:10 in Gal 4:30); pace de Boer, Galatians, 291. That this is Paul’s and not his opponents’ 
summary message in 4:22, 23 (pace Barrett, ‘Allegory‘, 10) seems clear from the tight fit between the 
opposition slave-free and flesh-promise and the larger argumentative frame Paul constructs. 
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but rather Paul’s summary of the story of Abraham’s two sons. Moreover, 
everything they need to hear is implied in two features of this story— the 
contrasting statuses of the sons’ mothers (slave or free, 4:22) and the differing 
manners of the sons’ births (κατὰ σάρκα and δι᾿ ἐπαγγελίας, 4:23).109 
 Though, as we have seen, Paul’s reading of salvation-history has depended 
on figural logic throughout, he makes the procedure explicit by claiming that ‘these 
things’ (ἅτινα; i.e., the status of the mothers and the manners of birth of the sons) are 
‘figuratively spoken’ (ἀλληγορούµενα) as representing two covenants. As a reading of 
the contemporary message of the Pentateuch, this is not an arbitrary imposition on 
the Abraham story but an argument about its deep eschatological and saving logic. 
Thus, Paul begins with the mother/covenant that corresponds to his initial class of 
addressees—those who want to be under the law—and draws a line from Hagar, to 
Mt. Sinai, and ending with the present Jerusalem.110 Though Mt. Sinai is in Arabia, it 
probably ‘is placed in the column with the present Jerusalem’ (συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν 
Ἰερουσαλήµ, 3:25) because Paul is expressing a shorthand geographical teleology not 
unlike that of 4 Ezra. Just as, in episode four of 4 Ezra, the law received in the 
wilderness (9:21 – 31) had Zion as its goal (10:44 – 46), so, in Paul’s reading, the 
trajectory of the covenant that originated at Sinai (ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ) is toward 
Jerusalem. What is striking in this comparison is that, for Paul, the theological 
momentum of this Sinai covenant begins with Hagar and ends at the present 
Jerusalem. This contradicts not only the bi-focal hermeneutic finally adopted by Ezra 
but also the vision that confirms it: for, whereas for 4 Ezra, the earthly Mother 
Jerusalem will be, qua the Torah-righteous, transformed into the heavenly Zion, for 
Paul the Sinai covenant and her earthly city are Hagar, enslaved to the dying cosmos 
and excluded from the eschatological inheritance. 
                                                
109 For the adverbial rather than adjectival rendering of these phrases, see J.L. Martyn, Theological 
Issues in the Letters of Paul (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 201, n. 225; Martyn, Galatians, 453–54,  n. 175. 
110 The textual fluidity surrounding the word Ἁγάρ is probably best explained by its presence 
originally and subsequent removal because of the difficulty of understanding the identification, 
though either reading has claim to the lectio difficilior; cf. Betz, Galatians, 244; Schlier, Galater, 220; F.F. 
Bruce, The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1982), 219. For an argument against inclusion, see esp. Mussner, Galaterbrief, 323–24. 
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 Paul’s abrupt shift from general (v.21) to specific addressees (µήτηρ ἡµῶν) in v. 
26 corresponds to a shift from this entropic to an eschatological point of view.111 
Additionally, the identification of the free Jerusalem above as ‘our Mother’ is the 
first of three such identifications from this perspective (4:28; 31), underlining Paul’s 
emphatic concern that the Galatians see themselves as he sees them, as free children 
born from and headed toward the heavenly Jerusalem. The fact that Paul begins to 
interpret the ‘Sarah’ side of the column from the end of its teleology, far from 
betraying a disinterest in the Abrahamic covenant, rather provides a sharp and 
telling contrast with the ‘present Jerusalem’ and its covenant. In short, whereas the 
theological momentum of the Sinaitic covenant begins with Hagar and ends at the 
present Jerusalem, the theological momentum of the Abrahamic promise begins and 
ends in the Jerusalem above—its heavenly source and goal. Put differently, seen 
through Paul’s conception of a cosmos and humanity enslaved to sin (3:21, 22), not 
only is the message of the whole Pentateuch found in nuce in Genesis 16 – 21, but the 
pattern of divine saving action established there already envisages the law’s integral 
participation in and confinement to this ‘dead’ existence of humanity under Sin in 
view of the life-giving and liberating Christ-gift.112 In this connection, Paul’s 
quotation of Isaiah 54:1 provides material support for his conception of the 
particular shape of divine saving action. It is commonly recognised that the motif of 
barrenness provides the thematic connection between Paul’s actualising reading of 
the Pentateuch via Genesis 16 – 21 and his citation of Isaiah 54:1 as support for v. 
26.113 What is missed is how Paul’s citation of this verse occurs within a discourse 
about the emergence of eschatological life within a ‘barren’ cosmos: the point of 
                                                
111 Hays, Echoes, 118: ‘Theologically, this image suggests that the hope of Israel rests in God’s 
transcendent grace rather than in the results of a human historical process.’ 
112 Paul is not reading Gen 16 – 21 in an arbitrary or even typological fashion here, but rather he is 
reading the Pentateuch as a whole from this story producing a figural correspondence; pace Martyn, 
Galatians, 448 n. 166. 
113 For a full analysis of this motif and the connection, see K.H. Jobes, ‘Jerusalem, Our Mother: 
Metalepsis and Intertextuality in Galatians 4:21 – 31‘, WTJ 55 (1993): 299 – 320. Cf. Betz, Galatians, 249; 
C. H. Cosgrove, ‘The Law has Given Sarah No Children (Gal. 4:21 – 30)‘, NovT 29 (1987): 231; S. Di 
Mattei, ‘Paul’s Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4.21 – 31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic 
Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics‘, NTS 52 (2006): 115, 118; M.C. de Boer, ‘Paul’s Quotation of Isaiah 
54.1 in Galatians 4.27‘, NTS 50 (2004): 377 – 79; Dieter Sänger, ‘Sara, die Freie - unsere Mutter. 
Namenallegorese als Interpretament christlicher Identitätsbildung in Gal 4,21 – 31‘, in Neues Testament 
und hellenistisch-jüdische Alltagskultur: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen (ed. R. Deines, J. Herzer, and K.-
W. Niebuhr; WUNT II 274; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 236 – 37. 
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Paul’s citation of Isaiah 54:1 is not simply the identification of the ‘birth’ of Paul and 
the Galatians (‘our Mother’, 4:26) as a reversal of barrenness, but rather the manner 
of this birth (ὑµεῖς δέ, ἀδελφοί, κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα ἐστέ, 4:28). For in this 
reversal of ‘barrenness’—specifically, its origin and the manner and potency of its 
begetting—Paul’s sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in salvation-history. 
God gives ‘life’ to the barren on the basis of a promise, so that, those who receive this 
promise depend on the miraculous work of God alone. To be born ‘through promise’ 
(δι᾿ ἐπαγγελίας, 4:23) is analogically identical to being ‘promised children’ (ἐπαγγελίας 
τέκνα, 4:28): the source and manner of Isaac’s physical birth is the archetype of which 
the ‘birth’ of the Galatians is the eschatological type. Moreover, in both cases the 
manner of begetting is κατὰ πνεῦµα, which is to say by means of God’s creative 
power.114 
Conclusion—Differing Life-Giving and Life-Ordering Gifts, Differing 
Hermeneutics 
The formal parallels between the treatments of the earthly and heavenly cities in 
Galatians and 4 Ezra make the material theological differences all the more striking: 
both metaphors operate in a cosmologically and eschatologically framed discussion 
of the proper identification of heirs. Yet, in 4 Ezra the relationship between the 
present and heavenly Jerusalem is read through a creational and Torah-shaped 
hermeneutic: the present Jerusalem, though subject to the futility of historical 
existence, is worthy and in so far as she gives birth to children who order their lives 
in Torah-terms, receives her righteous children back resurrected at the eschaton. By 
contrast, in Galatians the relationship between the present and heavenly Jerusalem is 
read through a pneumatologically creative and Christ-shaped hermeneutic: the 
present Jerusalem gives birth only to morally enslaved and eschatologically dead 
children in history unless they, like the Gentiles, are ‘born’ by the Spirit through 
receipt of the Christ-gift in history. For the law is confined to the fallen creation (Gal 
                                                
114 Though Thiessen recognises this ‘birth’ motif, his attempt at a Sonderweg interpretation of 
Paul’s account of descent and inheritance is unconvincing, because it fails to deal adequately with 
those points where the Torah itself and those who practise it are confined to ‘the present evil age’; cf. 
Thiessen, Gentile Problem, 105–60. 
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4:3, 9)—given to, fitted for, and cursing a ‘dead’ humanity, in anticipation of Jesus’ 
life-giving death received by faith (Gal 3:21, 22). 
 Thus we arrive at the conclusion of our comparison and the answer to both of 
our hermeneutical questions: Paul reads scripture, salvation-history, and the world 
differently than 4 Ezra and his opponents in Galatia because, whereas they see the 
Torah as the inviolable order of the divine gift of created life, Paul considers the 
Torah a part of the ‘barren’ created order from which the Christ-event gives birth to 
and orders eschatological life in the Spirit. In this way, our exegetical dialogue with 
4 Ezra has furthered research on Galatians in two respects. First, we have shown that 
current accounts of Paul’s theological logic in Gal 3 – 4 have not accounted for how 
Paul’s reading of salvation-history both takes on a necessary shape despite the 
contingent curse he appeals to in Dt 27:26 (Gal 3:10) and why, after the removal of 
inability, the law cannot provide the order of life of the church. As we have argued, 
an understanding of Paul’s answer depends on seeing how the law is negatively but 
integrally related to the Christ-gift: the law confines all things to a ‘dead’ existence 
and is itself fitted for and confined to that reality by divine design in light of the 
coming of the promised life-giving and life-ordering Christ gift. Second and in this 
connection, we have gone beyond recent research on gift in Paul, by showing that a 
mere recognition of the unconditioned and incongruous donation of the Christ-gift is 
not sufficient for capturing Paul’s deep logic. For Paul does not beg the question of 
the significance of the Christ-gift for the law in the church, but rather argues for its 
necessary confinement to the present evil age. A focus on divine life-giving 
benefaction in our comparative texts has, thus, brought Paul’s ‘submerged 
assumption’ to the surface. 115 Yet, given Paul’s rather schematic reading, our debate 
partners may still fairly ask: why is the self ‘dead’, and, if not the Torah, how does 
the Christ-gift order both self and society? We turn to these questions in 
conversation with 4 Maccabees in our final chapter.
                                                
115 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 407. 
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Chapter 5 
Life that Counts: The Reconstitution of the Self and Communal 
Flourishing in Galatians 5 – 6 in Debate with 4 Maccabees 
 
‘Who hindered you from obeying the truth?’ (Gal 5:7b). This question both 
encapsulates the debate outlined in the previous chapter and suggests key issues 
that debate raises. In our texts the truth is not simply believed but obeyed because it 
concerns the donation and ordering of life by God. In other words, our texts assume 
the convention of ‘balanced reciprocity’ characteristic of Greco-Roman systems of 
gift-exchange, wherein a gift obligates ‘returning the same kind of gifts, or gifts of 
equal value for those received.’1 4 Ezra presents the Mosaic choice between life and 
death as the hermeneutic for seeing beyond the futility of history to the gift of 
resurrection life for the Torah-righteous. Paul, by contrast, reads sacred text and 
salvation-history Christomorphically, arguing that the law’s curse recognises a 
singular ‘dead’ humanity, enslaved to the entropic elements of the cosmos and in 
need of the singular life-giving Christ-gift.  
 Both 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees consider life to be irrevocably given and ordered 
by the Torah at creation and, thus, Paul cannot simply assert that human beings are 
‘dead’ and that the law is implicated in this entropic order. He must explain why 
this is the case. More specifically, Paul, in apparently denying the libertas of 4 Ezra or 
4 Maccabees’ argument about the sufficiency of εὐσεβὴς λογισµός to rule the self, 
invites the questions of why he considers humanity ‘dead’, how this is to be 
understood, and what order of society, if not the Torah, the Christ-event entails. In 
Gal 5:13 – 6:10, we see how Paul would answer.  
 Thus, one burden of this chapter is to demonstrate how the anthropological 
and social questions that would be pressed by 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees illumine the 
debate about the relation of Gal 5 – 6 to the rest of the letter. Firstly, we aim to 
further research on the coherence of Galatians by showing that Gal 5:13 – 26 
represents the material ground and explication of Paul’s assumption that human 
beings are ‘dead’ in Gal 3:21. In this connection, we develop Troels Engberg-
Pedersen’s insight that Gal 4:21 – 31 provides a ‘bridge’ from Paul’s theological 
                                                
1 S. Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection 
(WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 22. 
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reading of salvation-history to his parenesis in Gal 5, demonstrating that the 
assumptions of both sections are defended theologically and grounded 
anthropologically in Gal 5:13 – 26.2 In the context of accounts of the theology and 
coherence of Galatians, this argument is significant because it shows how, 
ultimately, Paul’s account of the Flesh/Spirit antithesis in Gal 5:13 – 26 is the 
theological ground for his autobiography (Gal 1 – 2), his reading of salvation-history 
(Gal 3 – 4), and his ethical material (Gal 6). In this connection, recent scholarship has 
rightly abandoned two options that view Paul’s ‘ethical’ material as only loosely 
related to Gal 1 – 4: Paul is neither shifting here to a generalised collection of 
sententiae, nor fighting a two-front war against ‘legalism’ and ‘libertinism’, but 
rather, as most now argue, Gal 5 – 6 represents an integral piece,3 for some, the 
climax of Paul’s argument for the singular gospel.4  
 This chapter will modify this consensus, reintroducing 4 Maccabees’ 
philosophically inflected argument for the superiority of the Torah-ordered self and 
society. The aim is to clarify why Paul gives this particular account of the self in the 
context of the antithesis between the Flesh and the Spirit and how this account 
necessarily finds its proper expression in a Christ-shaped self and social order. In 
this connection, we will resolve the debate between Engberg-Pedersen and J. Louis 
Martyn over the character and function of Paul’s virtue ethics, showing both that 
Paul is concerned with individual virtue (contra Martyn) and that his account of the 
self is not structurally identical to but would decisively modify a Stoic account of 
anthropology (contra Engberg-Pederson).5 Specifically, we show, through exegetical 
dialogue, that Paul is operating with an inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered 
agency. Moreover, by attending to the formal structure of Paul’s argument in 
                                                
2 T. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34: ‘the 
two triads of law, flesh and slavery versus Christ, faith, spirit and freedom will be developed with 
regard to their internal, logical connection in the ‘paranetic’ section. In addition to providing exhortation 
of the Galatians, which it does do, that section also spells out exactly how it makes sense to connect the 
three items in either triad.’ 
3 F.J. Matera, “The Culmination of Paul’s Argument to the Galatians: Gal. 5.1-6.17,” JSNT 32 
(1988): 79–91; S. Schewe, Die Galater zurückgewinnen: paulinische Strategien in Galater 5 und 6 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); T.A. Wilson, The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: 
Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians (WUNT II 225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
4 See Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 136; M. Konradt, ‘Die Christonomie der Freiheit: Zu Paulus’ 
Enfaltung seines ethischen Ansatzes in Gal 5,13 – 6,10‘, EC 1 (2010): 60 – 81. 
5 Cf.  J.L Martyn, Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997); idem, ‘De-apocalypticizing Paul: An 
Essay Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen” JSNT 86 (2002); Engberg-
Pedersen, Stoics; idem, “Response to Martyn,” JSNT 86 (2002): 103–14. 
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conversation with 4 Maccabees, we will establish the apologetic character and clarify 
the logical form of the argument in Gal 5. In this way, way we take up the argument 
of Barclay, neglected by scholars, that Paul is involved in an apologetic ‘bridge-
building’ exercise.6 Though we will range across 4 Maccabees, one point will 
provoke particularly illuminating dialogue—the ‘philosophical’ section (4 Macc 1 – 
3), where the Torah-order defines the virtuous self and community (esp., 2:21 – 23). 
 In sketching a debate with 4 Maccabees through Gal 5 – 6, I will argue two 
theses: 1) whereas 4 Maccabees presents a Torah-ordered self that maintains its 
divinely given created integrity and, thus, freedom, Paul’s inchoate theory of action 
presents a self that, unless re-created and governed by the Spirit, is not free but in 
bondage to the evil passions and desires common to humanity, to the ‘Flesh’ (Gal 
5:13 – 26); 2) in both Galatians and 4 Maccabees, however, life is ordered where it is 
given, and, thus, while the proper expression of Torah-ordered existence is 
obedience to the Torah unto death in 4 Maccabees, in Galatians, by contrast, Spirit-
normed lives take the christomorphic shape of burden-bearing (6:1 – 5) and, thus, 
life-giving (6:6 – 10) communities. With regard to the latter thesis, we contribute to 
the debate over the relationship between Paul’s ethics and Christology vis-à-vis the 
Torah by clarifying the theological significance of the phrase ὁ νόµος τοῦ Χριστοῦ in 
Gal 6:2. By showing how the phrase encapsulates Paul’s apologetic bridge-building 
activity from the Christ-gift back to the Torah, we further paradigmatic readings of 
this phrase and show why the ethical material of Gal 6:1 – 10 serves a vital 
theological function in Paul’s argument. 
 In summary, it is in Paul’s Christological and pneumatological account of the 
creation and ordering of the self and community that the difference of his theological 
logic with that of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra comes to its clearest expression. For Gal 5 – 
6 provides the material basis and deep coherence of Paul’s previous argument by 
explaining the significance of and need for the new existence through the Christ-
gift—created, sustained, and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, through our exegetical 
dialogue with 4 Maccabees, this chapter produces two vital results for our thesis. 
First, by demonstrating how Gal 5:13 – 26 functions as the material theological 
                                                
6  J.M.G. Barclay, Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s Ethics in Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1988), 124 – 25. 
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ground for Paul’s argument in Gal 1 – 4 and why the ethical instruction of Gal 6 is 
necessary for theological completeness, this chapter concludes our new account of 
the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians.  
 This result is significant because it shows how Paul’s conception of the Christ-
gift as life-giving and life-ordering provides thematic coherence between Gal 1 – 4 
and Gal 5 – 6, while specifying the integral relation and separate theological function 
of Gal 5:13 – 26 and Gal 6:1 – 10. Whereas previous approaches assume, as Susanne 
Schewe rightly argues, a ‘Themaverschiebung’ that renders Gal 5:13 – 6:10 a 
‘Fremdkörper’ in the letter, the present chapter demonstrates how this section is 
thematically coherent with the rest of the letter because of its theological function.7 
Paul presents himself as an exemplary unworthy recipient of the life-giving and life-
ordering Christ-gift (Gal 1 – 2), bringing his autobiography to its climax with an 
account of himself as a ‘resurrected’ agent in the Christ-gift (Gal 2:18 – 21); he 
provides exegetical arguments for a reading of salvation and cosmic history 
designed to demonstrate how the law confines all things and is itself confined to a 
‘dead’ existence in light of this life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift (Gal 3 – 4; esp. 
3:21, 22); and, as we shall argue, he concludes (Gal 5 – 6) by showing why the Christ-
gift, not the Torah, is needed to effect the creation of new agents in the Spirit, and 
how these new agents are, in turn, properly ordered by the Spirit within a new 
community. Thus, at each stage in his argument, Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift 
as life-giving and life-ordering provides deep thematic coherence, while in Gal 5:13 – 
                                                
7 Schewe identifies three approaches used by scholars to construe the thematic unity and function 
of Gal 5:13 – 6:10 within the letter: 1) dogmatic models, which argue that the section arises as a 
necessary consequence of Paul’s previously articulated theology in the letter (Galater, 16 – 26); 2) 
rhetorical models, which construe the letter as deliberative rhetoric and this section as Paul’s final 
appeal to live differently (ibid., 26 – 48); 3) historical models, which depend on reconstructions of the 
situation in Galatia to interpret the particularities of this section (ibid., 49 – 59). On the argument 
about an assumed Themaverschiebung in these models, which thus renders Gal 5:13 – 6:10 a 
Fremdkörper in the letter, see Schewe, Galater, 9, 10, 40. Though similar to dogmatic accounts, the 
argument of this chapter differs from them because it sees Gal 5:13 – 6:10 arising not as a consequence 
of the theology developed in Gal 1 – 4 but as the climactic expression of the logical ground and 
necessary ethical order of that theology. In addition to Schewe’s monograph, for studies that limit 
Paul’s intention here to rhetorical persuasion, see the seminal work of G.A. Kennedy, New Testament 
Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1984), 144–52 and the more recent 
text-based study of D.F. Tolmie, Persuading the Galatians: A Text-centred Rhetorical Analysis of a Pauline 
Letter (WUNT II 190; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 189–203. Barclay’s earlier monograph is the 
preeminent ‘historical’ approach to these issues; J.M.G. Barclay, Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s 
Ethics in Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988). For two recent and significant theological construals, 
see Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 131 – 77 and Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2015), 423 – 41. 
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26 he grounds this theme theologically in an account of human bondage to evil 
passions and desires out of which the Christ-gift creates and orders new agents for a 
new community. 
 Second and consequently, we go beyond recent accounts of gift in Paul by 
showing why attention to the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering is necessary 
for capturing the deep theological logic of Galatians. As we have seen in chapter 
four, Paul does not assume that the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift 
precludes Torah norms in the church, but rather he argues that order of the church is 
necessarily indifferent to the Torah because the law confines and is confined to a 
‘dead’ existence under sin. Thus, the Torah’s function is integral to the Christ-gift, 
producing the entropic conditions out of which life is created and ordered by the 
Spirit. Likewise, as we shall argue, though it is the case that the Christ-gift is realised 
in ‘non-competitive communities, ordered by a new calibration of worth’8, this does 
not address the question why the Torah itself cannot produce such communities or 
represent the divine standard of worth. In other words, what is needed is an account 
of the inferential logic of Gal 5:18: εἰ δὲ πνεύµατι ἄγεσθε, οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόµον. In this 
connection, we argue that, in Gal 5:13 – 26, that ὑπὸ νόµον is Paul’s shorthand for the 
law’s participation and role in humanity’s bondage to the Flesh (i.e., the disordering 
evil passions and desires common to humanity), while it is in the Christ-gift that 
new agents are created and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, it is the life-giving and life-
ordering aspect of the Christ-event as divine gift that structures Paul’s theological 
logic. Likewise, as we shall argue, it is not simply that the Christ-gift establishes its 
own communal norms as unconditioned gift, for Paul, but rather that it does so in 
deeper fulfillment of the aims of the Torah itself. That is, the Christ-gift does not 
simply set aside Torah norms; it produces, as we shall argue, a Christ-piety that 
fulfills the Torah-virtue of love. 
5.1 Vice and Virtue in Galatia: Paul’s Apologetic Argument for Torah-Virtue 
without Torah-Piety in Gal 5 
In light of the scholarly confusion over the logic undergirding Gal 5:2, John Barclay 
poses the key question: ‘Why is it inconceivable to Paul that believing Gentiles might 
                                                
8 Barclay, Gift, 425. 
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express their faith in Christ, and conduct their life of love in the Spirit, by getting 
circumcised and observing the Torah?’9 We pursued a related question in the 
previous chapter: why, for Paul, does the law pronounce an indiscriminate and 
inevitable curse on those who follow it? Put simply, given Gal 3:21, 22, the law 
curses indiscriminately because it finds within humanity nothing by which to 
discriminate. In positive terms, the law is given to ‘dead’ humanity and, thus, its 
cursing word places all things under Sin as a preparatio evangelii. As we argued, it is 
not Paul’s appeal to the Christ-event in general but his conception of the Christ-gift 
as life-giving and, thus, his creative hermeneutic in particular that sets his reading of 
text and world apart from that of his opponents. In this section we will examine how 
Paul’s particular death-life framing of the slavery and freedom motif is vital for 
discerning both the logic of necessity in his extremely compressed summary in Gal 
5:1 – 6 and the apologetic character of his argument in Gal 5:13 – 26. For, we will 
argue, to render circumcision and Torah-observance a matter of indifference with 
respect to the demands of love (Gal 5:6), is both to call into question 4 Maccabees’ 
definition of love and to introduce an argument for Torah-virtue, although not 
Torah-piety.10 
 Consequently, by attending to the relation between the content and form of 
Paul’s argument, we contribute to the overall aim of this chapter in two ways. First, 
we begin to show why, for Paul, the law both provides the moral criteria the Christ-
gift fulfilles and yet the law itself cannot secure. Second, by showing how Paul’s 
notion of freedom carries his account of the Christ-gift in life-ordering and life-
giving terms, we begin to offer an explanation of the thematic coherence and 
argumentative function of Gal 5 – 6, while also underlining the importance of Paul’s 
construal of divine benefaction in life-givign and life-ordering terms for the 
argument.2 
                                                
9 J.M.G Barclay, ‘Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of 
Galatians‘, ABR 58 (2010): 37. 
10 By ‘Torah-virtue’, I mean love, the disposition Paul argues fulfils the law (Gal 5:13; cf. Lev 
19:18) and is the product of the Spirit in various forms (5:22, 23); by ‘Torah-piety’, I mean the practices 
of the Torah that Paul has been persuading the Galatians not to adopt (e.g., circumcision). 
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5.1.1 Life that Counts: Freedom as the Expression of New Existence in Love 
 The bridge Paul constructs in Gal 5:1 from 4:21 – 31 to 5:2 – 6 carries his 
particular notion of ‘freedom’ as eschatological existence directly into the crisis over 
circumcision in Galatia.11 As argued in the previous chapter, by freedom, Paul 
means the status of the Galatians as heirs born κατὰ πνεῦµα (4:28) and, thus, no longer 
subject to the ‘dead’ existence of ‘all things under Sin’ (3:21 -22), whether in the form 
of pagan or Jewish subservience to the order of life under the cosmic elements (4:1 -
11). Thus, against both the majority view that the state of ἐλευθερία12 in Gal 5:1 has to 
do with freedom from the law per se13 and a relatively recent minority report that 
identifies the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου of Gal 4:3, 9 as the primary referent,14 the present 
approach locates the meaning in the relation between the two. That is, when, on the 
basis of the state of new life the Galatians have, Paul implores in v. 1b, ‘stand firm, 
therefore, and do not be burdened again by a yoke of slavery’ (στήκετε οὖν καὶ µὴ 
πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε), what he means by ‘yoke of slavery’ is subjection to the 
                                                
11 Three features underline the transitional function of this verse: the reintroduction of Χριστός, 
framing 4:21 – 31 between 4:19, its asyndetic character, and the clear relation of the command µὴ πάλιν 
ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε to the discussion of circumcision in vv. 2 – 4. As Williams concludes, ‘Although 
5:1 is connected thematically with what precedes and follows and indeed functions as a bridge 
passage between the allegory and the parenetic material of chapters 5 and 6, syntactically this verse 
stands in grand isolation. No particle or conjunction binds it to what precedes, and no conjunction or 
particle in 5:2 connects verse 1 to what follows’; S.K. Williams, Galatians (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 
132. For the best structural analysis of this section in the context of Paul’s total argument, see 
Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 132–36.  
12 Since Deissmann’s discovery of the use of this phrase in sacral manumission rites, most 
scholars take this phrase as a dative of goal or purpose, and thus in parallel with ἐπ᾿ ἐλευθερίᾳ in 5:13; 
A. Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of 
the Graeco-Roman World (trans. L.R.M. Strachan; New York: Harper, 1927), 324 – 34. See, e.g., H. 
Schlier, Der Brief an die Galater (14th ed.; KEK 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 229; M.C. 
de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 309, n. 433. For an 
account of the textual variants likely created by confusion over this dative phrase and a compelling 
argument for Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡµᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν as the original reading, see Burton, Galatians, 270–
71. 
13 de Boer, Galatians, 311. 
14 Contra Coppins, Paul does not use στοιχεῖα and ζυγὸς δουλείας as ‘catch-all terms that are 
applicable to the past and present situations of both Jews and Gentiles,’ but rather, because of the 
law’s cosmic role in 3:21, the latter refers to the Torah in such a way that its integral relation to the 
former is presupposed; W. Coppins, Interpretation of Freedom in the Letters of Paul: With Special Reference 
to the German Tradition (WUNT II 261; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 114–15. Cf. Jones, who argues 
that the δουλεία in v. 1b cannot be limited to the requirements of the Torah, a position that must 
explain away the obvious limiting function of the word ζυγός; F.S. Jones, “Freiheit” in den Briefen des 
Apostels Paulus: eine historische, exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie (GTA 34; Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 100. 
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entropic existence of the present age in the form of commitment to the Torah.15 Rather 
than burdening themselves with this yoke, Paul’s desire is that the Galatians be 
‘Christ-shaped’ (4:19), but before he can articulate this state of freedom positively 
(beginning in vv. 5 – 6), he must first warn of the negative implications (vv. 2 – 4) of 
refusing to continue standing firm. 
 Because Gal 5:2 – 6 represents the first direct application of Paul’s previous 
argument to the situation in Galatia, 16 the logic is assumed. Consequently, if we ask 
why accepting the practice of circumcision in Galatia would necessarily mean that 
‘Christ will benefit [them] nothing’ (Χριστὸς ὑµᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει, 5:2),17 then we must 
infer the meaning of Christ’s ‘benefit’ from the previous argument to determine why 
circumcision necessarily cancels it. Also, as de Boer observes, the play on the related 
words ὠφελήσει and ὀφειλέτης (v. 3) ‘indicates that the point of v. 3 (obligation to 
observe the whole law) complements the point of v. 2 (Christ will be of no benefit).’18 
With this complementary relation and the necessity of inference in view, then, Paul’s 
solemn declaration to ‘every human being who has himself circumcised that he is 
obliged to do the whole law’ (παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτεµνοµένῳ ὅτι ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸν 
νόµον ποιῆσαι, 5:3) sounds similar to his appeal to the inevitable curse of Dt 27:26 (n.b. 
ποιῆσαι in 3:10, 12), and the implied benefit would seem to be Christ’s curse-bearing 
death (3:13). Thus, the problem with taking on the obligation entailed by the law 
would be that it brings the inevitable curse that the Christ-gift bears. 
 As we have seen, Paul’s salvation-historical argument is eschatologically and 
cosmologically inflected. Thus, the obligation to do the whole law is necessarily 
problematic because the Torah’s curse (3:10; 21) confirms (3:22) and conforms in 
                                                
15 In Coppins’s terms (Freedom, 114 – 115), ‘the freedom in view is “freedom from the elements of 
the world”, of which “the (Jewish) law” is a subset or instantiation’, but it does not follow that the law 
plays no constitutive role in the fundamental cosmic enslavement of the στοιχεῖα, as he suggests when 
limiting the target of 4:8 to Gentile ‘idolatry’ and not subjection to Torah. Rather, Paul’s argument by 
analogy works in these verses only if the latter is akin to the former, and that works, as we have 
argued, only if Jewish and pagan calendrical practices reinforce the same ‘dead’ cycle of life and 
death. Vollenweider is near the mark, ‘Die Tiefendimension paulinischer Reflexion ist freilich erst 
dann ausgelotet, wenn das Gesetz als seine universale anthroplogische – und möglicherweise gar 
kosmologische – Grösse und nicht nur als jüdisches Spezifikum…in den Blick gerät’; S. Vollenweider, 
Freiheit als neue Schopfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt (FRLANT 
147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 309. Contra de Boer (Galatians, 35, 161, 167), it is not 
necessary to conclude, however, that the law itself is ‘an enslaving power’. 
16 J.L. Martyn, Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 469. 
17 Barclay, ‘Battle‘, 36 – 7. 
18 de Boer, Galatians, 312. Cf. Dunn, Galatians, 265. 
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certain respects (e.g., in calendrical practices, 4:1 – 11) to the ‘dead’ condition of ‘all 
things under Sin’ (3:22). Hence, Jesus’ curse-bearing death (3:13) is inseparable from 
its life-giving application in the work of the Spirit in ‘birthing’ heirs from a dead 
humanity (4:21 – 31). In other words, the reason why the acceptance of circumcision 
in Galatia necessarily entails a loss of Christ’s benefit is that Jesus’ life-giving death 
is given not only without regard to Torah-observance but because such observance 
does not produce righteousness (3:21).19 It is not simply that the Torah is a ‘whole 
way of life’20 or a ‘total package [to be] accepted or rejected as such’.21 This begs the 
question Paul is debating with his Jewish-Christian interlocutors: why not include the 
Gentiles on Jewish terms, especially if, as authors like 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees argue, 
the law represents the social expression of created order?22 In Paul’s view, the 
problem is that the Torah oversees a ‘whole way of life’ that is inevitably cursed by 
God and, by divine design (cf. Paul’s emphasis on the historical location of the Torah in 
3:15 -18 vis-à-vis our reading of 3:19 – 22 and 4:1 -11 in the previous chapter), 
integrally related to the fallen created order.23 Thus, the acceptance of the practice of 
circumcision in Galatia,24 because it is, in effect, the acceptance of a cosmic curse only 
the Christ-gift bears, is necessarily a refusal of the life-giving benefit Jesus’ death 
bestows.  
 Verse 4 assumes the same logic, but the language of relationship, gift, and 
forensic evaluation is foregrounded. Paul describes ‘whoever is seeking to justify 
[himself] through the law’ (οἵτινες ἐν νόµῳ δικαιοῦσθε) as ‘cut off from Christ’ 
(κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ) and having ‘fallen from the gift’ (τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε). 
Thus, Paul brackets his forensic construal of those accepting circumcision with 
                                                
19 In this respect, we are in complete agreement with Barclay (‘Battle‘; idem, Paul and the Gift: the 
Christ-gift is unconditioned; what we are trying to explain is why for Paul it is also necessarily 
incongruous. 
20 Dunn, Galatians, 266 – 67; followed by R.B. Hays, The Letter to the Galatians (NIB XI; Nashville: 
Abingdon, 2000), 312 and de Boer, Galatians, 314. 
21 de Boer, Galatians, 314. 
22 For appeals to experience and the apparent misfit between nationalistic construals of Jewish 
identity and unconditional grace, see Dunn, Galatians, 262, 265, 271.  
23 As argued in chapter four, Stanley’s argument that the curse of Gal 3:10 is not actualised or 
inevitable is mistaken; C.D. Stanley, ‘“Under a Curse“: A Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10 – 14‘, NTS 
36 (1990): 481 – 511. Thus, Wilson’s thesis, because it depends on the view that the curse is a threat, is 
unpersuasive; Wilson, Curse. 
24 I take the verb περιτέµνησθε in v. 2 as middle because of the durative force of the present tense, 
thus specifying the acceptance of circumcision as a community practice; so, de Boer, Galatians, 311. 
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relational and gift language because ‘the Gift’ is a life-giving relationship with Christ 
for those who are ‘dead’—incapable of securing justification through the law. 
Seeking justification (present tense) through the law, then, just is a falling away 
(aorist) from the gift of Jesus’ death and resurrection life, a cleavage (aorist) from 
Christ himself in the sense that the implied forensic verdict for such a person is the 
very state of death that the Christ-gift was given to reverse. If you have a ‘living’ 
subject then righteousness (and the eschatological justification that attends it) can be 
had through the law (cf. 4 Ezra, 4 Maccabees, and Gal 3:21), but, for Paul, the law 
confines ‘dead’ subjects to cosmic and moral death in view of the divine gift of life 
donated in the Christ-event (Gal 3:22).  
 One could object that Paul does not himself use this death and life 
terminology in Galatians 5:1 – 6. But this overlooks the summary character of these 
verses (Paul uses only anarthrous nouns in vv. 5 – 6) and that Paul’s ‘sloganeering’25 
places the rhetorical emphasis on the new, concrete contrast between the would-be 
practice of circumcision in Galatia and the alternative way of life Paul calls ‘faith 
working through love’. As in Gal 3 – 4, however, a proper view of this contrast 
depends on seeing it within an eschatological, cosmological, and moral frame. Thus, 
Paul anchors his warning against οἵτινες ἐν νόµῳ δικαιοῦσθε logically (γάρ, vv. 5, 6)26 in 
the contrasting eschatological reality that ‘we’ (emphatic ἡµεῖς) experience and 
anticipate: ‘We by the Spirit from faith eagerly await the hope of righteousness; for in 
Christ Jesus neither circumcision counts for anything nor uncircumcision but faith 
working through love.’ The slogan πνεύµατι ἐκ πίστεως reintroduces two significant 
points of Paul’s previous argument (and anticipates another, cf. 5:25a: Εἰ ζῶµεν 
πνεύµατι): the Spirit is received by or through faith in the good news of Christ (Gal 
3:2, 5, 14), and a beginning ‘by the Spirit’ (3:3) is a birth ‘according to the Spirit’ 
                                                
25 H.D. Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia (Hermeneia; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 261 – 62; cf. B.C. Lategan, ‘Formulas in the Language of Paul: A 
Study of Prepositional Phrases in Galatians‘, Neot 25 (1991): 75 – 87. For an analysis of the phenomena 
in the Corinthian correspondence, see M.M. Mitchell, ‘Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline 
Argumentation: The Function of ”the Gospel” in the Corinthian Correspondence‘, in Gospel in Paul: 
Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker (ed. L.A. Jervis and P. 
Richardson; JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 63 – 88. 
26 Contra Longenecker, Galatians, 228. For Paul’s use of a logical but contrasting γάρ elsewhere in 
Galatians, see, on 2:17 and 3:10, Betz, Galatians, 121, 137. Engberg-Pedersen rightly identifies the same 
force in 5:5; T. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010), 244 – 45, n. 41. 
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(4:29). The point is that it is those who have received eschatological existence by the 
Spirit through faith who actually look forward to the coming eschatological 
deliverance of the righteous—ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόµεθα.27 This is so (γάρ) because 
the Christ-event has disclosed the ultimate standard of eschatological worth, which, 
though found formally in the law (5:14), is not dependent on the Torah’s division of 
humanity into the ‘circumcision’ and ‘uncircumsion’ (v. 6). What counts (τι ἰσχύει)28 
in Christ Jesus is not this kind of life, where taxonomies of the present evil age 
produce competing evaluations of worth, but life sourced from this faith and 
expressed through this love. In short, the life that counts eschatologically is that 
which matches its source, the Christ-gift (2:20)—the life of love. That righteousness, 
for Paul, is what proceeds from the Christ-gift (2:21) and, thus, counts in Christ 
Jesus, and it is only supplied in the form of new existence πνεύµατι ἐκ πίστεως.29 
 It is illuminating to bring 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees into our analysis here, for 
they, like Paul, assume that human love should be patterned after and sourced by 
divine love, though they construe both source and pattern differently. More 
specifically, Paul’s identification of the Christ-gift as both the definitive source and 
pattern of divine love raises questions for our conversation partners about created 
life—i.e., human agency and its proper social order—as divine gift. It is these types 
of concerns, we will argue, that account for the character and arrangement of Paul’s 
argument in Gal 5:13 – 6:10. In other words, what 4 Ezra and 4 Maccabees help us to 
                                                
27 Given the clear eschatological horizon indicated by Paul’s characteristic use of ἀπεκδέχοµαι (cf. 
Rom 8:19, 23, 25; 1 Cor 1:7; Phil 3:20) and the difficulty of teasing a concept of ‘double justification’ 
out of these brief verses (cf. Betz, Galatians, 262 n. 87; Cosgrove, Cross, 150), some scholars translate 
this phrase as an epexegetical genitive—‘the hope that is righteousness’—and thus as a reference to 
God’s ‘justification/rectification’ on the last day; so, e.g. Dunn, Galatians, 269; Martyn, Galatians, 472; 
Hays, Galatians, 313. This interpretation is problematic because the contrast between vv. 4 and 6 has to 
do with alternative sources and evaluations of human righteousness—law observance or a love-
producing faith—and each of Paul’s previous uses of δικαιοσύνη seem to refer not to the divine verdict 
but to human status (2:21; 3:6; 3:21). Thus, in our view it is preferable to take this phrase as a 
subjective genitive, translating it as ‘the hope which belongs to righteousness’, because it retains both 
the divine evaluation (the object of ἐλπίς is divine justification/rectification) and the human way of 
life that reflects it being evaluated in Paul’s other uses of δικαιοσύνη (that ἐλπίς is for the ‘righteous’). 
28 For this sense, see ‘ἰσχύω’, BDAG 484. For the significance for Paul’s construal of the Christ-gift 
as establishing its own criterion of worth, see Barclay, Gift, 392 – 93, 393, n. 9. 
29 J.W. Yates, The Spirit and Creation in Paul (WUNT II 251; Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 165: ‘Somewhat 
confusingly, it is correct to say that eschatological life in the spirit is both the product of, and 
precursor to, righteousness.’ This is so because Jesus’ death is life-giving to the ‘dead’ (3:21) as the 
expression of eschatological righteousness (cf. Gal 2:20; 5:6) and as the possibility of its enactment in 
new, living agents (Gal 5:14, 24, 25). 
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see here is how Gal 5 – 6 is neither seeking merely rhetorically persuasive aims, nor 
is it merely responding to the circumstances in Galatia. Rather, it is laying bare the 
ground of Paul’s theological logic (Gal 5) and providing, in general terms and for the 
sake of theological completeness, his positive account of how the Christ-gift properly 
orders the self and society in fulfillment of the Torah’s own aims (Gal 6).  
 With respect to the shared theme of love, it is striking that 4 Ezra (5:40), like 
Paul, identifies eschatological existence as the goal of the divine love promised to 
God’s people. Yet, as we have argued, whereas 4 Ezra identifies the revelation of 
eschatological existence as the expression of divine love beyond history in the 
resurrection for the Torah-righteous, Paul sees it in the ‘resurrection’ of ‘dead’ 
humanity within history in the Christ-event. Both emphatically identify new 
eschatological existence as the goal and gift of the divine love, but they construe this 
reality differently. The author of 4 Maccabees, by contrast, is less concerned with the 
apparent empirical negation of divine love for God’s people in history. He is more 
concerned with the proper ordering of human love according to the divine will. For, 
to him, it is obvious both that the disordered desires of Jason (and those like him) 
and subsequent neglect of the law are to blame for the divine chastisement that has 
befallen the Jewish nation (4 Macc 4:15 – 26) and that the martyrs prove that such 
personal and social disorder can be avoided. Pious, Torah-ordered reason is capable 
of ruling the passions, thus empowering the martyrs to live through the paradoxical 
contest of torture and death for the law in the certainty of receiving immortality as a 
return gift (17:11 – 16). Thus, the author of 4 Maccabees would likely press Paul at 
two significant points, asking ‘Is your configuration of the recipients of the law as 
“dead” (3:21) and enslaved (5:1) a denial that Torah-ordered reason is capable of 
ruling the passions, and, if so, what then is the status of the law?’ and ‘what, if not 
commitment to circumcision and the whole law, exactly do you mean by love?’ It is 
to the first of these interrelated questions that we now turn in debate with 4 
Maccabees. 
5.1.2 Vice, Virtue, and Communal Flourishing in 4 Maccabees and Galatians 
 We will examine Gal 5:7 – 12 with Gal 6:11 – 18 in our final section on 
communal order and Pauline polemics. Here we enter the scholarly conversation 
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about the function and force of Gal 5 – 6. Martyn’s approach is instructive; for in 
asking what would be missing if we removed Galatians 5:2 – 6:10 from the letter he 
highlights a prima facie case for the necessity of the section.30 It seems obvious, for 
example, that the removal of Paul’s account of the antithesis between the flesh and 
the Spirit would excise something vital. Yet, for the author of 4 Maccabees, an 
immediate concern arises in Paul’s argument in Gal 5:1 – 12; for after bringing his 
argument against circumcision to a climax with an exasperated wish that his 
opponents would castrate themselves (v. 12), Paul turns in the next two verses to 
speak of the fulfilment (πληρόω) of ‘the whole law in the one sentence’ of Lev 19:18. 
Paul’s positive use of the Torah in Gal 5:14 has surprised many interpreters, but it 
would not have confused the author of 4 Maccabees.31 For this is Paul’s version of an 
apologetic argument that is formally identical to that implied in 4 Maccabees 9:18: 
‘only the children of the Hebrews are invincible where virtue is concerned’.32 
Moreover, Paul’s movement from the assertion of the fulfilment of the law ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ 
to a more general discussion of vices and virtues plays a vital role in this argument. 
In this connection, we enter another scholarly debate: is it a ‘serious mistake’ to read 
Galatians 5:13 – 26 as ‘a form of moral discourse’ concerned with ‘vices and virtues 
attributable to individuals’33? Are these verses an example of ‘(ancient philosophical) 
virtue ethics in its starkest form’34 (italics original), or are these false choices?  
 In what follows, we will argue that Paul does engage in virtue ethics as a 
‘debating device’35 but one that is necessary not for rhetorical persuasion but for 
logical completeness: just as the author of 4 Maccabees needed to provide a 
‘narrative demonstration’ that proved that Torah-piety is rational in Hellenistic 
terms while the Hellenistic way of life is not, so Paul’s apology must demonstrate 
                                                
30 Martyn (Galatians, 481) cites four gaps were we to excise this section: a) no ‘warning predictions 
of 5:2 – 12’; b) no retort to the charge that Paul does not give ‘guidance in everyday life’; c) no detailed 
portrait of what ‘God’s rectifying deed looks like in the daily life of the church’; d) no call to living ‘in 
a world marked by the polarity between the Spirit and the Flesh’. 
31 Recently, de Boer, Galatians, 325:  ‘What makes v. 14 extraordinary is its surprisingly positive 
appeal to “the law.”’ 
32 The apologetic nature of Paul’s argument was recognised already by Barclay (Obeying the Truth: 
a Study of Paul’s Ethics in Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 124 – 25), but his observation has not 
been pursued in the subsequent literature. 
33 Martyn, Galatians, 484. 
34 Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 165. 
35 E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 97; followed by 
Barclay, Obeying, 141. 
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why a commitment to Torah-piety necessarily falls short of Torah-virtue (love) while 
life in the Spirit does not.36 In other words, through exegetical dialogue with 4 
Maccabees, we clarify the logical form of Paul’s argument. In this way, we begin to 
show how both Paul’s negative and positive statements about the law in Gal 5:13 – 
26 are grounded in his theological anthropology and why these statements are 
necessary for his argument. The case will proceed in two movements—first, in 
analysing Paul’s assertions that the works of the flesh are clear (5:19) and that there 
is no law against the fruit of the Spirit (5:23) in comparison with the Jewish 
modification of Stoic virtue ethics in 4 Maccabees; second, in light of this analysis, in 
arguing that Paul’s construal of life in the Spirit as the fulfilment of the Torah’s aim 
(5:14) produces a paradoxical and apologetic modification of Torah-virtue (not 
Torah-piety) that is formally identical to 4 Maccabees’ modification of Hellenistic 
virtue 
 Since the content of Paul’s ethics is not strikingly different from that of other 
Jewish writers of antiquity, it is not surprising to find considerable overlap with 4 
Maccabees.37 When, in Gal 5:19 Paul claims that the works of the Flesh are ‘evident’ 
or ‘manifest’ (φανερά), given the list of fifteen ‘vices’ he produces, the author of 4 
Maccabees would likely agree.38 In several cases they use the same words/cognates 
with the same meanings in the same context of a discussion of the role of the 
emotions in human action—e.g., ‘anger/rage’ (θυµός, Gal 5:20; 4 Macc 2:16 – 20), 
‘enmity’ (ἔχθρα, Gal 5:20; 4 Macc 2:14), and ‘drink/drunkard’ (µέθη /µέθυσος, Gal 5:21; 
4 Macc 2:7). Moreover, if we include synonyms and conceptual overlap, several 
patches of common ground emerge. For example, both sexual deviance and 
competitive rivalry are shared concerns: for the former, consider, ‘sexual 
immorality’, ‘lewdness’, ‘lasciviousness’ (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, ἀσέλγεια, Gal 5:19) and 
Joseph’s resistance of ‘sweet passion’ and the brothers’ refusal to ‘carouse in [their] 
                                                
36 What follows is my attempt to take up Engberg-Pedersen’s challenge (Stoics, 133 – 34) to read 
4:21 – 31 as a ‘Pauline bridge’ (329, n. 9) not only to 5:1 – 6 but also to vv. 13ff., specifically with 
reference to the ‘internal, logical connection in the “parenetic” section‘ (italics original) of ‘the two triads 
of law, flesh and slavery versus Christ faith, spirit and freedom’. 
37 For the view that Paul does not abandon but reconfigures the Torah in light of his Christology 
and with reference to the love command, see e.g. V.P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1968), 28 – 34; W. Schrage, Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: ein 
Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1961), 228–38.  
38 For the classification of Paul’s vices into four distinct groups—sexual immorality, idolatry, 
communal strife, and partying—see Lightfoot, Galatians, 210. 
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youth’ (ἡδυπάθεια, 4 Macc 2:2 – 4; ἐντρυφήσατε ταῖς νεότησιν ὑµῶν, 8:8);39 on the latter, 
see Paul’s block of eight vices ‘enmities, strife, jealousy, rages, rivalries, divisions, 
factions, envyings‘(ἔχθραι, ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυµοί, ἐριθεῖαι, διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσεις, φθόνοι, Gal 5:19, 
20) and, in 4 Maccabees, the ‘malevolent disposition’ (κακοήθης διάθεσις) that finds 
expression in the soul in the form of ‘boastfulness’, ‘love of money’, ‘love of glory’, 
‘love of argument’, and ‘envy’ (ἀλαζονεία, φιλαργυρία, φιλοδοξία, φιλονεικία, βασκανία, 4 
Macc 1:25 – 26).  
 A number of scholars view the central position of the vices associated with 
competitive rivalry and the fact that they account for over half of Paul’s vices as 
evidence that they represent his chief concern.40 Given the direct warnings of Gal 
5:15 and 5:26 and the content of Paul’s polemical statements in Gal 5:7 – 11 and 6:11 – 
17, this is almost certain.41 Though a full treatment awaits the final section below, 
here we should note that 4 Maccabees also views competitive rivalry as a critical 
problem. This is clear both from the position of the ‘malevolent disposition’ and its 
vices in 4 Macc 1:26 at the head of 4 Maccabees’ ‘philosophical section’ and the 
application of these vices (and virtues) to the characters in the ‘narrative 
demonstration’. For example, in the build-up to Antiochus Epiphanes’ showdown 
with the martyrs, the vices of love of money, love of glory, and envy are on full 
display, as Simon incites Seleucus to temple robbery in an attempt to depose Onias 
(4:1 – 14), Jason receives the high priesthood for a bribe from Antiochus Epiphanes 
(4:15 – 18), and Antiochus plunders the Temple in a rage over a perceived slight to 
his honour (4:22, 23). Thus, Paul and 4 Maccabees agree about vices, generally, and 
competition, particularly.  
 When Paul turns from his warning about the eschatological vanity of a life 
lived in the flesh (Gal 5:22) to his list of virtues in the fruit of the Spirit, our 
                                                
39 On immorality as a locus communis in Jewish ethics of the Second Temple Period and Paul, see 
A.F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven: YUP, 1990), 
187 – 223. For the traditional character of much of Paul’s vice list, see S. Wibbing, Die Tugend- und 
Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Qumran-Texte (BZNW 25; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959), 86–88. 
40 A. Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament: exegetisch, religions- und 
formgeschichtlich Untersucht ( NTAbh; Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), 30; B.S. Easton, ’New Testament 
Ethical Lists’, JBL 51 (1932): 5 – 6; Wibbing, Lasterkataloge, 91, 95 – 7; F.F. Bruce, The Epistle of Paul to the 
Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 250; Barclay, 
Obeying, 152 – 55. 
41 Barclay, Obeying, 154. 
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comparison with 4 Maccabees moves to more alien territory. Yet, there are 
significant terminological and conceptual similarities. Paul’s virtues of love (ἀγάπη), 
endurance (µακροθυµία), and self-control (ἐγκράτεια) are matched in 4 Maccabees by 
the motifs of love of various types/things (e.g., φιλότεκνος, 4 Macc 15:4; cf. 1:26; 2:13; 
5:34; 8:26; 14:13; 15:4 – 14, 12, 25; 16:3), endurance of suffering (ὑποµονή, 1:11; 7:9; 9:8, 
30; 15:30; 17:4, 12, 17, 23), and self-control/temperance/’the wise’ (ἐγκράτεια, 5:34; 
σωφροσύνη, 1:3, 6, 18, 30–31; 5:23; and σώφρων, 1:35; 2:2, 16, 18, 23; 3:17, 19; 15:10). 
More significantly, these similarities exist in a formally identical hierarchical and 
teleological structure concerned with moral formation for the sake of communal and 
eschatological flourishing. In 4 Maccabees εὐσέβεια is the chief virtue in which all of 
the other virtues consist implicitly, and, thus, εὐσέβεια defeats competitive rivalry in 
the community by forming the cardinal virtues that produce harmony in the nation 
and harmony eschatologically. Likewise, in Galatians ἀγάπη is the chief ‘virtue’ in 
moral formation that produces communal and eschatological flourishing: it is the 
disposition that produces action that counts eschatologically (Gal 5:6); in contrast to 
‘the flesh’, it is the characteristic disposition that produces mutual service (5:13) 
rather than mutual destruction (5:16) in Christian community; it is the fulfilment of 
the law (5:14); and, in contrast to the ‘works of the flesh’ that preclude entry into the 
Kingdom (5:19 – 21), it is the first of Paul’s singular fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22).  
 We will have occasion to agree with Martyn that, in one respect, it is a 
‘serious mistake’ to interpret Paul’s Flesh and Spirit discourse as simply an example 
of Greco-Roman vice and virtue discourse.42 But, given what we have just observed, 
this is not because Paul is interested in the effects of apocalyptic powers only on 
community and not individual moral agency.43 For both Galatians and 4 Maccabees 
are concerned with moral formation of individuals within both the communal 
horizon and the eschatological horizon. This does not mean, however, that we are in 
                                                
42 Martyn, Galatians, 484. 
43 Martyn, Galatians, 485, n. 46: ‘In Gal 5:18 – 24 Paul speaks consistently and exclusively of the 
community of those who belong to Christ, those who have received the Spirit of Christ.’ Note, 
however, that Martyn (531) excludes Galatians 5:17d from this communal focus, restricting Paul’s 
statement there to the experience of those who are ‘attempting the impossible, that is to follow both 
Christ and the Sinaitic Law’. Rather than specifying this impossible attempt in anthropological terms, 
Martyn is content to attribute it to the fact the community is ‘[s]omehow permeable both to the Flesh 
and the Spirit’. It is this ‘somehow’ that needs explaining, and in anthropological terms, as we will see 
below. 
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complete agreement with Engberg-Pedersen that we have in Galatians an example of 
ancient philosophical virtue ethics ‘in its starkest form’.44 For we will argue that, 
despite formal structure, Paul’s account of moral formation itself is materially 
opposed to that of a Stoically inflected Jewish account like 4 Maccabees. Before 
turning, however, to these material differences, we need to broaden our account of 
the formal structures and force of these arguments, because both Galatians and 4 
Maccabees utilise identical formal structures as a part of a matching larger 
apologetic argument. Once our analysis of the formal structures of these arguments 
is in place, we will be in position to see how Gal 5:13 – 26 represents the theological 
ground of Paul’s theological logic, and thereby offer a new account both of the 
theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians. For, by attending to the 
shared formal structure of the arguments of Galatians and 4 Maccabees, the 
recognition that they each construe life with respect to human agency enables us to 
see the material differences in their understandings of where this life is given and 
ordered by God. That is, whereas 4 Maccabees argues for the superiority of Torah-
piety in inculcating Hellenistic virtue on the basis of a conception of human agency 
given and ordered by the Torah from creation, Paul argues for the superiority of 
Christ-piety in inculcating Torah virtue on the basis of a conception of human 
agency reconstituted and ordered in the Christ-gift by the Spirit. Thus, Paul’s 
account of new and newly-ordered agents vis-à-vis a ‘dead’ existence ὑπὸ νόµον (Gal 
5:18) provides the theological grounding for his antithesis between the Christ-gift and 
the works of Torah. 
5.1.3 All You Need is Love (As I Define It): Paul’s Apologetic Argument for the Fulfilment 
of the Torah in the Church 
 As we saw in chapter two, the peculiar force of 4 Maccabees’ apology for 
Judaism depends on a creative melding of Torah-piety and Hellenistic virtue ethics. 
Though the explicitly philosophical register of 4 Maccabees is slightly atypical, this 
text shares in the same ‘bridge-building’ mission of a number of Hellenistic Jewish 
                                                
44 Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 165. 
 254 
writings of the period.45 4 Maccabees’ test of the Stoic thesis that reason rules the 
passions ups the ante, however, as it also argues that only the Jews lead a way of life 
that proves this thesis and fulfils the ideals of virtue. Consequently, Eleazar’s 
programmatic response to Antiochus trumpets the Jewish achievement of Hellenistic 
virtue as a way of bolstering Jewish identity and commitment: despite Antiochus’s 
judgement that Jewish philosophy is irrational, the Jews will not give it up, because 
it teaches them the cardinal virtues of σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη by which 
they restrain both the passions of pleasure and pain and learn to act justly (5:22 – 24). 
It is unclear whether the author of 4 Maccabees was aware of Plato’s exclusion of 
εὐσέβεια from the list of virtues,46 but, for this Hellenistic Jew, the virtue of φρόνησις is 
inculcated only through training in Torah-piety (1:15 – 17). In Eleazar’s climactic 
assertion that the Jewish philosophy ‘teaches piety so that we worship the only 
existing God majestically’ (εὐσέβειαν ἐκδιδάσκει ὥστε µόνον τὸν ὄντα θεὸν σέβειν 
µεγαλοπρεπῶς, 5:24) we have a particular instance of 4 Maccabees’ peculiar claim: 
φρόνησις, properly speaking, is a matter of training in Jewish εὐσέβεια. The refusal of 
the martyrs to eat the pork provides the test case for this claim, and the argument 
progresses from an a posteriori to an a fortiori one. Because the martyrs’ instruction in 
the Torah as a whole produces the cardinal virtues of self-control, courage, and 
justice, the general claim that wisdom is a matter of Torah-piety and the particular 
claim that it is wise to practise circumcision (4:25) and abstain from pork are 
simultaneously vindicated. In other words, Eleazar’s two-fold rationale for 
abstinence—that the law is a seamless whole (5:20, 21) and that the law is a divine 
gift given for the good of human beings (5:25, 26)—is considered rational because 
circumcision and food laws are a part of the way of life that inculcates Hellenistic 
virtue. 
 What is vital for our purposes is that Paul’s appeal to ἀγάπη functions in an 
identical fashion to 4 Maccabees’ paradoxical appeal to the cardinal virtues but with 
the opposite effect. 4 Maccabees builds a bridge from Hellenistic virtue toward 
                                                
45 Barclay, Obeying, 124–25. Note, for example, how in Wis 8:5 – 7 it is the personified Jewish 
Wisdom ‘from whom all things are made’ (τῆς τὰ πάντα ἐργαζοµένης) who teaches those who love 
righteousness the virtues (ἀρεταί) of σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, and ἀνδρεία, of which ‘there is 
nothing more profitable in the life for human beings’ (ὧν χρησιµώτερον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν βίῳ ἀνθρώποις). 
46 Resp., Book IV, 427b – c.  
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Torah-piety, while Paul builds back from a shared recognition of vice and virtue 
toward Torah-virtue.47 This produces a Pauline paradox that is formally identical to 
that of 4 Maccabees. Just as in 4 Maccabees the Hellenistic way of life does not 
provide the conditions sufficient for attaining Hellenistic virtue but the Torah does, so 
does the Torah way of life in Galatians prove insufficient for its own goal of love but 
life in the Spirit does. This reading depends on a particular understanding of πληρόω in 
Gal 5:14, a recognition of the framing of the vices in v. 19, the assertion of the Torah’s 
positive relation to the fruit of the Spirit in v. 23, and the fact that Paul considers the 
Spirit’s chief fruit of love to be a virtue. 
 Debates over the interpretation of Gal 5:14 are longstanding and extensive. 
For the purposes of the present argument, we must limit ourselves to briefly stating 
the reasons for our interpretation and rebutting one prominent recent group of 
counterarguments. With regard to de Boer’s isolation of the three main interpretive 
issues in this verse,48 we take ὁ πᾶς νόµος to refer to the entirety of the Mosaic 
legislation (cf. ὅλον τὸν νόµον, 5:3),49 the verb πεπλήρωται to refer to the ‘fulfilment’ of 
this legislation in the sense that the moral goal of the Torah is completed only by the 
ἀδελφοί in mutual service through love (5:13), and, thus, ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ… ἐν τῷ· ἀγαπήσεις 
τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν refers to the ‘one sentence’ in which the overarching aim of 
the Torah is stated. Despite de Boer’s recent argument, there is no good reason to 
think that Paul is using νόµος in v. 14 to refer, as in 4:21b, to the Pentateuch or 
(without precedent in Galatians) the scriptures in general.50 For it is not the case that 
a positive reference to the law would be ‘undermining his whole argument to this 
point.’51 As we have seen, Paul is not operating with a negative view of the Mosaic 
                                                
47 Barclay, Obeying, 125: ‘If Diaspora Jews used virtue-lists to commend the law as compatible 
with a highly moral way of life, Paul uses such a list to commend the morality of life in the Spirit as 
compatible with the law.’ 
48 de Boer, Galatians, 343: ‘There are…three main issues in the interpretation of v. 14: (1) the 
precise reference of the phrase “the entire law,” (2) the import of the verb “to fulfil,” and (3) Paul’s 
use and interpretation of Lev 19:18.” 
49 Since Hübner’s largely failed attempt to establish a distinction between the noun phrases in 5:3 
and 5:14, the majority of scholars have seen a reference to the Torah in Paul’s use of νόµος; H. Hübner, 
‘Das ganze und das eine Gesetz, zum Problem Paulus und die Stoa‘, KuD 21 (1975): 239 – 56; idem, 
Law in Paul’s Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 36 – 41. So, e.g., Barclay, Obeying, 136–37; 
Martyn, Galatians, 486. For early criticisms of Hübner’s case, see Sanders, Paul, the Law, 96 – 7; H. 
Räisänen, Paul and the Law (2nd ed.; WUNT 29; Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 27, n. 72. 
50 de Boer, Galatians, 342–45. 
51 Ibid., 344. 
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legislation simpliciter.52 Rather, the Torah is ultimately positive precisely in its 
negative function, for it is by no means contrary to (κατά) the promises (3:21). Here 
Paul views the Torah as negative in its positive function, in that it voices the moral 
aim by which all human practices, even those of the Torah, are to be judged.53 In 
other words, as in 5:1 – 6, Paul is suggesting that the practice of circumcision is, if 
considered a part of the seamless whole of moral order, paradoxically, inimical to 
the life of love that counts (5:6), a life to which the Torah itself points (and is, thus, 
not against; cf. κατά, 5:23) but only the Christ-event produces. Thus, contra de Boer, 
the parallel of 5:3 is decisive, and Paul’s use of νόµος here refers to the Mosaic 
legislation.54 
 Relatedly, a number of scholars recognise the significance of Paul’s shift to the 
language of ‘fulfiling’ rather than ‘doing’ the Torah in v. 14.55 Though de Boer is 
correct that Paul is not commanding the Galatians directly to observe Lev 19:18, it 
does not follow that the force of this citation is reducible to a reading of that verse in 
purely promissory terms (i.e., ‘you will love your neighbour as yourself’).56 For the 
inferential γάρ of v. 14 indicates that v. 13 is Paul’s interpretation of the force of Lev. 
19:18,57 and in v. 13 Paul commands the Galatians not to misuse their freedom but to 
enslave themselves to one another διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης. De Boer observes that Gal 6:2 
precludes Martyn’s suggestion that πεπλήρωται should be taken as a divine passive, 
which Martyn argues refers to the work of Christ in bringing the law to its 
                                                
52 This is not to suggest that, with Martyn (Galatians, 505 – 8), we should distinguish between ‘the 
enslaving voice of the Sinaitic Law’ and the promising voice of ‘the Abrahamic Law’. For, as we saw 
in Paul’s reading of the Pentateuch via the story of Sarah and Hagar, both the promise and the Mosaic 
legislation are, for him, envisaged in nuce in Genesis 16 – 21, with both culminating in the Christ-
event. There is, to switch the metaphor, therefore, one divine voice, with, as it were, the minor Torah-
tune inevitably enfolded and resolved in the major and eternal theme of the good news of the Christ-
event. 
53 Thus, the love command provides an ‘echo of the gospel’ in the Torah precisely by pointing 
beyond its own moral horizon to the newly created and eschatologically ordered humanity and 
community called into existence in the Christ-event; for this language of ‘echoes of the gospel in the 
Scriptures of Israel’, see Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 170, n. 21; Barclay, Gift, 359, 418, 
431. 
54 de Boer, Galatians, 344–45. 
55 See e.g. Betz, Galatians, 275; S. Westerholm, Israel’s Law and the Church’s Faith: Paul and his Recent 
Interpreters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 201–5; Barclay, Obeying, 138–41; Longenecker, Galatians, 
242; de Boer, Galatians, 345. For an opposing position, see Dunn, Galatians, 289–90. 
56 de Boer, Galatians, 343–50. 
57 Martyn, Galatians, 486. 
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‘completion’ in a salvation-historical fashion.58 But he does not account then for the 
logical relation, as Martyn does, between vv. 13 and 14.59 Consequently, de Boer 
conflates the disposition of love with Paul’s command of mutual service, does not 
account for the imperatives in v. 13 (and v. 15), and, thus, misses the particular force 
of vv. 13 – 14.60 That is, the logical relation between vv. 13 and 14 indicates that Paul 
specifies and commands the behaviour that fulfils the moral aim of the Torah, 
quintessentially expressed in the command of Lev 19:18, the aim of love.61 Put more 
sharply, Paul is manifestly not merely ‘describing…’ and ‘not prescribing’,62 but 
rather he is commanding the behaviour that as the fulfilment of the Torah’s aim, in 
his view, corresponds to the liberated state created by the Christ-event. Thus, with 
most commentators, we should take the force of the perfect πεπλήρωται to be gnomic 
in character but with a particular sense: it is not simply that the state of liberty won 
by the Christ-event inevitably fulfils the law in the sense that the promise or 
prophecy of Lev 19:18 is fulfiled in Christian community,63 but rather that this state 
fulfils the law when it is expressed not in ‘fleshly’ behaviour but in mutual service.64 
In Barclay’s terms, Paul is in fact claiming here that the life of mutual service in the 
church amounts to a ‘total realization and accomplishment of the law’s demand’.65 
He does this not by commanding love in the terms of Torah-piety, as his opponents 
might do, but by commanding mutual service as the fulfilment of Torah-virtue 
(love). 
                                                
58 Cf. David Horrell, who correctly notes that the parallel in Rom 13:8 – 10 confirms that Paul 
views Lev. 19:18 as ‘epitomizing a Christian’s obligation’; D.G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A 
Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 226. 
59 de Boer, Galatians, 345–46; Martyn, Galatians, 489. Because Martyn’s argument for the 
grammatical passive is integrally related to his view that the law is fulfiled in Christ’s taking ‘the Law 
in hand’ (490), Martyn’s overall reading is, likewise, undermined by de Boer’s appeal to Gal 6:2. 
60 Cf. de Boer’s language (Galatians, 346): ‘Whenever mutual love happens, those loving (will) 
“have fulfiled the law”’. But Paul does not merely promise love in Galatians 5 – 6 but he commands 
mutual slavery (5:13) and mutual burden bearing (6:2) as the fulfilment of the Torah’s aim and the 
law of Christ, respectively. 
61 Pace de Boer (Galatians, 346), it is not ‘the promise heard by Paul in Lev 19:18’ that is ‘fulfilled’ 
in ‘[the] actual love [of the Galatians] for one another’, but rather the fulfilment of this command is 
specified as fulfiled in the particular behaviour of mutual service Paul is commanding in Galatia. 
62 Pace Westerholm, Israel’s Law, 201; followed by de Boer, Galatians, 346; similarly in Betz’s 
distinction between ‘prospective’ and ‘retrospective’ fulfilment; Betz, Galatians, 275. 
63 Contra de Boer, Galatians, 346–48. 
64 Westerholm, Israel’s Law, 235: ‘For Paul it is important to say that Christians “fulfil” the whole 
law, and thus to claim that their conduct (and theirs alone) fully satisfies the “real” purport of the law 
in its entirety, while allowing the ambiguity of the term to blunt the force of the objection that certain 
individual requirements…have not been “done”.’ 
65 Barclay, Obeying, 139. 
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 This reading is supported from the vantage-point of our debate with 4 
Maccabees. For 4 Maccabees operates with a similar distinction between dispositions 
and actions precisely in order to argue for the superiority of Torah practices in 
exemplifying Hellenistic dispositions/virtues. If, as we saw in the previous 
subsection, Paul and the author of 4 Maccabees are agreed that divine judgement is 
concerned with these types of vices and that the law does not prohibit the virtues 
associated with the fruit of the Spirit, then Paul is in a position to make an a posteriori 
argument formally identical yet materially opposed to that of 4 Maccabees. By 
calling τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός ‘evident’ (φανερά) in v. 19 Paul implies that these ‘works’ are 
universally acknowledged as condemnable, and, likewise, by asserting that the 
Torah is not ‘against’ (κατά) the fruit of the Spirit in v. 23, he implies that these 
virtues are commendable according to everyone, even his opponents.66 Thus, if the 
ultimate goal of the law is love of neighbour (Torah-virtue), and those who are made 
alive by and live according to the Spirit (5:24, 25) produce this love apart from 
complete subordination to the law’s particular way of life, then, a fortiori, observance of 
the law’s particular works (Torah-piety) is not necessary for the fulfilment of its own 
purpose (Torah-virtue).67 It is perhaps not too farfetched to imagine that an author as 
ingenious at synthesising Stoic virtue ethics and Jewish piety as 4 Maccabees would 
admire Paul’s achievement. He has deployed the very apologetic move used by 
                                                
66 Barclay rightly argues that taking κατά as ‘concerning’ is both ‘very unusual in the New 
Testament’ and an apparent contradiction of v. 14; ibid., 123. We would add that the other parallel in 
which both κατά and νόµος occur, Gal 3:21, supports the translation ‘against’, with 3:21 – 22 providing 
the overarching theological correspondence between Torah and Promise and 5:23 the specific ethical 
correspondence between Torah and the Christ-event. Since the interpretation of τῶν τοιούτων as 
masculine both arises from uncertainty about the reason for Paul’s remark and is not easily reconciled 
with Paul’s focus on qualities of people and not people per se in 5:22 – 23, the neuter is to be preferred. 
For an overview of the interpretive issues and a conclusion with which we are in general agreement, 
see ibid., 119 – 25. It does not follow, as Engberg-Pedersen contends (Stoics, 164, 330, n. 13, 343, n. 17) 
in a recent revival of the alternate translation of κατά (cf. G.M. Styler, ’The Basis of Obligation in 
Paul’s Christology and Ethics’, in Christ and Spirit in the New Testament: Studies in Honour of C.F.D. 
Moule [ed. B. Lindars and S.S. Smalley; Cambridge: CUP, 1973], 179, n. 11), that a recognition of the 
fact that the law is dealing in ‘act-types’ or ‘commands’ while Paul is concerned with ‘attitudes’ 
supports the translation of κατά as ‘about’ or ‘concerning’. For this misses the logical connection 
between the commands of v. 13 and love as the overall aim of the law in v. 14, a connection which is 
vital for Paul’s apologetic argument. What the Torah aims at, the ἀδελφοί fulfil by doing what Paul 
commands in v. 13. 
67 Pace Wilson (Curse, 112), the problem Paul is addressing here is not ‘the threat of a 
curse…looming large in the background’ but the actual cursed state of humanity that the law’s curse 
confirms (3:21, 22), and thus the fulfilment of Torah-virtue is achieved not as an avoidance but as a 
reversal of this state. 
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Hellenistic Jews to argue for Torah-piety against that piety. Yet, debate is inevitable 
for 4 Maccabees, as nothing less than the reconstitution of Israel and the eternal 
beatitude of her martyrs is at stake in this inversion. 
 With this analysis of the overlapping content and shared logical form of the 
arguments of Galatians and 4 Maccabees in place, we are now in a position to 
consider the theological ground of their material differences. In so doing, we turn to 
a significant contribution of this chapter, arguing that in Gal 5:13 – 26 Paul grounds 
his theological logic ultimately in a conception of new and newly-ordered selves 
given in the Christ-gift and expressed in relationship with the Spirit. 
5.2 Veni Creator Spiritus: Freedom as New and Newly Ordered Selves in a New 
Community 
Though Paul utilises an apologetic argument like 4 Maccabees’, he inverts the 
conclusion. Despite an obvious disagreement over which ‘virtue’ is chief (εὐσέβεια or 
ἀγάπη), 4 Maccabees would have a more basic concern; for he would want to know 
why Jewish piety is insufficient. For in denying the sufficiency of Jewish piety, is 
Paul denying the sufficiency of Torah-ordered reason to rule the passions, 4 
Maccabees’ overarching claim? In 4 Maccabees Torah-piety is only insufficient if left 
unpractised, whereas Paul has argued that the very practice is problematic (Gal 2:15 
– 4:31; 5:1 – 6). Why?  
 This fundamental question arose at several places in the debate with 4 Ezra in 
the previous chapter—why are those ‘of the works of the law’ inevitably cursed 
(3:10)?; the recipients of the law ‘dead’ (3:21)?; those who follow the Jewish calendar 
enslaved to ‘the elements of the cosmos’ (4:8 - 11)? These questions are all answered 
generally by recognising that Paul is operating with a conception of the fallen 
cosmos that is similar to that of 4 Ezra, with one vital exception: whereas 4 Ezra 
explicitly configures the recipient of the law as occupying an anthropological 
reserve, a space of libertas, Paul configures the recipient of the Torah as enslaved to 
sin and transgression. Yet, Paul has not made an explicit argument for his 
anthropological pessimism. We will argue that he does this in Galatians 5:13 – 26. 
 Thus, we aim to contribute to the longstanding debate about the function of 
Galatians 5 – 6 in the argument of the letter. Galatians 5:13 – 26 is necessary for 
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Paul’s argument because it provides the material grounds and climactic elaboration 
of his fundamental claim: eschatological life is given and ordered only in the Christ-
event by the Spirit, not in or according to the Torah. Specifically, Paul argues in these 
verses that the human agent is free only in so far as she is both recreated by the 
Spirit and continually dependent on the Spirit in the exercise of that freedom.68 Our 
argument will proceed in two phases: we will compare the opposition between σάρξ 
and the πνεῦµα in Galatians with that between the πάθη and εὐσεβὴς λογισµός in 4 
Maccabees with regard to their respective configurations of the relationship between 
passions, desires, and actions, arguing that Paul’s personifications are aimed not at 
presenting the effects of warring apocalyptic powers on the church per se but with 
the formation of virtue and the threat of vice within the church in light of the 
eschaton; and we will contend based on this analysis that Paul’s argument depends 
on an inchoate theory of human agency that is concerned with the origin, ongoing 
source, and order of the newly created human existence. This theory configures new 
human agents as those who are brought from ‘death’ as slavery to evil desires and 
actions to ‘life’ as the expression of a new relationship with God secured by the 
Christ-gift, created and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, for Paul, the recipients of the law 
are ‘dead’ to God (Gal 3:21; cf. Gal 2:19) precisely because they are willingly 
enslaved to evil desires and actions, an anthropology that is diametrically opposed 
to that of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. 
 Consequently, this section establishes two significant results for this chapter 
and the thesis. First, it provides a new account of the theological logic of Galatians 
by showing that Paul’s antithetical logic is grounded ultimately in Gal 5:13 – 26—i.e., 
in his account of reconstituted and reordered agency vis-à-vis life ὑπὸ νόµον. Thus, 
Galatians 5 – 6 is not simply Paul’s climactic rhetorical appeal to desist from seeking 
circumcision; it is not simply a response to the circumstances of the crisis in Galatia; 
it is not even Paul’s presentation of ‘a genuinely Christ-believing form of life’69 or ‘a 
                                                
68 We are extending and specifying Yates’ key insight about Gal 5:25 (Spirit, 172): ‘Based on the 
traditions employed elsewhere by Paul when he speaks of the spirit in this way, this must be 
considered in some way to be resurrection life. The spirit has not simply indwelt in order to 
empower. The spirit has indwelt so as to give new life.’ 
69 Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 131. 
 261 
consequence of his own theological presentation’ (ital. added).70 Rather, it is the 
climax and ultimate ground of his theological argument. The law cannot provide the 
proper order of either the self or the church, for Paul, because it is confined to 
humanity’s ‘dead’ existence—the enslavement to the evil passions and desires of the 
Flesh out of which the Christ-gift creates and reorders human life. Second and in 
connection with Barclay’s recent theological construal of the function of Gal 5 – 6, 
this section shows that it is not the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous gift 
per se, but rather it is Paul’s particular conception of the Christ-gift as the definitive 
life-giving and life-ordering divine gift that establishes his antithetical logic. Paul 
does not assume that the divine donation of life apart from Torah norms requires a 
new norm; he argues that Torah norms (existence ὑπὸ νόµον) participate in and are 
confined to life dominated by the Flesh by divine design in view of the new existence 
created and ordered by the Christ-event.  
5.2.1 Flesh and Spirit, Passions and Reason: Vice and Virtue in Gal 5:13 – 26 and 4 
Maccabees 
 An anthropological comparison of Paul’s vice and virtue discourse in Gal 5:13 
– 26 with that of 4 Maccabees must consider two difficulties at the outset. Though 
Paul is making an apologetic argument similar to those found in Hellenistic Jewish 
texts, he neither commands virtue, nor does he use all of the standard terminology of 
ancient moral psychology (e.g., the language of reason is missing). Rather, Paul 
situates his discourse in an apparently cosmic frame, pitting the personified ‘Flesh’ 
against the ‘Spirit’. Based on these differences some scholars contend that any 
comparison of Galatians to texts like 4 Maccabees is misleading.71 Yet, Paul builds a 
bridge from the fruit of the Spirit to the Torah by insisting that ἀγάπη is the chief aim 
of both. This identification of a principal ‘virtue’ in the context of an apologetic 
argument, Paul’s dependence on virtue and vice lists to make this argument (even if 
modified), and his use of terminology related to ancient moral psychology (i.e., 
ἐπιθυµία/ἐπιθυµέω, 5:16, 17, 24; πάθηµα, 5:24) suggest the prima facie viability of a 
                                                
70 B.W. Longenecker, The Triumph of Abraham’s God: The Transformation of Identity in Galatians 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 80, n. 13. 
71 Martyn, Galatians, 484: ‘It is…a serious mistake to read Paul’s descriptions of the activities of 
the Flesh and the Spirit in Gal 5:19 – 23 as an example of nomistic, moral discourse focused on “vices” 
and “virtues.”’ 
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comparison with 4 Maccabees. Thus, we use the frame provided by ancient virtue 
ethics discourse in a heuristic fashion, arguing that the exegetical results justify the 
comparison. 
 Paul’s personification of σάρξ and πνεῦµα in Galatians 5:16 is the third instance 
of this opposition in the letter, combining with that at 3:3 to frame Paul’s argument 
about the law.72 The second and third instances show a marked development: Paul 
has moved from a discussion of the impending Galatian pursuit of the ‘works of the 
law’ in general as a fleshly endeavour (3:3) to the particular and similar activities of 
persecution (4:29) and community rivalry (5:20, 21) as the products of the flesh. Thus 
far, Paul’s use of the word σάρξ, then, seems to imply a correlation between Jewish 
piety and the vices he considers condemnable.73 If so, Paul’s argument would be 
diametrically opposed to that of 4 Maccabees. Jewish piety actually tends not toward 
freedom in virtue but toward slavery to vice. We will address this potential negative 
proof of Paul’s argument in the next section with regard to Paul’s polemics. In order 
to see how, why, and in what respect Paul might be correlating Torah-piety with 
vice, however, we must deepen our debate, beginning by examining several 
intriguing similarities between Paul’s personifications in Galatians 5:16 – 18 and 4 
Maccabees’ theory of the self.  
 Though the personifications of σάρξ and πνεῦµα would be initially obscure to 
the author of 4 Maccabees, given Paul’s elaboration of this antithetical pair in the 
remainder of vv. 16 - 26, the force of his opening statements would not. For in Gal 
5:16 Paul expresses confidence that the Galatians are capable of mastering the ‘desire 
of the flesh’: Λέγω δέ, πνεύµατι περιπατεῖτε καὶ ἐπιθυµίαν σαρκὸς οὐ µὴ τελέσητε. The 
phrase Λέγω δέ connects this verse with the warning in v. 15 to ‘Look!’ (βλέπετε), lest 
their beastly behaviour lead to mutual annihilation. Verse 16 tempers this warning 
by making it clear that communal disintegration is generally avoidable. Using οὐ µή 
plus the aorist subjunctive τελέσητε to express the strongest possible future 
negation,74 Paul assures the Galatians that they will ‘by no means complete the 
                                                
72 Barclay, Gift, 426. 
73 Morales, Spirit and Restoration, 143. 
74 E.D. Burton, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek (T&T Clark, 1894), § 172: ‘The 
Aorist Subjunctive is used with οὐ µή in the sense of an emphatic Future Indicative.’ 
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desires of the Flesh’ if they heed his command to ‘walk by the Spirit’.75 Likewise, 4 
Maccabees’ entire discourse is aimed at proving that ‘pious reason is Sovereign over 
the passions’ (αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισµός, 4 Macc 1:1). Thus, 4 
Maccabees makes similar pronouncements to Gal 5:16 in a number of places, 
personifying λογισµός as δεσπότης (2:24; 18:2; cf. 6:34, 35) and arguing throughout that 
reason ‘rules’ (cf. the use of the verbs κρατέω/ἐπικρατέω in 1:3, 5–6, 14, 19, 32–33; 2:4, 
6, 9–11, 14–15, 20, 24–3:1; 5:23; 6:32, 34–35; 7:18; 8:1; 13:4; 14:1; 15:26; 16:2; 17:20). 
Intriguingly, 4 Maccabees even deploys the word σάρξ in this connection—‘as many 
as apply themselves to piety from a whole heart, only these are able to subdue the 
passions of the flesh’ (ὅσοι τῆς εὐσεβείας προνοοῦσιν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας, οὗτοι µόνοι δύνανται 
κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν, 7:18). 
 Consequently, Gal 5:16 would suggest to the author of 4 Maccabees an 
affirmation of the self’s ability to master its desires that is formally similar to his 
own. Likewise, the antithetical relationship between the Flesh and the Spirit would 
be familiar. For 4 Maccabees answers a potential objection to his thesis by 
introducing a distinction and, like Paul, an antithetical relationship—‘for reason is 
not the destroyer of the passions, but [their] opponent’ (οὐ γὰρ ἐκριζωτὴς τῶν παθῶν ὁ 
λογισµός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνταγωνιστής, 3:5). In this respect, λογισµός is the means by which 
the self avoids the state of ‘being enslaved to desire’ (δουλωθῆναι τῇ ἐπιθυµίᾳ). Thus, 
reason does not destroy but controls passions like ‘anger’ (θυµός, 3:3; cf. Gal 5:20) and 
‘malice’ (κακοήθεια, 3:4; cf. Rom 1:29). Consequently, when Paul enlists in v. 17 the 
antithetical relationship between the Flesh and the Spirit in support (γάρ) of his 
assurance that walking by the latter will stifle the desires of the former, the author of 
4 Maccabees would see in this an anthropological statement about the asymmetry of 
power between the superior Spirit and the inferior Flesh, taking ἵνα µὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε 
ταῦτα ποιῆτε to refer to the resulting state of the Spirit’s frustration of the Flesh’s 
desires.  
 It does not follow that this is what Paul meant in v. 17d, but there are good 
exegetical grounds for preferring this option. Of the possible interpretations, Barclay 
is correct that the emphatic assurance of v. 16 and the ‘crucifixion’ of the Flesh in v. 
                                                
75 Barclay, Obeying, 111; Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 341, n. 12. 
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24 preclude two of them: one cannot take ἵνα µὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε as either a 
situation in which the Flesh blocks the self’s good, Spirit-created wishes or a 
stalemate of opposing forces that frustrate each other.76 Barclay’s proposal focuses 
on the phrase ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε, arguing that this should be translated ‘whatever you 
want’.77 On this reading, Paul is assuring the Galatians that the refusal to be 
circumcised and obey the Torah does not leave them without an order for life. The 
Spirit is sufficient. Though this view fits the context well, it depends on taking the 
phrase ἃ ἐάν as ‘whatever’ rather than ‘what’, a translation which is possible but 
perhaps not likely given the parallel construction (ὃ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ 
θερίσει) in Gal 6:7.78 In that context, the relative pronoun ὅ seems to refer not to the 
problem of an unstructured life but rather to two definite and contrasting sources 
and modes of existence (Spirit/Flesh) and their respective outcomes 
(corruption/eternal life). Likewise, in the context of Gal 5:17, it seems that Paul’s 
warnings both to ‘Look!’ to the communal ramifications (5:13, 15) and to remember 
the eschatological implications of ‘fleshly’ behaviour (5:21) imply that his focus here 
is not the problem of a lack of structure but of two contrasting structures, one 
disordered (Flesh) and the other properly ordered (Spirit).79 As we argued above, 
Paul’s apologetic argument depends on basic agreement about moral order (5:19, 
23). Though it is far from certain, it is probably best, then, to take ἵνα µὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε 
ταῦτα ποιῆτε as the resulting state of the opposition between Flesh and Spirit in which 
                                                
76 Barclay, Obeying, 112–14. Lambrecht’s attempt to side-step the force of this objection against the 
‘Spirit-Inspired Wishes’ view by interpreting v. 17d as referring to a hypothetical situation is 
unpersuasive; J. Lambrecht, ’The Right Things You Want to Do: A Note on Galatians 5,17d’, Bib 79 
(1998): 522 – 23. For it depends on the dubious assumption that Paul would mean ‘that what the 
Galatian Christians want is always evil and wrong’ (519). The point is not that the Galatian Christians 
‘always’ have only evil desires but that they must always contend with them. Paul assumes that the 
Galatians have some ongoing relation to the desires of the Flesh in 5:16, even if that relation is one of 
having ‘crucified’ its passions and desires (5:24), as demonstrated both by his communal and 
eschatological warnings (5:15, 21). 
77 Barclay, Obeying, 110–16; Barclay, Gift, 428, n. 18. 
78 Lambrecht notes (’Right ’, 521 – 22) the difference and the parallels at Gal 6:7 and 1 Cor 6:7 but 
does not present a compelling argument for his preference, asserting rather that Rom 7:15c provides 
the decisive parallel. 
79 Barclay, Obeying, 115: ‘The warfare imagery is invoked…to show the Galatians that they are 
already committed to some forms of activity (the Spirit) and against others (the flesh)’. Yet, the 
question is not just the Spirit’s sufficieny to provide ‘direction’ (116), but why this direction precludes 
circumcision and Torah-piety as the expression of its order. 
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the Spirit successfully resists the evil desires of the Flesh with which the Galatians 
have to contend.80  
 Consequently, both the author of 4 Maccabees and Paul are confident that the 
evil desires, though ineradicable,81 are nonetheless capable of being held in check by 
a more powerful force. When, however, Paul further specifies in 5:18 his instruction 
in v. 16, three material differences begin to emerge for debate. These all depend on 
recognising a crucial development in the argument. The switch from the present 
active verb περιπατεῖτε to the present passive ἄγεσθε reflects Paul’s development of 
the theme of contrasting desires, though with a significant twist: whereas in v. 16 
Paul assures the Galatians of the efficacy of walking by the Spirit vis-à-vis the desire 
of the Flesh, here he makes a similar assurance but grounded specifically in an 
assertion of freedom from the desire of the Flesh. That is, in v. 16 the theme of 
agency is implicit, while in vv. 17–18 it is explicit: you will not complete the desire of 
the Flesh if you walk by the Spirit, because you are not enslaved to the Flesh if you 
are led (in your desires) by the Spirit. This leads, however, to the consideration of 
our first material divergence; for the author of 4 Maccabees would receive a shock in 
the apodosis of v. 18. He is expecting Paul to write οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ σάρκα, not οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ 
νόµον!82 For to be ὑπὸ νόµον for 4 Maccabees is to be free from the tyranny of the 
desires and passions. It is ‘under the rule of the Torah through reason’ (ὑπὸ τοῦ νόµου 
κρατεῖται διὰ τὸν λογισµὸν) that the ‘stingy’ (φειδωλός, 4 Macc 2:9; cf. 2:6) person acts 
                                                
80 A version of this view originated with John Chrysostom, who concludes, ‘[Paul] calls Flesh here 
reasoning that is earthly, indifferent, and negligent” (Σάρκα ἐνταῦθα τὸν λογισµὸν καλεῖ τὸν γεώδη, τὸν 
ῥᾴθυµον καὶ ἠµεληµένον; In epistolam ad Galatas commentarius [PG 61:671 – 72]). Chrysostom wrongly 
reduces the Flesh and Spirit opposition to contrasting modes of reasoning not contrasting agents. For 
recent supporters of the general view, see e.g. R. Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their 
Use in Conflict Settings (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 106–7; G.D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The 
Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 436; de Boer, Galatians, 354–55. 
Lambrecht’s protest (’Right’, 519) that the verb ἐπιθυµέω should be supplied in v. 17b with the Spirit as 
the subject (following Dunn, Galatians, 297; contra Lightfoot, Galatians, 210) and, thus, the ‘meaning’ 
(connotation?) of ἐπιθυµέω is ‘most proabably neutral’ with the Flesh as the subject in 17a, is 
unpersuasive. The desiring of the Flesh is evil, as is clear from the works it produces—vice versa for 
the Spirit. Likewise, Moo’s objection that Paul pays ‘precisely equal attention’ to the Flesh and the 
Spirit ‘earlier in the verse’ and, thus, that the Spirit’s desiring is probably not in view in v. 17d is 
misguided; Moo, Galatians, 356. Paul’s symmetrical expression of mutual opposition does not 
preclude a hierarchical ordering, and if we take ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται as parenthetical (cf. de 
Boer, Galatians, 355), then the reference to the Spirit’s desiring in v. 17b precedes the reference to the 
subject’s willing in v. 17d, suggesting the Spirit as an aid in 17d. 
81 Contra the emphasis on ‘sinlessness’ in Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 167, 172–73. 
82 Ibid, 162: ‘Paul here almost explicitly connects the law with—the flesh: if the Galatians are led 
by the pneuma, they are not under the law; and here is a list of the “works” (erga)—of the flesh…!’ 
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justly and allows the fields and vineyards to be gleaned by the poor. If Paul is 
correct, then, and the Galatians are not ὑπὸ νόµον, then by 4 Maccabees’ lights they 
are enslaved to the desires of the Flesh. 
5.2.2 Created or Newly Created Selves?: Contrasting Theories of Agency in Galatians and 4 
Maccabees 
 The question for 4 Maccabees, then, is how Paul uses the phrase ὑπὸ νόµον to 
convey not freedom but slavery. An answer to this question, however, depends on 
recognising another formal similarity between the discourses of Galatians and 4 
Maccabees. For Paul, the Spirit serves the same anthropological function as εὐσεβὴς 
λογισµός in 4 Maccabees. Thus, as in 4 Maccabees where εὐσεβὴς λογισµός (shorthand 
for ὑπὸ τοῦ νόµου κρατεῖται διὰ τὸν λογισµὸν, 2:9) rules the passions such that vice is 
hindered and virtue is produced, so in Galatians walking by the Spirit nullifies the 
desires of the Flesh (5:16) such that vicious acts are avoided (5:19 – 21) and virtuous 
dispositions are produced (5:22 – 23). Moreover, the horizons of penultimate and 
ultimate significance of these anthropologies are the same: socially, the ruler whose 
mind is Torah-ordered rules a kingdom characterised by the cardinal virtues (4 Macc 
2:23), while those who keep in step with the Spirit (Gal 5:25) avoid the reciprocal 
provocation (and destruction!, 5:15) that arises from vain-opinion, conceit, and envy 
(Gal 5:26); eschatologically, though he alludes to judgement negatively as the loss of 
inheritance of the Kingdom (Gal 5:21) rather than positively as eternal torture (4 
Macc 9:9) and he waits until Gal 6:7, 8 to contrast the organic result of vice 
(‘corruption’, φθορά) with that of virtue (‘eternal life’, ζωή αἰώνιος), Paul is explicit, like 
4 Maccabees, that vice will receive its ultimate eschatological condemnation and 
virtue, conversely, its eschatological commendation. Thus, contra Martyn, Engberg-
Pedersen is correct that Paul is concerned with the formation of virtue and the vices 
of individual Galatians, while, with Martyn and Engberg-Pedersen, we must 
recognise that impending communal flourishing or dissolution is Paul’s proximate 
concern in Gal 5:13 – 6:10.83 Paul’s ultimate concern, the eschatological horizon, 
foregrounds the seriousness of personal and communal disorder at 5:21, 6:5, and 6:7, 
                                                
83 Ibid., 340, n. 9: ’It is not enough just to say: a new creation.’ This criticism of Martyn is valid, but 
Engberg-Pedersen’s own reduction (ibid., 155) of Paul’s language of life and death to self-
understanding is equally problematic as an interpretation of Paul’s vice and virtue discourse. 
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8. In other words, as in 4 Maccabees, Paul argues here for the integral relation 
between the ordering of the self and the ordering of community—whether toward 
flourishing or dissolution—while not losing sight of the eschatological horizon. Paul 
just has a different conception of the constitution and ordering of self and society. 
 In this connection, a closer examination of this shared anthropological 
function betrays materially divergent anthropologies (and cosmologies). For 4 
Maccabees configures εὐσεβὴς λογισµός as a human ruling capacity, while in Galatians 
Paul conceives of Πνεῦµα not as an anthropological reality but as a new ordering 
relationship arising from the Christ-gift. 4 Maccabees configures the properly 
ordered self as the result of the exercise of an inviolable and created ruling capacity 
(λογισµός) according to the Torah-norm given to the self at creation (4 Macc 2:20 – 
23a)—at the same time (ὁπηνίκα) that God created the mind as ruler of the self (2:22) 
‘he gave to [the mind] the law’ (καὶ τούτῳ νόµον ἔδωκεν, v. 23a). Thus, the question is 
not, ultimately, of created capacity or even moral order in 4 Maccabees but of moral 
agency. ‘Only the Hebrews are invincible were virtue is concerned’ (9:18): will one 
recognise this and live accordingly or not? In the terms of 4 Ezra 8:56 and 9:11, the 
self enjoys a state of created libertas from which either to accept or reject the divine 
benefaction of Torah-ordered creation. For Paul, however, the question of moral 
agency is not reducible to the exercise of created ruling capacity. For the receipt of the 
Christ-gift is logically antecedent to any expression of properly ordered moral 
agency—it is those who are τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ who have actively crucified the Flesh 
with its passions and desires (Gal 5:24).84 Thus, we arrive at a material 
anthropological difference: whereas 4 Maccabees configures the created human as 
inviolably capable and responsible for her own proper ordering according to the 
created Torah-order, Paul configures the human capable only in receipt of an 
ongoing relationship with the Spirit. It is those who walk by the Spirit who do not 
complete the desires of the Flesh (5:16), precisely because they are led (in their 
desires) by the Spirit (5:18). In short, for the Flesh to be resisted a new liberating 
relationship to God, established in the Christ-gift, is required. We will argue below 
                                                
84 Barclay, Gift, 429. 
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that this is the force of Paul’s language of living πνεύµατι in Gal 5:25 and new 
creation in 6:15. 
 Yet, we must first turn to a potentially misleading but illuminating question. 
If the capacity for self-governance is not a created and inviolable human capacity, 
does Paul, then, deny human agency ante Christum? Not exactly. Paul does not 
employ ‘the rhetoric of the flesh’ as ‘passive and mechanical’ in contrast to ‘the 
rhetoric of the spirit’, which is ‘active and purposeful’.85 Paul, rather, contrasts two 
types of active agents—one led by the Spirit, the other by the Flesh. This is the 
implication not only of Paul’s personification of the Flesh and Spirit in Gal 5:17 
generally but, if our reading of 5:17d and 5:18 is correct, then also of Paul’s particular 
reading of the salvation-historical, anthropological, and cosmological significance of 
the Christ-event. For if what is required to resist the desires of the Flesh is the advent 
of the Spirit, then what is absent ante Christum is not human agency per se but 
properly ordered human agency. That is, for Paul the Flesh does not simply assault 
the self ante Christum, as the passions do in 4 Maccabees, or tempt the self, as the 
cogitamentum malum does for Uriel (4 Ezra 7:92), but rather the Flesh rules the self—the 
selves of Jews and Gentiles alike. In other words, Paul’s picture of the human 
condition ante Christum is much like that of Ezra in the opening complaint of 4 Ezra. 
As with the cor malignum so with the Flesh: ‘the disease became permanent…what 
was good departed [from the hearts of the people] and the evil remained’ (facta est 
permanens infirmitas… discessit quod bonum est et mansit malignum, 4 Ezra 3:22). 
Though we should be careful not to import conceptually developed accounts of the 
will into the discussion,86 we must recognise that neither Ezra’s opening account of 
the cor malignum nor Paul’s conception of the Flesh preclude moral responsibility, as 
both assume that the evil actions these produce rightly incur the divine judgement. 
Both the cor malignum and the σάρξ are the agent’s own; it is just that their selves are 
inevitably turned toward evil. Thus, we have another material anthropological 
difference: whereas the self always retains its created integrity because of the 
                                                
85 Contra O. O’Donovan, ’Flesh and Spirit’, in Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the 
Gospel, and Ethics in Paul’s Letter (ed. M.W. Elliott et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 277. 
86 For the defence of the position that Augustine was the first to produce a conception of the will, 
see A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: UCP, 1982). Cf. the recent counter-
proposal, arguing that Epictetus was the first to form a concept of the will in M. Frede, A Free Will: 
Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: UCP, 2011). 
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governing faculty of λογισµός in 4 Maccabees, Paul configures the self apart from the 
Spirit as irrevocably disordered because ruled by the evil desires of the Flesh. It is 
inadvisable to try to establish this point based on either this parallel with 4 Ezra or 
the contested interpretation of Gal 5:17d alone. There are, however, several 
exegetical observations that support our contention that Paul is operating with an 
inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered agency. 
 The first observation depends on recognising the categorical difference 
between Paul’s vice and virtue lists. In Engberg-Pedersen’s terms, the former is 
concerned with ‘act-types’, while the latter is concerned with ‘mental states’ or 
dispositions.87 Engberg-Pedersen’s interpretation of this difference occurs in relation 
to his account of the force of Gal 5:23b: the law is not against the fruit of the Spirit in 
the sense that it is not concerned with mental states but act-types. As we have seen, 
however, Paul’s point is not about the irrelevance but the paradox of the Torah, as 
his identification of the key ‘mental state’ of love as expressing the Torah’s aim is 
one of the twin pillars on which his argument stands. The problem is not that law is 
indifferent to virtue but that, though not against it, it does not produce virtue. We 
propose here, then, a different reading of the distinction: viz., the ‘act-types’ allow 
for no ‘space’ between desire and action, while ‘mental states’ do. In other words, 
without the Spirit, the self just is disordered—the ‘Flesh’s desire’ and the ‘passions’ 
that arise from human experience lead inevitably to the Flesh’s characteristic 
‘works’. It is only in relation to the Spirit that a ‘space’ is, as it were, opened up such 
that one is in a position to resist the desires of the Flesh by being led by the Spirit.88 If 
Paul is modifying a particular view of ancient moral psychology in its relation to 
virtue ethics, as he seems to be, then this is an implication of his placing of the Spirit 
in the place of reason as the governing faculty. Only the human agent led by the 
                                                
87 Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 164. On Paul’s vice list as types of actions, see D. Lührmann, 
Galatians: A Continental Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 111. 
88 Although the force of Engberg-Pedersen’s account of the opposition in ‘mythical’ terms is 
obscure, in so far as we are construing situation as a ‘space’ where deliberation is possible for the 
Galatians, the result of his account is similar to our own. Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 163: ‘The general 
account is designed to leave it up to those individuals whom Paul is addressing whether they will let 
‘the other force’ have its way or not’. The problem with Engberg-Pedersen’s account is that he does 
not recognise that this ‘whether’ is itself only possible for Spirit-created agents, for Paul. In contrast to 
his reductive communal focus, cf. Martyn’s criticism of Engberg-Pedersen: ‘Paul presupposes a 
history of the relation between the Spirit and the Galatians, a history that began with God's inceptive 
act of sending the Spirit into their hearts’; J.L. Martyn, ‘De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused 
on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen‘, JSNT 86 (2002): 91. 
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Spirit, rather than tending toward the dissolution of the self, is a properly ordered 
human agent. How, though, does this space for the properly ordered self emerge? 
 Two further related exegetical observations regarding the flow of thought of 
Gal 5:22 – 26 and the metaphorical entailments of the juxtaposition of ‘crucifixion’ 
and ‘life’ in vv. 24 and 25 are in order in this regard. First, in vv. 23 – 26 Paul 
alternates between positive and negative statements, bringing his moral discourse to 
a close with a general admonition in v. 25 and a specific application of this 
admonition to the Galatian situation in v. 26. Thus, v. 24 provides the logically 
antecedent reality that undergirds the Spirit’s production of fruit in vv. 22 and 23: 
because Christians have crucified the passions and desires of the Flesh (v. 24), the 
fruit the Spirit produces should be evident in their lives (vv. 22, 23). They have ‘died’ 
to one set of dispositions in order to ‘live’ to another. Precision and clarity are 
essential here: the force of this metaphor is neither reducible to a mere ‘normative 
self-identification’,89 nor is it about ‘baptism as a corporate victory over a cosmic 
power’ as opposed to ‘an individual’s killing his bodily desire’.90 The former fails to 
take into account that such a self-identification, because it consists in a renewed life-
giving and life-ordering relationship, is dependent on the antecedent ‘creation’ by 
the Spirit and ongoing relation of the self to the Spirit. The latter confuses the 
communal and cosmological horizon of Paul’s discourse with its argumentative 
thrust, which is anthropological. To be sure, Paul’s metaphorical personification of 
the Flesh in antithesis with the Spirit evokes a phenomenon that is cosmic in scope, 
but the very word σάρξ, ‘flesh’ suggests an anthropological reality.91 This is 
confirmed both by the proliferation and centrality of the language of moral 
psychology in vv. 16 – 26 and by Paul’s careful wording in Galatians 6:8: the Flesh to 
which one might sow is τὴν σάρκα ἑαυτοῦ, ‘his own flesh’. Thus, our position on the 
force of Paul’s metaphorical crucifixion language is similar to Engberg-Pedersen but 
with an important Martynian twist: it is new agents in particular and not the new 
community in general, created by the Spirit and ordered according to the Spirit’s 
                                                
89 Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 152. 
90 Martyn, Galatians, 501, n. 88. 
91 For a critique of Martyn’s cosmic martial metaphors as an over-interpretation of the possible 
military connotations of a few key terms, see Morales, Spirit and Restoration, 152–53. 
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desires, who have made a definitive break and ‘crucified’ the passions and desires of 
the Flesh.  
 This leads to another observation about the metaphorical entailments of the 
death and life language of vv. 24 – 25. For v. 25a relates to v. 24 as v. 24 relates to v. 
23—viz. with the antecedent verses being supported logically by what follows. This 
point arises if we ask what Paul means by the metaphorical phrase Εἰ ζῶµεν πνεύµατι 
in v. 25a. It is unlikely that Paul is referring to life by the Spirit in the sense of order, 
because that would make the clause in v. 25b redundant—‘if we live according to the 
Spirit, let us order ourselves according to the Spirit’.92 Rather, the dative in the 
protasis is likely instrumental and, thus, ‘existence’ is the likely referent of ζῶµεν—‘if 
we exist by means of the Spirit…’ But now we are faced with the same question we 
encountered in Galatians 3:21: in what respect, apart from the Spirit’s agency, were 
the Galatians ‘dead’? Verse 24 suggests that it was in the dominance of the Flesh’s 
passions and desires, for v. 25b provides the positive corollary of v. 24—new agents 
have ‘crucified’ the Flesh and, thus, they should ‘order themselves according to the 
Spirit’ (πνεύµατι καὶ στοιχῶµεν), with respect to their passions and desires. It is the 
middle term—Εἰ ζῶµεν πνεύµατι—that enables both. In other words, being 
‘resurrected’ by the Spirit is, for Paul, being freed from the ‘dead’ existence of the 
dominance of the evil passions and desires characteristic of fallen human nature, 
such that the new agent can make a decisive break with them, in order to live 
according to the dispositions produced in relationship with the Spirit.93 Thus, Paul 
provides here the material ground for his contention in Gal 3:21 that the Torah could 
not make alive so that righteousness would result, for the Spirit not the Torah is the 
                                                
92 Barclay, Gift, 429, n. 20. 
93 For accounts of the Spirit as effecting a substance-ontological change, see, e.g., P. Stuhlmacher, 
‘Erwägungen zum ontologischen Charakter der καινὴ κτίσις bei Paulus’, EvT 27 (1967): 1 – 35; F.W. 
Horn, Das Angeld des Geistes: Studien zur palinischen Pneumatologie (FRLANT 154; Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992); idem, ‘Wandel im Geist: zur pneumatologischen Begründung der 
Ethik bei Paulus’, KD 38 (1992): 149 – 70. Though the work of Volker Rabens amounts, in our view, to 
a decisive criticism of this approach and his proposal of a relational model is broadly correct, the 
language of ‘empowerment’ potentially occludes the metaphorical and thus theological significance 
of life as new existence (Gal 5:25a) and, given the focus of his thesis, he pays no attention to the 
question of Paul’s antithetical theological logic in Galatians; V.Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in 
Paul (WUNT II 283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010). 
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creator of new agents and the source of the dispositions and desires to which the 
Torah points but does not directly lead.  
 We now have a clear answer to the puzzle of Paul’s use of ὑπὸ νόµον. For Paul 
ὑπὸ νόµον is theological shorthand for the law’s decisive role in the anthropological 
plight of humanity ante Christum. In the present evil age the Torah’s role is to enclose 
‘all things under Sin’ in the sense that, rather than freeing human agents, the law’s 
curse confirms human agents in their ‘dead’ condition of being bound to evil 
passions and desires. The law is concerned with the transgressions these produce 
(3:19). Thus, if the Galatians are led in their desires by the Spirit, they are not ‘under 
Torah’ in the sense that they are free from the evil desires and actions the law’s curse 
governs but does not change. It is in this sense that ‘Hagar is in slavery with her 
children’ (4:25), while Paul and the Galatians are children of the free ‘Jerusalem 
above’ (4:26). The latter have experienced the eschatological reversal of barrenness 
foretold by Isaiah in the ‘resurrection’ of their very selves from a ‘dead’ existence 
(Gal 4:27, 28; cf. Isa 54:1). 
 This freedom is not inviolable, as in 4 Maccabees or 4 Ezra. Paul’s conditional 
sentence in Galatians 5:18, the imperatives in 5:13, 16, 25, and 26, and the possibility 
of temptation assumed in 6:1 make this clear. Moreover, Barclay is correct that the 
key to understanding the indicative-imperative paradox lies in how Paul’s death and 
life language relates to, in our terms, his theory of new human agents.94 Still, we 
would add a further point to Barclay’s insistence that the Spirit-generated life ‘can 
hardly be said to be real without [its human] expression’.95 For the absence of the 
human expression of Spirit-generated life not only lacks reality, it inevitably 
expresses its alternate. The absence of the reality of Spirit-generated life is, for Paul, 
always the presence of Flesh-generating death.  
 In this connection, when Paul turns from his consideration of the community 
order in Galatians 6:1ff to the eschatological horizon in Galatians 6:7, 8, the language 
of death and life is constitutive of the alternatives facing newly created agents—
‘what one sows, that will he reap’ (ὃ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει). The 
                                                
94 Ibid., 429 – 30: ‘The indicative of “life” is not a statement of status, imaginable in abstraction 
from practice, but of existence, whose truth is evidenced in practice, and necessarily so.’ 
95 Ibid., 430. 
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appeal to the motif of divine impartiality—Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, θεὸς οὐ µυκτηρίζεται—makes 
the forensic context of Paul’s eschatological appeals, implicit at 5:21, explicit here.96 
Yet, it is the manner in which Paul presents the death and life dilemma of the 
Galatians that is critical for our purposes. As we have seen throughout this study, 
organic metaphors are valuable argumentative tools in moral discourse because they 
clarify the potentially opaque horizon of significance of moral action. These organic 
metaphors cut through the haze by positing a necessary connection between the life 
one lives now and the results of that life in the future. It is this function that Paul 
exploits in Gal 6:7, 8 to stress the ultimate significance of the personal and communal 
lives of the Galatians: ‘the one who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap 
corruption’ (ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν σάρκα ἑαυτοῦ ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς θερίσει φθοράν) and ‘the one 
who sows to the Spirit will reap eternal life’ (ὁ δὲ σπείρων εἰς τὸ πνεῦµα ἐκ τοῦ πνεύµατος 
θερίσει ζωὴν αἰώνιον). Paul’s use of the word φθορά and the phrase ζωὴ αἰώνιος in this 
context are pregnant with significance, for they indicate how Paul’s eschatology, 
cosmology, ecclesiology, and anthropology are all integrally interrelated. The advent 
of the creator Spirit gives life to the Galatians in receipt of Jesus’ life-giving death, 
and, thus, the ‘corruption’ of the present evil age in its personal and communal 
expressions of disorder is no longer a given. Rather, those who sow to the Spirit (i.e., 
live according to the Spirit’s desires) order their lives in relationship with the Spirit, 
and, thus, both do good (καλός, 6:9; cf. 4:17) to others and expect the divine 
outworking of their actions unto eternal life. Thus, Paul’s organic death and life 
language is his fundamentally integrating language. Those who sow to the evil 
desires and passions of the flesh will experience the φθορά characteristic of the 
present evil age—the dissolution of the self, the destruction of community, and the 
eschatological disapprobation of God. Likewise, new agents who sow to the good 
desires of the Spirit will experience the ζωὴ αἰώνιος characteristic of the age to come—
the integrity of the self, the flourishing of community, and the eschatological 
approbation of God. 
                                                
96 It is, therefore, doubtful, as de Boer argues, ‘that by the end of the epistle the forensic 
apocalyptic eschatology of the Teachers has been decisively overtaken and neutralized by Paul‘s 
cosmological apocalyptic eschatology’; M.C. de Boer, ‘Paul and Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology‘, in 
Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn (ed. J. Marcus and M.L. Soards; 
JSNTSup 24; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 185. 
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 4 Maccabees argues that God gave the Torah to the mind at creation, such that 
human beings are inviolably endowed with the ability to rule the passions that 
threaten to disorder both the self and society. Thus, ‘[one] rules [oneself] under the 
law through reason’ (4 Macc 2:9). Paul, by contrast, takes life ὑπὸ νόµον to be 
synonymous with slavery to the evil passions and desires of the Flesh. Moreover, for 
Paul, freedom from this state of disorder depends not on the exercise of created 
freedom according to the law but on the receipt of life in a new and newly-ordered 
existence in the Christ-gift through the Spirit. This conception of new and newly-
ordered agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ νόµον, enslaved to evil desires and passions, 
is the theological ground of Gal 1 – 4:  it explains why in Gal 1 – 2 that, though a 
committed Jew, Paul considered himself in need of the reconstitution and reordering 
of his agency in the Christ-event; and it explains why in Gal 3 – 4 Paul assumed that 
those in receipt of the law are ‘dead’ and imprisoned along with the rest of the 
cosmos ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν (Gal 3:22). This result is significant because it shows that Paul’s 
theological logic depends on his account of theological anthropology in Gal 5:13 – 26. 
Moreover, this grounding in Paul’s conception of life arising and being properly 
ordered from ‘death’ in the Christ-gift exhibits the deep thematic coherence of 
Galatians. Likewise, the demonstration of this thematic coherence shows why a 
recognition of the character of the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous 
simpliciter is not sufficient for accounting for Paul’s theological logic. For what is 
needed, if Paul is to avoid begging the question, is an argument for why the new life 
received in the Christ-gift cannot find proper expression in the practice of the Torah. 
Paul’s answer is that life ὑπὸ νόµον is life enslaved to the evil desires and actions that 
the law’s curse governs but does not change. The law confines humanity and is itself 
confined to this ‘dead’ existence, such that an embrace of Torah-piety is of necessity a 
life at once incapable of fully expressing the Torah-virtue of love and subject to evil 
desires and passions that produce the works of the Flesh. Thus, the Christ-gift finds 
personal and communal expression apart from Torah-piety of necessity. 
5.3 Communal Order and Pauline Polemics in Gal 5 – 6 
As in the preceding chapter, our debate has arrived at a stalemate over differing 
construals of divine life-giving benefaction and, thus, revelation: whereas 4 
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Maccabees and 4 Ezra consider the Torah the revelation of the inviolable order given 
by God at creation, Paul sees in the Christ-event the gift of a new and newly ordered 
life. Nonetheless, there remains another matter the author of 4 Maccabees might 
wish to pursue. For whereas 4 Maccabees’ apologetic works by addition and, thus, 
the practices of circumcision and abstinence from forbidden foods are rational (and 
necessary) by implication, the apology of Galatians works by subtraction, as life in 
the Spirit produces love and its fruit and, thus, renders the works of the law 
unnecessary by implication. Thus, even if the author of 4 Maccabees granted Paul’s 
argument to this point, he would still want to know how love is to be expressed. If 
Torah-piety is not the necessary shape of love in community, what is? This is the sort 
of question Paul answers in Gal 6:1 – 10. 
 In this connection, this closing section concludes our new account of the 
function of Gal 5 – 6 by arguing that Gal 6:1 – 10 is necessary not simply for reasons 
of rhetorical persuasion or the circumstantial needs of the Galatian churches but 
rather to provide theological completeness. That is, Paul’s apologetic argument for 
the Christ-gift as the fulfillment of Torah-virtue but not Torah-piety invites the 
question of the proper order of social life as a theological matter. If Torah-piety does 
not provide the proper order of communal life, what order does the Christ-gift 
produce? How is this order to be understood with reference to the Torah-virtue of 
love? Paul answers questions like these, we argue, by showing how Christ’s self-
giving functions as the positive, paradigmatic expression of the order of the newly-
created self and society. 
5.3.1 Pauline Polemics 
 One of the most surprising results of a debate between 4 Maccabees and 
Galatians is just how bad Paul appears in light of it. For Paul, like Antiochus, denies 
the identification of Torah with divine order (pork is one of αἱ τῆς φύσεως χάριτες, 4 
Macc 5:9) and renders adherence to circumcision and Jewish food laws indifferent in 
the church. When Paul warns against becoming κενόδοξος in Gal 5:26, is he, like 
Anitochus (Eleazar is accused of κενοδοξῶν περὶ τὸ ἀληθές, 4 Macc 5:10), suggesting that 
his opponents’ commitment to circumcision and the food laws is a species of ‘vain-
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opinion’, κενοδοξία?97 If so, then Paul’s polemics serve a similar function to 4 
Maccabees’ characterization of Anitochus Epiphanes—viz., the attitudes and actions 
of his opponents constitute a sort of negative proof that life ὑπὸ νόµον reveals its 
‘fleshly’ character.  
 There are several good reasons for thinking that Paul classes his opponents’ 
views as ‘vain-opinion’ (κενοδοξία). First, he attributes their thinking to an alien 
source, denying that the leavening ‘persuasion’ (ἡ πεισµονή) at work among the 
Galatians arises ‘from the one who calls [them]’ (ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑµᾶς, 5:8, 9). In fact, 
this persuasion is blocking the Galatians from ‘obeying the truth’ (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ µὴ 
πείθεσθαι, 5:7b). Though Paul is confident ‘in the Lord’ regarding the Galatians (5:10), 
this depends on their ‘not thinking otherwise [than he does]’ (οὐδὲν ἄλλο φρονήσετε), 
which in turn means that they must walk (5:16) and be led by the Spirit (5:18). Thus, 
Paul’s characterisation of his opponents in Gal 5:7 – 12 fits his apologetic argument 
about the relationship between dispositions, desires, and actions that follows in 5:13 
– 26, so that the attitudes and activities of Paul’s opponents by implication bear an 
inevitably ‘fleshly’ character. Consequently, when Paul concludes his argument in 
Galatians 5:26 with a warning against becoming κενόδοξος, it it is not simply ‘conceit’ 
or ‘pride’98 in general but the specific ‘delusion’ of his opponents99 sourced from a 
false account of the ‘truth of the gospel’ that is in view (5:7; cf. 1:6 – 9; 2:14; 4:16).100 
                                                
97 The three key words in v. 26—κενόδοξος, προκαλέω, and φθονέω—are exceedingly rare in the NT 
and LXX (προκαλέω, 2 Macc 8:11; φθονέω, Tobit 4:7, 16), and, thus, de Boer’s judgement is apt (Galatians, 
373): ‘Paul’s choice of words thus represents an attempt to make contact with the culture and 
knowledge of the Greek-speaking Gentile believers in Galatia’. See, likewise, Lightfoot, Galatians, 214; 
Burton, Galatians, 324–25; Betz, Galatians, 295; Vouga, Galater, 145.  
98 Pace Barclay, Obeying, 160; de Boer, Galatians, 373. 
99 The thematic links between thoughts, dispositions, and actions along with the focus on 
community rivalry suggest that the divisions in Galatia, though not the specific object of Paul’s 
general reflections in 6:1 – 10, are nonetheless a catalyst and key background for them. Contra de Boer, 
Galatians, 351, 368; cf. 373. On the evidence for discord in Galatia, see Barclay, Obeying, 153. 
100 The adjective κενόδοξος in BDAG is unjustifiably limited to ‘having exaggerated self-
conceptions, conceited, boastful’. For several of the parallels listed demonstrate that the word 
frequently occurs in the context of debate about adherence to truth not improper self-estimation. 
Thus, Philo describes, in Dreams 2:105 – 106, the one who ‘changes his mind that he might no longer 
dream the worthless fantasies of the vain-opinionated’ (µεταβάλῃ καὶ µηκέτ᾿ ἐνυπνιάζηται µηδὲ ταῖς κεναῖς 
τῶν κενοδόξων φαντασίαις) as the one who ‘has been raised to clarity above indistinctness and from a 
false notion to truth’ (ἐγρηγορώς, ἐνάργειαν δὲ πρὸ ἀσαφείας καὶ πρὸ ψευδοῦς ὑπολήψεως ἀλήθειαν). For 
similar uses of the adjective in the same context, see both Epictetus 3:24.40 and Aristeas 8. See also the 
relationship between κενοδοξία, idolatry, and sexual immorality in Wis 14:12 – 14.  
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 Paul’s reading of the motives of his opponents in Galatians 5:7 – 12 and 6:11 – 
18 supports this reading of κενόδοξος. The exact circumstance that leads Paul to the 
implicit denial of 5:11 that he is not ‘still preaching circumcision’ (περιτοµὴν ἔτι 
κηρύσσω) is unclear, but his logic is not. Since Paul is still being persecuted, he 
obviously is not still preaching circumcision101. Paul’s understanding of the σκάνδαλον 
of the cross, in this connection, has been interpreted in two basic ways: it is either the 
offence of a crucified messiah102, or it is the offence of the devaluation of the Temple 
and the Torah among ‘Hellenists’ in the early church (cf. Acts 6:1; 8:1).103 The 
interpretation offered here, however, supports the recent contention of Michael 
Wolter, who argues that the σκάνδαλον relates to ’der Heiligkeit Israels’ in so far as 
the Christ-event ‘den Unterschied zwischen Israel und den Völkern letztlich aufhebt’ (ital. 
orig.).104 That is, the cross is a σκάνδαλον in the context of the sort of claim that 4 
Maccabees makes for the supremacy of Jewish-piety, as represented in commitment 
to circumcision and the food laws. The cross negates this claim by exposing the 
anthropological impotency of the εὐσέβεια on which it rests. Thus, unlike Paul, his 
opponents do not advocate circumcision for noble ends, but only to avoid 
persecution τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (6:12). That is why Paul can both chastise the 
Galatians for not obeying the truth (the gospel entails a personal and communal 
order, 5:7) and warn them against the inevitably vicious effects of becoming 
‘deluded’ (κενόδοξος) on their dispositions and attitudes. Another accursed gospel is 
really a false and impotent gospel (cf. 1:6 – 9). In this connection, it is important to 
recognise the relationship between Paul’s death-life pattern elsewhere in Galatians 
(2:19 – 21; 5:24 – 25) and his language of crucifixion and new creation in 6:14, 15: it is 
the introduction of competitive rivalry characteristic of the works of the flesh (5:20) 
into the Galatian community in the form of advocacy for and vain-boasting in 
circumcision in contrast to Paul’s boast in the cross and new creation that reveals his 
                                                
101 For analysis of the grammar of these verses and in support this view, see J. Lambrecht, ‘Is Gal 
5:11b a Parenthesis? A Response to T. Baarda‘, NovT 38 (1996): 239. 
102 U. Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 86., which depends 
solely on Justin, Dial. 90.1. For analysis of a broader textual basis that would provide qualified 
support to this position, see D.W. Chapman, Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion 
(WUNT II 244; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 
103 K.-W. Niebuhr, Heidenapostel aus Israel: die jüdische Identität des Paulus nach ihrer Darstellung in 
seinen Briefen (WUNT I 62; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 62 – 65.  
104 M. Wolter, Paulus: Ein Grundriss seiner Theologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2011), 23. 
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opponents’ thoughts, dispositions, and actions as a species of κενοδοξία. This means 
that it is not just the new existence that Paul boasts in when boasting in the cross, but 
it is the new order that existence entails. New creation (6:15), faith working through 
love (5:6), even, in the specifically Pauline sense of practicing Torah-virtue, ‘keeping 
the law’ (the implication of Paul’s charge, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ περιτεµνόµενοι αὐτοὶ νόµον 
φυλάσσουσιν, 6:13; cf. 1 Cor 7:19). That is what counts. That is the κανών (6:16) by 
which the ‘peace and mercy of God’ is experienced and on which Paul’s hopes for 
Israel depend.105 We could easily imagine the author of 4 Maccabees responding in 
disgust both to this rhetoric and the theology that undergirds it. Yet, at least for the 
purposes of this chapter, we must entertain the possibility that he would push Paul 
further. 
5.3.2 Christological Social Order 
 For the author of 4 Maccabees, Torah defines what is ‘good’ (4 Macc 2:22, 23), 
but Paul has already qualified this identification. Thus, to avoid the charge of 
arbitrariness from an opponent like 4 Maccabees, Paul offers a construal of moral 
order that exhibits some deeper coherence with the divine purpose, developing in 
Gal 6:1 – 10 a Christ-piety that shows how the divine eschatological benefaction 
produces its own coherent moral order. With this reading we aim to make a modest 
contribution to the interpretation of Gal 6:2. By supporting and modifying the 
reading ὁ νόµος τοῦ Χριστοῦ as referring to Christ’s self-giving as a ‘metanorm’,106 we 
will clarify how and why Paul positively relates this metanorm to the Torah. 
 An exhaustive evaluation of the various interpretations of Gal 6:2 is 
unnecessary. For the cognate evidence for the key phrase τὸν νόµον τοῦ Χριστοῦ is so 
sparse (cf. ἔννοµος Χριστοῦ, 1 Cor 9:21) that any interpretation will depend on how one 
takes the argument as a whole.107 In this regard, our interpretation of Gal 5:14 in the 
context of Paul’s apologetic argument in Gal 5:13 – 26 suggests the exclusion of 
                                                
105 S.G. Eastman, ’Israel and the Mercy of God: A Re-reading of Galatians 6.16 and Romans 9  –  
11’, NTS 56 (2010): 367 – 95. 
106 Horrell (Solidarity, 99, n. 2) defines a metanorm as ‘one which determines the moral framework 
within which other norms, values and customs can be articulated and practiced’. For the concept of a 
‘metanorm’, see S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary 
Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 45. 
107 Horrell, Solidarity, 222. 
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certain options from the outset. It would not be compelling or necessary to take 
Paul’s reference to ‘the law of Christ’ without reference to the Mosaic law in either a 
promissory sense108 or as an ‘ironic rhetorical formulation’ referring only to a new 
norm of Christ’s self-giving.109 Either interpretation would gut Paul’s apologetic 
argument, which depends on a real not merely rhetorical connection to and construal 
of the Torah. In this regard, Martyn’s argument that ὁ νόµος τοῦ Χριστοῦ has the sense 
of ‘the law as taken in hand by Christ’ and thus fulfiled redemptive-historically 
exemplifies the sort of real connection between Christ and the law that is needed, 
but it founders on his interpretation of analogous genitive phrases including νόµος in 
Romans (Rom 3:27; 7:23, 25; 8:2).110 Likewise, despite the pedigree of the view,111 
there is no evidence that Paul refers to Christ’s own teaching either in opposition to 
(as New Torah of the Messiah)112 or as the definitive expression of the Torah’s 
meaning.113 Thus, we agree with Horrell that there is no necessary contradiction 
between a real reference to the Torah here and an appeal, in Hays’s terms, to the 
‘paradigmatic self-giving of Christ’.114 Consequently, we propose a modification of 
Hays’ ‘paradigmatic’ account along the lines of our reading of Paul’s argument in 
Galatians 5:13 – 26: the phrase ὁ νόµος τοῦ Χριστοῦ represents the ethical climax of 
Paul’s bridge-building activity in that he weds the Torah-virtue of love with the 
particular expression of Christ’s love as self-giving (cf. 1:4; 2:20). This marriage of 
Torah-virtue and Christ-shaped disposition and action configures normative 
communal dispositions and actions as expressions of loving and thus Torah-fulfiling 
self-giving (6:1 – 5). More precisely, mutual burden-bearing fulfils ‘the law of Christ’ 
                                                
108 Contra de Boer, Galatians, 378. It is hard to see how a notion of prophetic or promissory 
fulfilment in 6:2 serves as the Galatians’ obedience to Paul’s commands in 6:1, 2, and 4. 
109 R.B. Hays, ‘Christology and Ethics in Galatians: the Law of Christ‘, CBQ 49 (1987): 275. 
110 See Horrell, Solidarity, 228. Cf. Martyn, Galatians, 549, 556–57. 
111 For an overview of the history of interpretation, see G.N. Stanton, ‘What is the Law of Christ? ‘, 
ExAud 17 (2001): 47 – 59. 
112 Contra W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology 
(London: SPCK, 1948), 142 – 44; C.H. Dodd, ‘ENNOMOS CHRISTOU‘, in More New Testament Studies 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), 134 – 48. On the idea that the Rabbis expected a ‘new torah’, see the 
analysis and negative verdict of P. Schäfer, ‘Die Torah der messianischen Zeit‘, ZNW 65 (1974): 27 – 
42. 
113 See, e.g. Dunn, Galatians, 322; Moo, Galatians, 378. Horrell observes (Solidarity, 225) that the 
absence in Paul of any reference to Jesus’ Doppelgebot is not evidence of absence of influence and, 
thus, influence remains a possibility. For overviews, see Barclay, Obeying, 135–36; Martyn, Galatians, 
515–18. 
114 Horrell, Solidarity, 230. Cf. Hays, ’Christology ’, 275. 
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in the sense that it fulfils the Torah’s aim of love in the cultivation of Christ-shaped 
dispositions and actions.115 
 Like Paul’s bridge in 5:1 – 6, the logic of 6:1 – 10 is assumed. Thus, a careful 
analysis of Paul’s word choice in v. 1 is vital, as it provides the first glimpses of 
Paul’s pneumatological and Christological shaping. The phrase ἐὰν καί (‘if however’) 
connects 6:1 to the warning against ‘deluded’ beliefs and their characteristic 
dispositions (envy) and actions (provocation) in 5:26, rendering 6:1 a point-by-point 
reframing of the type of situation faced in Galatia.116 The Galatians may face a 
‘trespass’ (παράπτωµα) in the community—not a ‘transgression’(παράβασις, cf. 3:19).117 
And in that case, those led by the Spirit (οἱ πνευµατικοί)118 should employ a Spirit-
generated disposition of ‘gentleness’ (ἐν πνεύµατι πραΰτητος) not envy (5:26), in order 
to practise ‘mending’ (καταρτίζετε) of those who trespass (τὸν τοιοῦτον) rather than 
provocation (5:26). Paul’s appended warning—σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν µὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς— 
both underlines the risk to individuals (singular, σεαυτόν!) involved in this activity 
and provides a stark contrast to the disposition of his opponents. The ‘deluded’ do 
not recognise the real risk of temptation, an oversight οἱ πνευµατικοί cannot afford.  
 This reading discloses the tight fit between Paul’s theory of moral agency and 
his ethical guidance in Gal 6:1. As we have argued, Paul does not hold either that 
moral agency is an inviolable created capacity (4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra) or that it is 
an inviolable feature of new created agency but rather that it depends on one’s 
ongoing relation to the Spirit. Thus, though the phrase ἐν πνεύµατι πραΰτητος likely 
refers to a human disposition, there is no assumed competition between divine and 
human agency—it is οἱ πνευµατικοί who exhibit this disposition.119 Consequently, v. 1 
                                                
115 In this regard, we aim to clarify in what respect this phrase means, as Barclay puts it (Obeying, 
134), ‘the law as redefined and fulfiled by Christ in love’.  
116 Schlier, Galater, 270: ‘Paulus formuliert wiederum nicht so grundsätzlich, sondern bringt ein 
konkretes Beispiel’. 
117 de Boer, Galatians, 374 – 75. 
118 Some scholars take οἱ πνευµατικοί as an ironic subversion of Paul’s opponents’ self-
designation—e.g., Schlier, Galater, 270; Martyn, Galatians, 546. But a parallel such as 1 Cor 3:1 both 
militates against such a view and gives a clue to the meaning: there, to be πνευµατικοί is to be mature, 
not νηπίοι ἐν Χριστῷ or ‘fleshly’ (σάρκινος). Here, as there, Paul considers all the Galatians recipients of 
the Spirit, but to be πνευµατικοί is to be walking according to the Spirit regularly (5:25).  
119 de Boer, Galatians, 373: ‘Paul here appears to use the term “spirit” (pneuma)  in a nontheological 
sense to refer to an attitude or posture. But there may be a play on words since Paul also regards 
humility as a fruit of the Spirit. The Spirit of humility is, as it were, the humility of the Spirit’. 
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reframes the issue of a breakdown in community using Paul’s moral agency 
framework: rather than the mutual rivalry and envy that flows from vain opinion, 
the Galatians are to be led by the Spirit in a gentle disposition for the purpose of 
restorative action. That is to say, we need look no further than the communal discord 
in Galatia and Paul’s diagnosis of it in our search for the relevance of Gal 6:1 – 10. 
This ethical guidance begins with that situation as a catalyst but moves beyond it to 
address the more generally applicable situation of community rupture. 
 As suggested above, this is the sort of concrete example an author like 4 
Maccabees would expect. The crucial point for our purposes, then, is that both Paul’s 
polemics and his apologetic argument for new moral agents frame and inform his 
ethical guidance in Gal 6:1 – 10. Any interpretation of 6:2 must account for its 
function within this larger argument. The hypothesis pursued here is that this verse 
provides the formal shape of the ‘Christ-piety’ that, in Paul’s view, fits both the 
Torah-virtue of love and the revelation of its particular eschatological shape in the 
Christ-event. In other words, ‘sacrificial’ burden-bearing is the mutual responsibility 
of all who are being guided by the Spirit (5:13; 6:1). This is so because, given the 
cosmological and anthropological conditions of the present evil age, Jesus’ death for 
sinners and the life-giving donation of the Spirit discloses the fulfilment of the law of 
love as mutual burden-bearing (5:14; 6:2). The coherence, then, of Paul’s ethics is 
rooted in his Christology, because Jesus’ life-giving death discloses the shape of 
eschatological love in the present evil age. This makes sense not only given the 
theological logic and new theory of moral agency we have seen through our debate, 
but also in the exegesis of Paul’s ethical guidance in Galatians 6:1 – 10. Specifically, 
this view makes sense of Paul’s assumed standard of judgement and his continued 
focus on the relation between dispositions and actions in their communal and 
eschatological contexts in 6:3 – 10. In other words, for Paul, the disposition of love 
received in relation to the Spirit finds its appropriate expression in the community—
its fitting return—in lives of mutual burden-bearing in the church. Thus, Paul’s 
command that the Galatians ‘enslave themselves to one another’ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης (Gal 
5:13) is one of his discourse-specific identifications of the appropriate return of the 
Christ-gift—an obligation he glosses with the phrase ‘the law of Christ’ (Gal 6:2). 
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5.3.3 Recognising the Eschatological Order in Thought and Deed 
 Against earlier interpreters who saw Gal 6:1 – 10 as a loose collection of 
sententiae strung together by Stichwörter, John Barclay has drawn attention to Paul’s 
dialectic movement between individual accountability and communal 
responsibility.120 We may further specify this dialectic as an aspect of a broader 
theme in Gal 5 – 6, as Paul consistently treats individual dispositions and actions in 
the context of their communal effects and the eschatological verdict these actions 
will receive.121 Relatedly, Gal 6:3 – 5 represents not just a focus on individual 
accountability but a continuation of Paul’s examination of the communal and 
eschatological significance of the dispositions and action of new agents. Again, 
Paul’s focus on distinguishing vain-opinion from the truth of the gospel plays a vital 
role in his analysis. An exegetical difficulty illustrates the point: how does v. 3 follow 
from v. 2; how is a diagnosis of self-deception a logical explanation of the mutual 
burden-bearing command or ‘the law of Christ’? Some interpreters ignore this 
difficulty by taking v. 3 to refer either to Paul’s appeal against becoming κενόδοξοι in 
5:26122 or his warning about temptation in 6:1,123 seeing in Paul’s diagnosis of self-
deception in 6:3 a veiled warning against vanity in general.124 Yet, if we take the γάρ 
of v. 3 to be governing vv. 3 – 4 together and we consider that Paul’s discourse on 
κενοδοξία is not relative (an overestimation of one’s worth) but categorical (a false 
estimation arising from a false standard), we can account for the connection to 6:2. 
For if the answer to self-deception (v. 3) is testing (v. 4), then the assumption is that 
the self-deceived are not reflecting on the proper evaluation of their dispositions and 
actions. The one who ‘thinks he is something when he is nothing’ (δοκεῖ τις εἶναί τι 
µηδὲν ὤν) is self-deceived because he does not test (δοκιµάζω) ‘his own work’ (τὸ…ἔργον 
ἑαυτοῦ δοκιµαζέτω). He assumes a standard instead of using the appropriate 
                                                
120 Barclay, Obeying, 149–66. 
121 Though we see coherence in vv. 1 – 10 too, we agree with D.W. Kuck, ‘“Each Will Bear His 
Own Burden“: Paul’s Creative Use of an Apocalyptic Motif’, NTS 40 (1994): 289 – 97: ‘[against those 
who view this as a loose collection, Kuck contends that] Paul in 6.1 – 5 is building a single argument, 
that this argument concerns proper individual self-perception as the ground for life in the 
community, and that this argument has a specifically Christian point of view, which is set forth 
principally in the climactic reference to the final judgement of God in 6.5.’ 
122 Mussner, Galaterbrief, 400; Barclay, Obeying, 160; de Boer, Galatians, 381. 
123 Lightfoot, Galatians, 216; Betz, Galatians, 301. 
124 Longenecker’s interpretation (Galatians, 276) of v. 3 as a conceited attitude that blocks the 
mutual burden-bearing commanded in v. 2 is a notable though unpersuasive exception. 
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standard—‘the law of Christ’. Paul’s positive estimation of proper ‘work’ in v. 4125 
and his allusion to the forensic apocalyptic motif of burden-bearing at the eschaton 
in v. 5 cement the point.126 What matters is not one’s assumed perception but God’s 
estimation, which is impartial (cf. Gal 2:6)127—ἕκαστος γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον βαστάσει. 
Thus, Paul is not puncturing self-inflated pride here but urging the application of the 
appropriate standard of eschatological worth. This standard is Christological, as a 
brief look back from 6:2 to Gal 5:13 – 14 and 5:5 – 6 and a look forward to 6:6 – 8 
shows. 
5.3.4 The Christological Shape of Self and Society 
 As we argued above, in Gal 5:5 – 6 Paul defines the eschatological standard of 
worth with reference to the Christ-event. The hope to which the Galatians look 
forward by the Spirit’s power depends on the righteousness revealed ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 
Moreover, in Gal 5:13 – 14 Paul applies this standard to the situation in Galatia in 
support of his apologetic argument for Torah-virtue: the mutual slavery Paul 
commands ‘through love’ (διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης) fulfils the entirety of the Torah’s ethical 
aim, summarised in the ‘one sentence’ of Lev 19:18. Thus, when we arrive at Gal 6:2 
we are prepared in advance for Paul’s theological shorthand for the divine 
eschatological norm. The life that counts is the life characterised by a disposition of 
love towards others, as echoed in Torah-virtue and revealed in its Christological 
shape in mutual burden-bearing. The self-deceived person does not apply this 
vertical eschatological standard to himself, employing instead assumed horizontal 
standards that are ‘vain-opinion’ and tend toward envy and mutual provocation 
(6:3; cf. 5:26). The one who tests her own actions has no cause to boast to another 
(6:4),128 however, for she recognises that the divine verdict is the one that counts 
                                                
125 Barclay, Obeying, 161–62. 
126 The majority of scholars think v. 5 refers to the eschatological judgement. For the most 
compelling argument, see Kuck, ‘Burden‘. See also, Hays, Galatians, 335; de Boer, Galatians, 385. For 
the contrary view that the future verb is gnomic, see Betz, Galatians, 304. 
127 Barclay, Gift, 437. 
128 It seems better to take the force of εἰς to be ‘to’ rather than ‘in’ and τὸ καύχηµα to mean ‘the 
activity of boasting’ rather than ‘ground for boasting’—‘and then he will boast to himself alone and 
not to the neighbour’ (καὶ τότε εἰς ἑαυτὸν µόνον τὸ καύχηµα ἕξει καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον). Thus, Barclay, 
Obeying, 160 – 61; Dunn, Galatians, 325; Kuck, ‘Burden‘, 294; Martyn, Galatians, 550; Schewe, Galater, 
164. This is so for two reasons. First, it is not clear how a boast in one’s neighbour at the eschaton fits 
the context: how might an eschatological boast in another (v. 4) be a corollary of a false perception of 
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(6:5).129 The striking parallel with 4 Ezra 7:105 makes the same point—enim portabunt 
unusquisque tunc iniustitias suas aut iustitias—but, as we have seen, there the Torah, 
not ‘the law of Christ’, is the standard. Thus, in contrast to the Torah-piety of 4 
Maccabees (and 4 Ezra) Paul presents a Christ-piety in which love expressed as 
mutual burden-bearing is the sort of life that expresses the ultimate divine standard 
of righteousness. 
Conclusion—Self and Society Created and Ordered in the Christ-Gift 
Why is it that those ‘who would be justified by the law’ have necessarily ‘fallen away 
from the gift’ (Gal 5:4)? Ironically, it is the very life 4 Maccabees presents as the 
quintessential expression of the properly ordered self—i.e., life ‘under the rule of the 
Torah by reason’ (4 Macc 2:9)—that is synonymous, for Paul, with a life that is 
enslaved to the evil desires and passions characteristic of fallen humanity, to the 
‘Flesh.’ The ironic portrayal of life ὑπὸ νόµον is not mere rhetoric, however, but is 
derived from Paul’s understanding of God’s life-giving benefaction. Unlike 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, for Paul, life is not inviolably given by God as Torah-ordered 
at creation, but rather life is given and ordered in Jesus’ death as created anew and 
continually reproduced by the Spirit in those who receive this life by faith. By 
isolating and arguing against the key anthropological assumption of texts life 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, Paul provides an alternate account of both moral agency and 
moral order. Unlike 4 Ezra, there is for Paul no anthropological reservation, no zone 
of libertas from which to either accept or reject the divine gift of Torah-ordered life. 
On the contrary, one is either dominated by the desires of the Flesh or led by the 
desires of the Spirit.  
 Paradoxically, it is the very experience of individual and social futility of life 
ὑπὸ νόµον that the Christ-event discloses in full, for Paul. In their very commitment to 
Torah-piety, his opponents actually subvert the Torah-virtue of love by introducing 
                                                                                                                                                  
one’s own eschatological ‘worth’ (v. 3)? Second, only a few verses later, in 6:14, Paul categorically 
denies any boast other than that which is in the cross of Christ, a quintessential boast in another. These 
considerations, along with the clear interplay between the communal and eschatological horizons and 
the parallels in 2 Cor 8:24 and Rom 4:2, support the interpretation offered here. Contra Lightfoot, 
Galatians, 217; de Boer, Galatians, 382–84. 
129 Kuck, ’Burden ’, 296: ‘Each individual is to watch out for himself or herself, examine the self 
rather than judge others, and look to God's future judgement as the final arbiter of status.’ 
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community rivalry. Thus, a double irony is disclosed in Paul’s rhetoric and theology: 
not only does commitment to Torah-piety as the ultimate divine norm leave the self 
disordered, but it inevitably produces a competitive and disordered community. 
This is so, according to Paul, because the divine intention for the Torah was to 
confirm human beings in and confine them to their evil desires and actions (3:22; cf. 
5:18), in order to reconstitute and order them as new agents in the Christ-event. Only 
those who are of Christ are capable of crucifying the desires and passions of the 
Flesh because only they exist as newly created agents, capable of properly exercising 
moral agency by the Spirit; only they fulfil the Torah by living lives of mutual 
slavery through the Spirit-sourced disposition of love; and only they experience the 
eschatological integrity of the self by living according to the new creation order—i.e., 
‘the law of Christ’. Thus, we arrive at the point of ultimate difference between Paul’s 
theology in Galatians and that of 4 Maccabees (and 4 Ezra): because Jesus’ life-giving 
death is the divine gift of life in this evil age, the proper expression of that life cannot 
be Torah-shaped but must instead be Christ-shaped. Torah-piety is not contrary to 
this life-giving Gift (for it confines all things to ‘death’ as preparatio evangelii), but 
neither does it express the order this gift creates (for Torah-piety itself is confined to 
the ‘dead’ existence of the present evil age). Rather, it is, for Paul, a ‘Christ-piety’ 
expressed in lives of mutual burden-bearing sourced from divine love that counts 
before God. For, whereas 4 Maccabees produces an apology for the superiority of the 
Jewish way of life by identifying Stoic virtue paradigmatically in the Torah-piety of 
the martyrs, Paul, by contrast, produces an apology for the normativity of Christ-
shaped (not Torah-shaped) lives and communities by seeing in the self-giving of 
Christ the Torah-virtue of love quintessentially revealed.  
 With the above reading of Gal 5 – 6, we have reached the primary 
contribution of the present chapter, which also constitutes a significant result for this 
thesis. Through exegetical dialogue primarily with 4 Maccabees, we have offered a 
new account both of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians, in 
general, and thereby a new account of the function of Gal 5 – 6, in particular. That is, 
we have shown that Paul’s theological logic depends on his articulation in Gal 5:13 – 
26 of an inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered selves. More specifically, we 
have shown that Paul considers Torah-piety necessarily antithetical to life that 
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fulfills the Torah-virtue of love, because he see the works of the law as confining and 
confined by divine design to a ‘dead’ existence, subject to the evil passions and desires 
of the Flesh. It is because Torah-piety is by divine design confined, along with 
humanity, to this ‘dead’ existence in view of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-
gift that the works of the law cannot be the proper order of the church. Thus, in the 
context of accounts of the function of Gal 5 – 6, Paul’s presentation of the 
Flesh/Spirit antithesis functions neither as merely persuasive rhetoric nor as only a 
contingent response to the circumstances in Galatia but rather as the theological 
ground of Paul’s entire argument.  
 We have also shown that, in service to his apologetic argument, Paul provides 
in Gal 6:1 – 10 a Christ-piety that posits a deep connection to the Torah-virtue of 
love. For, as we argued in debate with 4 Maccabees, Paul presents Christ’s self-
offering as a metanorm for personal and social order not simply to address 
community rivalry in Galatia (cf. Gal 6:1) but for the sake of theological 
completeness. In short, if Torah-piety does not order self and society as the order of 
created life, how does the life-giving Christ-gift so order human existence? Paul 
answers a question like this by positing Jesus’ self-offering as the revelation of the 
eschatological shape of love in the present evil age (Gal 6:2)—and thus as both the 
eschatological standard by which individuals will be judged (6:3 – 8) and the norm 
for social action (6:9, 10). With this reading, we have offered a new account of the 
function of Gal 6:1 – 10 in Galatians in theological terms. 
 Finally, by attending to the way Paul argues from his understanding of the 
life-giving and life-ordering character of the Christ-gift, we have gone beyond recent 
reconsiderations of grace in Galatians. That is, we have shown that Paul’s 
recognition of the unconditioned and incongruous character of the Christ-gift per se 
does not resolve the problem of the theological logic or thematic coherence of 
Galatians. For Paul’s opponents shared his experiences of Christ and the Spirit but 
failed to draw the same inference for personal and social order. What is needed, 
then, are answers to a series of why questions: why does Paul consider his life in 
Judaism as needing to be reconstituted and reordered (Gal 1 – 2); why does Paul 
assume that the recipients of the law are ‘dead’ and thus that the law cannot be the 
eschatological standard of righteousness (Gal 3:21, 22)? The answers lie not in the 
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recognition that the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift implies its own 
norms. Rather, they lie in an analysis of the logic of Paul’s Christological and 
pneumatological understanding of the divine donation and thus ordering of 
eschatological life in the Christ-gift. In short, Paul’s life in Judaism needed 
reordering and the law itself could not provide the shape of that reordering, because 
by divine design Torah-piety confines and is confined to the life of the Flesh. And, as 
we have argued, it is Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-
ordering terms in contrast to the Torah as a death-dealing reality that grounds the 
antithetical theological logic of his argument. It is this conception and the 
‘resurrection’ hermeneutic that it produces that is conveyed in the life and death 
language that arises at critical junctures in Paul’s argument (Gal 2:18 – 21; 3:10 – 14, 
21 – 22; 4:21 – 31; 5:24, 25; 6:8, 14, 15). It is this particular conception of divine 
benefaction as life-giving and life-ordering and the logic and hermeneutic that 
conception produces that undergirds the theology and thematic coherence of 
Galatians.
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Conclusion 
 
1. Debating Life as Divine Gift and God as Life-Giver  
This thesis has placed 4 Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and Galatians in conversation on the 
topic of divine life-giving benefaction and life as divine gift, in order both to observe 
those places where they differ and to explain why they do. We have argued that, 
though each author considers God to be the one who gives and orders life, they 
conceive of these gifts of life and their respective orders differently. For Paul, life is 
ultimately given and ordered only in the Christ-event, while for 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra life is inviolably given at creation as Torah-ordered. This conclusion, however, 
invites but does not answer the question of the theological logic of Galatians. 
Because Paul and his opponents have the Christ-event in common, we must ask why 
they view the implications of this event differently. Thus, by comparing three 
particular texts on divine benefaction, this work both seeks to contribute to the 
reevaluation of Paul’s theological relation to Judaism and, by focusing on divine life-
giving benefaction, to propose an alternative account of Paul’s theological logic in 
Galatians. This conclusion, then, will summarise the argument of each chapter, in 
order to introduce a summary of the contribution of the whole.  
2. Thesis Summary 
Part one of this thesis analysed the accounts of divine life-giving benefaction and life 
as divine gift in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, which, though exhibiting differing 
cosmologies, are both creational and Torah-ordered. Chapter one argued that 4 
Maccabees grounds God’s life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the 
eschaton in his inviolable donation of Torah-ordered life at creation. In 4 Maccabees, 
wisdom just is ‘the instruction of the law’ (1:16, 17), because God gave ‘[the law] to 
the mind’ at creation to restrain the passions, a gift which irrevocably endowed 
humanity with the necessary and sufficient moral agency and the moral order for 
individual and societal virtue and, thus, flourishing (2:23). Because this divine 
donation of Torah-ordered life is inviolable, moral agents and nations are capable of 
and responsible for living according to it. This Torah-ordered creational design and 
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its just divine maintenance is paradigmatically proven, for 4 Maccabees, in the 
vindication of the martyrs and punishment of the tyrant Antiochus Epiphanes. The 
exemplary priest Eleazar elucidates and embodies a paradoxical pedagogy in which 
torture is transformed into triumph and death is turned into life. He defends the 
sanctity and rationality of the Torah-order (5:14 – 38; 6:16 – 23), demonstrates the 
efficacy of pious reason (i.e., Torah-ordered reason) in resisting the passions of 
torture in commitment to that order (6:1 – 11, 24 – 26), and commends the cultic 
vision of life as the basis for the good life and the ground of the reconstitution of the 
nation through ‘sacrificial’ self-offering (5:24; 6:26 – 30). Eleazar’s commitment to 
God (not Nature) as Benefactor of the created Torah-order of self and society is 
grounded in his belief that the fathers will receive him (5:37), a belief more fully 
explicated in the mother’s eschatological hermeneutic that envisions the return gift 
of immutable immortality for the martyrs’ inviolable Torah-commitment (16:16 – 23; 
cf. 7:18 – 20). Thus, as ‘the instructor’ of the martyrs (9:8), Eleazar laid the 
groundwork for their atoning resistance to the tyrant (17:21, 22), thereby 
guaranteeing his defeat at the hands of ‘the Divine Providence [who] saved Israel’ 
(17:22) and, as the mother taught, ensuring the martyrs’ receipt of ‘the victory prize 
in life everlasting’ (17:12) and ‘the divine justice which is eternal torture through fire’ 
(9:9; cf. 10:15; 12:12) for Antiochus.  
 Paradoxically, then, for 4 Maccabees, the perfect expression of the good life in 
a time of divine chastisement is a noble death—an affirmation of the divine order of 
life that God gave, receives back, and transforms into eternal life and national 
renewal. 4 Maccabees is thus both a theodicy and an apology: God’s inviolable 
constitution of moral agency and societal life as Torah-ordered and cult-centered is 
rational (contra Antiochus Epiphanes) because it produces virtue, and it is vindicated 
because God rewards that virtue in and beyond history. ‘[O]nly the children of the 
Hebrews are invincible for virtue’ (9:18) because only they listen to the God who 
says ‘I kill and I make alive; this is your life and length of days’ (18:19)—that is, only 
they recognise the inviolable created Torah-order by which God judges individuals, 
leaders, and nations. It is this conviction about the irrevocable and effectual divine 
donation of life as Torah-ordered for individuals and societies that shapes the 
entirety of 4 Maccabees’ theology—providing the anthropological basis for moral 
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agency and national life, the soteriological criterion through which virtue and vice 
receive their fitting divine return, and the Deuteronomic hermeneutical pattern 
through which scripture, history, and experience are seen as consistent with fitting 
divine justice. 
 In chapter two, we argued that it is theologically axiomatic for 4 Ezra that the 
absence of God’s perfect judgment in the present world is explicable only in light of 
the world’s moral and ontological renewal unto fullness of life at the eschaton. Yet, it 
is precisely the need for ontological transformation that prevents the ultimate 
exercise of divine justice in history and occludes the operations of ultimate heavenly 
justice. Thus, in 4 Ezra, Ezra is the exemplar of the wise man who receives an 
apocalyptic education in which his epistemic (not moral) estrangement from God’s 
‘way’ is overcome. Ezra sees in the resurrection of Zion qua the righteous the 
demonstration of the sanctity of the divine gift of Torah-ordered life and, in that 
revelation, confirmation of the justice-shaped mercy of God. Though ‘when Adam 
transgressed [God’s] ordinances, what had been made was judged’ (7:11), rendering 
Ezra and all humans both cognitively limited and ‘corrupted’ and thus unable to 
‘understand the incorruptible’ (4:10 – 11), and though the cosmos itself is incapable, 
without judgment and ontological transformation, of serving as the venue of divine 
salvation because it is ‘full of sadness and infirmities’ (4:27), and though ‘a grain of 
evil seed was sown in Adam’s heart from the beginning’ (4:30)—despite all this, at 
the final judgment there will be no intercession or vicarious substitution, for ‘all shall 
bear their own righteousness and unrighteousness’ (7:105). This is so because all 
humanity has been inviolably endowed with moral agency—a space of libertas from 
which either to accept or reject the divine gift of life as Torah-ordered (8:56; 9:10 – 
12)—and, thus, every ‘human being born over the earth’ (7:127) will be judged by the 
words of Moses who said, ‘Choose life for yourself, that you may live!’ (7:129). 
Likewise, though Israel is, like the cosmos, an ageing mother whose womb is dying, 
and thus the number and stature of her righteous inhabitants is lessening to the 
point of extinction (5:44 – 55), there will be a just and merciful eschatological reversal 
of this national ‘death’. Thus, when Ezra finally adopts Uriel’s bi-focal view of Zion’s 
plight, encouraging the grieving Mother Zion that God’s way is ultimately just 
(10:16; cf. 4:24) and that the labours of his people do not come to nothing (10:24; cf. 
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3:33), he demonstrates that he is worthy to see and experience her eschatological 
transformation qua the righteous (10:29 - 59). Thus, he is worthy and ready to lead 
the post-exilic community toward that reality. 
 Consequently, 4 Ezra’s theological vision, like that of 4 Maccabees, is 
paradoxical, though its precise character differs: it is only the one who fully and 
faithfully laments the futility of historical existence, enquiring after God’s justice in 
it, who is worthy to be taught and shown the eschatological fecundity of God’s law 
(9:31 – 37) for the righteous Israelite in ‘resurrected’ Zion. This way of accounting for 
the occlusion of divine justice in history makes 4 Ezra’s theodicy a cosmologically 
pessimistic and, thus, deeply qualified one. One cannot expect fitting justice within 
history, because the righteous live within both a nation and world that is 
fundamentally entropic, characterised by the experience of and headed towards 
cosmic death. Fitting divine justice and salvation will be commensurate with divine 
infinite and incorruptible being, which means that these await the event of the 
removal of sin, sickness, and death and the emergence of immutable life (7:113). 
Thus, though humanity retains an inviolably endowed moral agency and Torah-
order, the entirety of human existence can be characterised as a series of passages 
that are ‘evil, full of great dangers, and upheld only by great labors’ (7:12). It is this 
dual conviction about the entropic cosmos and nation and the free moral agent that 
is the controlling centre of 4 Ezra’s theology—producing a relatively pessimistic 
anthropology (resisting the ‘evil thought’ requires ‘great labour’, 7:92) that is still 
essentially optimistic (a few do it), an account of cosmological and national life prior 
to the eschaton that is fundamentally pessimistic, a soteriological criterion that limits 
the righteous to a miniscule few (a ‘drop of water’ in an ocean of humanity, 9:16), 
and thus a bi-focal hermeneutical lens from which one might ignore the vanities of 
history and instead celebrate the ‘gold dust’ (8:2) for whom paradise and life is 
prepared (8:52). 
 In part two, we turned to analyse Paul’s account of divine life-giving 
benefaction, which is Christological and morally creative. Chapter three argued that 
the theological significance of Paul’s paradigmatic autobiography lies fundamentally 
in the shape of the anthropology it discloses. By comparing Paul’s self-portrayal in 
Gal 1 – 2 with the exemplary figures Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (4 Ezra), we 
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disclosed differing conceptions of the constitution and integrity of the self: whereas 
both Eleazar and Ezra represent God’s gift of inviolable and inviolably Torah-
ordered existence at creation, maintaining that created integrity through obedience 
to the Torah, Paul presents himself as the paradigm of the reconstitution, reordering, 
and eschatological integrity of humanity in the Christ-gift. Thus, Paul’s presentation 
of himself as an unworthy recipient of divine life, from the perspective of 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra where worth is Torah-reckoned, raises grave theological 
questions not only about social and cosmological order, and thus soteriology, but 
more fundamentally about the consistency, justice, and thus identity of God. If 
human life is not given by God as Torah-ordered but is rather ‘resurrected’ in the 
Christ-gift, why is this necessarily the case, what role then does the Torah play in this 
divine life-giving donation, and how exactly does the Christ-gift order self and 
society? 
 In chapter four, through a running debate with 4 Ezra on these questions, we 
argued that the theological and hermeneutical profile of Paul’s reading of sacred text 
and salvation history in Gal 3 – 4 is disclosed as a Christologically and 
pneumatologically grounded theodicy. Both Paul and 4 Ezra argue against a reading 
of sacred and human history as an Unheilsgeschichte, but whereas 4 Ezra’s bi-focal 
lens discloses the resurrection of the body and Zion qua the righteous beyond 
history, Paul’s sees in the Christ-event the ‘birth’ of the self for the unworthy 
believer within history. This produces a reading of the Torah not as the path through 
entropic existence, as in 4 Ezra, but as the divine cursing verdict confining ‘all 
things’—Jews and Gentiles alike—under Sin and death. God’s identity as death-
dealer and life-giver is thus, for Paul, fully disclosed in the Christ-gift, not the Torah. 
For he reads salvation-history as the history of the divine creation of life out of 
barrenness, a dead estate that the law does not change but, as divine curse, confirms 
precisely as a preparatio evangelii. Thus, Paul’s reading of sacred text and salvation 
history is controlled by a ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ hermeneutic, which is to say a 
Christological and pneumatological hermeneutic. Unlike his opponents, Paul sees in 
the Galatians’ receipt of the Christ-gift and the subsequent expression of the power 
of the Spirit the life-giving activity of God. Likewise, his reading of the Pentateuch 
from the perspective of Gen 16 – 21 is death and resurrection shaped: the Torah, far 
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from being either the expression of the creation order or identical with the 
eschatological order, is implicated in the fleshly and, thus, ultimately enslaved 
manner of life of the present Jerusalem, while the promise and its fulfilment in the 
Christ-gift bears children from and destined for the Jerusalem above. Thus, if Paul 
were asked, by 4 Ezra, why those who are under the law are necessarily cursed, his 
response would be that they, along with the cosmos, are dead. Yet, this raises further 
questions: why and in what respect are they dead, and if the Torah is implicated in the 
order of death of the present evil age, what positively is the order of life disclosed in 
the Christ-event and how are these related? 
 In chapter 5 we took up these questions in the context of the perennial 
problem of the purpose of Paul’s ethics in Gal 5 – 6, arguing through debate with 4 
Maccabees that these chapters most clearly disclose the material Christological and 
pneumatological theological basis for Paul’s argument, which in turn determines the 
formal contours of his fundamentally interpersonal and communal ethic. In Gal 5:13 
– 6:10 Paul answers two questions that an author like 4 Maccabees (and Paul’s 
opponents in Galatia) would have: why is it that those ‘who would be justified by the 
law’ have necessarily ‘fallen away from the gift’ (Gal 5:4), and, if Torah-piety does not 
provide the order of eschatological life but the Christ-event does, how is this order to 
be expressed by individuals and communities? In short, by isolating and arguing 
against the key anthropological assumption of texts like 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, 
Paul produces an alternative account of moral agency and moral order. Life is not 
inviolably given at creation as Torah-ordered moral agency, but rather life is given 
and ordered in Jesus’ life-giving death as created anew and continually reproduced 
by the Spirit in those who receive this life by faith. There is no zone of libertas; those 
ὑπὸ νόµον are dominated by the evil passions and desires of the Flesh. It is the Spirit 
who reconstitutes moral agents, and these agents exhibit the Spirit-produced Torah-
virtue of love by resisting the practices of the flesh and living lives of mutual 
burden-bearing (Gal 6:2).  
 Thus, we arrive at the ultimate theological difference between Paul and 4 
Maccabees, 4 Ezra, and his opponents in Galatia, which is at once anthropological, 
social, cosmological, and eschatological. As in moral agency, so in moral order: 
because Jesus’ life-giving death is the divine gift of life in this evil age, it is only in 
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relation to the life of Jesus created and sourced by the Spirit that properly ordered 
moral agency is possible. And thus the proper expression of that life cannot be 
Torah-shaped but must instead by Christ-shaped. Where life is given, there it is 
ordered, and thus, because God gives life to dead agents in the Christ-gift, the 
expression of that life will necessarily conform to Jesus’ own life-giving death. It is in 
this ‘Christ-piety’ expressed in lives of mutual burden-bearing sourced from divine 
love that the Torah-virtue of love is fulfilled and divine righteousness practised. It is, 
according to Paul, not Torah-piety but receipt and exercise of the ongoing life 
according to the Christ-gift—that is, the bearing of one another’s burdens—that 
counts before God. It is life sourced from and lived according to this new creation 
that fulfils Torah-virtue in the law of Christ. 
3. Summary of Results  
By attending to the language and thus conceptions of God as life-giver and life as 
divine gift in our comparative texts we have both analysed and demonstrated the 
importance of an unstudied theme and made a range of contributions to the study of 
each text, in particular, and to research on the relation between Pauline and Jewish 
conceptions of grace, in general. We will conclude by summarising the contributions 
this study has made to research on the coherence and theological logic of 4 
Maccabees and 4 Ezra, on grace in Jewish texts of antiquity, on the coherence and 
theological logic of Galatians, and on the relation between Pauline and Jewish texts 
of antiquity regarding divine benefaction.  
4 Maccabees and its Atonement Theology 
 Though our focus was specifically on God as life-giver and life as divine gift, 
in chapter one we contributed to research on 4 Maccabees by offering the first full 
appraisal of divine benefaction in this text. This analysis produced important results 
for understanding the theological logic of 4 Maccabees (specifically, by resolving the 
debate surrounding its atonement theology), in particular, and for the recent 
reconsideration of grace in the Pauline and Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity, 
in general. With respect to the two dominant models of 4 Maccabees’ atonement 
theology and theological logic, neither a mere recognition of the martyrs’ deaths as 
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atoning1 nor an account of this atonement in merely exemplary terms2 is sufficient to 
convey the text’s theological logic. For, as we demonstrated, the self-offering of 
Eleazar and the martyrs has logical and theological force only within 4 Maccabees’ 
deeper account of the circle of the divine gift of life initiated at creation and 
maintained by God’s life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the 
eschaton. Put more specifically: God’s indiscriminate donation of Torah-ordered life 
in creation is the basis of inviolable moral agency, and thus the precondition for the 
discriminating return of life as a gift to the worthy—whether temporally or eternally, 
nationally or individually. Thus, without an account of divine life-giving 
benefaction, 4 Maccabees’ atonement theology and the theological logic remain 
opaque.  
The Theological Logic and Coherence of 4 Ezra 
  Regarding debates over the coherence and theology of 4 Ezra, we 
showed in chapter two how the vision of episode four relates to episode three (and 
the previous episodes) theologically. And, in so doing, we gave a new account of the 
coherence and theological logic of 4 Ezra. Despite the recent minority report of 
Hogan that Ezra’s vision represents a non-rational qua apocalyptic alternative to 
reasoned theological debate3 and the majority view championed by Stone that 4 Ezra 
avoids the theological questions of episode one in favour of a merely psychological 
explanation of Ezra’s ‘conversion’,4 we argued that the framing of the vision posits 
that Ezra’s experience of the ‘resurrection’ of Zion itself is the answer to his 
theological questions. In this connection, we both confirmed Barclay’s analysis of the 
                                                
1 See, e.g., H. Anderson, “4 Maccabees,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (ed. J.H. 
Charlesworth; vol. 2; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 531–64; M. de Jonge, “Jesus’ Death for Others 
and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs,” in Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and 
Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn (ed. T. Baarda; Kampen: Kok, 1988: 142 – 51; J.W. van 
Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees (JSJSup 57; 
Leiden: Brill, 1997), 150–53. 
2 See, e.g., S.K. Williams, Jesus’ Death as Saving Event: the Background and Origin of a Concept 
(HTRDS 2; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975); D. Seeley, The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and 
Paul’s Concept of Salvation (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990); T. Rajak, “Dying for the Law: The 
Martyr’s Portrait in Jewish-Greek Literature,” in The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in 
Cultural and Social Interaction (AGJU 48; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 99–133. 
3 K.M. Hogan, Theologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom Debate and Apocalyptic Solution (JSJSup 130; 
Leiden  ; Boston: Brill, 2008). 
4 M.E. Stone, Fourth Ezra (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990). 
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competing definitions of gift in episode three5 and went beyond that analysis by 
showing how a focus on the relation between eschatological life and created life as 
gift is needed to grasp 4 Ezra’s theological logic. Specifically, by tracing the 
development of organic metaphors throughout the first four episodes of 4 Ezra, we 
showed how the seed metaphor of episodes three and four establishes the 
connection between dying historical Zion and resurrected eschatological Zion, while 
the account of God as one who gives life to dead Zion qua the righteous supplies the 
logic by which the connection holds. In other words, we showed that, in order to 
understand why Ezra adopts Uriel’s account of God as a discriminate giver and how 
that account resolves his quest for seeing the survival of Zion, one must attend to the 
organic language through which the debate over the efficacy of the gift of moral 
agency and its Torah order is persued. In so doing, we argued, the long-standing 
scholarly debate over the coherence and theological logic of 4 Ezra is resolved.6 
 In addition to solving a number of exegetical problems and resolving debates 
over the theological logic of these texts, our readings of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra in 
part one have contributed to the recent reconsideration of grace in Pauline and 
Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity in two important respects.7 First, we have 
shown that 4 Maccabees’ understanding of grace neither fits within the dominant 
pre-Sanders framework of ‘legalistic works righteousness’, nor does it confirm the 
assumption of earlier scholars and Sanders that grace is by definition ‘groundless’, 
‘free’, ‘not earned’, and ‘unmerited’.8 Rather, 4 Maccabees construes national 
restoration and eternal life as the discriminate divine gift of life to the Torah-worthy, 
grounded in an account of the indiscriminate donation and ordering of life as Torah-
ordered at creation. Thus, 4 Maccabees argues both that God gives life in history and 
eschatologically to the worthy, grounding these gifts in a particular construal of 
divine benefaction at creation. In that respect, there is no tension between God’s 
                                                
5 J.M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 288 – 300. 
6 This debate stretches back to the dawn of the twentieth century, specifically the seminal work of 
Gunkel in H. Gunkel, ‘Das vierte Buch Esra‘, in Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten 
Testaments (ed. E. Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900): 2:331 - 402. For the most recent 
comprehenseive overview, see Hogan, Theologies, 15 – 35. 
7 In addition to Barclay, see J.A. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013); O. McFarland, God 
and Grace in Philo and Paul (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
8 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1977), 394 – 96.  
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indiscriminate and prior creative action and his subsequent and saving 
eschatological action. Consequently, the tendency to downplay the fittingness of 
divine salvation as gift, as, e.g., in Paul Redditt’s important article on the law in 4 
Maccabees, is misguided.9 Second, we both confirmed Barclay’s analysis regarding 
the differing definitions of grace in episode three of 4 Ezra and went beyond that 
analysis, showing that the differing definitions of grace depend, theologically, on 4 
Ezra’s conception of the relation between created and eschatological life as divine 
gift. That is, we showed that, without a careful tracing of the debate over life and 
Torah as created gifts prosecuted through 4 Ezra’s organic metaphors, an account of 
4 Ezra’s theological logic is not possible. For it is Uriel’s particular account of created 
life as life-giving and life-ordering that establishes the connection between fallen and 
eschatological reality, and it is in adopting this account that Ezra’s worth is proven 
and his initial request to see God’s way resolved in revelatory vision. 
 In summary, neither the assumption that grace is ‘groundless’ (as in previous 
studies on both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra) nor the recognition that divine gifts can go 
to the worthy (as in Barclay on 4 Ezra) are sufficient for understanding the 
theological logic of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. For, though they differ on the status of 
the Jewish nation and the cosmos, both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra consider divine 
return gifts to be discriminate because they assume the inviolability of the divine 
indiscriminate donation of created life in the form of human agency and Torah-
order. In short, to understand the theological logic of these texts one must give an 
account of their conceptions of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. Thus, 
with respect to the recent reconsideration of grace in Pauline and Jewish texts, our 
research confirmed the analyses of Linebaugh, McFarland, and Barclay on the 
importance of attending to how grace is defined, while also extending and 
deepening that research in the analysis of our specific comparative texts.  
The Theological Logic of Galatians 
 In addition to giving an account of divine life-giving benefaction in Galatians, 
the exegetical dialogue we hosted on this theme with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
produced a number of results. Here we will itemise those results with respect to the 
                                                
9 P.L. Redditt, ‘The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees‘, CBQ 45 (1983): 249–70. 
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debate over theological logic of Galatians. This will prepare for a summary of the 
implications of the particular findings in parts one and two of this thesis for the 
study of theological relations between Pauline and Jewish texts of antiquity, in 
general, and their conceptions of grace, in particular.  
 In chapter three we contributed to research that contends that Paul presents 
himself as a paradigm of ‘the working of the gospel’10, by placing his exemplary 
account in conversation with those of Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (4 Ezra). This 
conversation produced one significant result for scholarship on Galatians, in general, 
and our thesis, in particular. 
1. The Function of Paul’s Paradigmatic Autobiography (Gal 1 – 2)  
Our analysis enabled us to see how Paul’s autobiography represents not an 
appeal to the singularity of the gospel,11 not merely an appeal to the change in 
redemptive-historical time or the creation of a new cosmos,12 and not even an 
appeal to the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift per se,13 but rather 
Paul’s autobiography is the beginnings of an argument, climaxing in the 
formal presentation of Gal 2:18 – 21, for his particular construal of the 
singularity of the Christ-gift as gift to the unworthy vis-à-vis the law. In this 
way, we demonstrated that Paul’s autobiography in Gal 1 – 2 reaches its 
formal climax in his presentation of himself as the recipient of a new and 
newly-ordered agency for a new community in the Christ-gift. Thus, we 
began to go beyond Barclay’s research by showing not simply that Paul 
conceives of divine benefaction in the Christ-gift as unconditioned and 
incongruous but, by focusing on the life-giving and life-ordering aspect of this 
gift in conversation with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, how this conception is 
implicated in deeper questions about created and eschatological life in 
relation to the Torah. Because Paul’s opponents shared his experience of the 
                                                
10 B.R. Gaventa, ‘Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm‘, NovT 28 (1986): 313; cf. G. 
Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding (Atlanta: Scholars, 1985); B. Dodd, Paul’s 
Paradigmatic ‘I‘: Personal Example as Literary Strategy (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 
1999); J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul’s Story: Theology as Testimony‘, in Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical 
Assessment (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 133–56. 
11 B.R. Gaventa, ‘The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians‘, in Pauline Theology, Vol. 1 
(ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 147 – 59. 
12 Cf. Martyn’s two questions: ‘What time is it?’ and ‘In what cosmos do I live?’; J.L. Martyn, 
Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 23. 
13 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 386. 
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redemptive-historical change inaugurated by the Christ-event and its 
consequent effects in divine incongruous gift-giving but disagreed about the 
implications of these for the Torah, what is needed, in order to understand 
how Paul avoids begging the question, is not an appeal to the Christ-gift but 
an account of his inferential logic with respect to it. In this connection, we 
showed that the particular character of Paul’s autobiography implies a 
rejection both of accounts of the enduring efficacy of created agency and of 
identifications of the Torah with the created order—i.e., accounts like those 
used to present Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary worthy recipients of 
eschatological grace. With this finding, we offered a new account of the 
function of Gal 1 – 2 as the introduction of Paul’s primary theme—life as new 
human agency and order from ‘dead’ conditions—in a formal 
autobiographical argument. Moreover, this result initiated the subsequent 
clarification of the material development of Paul’s argument for the life-
giving and life-ordering character of the Christ-gift in the next two chapters of 
this thesis.  
 
 In chapter four we furthered research on Paul’s theological logic in Gal 3 – 4 
by demonstrating, through exegetical dialogue with 4 Ezra, how Paul avoids 
begging the question in argument with his opponents.  
 
2. Clarifying the Question of Paul’s Theological Logic 
Our initial contribution of chapter four had to do with clarifying what an 
account of Paul’s theological logic would entail. Through dialogical exegesis 
with 4 Ezra over Gal 3:1 – 14, we showed that what needs explaining is the 
logic that deems as necessary and inevitable the particular pattern of 
salvation-history in which the Abrahamic promise, the Deuteronomic curse, 
and the Christ-event are integrally related.14 This result was significant for 
                                                
14 Thus, we refuted both Stanley’s reading of the curse as a threat and not a reality and Wilsons’ 
account of Paul’s theological logic, as the latter depends materially on the former; C.D. Stanley, 
“‘Under a Curse’: A Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10-14,” NTS 36 (1990): 481–511; T.A. Wilson, The 
Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians (WUNT II 225; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
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our argument, because it enabled us to evaluate available models of Paul’s 
theological logic. 
 
3. Evaluating Available Models of Paul’s Theological Logic 
Next, we showed how various models of Paul’s theological logic failed as 
accounts of Paul’s logic. Whereas the family of ‘dogmatic’ approaches of 
Sanders, Martyn, and de Boer exacerbate the problem of Paul’s logic by not 
explaining why the pattern is necessary,15 appeals to the redemptive-historical 
failure of Israel (Scott, Wright, Hays, and Barclay),16 the experience of the 
Spirit simpliciter (Hays and Dunn),17 or Paul’s pessimistic reading of salvation-
history from Deuteronomy (Watson)18 do not explain why the curse at the 
centre of Paul’s pattern is inevitable or why the law cannot order the 
eschatological community once the curse is removed. In this last connection, 
we argued that the family of traditional accounts of Paul’s logic,19 likewise 
fail, because they do not explain why the law cannot provide the order of the 
church once inability is removed in the Christ-event.  
 
4. The Logic of the Life-giving and Life-ordering Christ-Gift 
Finally, we went beyond available models and Barclay’s recent account of 
gift, showing how Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-
ordering terms constituted not an appeal to but an argument for its necessary 
status as a gift to the unworthy. Specifically, we showed that Paul considers 
                                                
15 For the argument justifying grouping these authors together under the ‘dogmatic’ label, see 
chapter four, 196. Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 483, n. 37, 484; ibid., Paul, the Law, 21 – 7; 
J.L Martyn, Galatians (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 311; and M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A 
Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 200 – 01. 
16 See  J.M. Scott, ‘Paul’s Use of Deuteronomic Tradition‘, JBL 112 (1993): 657 – 59; idem, ‘”For as 
Many as Are of Works of the Law are Under a Curse” (Galatians 3:10) ‘, in Paul and the Scriptures of 
Israel (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; JSNTSup 83; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 195; N.T. 
Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1991), 137 – 56; R.B. Hays, The Letter to the Galatians (NIB XI; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 258–59; 
Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 405 – 06, n. 39. 
17 R.B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: YUP, 1989), 108; Dunn, Theology 
of Galatians, 95. 
18 F. Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (2nd ed.; London: T&T Clark, 2015),394 – 96 
19 See, e.g., R.H. Gundry, ‘Grace, Works, and Staying Saved in Paul‘, Bib 66 (1985): 1 – 38; T.R. 
Schreiner, ‘Paul and Perfect Obedience to the Law: An Evaluation of the View of E.P. Sanders‘, WTJ 
47 (1985): 245 – 78; G.P. Waters, The End of Deuteronomy in the Epistles of Paul (WUNT II 221; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 93 – 100.  
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the law confining and confined to a ‘dead’ existence by divine design in view 
of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift. Moreover, we showed that the 
hermeneutic by which Paul sees the stability of divine saving action in history 
is ‘death’ and ‘resurrection’ shaped: just as God brings forth children from the 
barren Sarah, so does the Jerusalem above bring forth heirs from the barren 
conditions of the present evil age in the Christ-gift by the Spirit. In the context 
of our debate with 4 Ezra, this result showed why one cannot assume that 
justice and mercy are in a necessarily antithetical opposition in either 
Galatians or 4 Ezra, but rather the question is one of construal: Paul construes 
justice as mercy-shaped, gift to the unworthy within history, while 4 Ezra 
construes mercy as justice-shaped, gift to the worthy beyond history.20 
Moreover, we showed that it is their differing accounts of divine life-giving 
benefaction that explain these differences. 
  
5. The Theological Function of Gal 3 – 4 
Thus, the result of our overall reading was a clarification of the theological 
function of Paul’s argument in Gal 3:1 – 22—viz., he shows why the Christ-
gift and necessarily not the law is life-giving. In this way, we demonstrated a 
key point from our introduction: since Sanders ‘dogmatic’ reading of Paul’s 
antithetical theological logic, scholars have generally failed to ask what Paul 
might mean in Gal 3:21 by implying that the law is given to the ‘dead’, to 
people in need of being ‘made alive’ (ζῳοποιέω). In this connection, we showed 
that, though the arguments of Gathercole and Sprinkle regarding the 
soteriological thrust of Paul’s reading of ‘life’ texts are persuasive, generally, 
they are of limited utility as accounts of Paul’s theological logic.21 Specifically, 
Sprinkle’s account of that logic in terms of a general antithesis between divine 
and human agency fails because it does not take into account or explain why 
                                                
20 Thus, pace Watson, one cannot conclude that Ezra’s change of view amounts to a repudiation of 
his ‘former belief in the covenant with Israel and in the saving power of the divine mercy’; Watson, 
Hermeneutics, 464, n. 45. 
21 S.J. Gathercole, ‘Torah, Life, and Salvation‘, in From Prophecy to Testament: The Function of the Old 
Testament in the New (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 131–
50; P.M. Sprinkle, Law and Life: the Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism and in Paul (WUNT II 
241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
 302 
Paul should prefer divine creative agency in the Christ-event and not at 
creation (as in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra).22 Relatedly, we showed how Gal 3:23 
– 4:31 serves not a merely rhetorical but a theological function23—viz., it 
shows why the law cannot order the life of the eschatological community. 
Thus, contra Sprinkle the law is not excluded from the eschatological order of 
life either because it is a ‘merely human way of appropriating eschatological 
life’ or simply because that life must be ‘created by divine action, the 
revelation of Christ in Paul’, but rather because, by divine design, the law itself 
confines and is itself confined to the morally ‘dead’ estate of humanity.24 
Relatedly, though Paul’s reading of ‘life’ texts in Gal 3 – 4 does have a 
soteriological and, specifically, creative thrust, the ‘social’ or ‘regulative’ 
readings of Wright, Dunn, and Wakefield are not altogether misguided.25 
Paul is concerned to address how the Christ-gift orders the self and social life, 
just not at this point in the argument: in Gal 3 – 4 he is producing an argument 
for why the law cannot provide that order. Finally, we showed that Paul’s 
reading of the Pentateuch via an interpretation of Genesis 16 – 21 is neither an 
‘afterthought’26 nor an occasion for ‘offensive and heretical’ statements that 
amount to ‘hermeneutical jujitsu’,27 but the display of the lens through which 
one might see the donation of the promise, the addition of the Torah, and the 
Christ-event as expressing one singular saving purpose. That lens is creative 
and Christomorphic, as Paul sees prefigured in the births of Isaac and Ishmael 
two manners of birth—one according to ‘natural’ human means (κατὰ σάρκα) 
                                                
22 The same is true of the explanation of Watson, on whom Sprinkle is dependent; F. Watson, 
‘Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and Human Agency‘, 
in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment (ed. S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. 
Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 116. 
23 Cf. the interpretation of Paul’s identification of Jewish with pagan calendrical practices as 
merely rhetorical in M.C. de Boer, ‘The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου in Galatians‘, NTS 
53 (2007): 222 – 24. 
24 Sprinkle, Law and Life, 155 – 56. 
25 A ‘social’ or ‘regulative’ interpretation of Paul’s reading of of Lev 18:5 was first introduced in G. 
Howard, ‘Christ the End of the Law: the Meaning of Rom 10:4ff‘, JBL 88 (1969): 331 – 37. See, e.g., 
J.D.G. Dunn, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1993), 174 – 75; 
idem, Theology of Paul, 152 – 53; Wright, Climax, 149; and A.H. Wakefield, Where to Live: The 
Hermeneutical Significance of Paul’s Citations from Scripture in Galatians 3:1 – 14 (AcBib 14; Atlanta: SBL, 
2003), 131 – 88. 
26 Dunn, Theology of Galatians, 124. 
27 Hays, Echoes, 112, 115. 
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and, thus, confined to slavery and death, and one by the miraculous power of 
the Spirit and thus eschatologically free (κατὰ πνεῦµα, 4:29). 
 
 In summary, with these results, we clarified Paul’s theological logic in 
Galatians by showing how his reading of sacred text and salvation-history 
represents not an appeal to the Christ-event, Spirit experience, sacred text, or even 
the character of the Christ-gift as gift to the unworthy, as the models we surveyed 
assume, but an argument for the necessarily integral yet antithetical relation 
between the Christ-gift and the law. Moreover, this result initiated our final chapter, 
in which we addressed: 1) why, ultimately, and it what sense Paul considers 
humanity ‘dead’; and 2) how the Christ-gift orders the self and community in 
positive terms. 
  
 In chapter five, through exegetical dialogue primarily with 4 Maccabees, we 
brought our study of divine life-giving benefaction to a close in the context of 
scholarly debates over the thematic coherence and theological logic of Galatians.28   
 
6. Clarifying the Thematic Relation between Gal 4 and 5 
 
Our initial argument of chapter five showed that, whereas interpreters take 
Paul’s term ἐλευθερία in Gal 5:1 to mean freedom either from the Torah per se29 
or freedom from the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου (Gal 4:3, 9),30 it is the relation between 
the Torah and the cosmic elements that informs Paul’s usage. By ἐλευθερία he 
means freedom from entropic existence in the form of commitment to the 
Torah, a concept which serves as the thematic bridge from Gal 4:21 – 31 to Gal 
5. Thus, we began our own development of Engberg-Pedersen’s insight about 
the logical and thematic relation between Gal 4 and 5.31  
                                                
28 Cf. the overview of dogmatic, rhetorical, and historical models in S. Schewe, Die Galater 
zurückgewinnen: paulinische Strategien in Galater 5 und 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 
16 – 59. Though focused on explaining the rationale for Paul’s references to the law in Gal 5:13 – 6:10, 
see also the overview of approaches in Wilson, Curse of the Law, 1–4. 
29 M.C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 311. 
30 Coppins, Freedom, 114–15. 
31 T. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34: 
‘the two triads of law, flesh and slavery [Gal 4:21 – 31] versus Christ, faith, spirit and freedom [Gal 
5:13 – 26] will be developed with regard to their internal, logical connection in the ‘paranetic’ section. In 
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7. Explicating the Apologetic Character and Logical Form of Gal 5 
 
Next, by attending to the formal structure of Paul’s argument in conversation 
with 4 Maccabees, we demonstrated the apologetic character and clarified the 
logical form of the argument in Gal 5. In this way, way we developed the 
argument of Barclay, neglected by scholars, that Paul is involved in an 
apologetic ‘bridge-building’ exercise.32 Both authors make arguments that 
progress from a posteriori to a fortiori: but, whereas 4 Maccabees argues that 
only Torah-piety inculcates Hellenistic virtue, Paul argues that only Christ-
piety fulfils Torah-virtue. This result invited an analysis of the material 
ground of 4 Maccabees’ and Galatians’ formal differences, which led to one of 
the most significnant contributions of the chapter and the thesis.  
 
8. Gal 5:13 – 26 as Material Ground of Paul’s Theological Logic 
 
Ultimately, we showed, then, that Gal 5:13 – 26 represents not merely 
persuasive rhetoric,33 not a contingent address to Galatian circumstances 
simpliciter,34 and not even an elaboration of Paul’s theology,35 but rather the 
ground of his theological logic. That is, Paul presents there his inchoate 
theory of new and newly-ordered human agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ 
νόµον (Gal 5:18) that is enslaved to the evil passions and desires characteristic 
of fallen humanity. With this result, we resolved the debate between Engberg-
Pedersen and Martyn over the character of Paul’s virtue ethics, showing that 
Paul is indeed engaged in virtue-ethics (with Engberg-Pedersen) and that he 
decisively modifies anthropological conceptions of the Stoic kind employed in 
4 Maccabees (with Martyn).36 Moreover, we showed that this conception of 
                                                                                                                                                  
addition to providing exhortation of the Galatians, which it does do, that section also spells out exactly 
how it makes sense to connect the three items in either triad.’ 
32  J.M.G. Barclay, Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s Ethics in Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1988), 124 – 25. 
33 See, e.g., G.A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: 
UNC Press, 1984), 144–52; Tolmie, Persuading the Galatians, 189–203. 
34 See, e.g., Barclay, Obeying the Truth. 
35 See, e.g., Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 131 – 77 and Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 423 – 41. 
36 Cf. Martyn, Galatians; idem, ‘De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on Paul and the 
Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen” JSNT 86 (2002); Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics; idem, “Response to 
Martyn,” JSNT 86 (2002): 103–14. 
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new and newly-ordered agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ νόµον is the 
theological ground of Gal 1 – 4, because it explains why in Gal 1 – 2 that, 
though a committed Jew, Paul considered himself in need of the reconstitution 
and reordering of his agency in the Christ-event; and it explains why in Gal 3 
– 4 Paul assumed that those in receipt of the law are ‘dead’ and imprisoned 
along with the rest of the cosmos (including the law) ὑπὸ ἁµαρτίαν (Gal 3:22).  
 
 
9. The Theological Logic and Thematic Coherence of Galatians 
 
The preceding results, and especially those of chapter five, are significant 
both because they show that Paul’s theological logic throughout the letter is 
grounded in his theological anthropology and because they expose the deep 
thematic coherence of Galatians—both longstanding puzzles in the study of 
this letter.37 It is Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-
ordering terms vis-à-vis the Torah as a death-dealing reality that grounds the 
antithetical theological logic of his argument. It is this conception and the 
‘resurrection’ hermeneutic that it produces that is conveyed in the life and 
death language that arises at critical junctures in Paul’s argument (Gal 2:18 – 
21; 3:10 – 14, 21 – 22; 4:21 – 31; 5:24, 25; 6:8, 14, 15) and provides the thematic 
coherence of the letter. 
 
10. The Function of Paul’s ‘Ethics’ (Gal 5 – 6) in Galatians 
  
Finally, we demonstrated that the function of Gal 6:1 – 10, given Paul’s 
argument against Torah-piety, is necessary for the theological completeness of 
his apologetic argument. In other words, though his instruction is fitted to the 
situation in Galatia rhetorically and historically, it moves beyond these to a 
general, positive account of Christ-piety. Thus, we supported and nuanced 
the ‘paradigmatic’ interpretations of Gal 6:2 of Hays and Horrell, by showing 
                                                
37 As we observed in chapter four, attention to the problem of Paul’s theological logic goes at least 
as far back as Luther’s commentary on Gal 3:10. For an overview of the problem of thematic 
coherence in relation to Gal 5:13 – 6:10, which became of a focus of scholarly concern in the early 
twentieth century, see Barclay, Obeying, 9 – 26.  
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how and why Paul positively relates Christ to the Torah.38 In this connection, 
we showed specifically that Paul’s appeal to Christ as paradigm through the 
phrase ὁ νόµος τοῦ Χριστοῦ in Gal 6:2 encapsulates his apologetic bridge-
building activity from the Christ-gift back to the Torah, while Gal 6:3 – 10 
presents the positive significance of this for the self and community. In other 
words, we showed not simply that, in Horrell’s terms, the Christ-gift is a 
metanorm but why Paul was compelled to offer this metanorm for the sake of 
his argument. It serves an apologetic and theological purpose. Thus, with this 
interpretation of Gal 5 – 6, we supplied a longstanding desideratum by 
showing precisely how Paul’s ‘ethical’ section is related to and, recognised 
more recently,39 serves as the climax of the letter. Though fitted to the 
historical situation of the Galatians and rhetorically shaped, Gal 6:1 – 10 is 
necessary because it provides Paul’s positive account of how the Christ-gift 
orders the self and the church in deep continuity with the aim of the Torah 
(i.e., love), while Gal 5:13 – 26 shows why this ordering is necessary. 
  
 In summary, with the above results, we both confirmed and went beyond 
Barclay’s recent reconsideration of gift in Galatians, while resolving a number of 
exegetical and interpretive puzzles. In Galatians, the Christ-gift is unconditioned 
and incongruous, but Paul is not appealing to this reality but arguing for its 
necessity and its necessary indifference to Torah-piety as the norm of church life. 
Moreover, with respect to the studies of Linebaugh and McFarland, our thesis shows 
how their tracing of the differing construals of definitive divine gift-giving 
exegetically to cosmological conceptions, for Wisdom and Philo, and Christological 
conceptions, in Romans and Paul, generally, might suggest not simply 
incommensurable theological conceptions but common ground for debate.40 For, 
with respect to Galatians, we showed that Paul’s account of the Christ-gift in life-
giving and life-ordering terms amounts to a denial of a cosmological and Torah-
                                                
38 R.B. Hays, “Christology and Ethics in Galatians: the Law of Christ,” CBQ 49 (1987): 268–90; 
D.G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 
2005), 221 – 31. 
39 See, e.g., F.J. Matera, “The Culmination of Paul’s Argument to the Galatians: Gal. 5.1-6.17,” 
JSNT 32 (1988): 79–91; Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 136; M. Konradt, ‘Die Christonomie der Freiheit: Zu 
Paulus’ Enfaltung seines ethischen Ansatzes in Gal 5,13 – 6,10‘, EC 1 (2010): 60 – 81. 
40 Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness; O. McFarland, God and Grace in Philo and Paul. 
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ordered created anthropology for 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. Further, we showed that, 
in order to give an adequate account of the theological logic and thematic coherence 
of Galatians, it is not enough to recognise the unconditioned or incongruous 
character of the Christ-gift. For Paul’s opponents recognised this particular aspect of 
divine beneficence themselves but did not make the same inference as Paul with 
respect to the Torah. Thus, by attending to Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift as life-
giving and life-ordering, we have answered a series of why questions that disclose 
the inferential logic of necessity in Paul’s antithesis between the Torah and the order 
of life in the church. Put concisely, if Christ, then not Torah, because the works of the 
Torah confine humanity and are confined to a ‘dead’ existence, out of which the 
Christ-gift creates and orders new selves for a newly-ordered community by the 
Spirit in fufilment of the Torah’s deep aim of love. 
Results for Paul and Judaism 
 By comparing Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra on God as life-giver and life 
as divine gift, this thesis has contributed both to the ongoing reevaluation of Paul’s 
theological relation to Jewish authors of antiquity and to the debate over the 
theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians. Though they differ on the 
status and prospects of the Jewish nation and the cosmos, 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra 
both consider God’s fundamental gift to be the irrevocable donation of Torah-
ordered life to humanity at creation, while, by contrast, Paul sees Jesus’ death and 
resurrection as the divine gift of the reconstitution and reordering of human life 
within history by the Spirit. Consequently, two features of post-Sanders scholarship 
are modified such that a new consideration of Paul’s antithetical theological logic in 
Galatians is possible. Firstly, though neither 4 Maccabees nor even 4 Ezra fit within 
the dominant pre-Sanders framework of ‘legalistic works righteousness’, neither 
text’s view of divine grace is identical to Paul’s. In fact, Paul’s Christological and 
pneumatological conception of God’s life-giving activity is not only at odds with the 
creational and Torah-ordered conceptions of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra but, in light of 
them, raises grave theological questions regarding creation, salvation-history, the 
Torah, and, ultimately, the identity of God.  
 308 
 Through identifying and analysing these questions, a second problem of post-
Sanders scholarship has been addressed in this study. As we saw in the introduction, 
Sanders’ comparison of Paul to Judaism as religions of univocal grace necessitated a 
search for a new understanding of the quarrel between Paul and his opponents over 
the law. Moreover, it was the perceived inadequacy of Sanders’ own ‘dogmatic’ 
account that gave rise to the regnant view of those associated with the ‘New 
Perspective’ that Paul was not opposing Judaism per se but a form of Judaism 
dominated by nationalism. As this thesis has demonstrated, neither view gets at the 
logic of necessity by which Paul’s argument operates and which 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra would want explained. This is so in part because both views pay insufficient 
attention (from the perspective of our texts) to the integral relation between 
anthropology and community, self and society, and thus occlude important features 
of these texts. Thus, even though 4 Ezra redefines Zion qua the righteous and 
envisions her true flourishing only at the eschaton, an argument for the necessary 
decline of the historical nation must be proffered (i.e., the world-as-womb metaphor) 
in order to explain the misfit between the possibility of individual Torah-
righteousness and the inevitability of national (and cosmic) decline and death. Yet, 
in both 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra the irrevocable donation of Torah-ordered human 
agency is the very precondition of national reconstitution within history (4 
Maccabees) and national resurrection beyond history (4 Ezra).  
 For these authors, then, a Pauline attack on Jewish ‘nationalism’ is 
simultaneously an attack on Torah-ordered creational anthropology. Though 
advocates of the New Perspective rightly insist on the radically inclusive nature of 
Paul’s gospel and social practice, they wrongly neglect analysing the Pauline 
theological anthropology that insists that both Jew and Gentile are dead—subject to 
the Torah’s curse that encloses all things under Sin. Likewise, Sanders’ ‘dogmatic’ 
construal (and other views that are materially similar to it) is unsatisfying because it 
begs the key question. What is at issue in Galatia is not the antithesis between the 
Christ-event and the Torah but why the antithesis is necessary. It will not do simply to 
appeal to the Christ-event itself (even its character as gift to the unworthy), the 
experience of the Spirit, Israel’s historic failure to obey the law, or Paul’s reading of 
Deuteronomy to explain the antithesis, for Paul and his opponents were readers of 
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scripture, recipients of the Christ-gift, and had experienced the Spirit. That is, since 
Sanders’ influential interpretation of Gal 3:21, most scholars fail to ask and answer 
the vital questions: even if the law is not intended to make-alive, on Paul’s view, 
what does it mean that the recipients of the Torah are ‘dead’?; and why once ‘made-
alive’, is the Torah necessarily inadequate for providing the order of church life? As 
we argued in section two of this thesis, Paul’s account of divine benefaction is at 
odds with those of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, but their theological grammars are not 
utterly alien. They each view God as life-giver and death-dealer (cf. Dt 32:39). Paul 
simply denies the core theological axiom of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra: life is not 
irrevocably given as Torah-ordered and inviolably free at creation. Rather, for Paul, 
the Torah-piety is both itself the instrument by which God confirms and encloses 
humanity in its enslavement to evil desires and passions and, thereby, itself confined 
to that ‘dead’ existence. Yet, God deploys the Torah’s cursing word precisely in 
preparation for the divine bestowal of eschatological life in Jesus’ death and 
resurrection. The law serves the singular gospel, for Paul, by confirming a singular 
‘dead’ humanity from which eschatological life is created and ordered in Christ by 
the Spirit for those who believe. Moreover, this new and newly-ordered humanity in 
the Christ-gift is in deep harmony with the aim of the Torah—viz., as the source and 
quintessential expression of love disclosed in ‘the law of Christ’ (Gal 6:2). 
 Instead of beginning with the general issue of Paul’s relation to Judaism, this 
thesis has asked how the particular conceptions of God’s divine life-giving 
benefaction in 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra might expose the buried assumptions of 
Paul’s theology in Galatians. As we have seen, the needed clarifications revolved 
around Paul’s assumption that the recipients of the law are ‘dead’ and that the law 
itself is confined to this estate. In this connection, despite the important cosmological 
and sociological differences between 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, these texts shared an 
axiomatic theological commitment to the belief that God endowed human life as 
inviolably free and irrevocably Torah-ordered from creation. Thus, in opposing their 
Torah-reckoned conceptions of human and social worth, Paul would not be 
opposing their commitment to divine grace per se but rather their particular 
construal of it as creational, Torah-ordered, and endowing human agents with 
freedom. Likewise, the authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, in opposing Paul’s 
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conception of new and newly-ordered agents and community in the Christ-gift, 
would not be opposing the idea that human worth depends ultimately on a divine 
creative and ordering act, but rather they would deny Paul’s radically pessimistic 
anthropology and his concomitant reading of the donation of the Torah as confined 
to and integral to fallen created order.  
 Paul and the authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra not only believed that God is 
a giver, but they believed that God gives life and deals death. An analysis that stops, 
however, only at this most general level risks not only a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what grace means in these texts, but also occluding the radical 
nature of Paul’s antithetical argument in Galatians. Because Paul sees in the Christ-
gift the creation of new agents for a new community, the practices of the Torah 
cannot be identified with the created or eschatological order but are by divine design 
integral to the moral slavery of humanity in the present evil age. Given such an 
inversion of their carefully articulated and fully argued views of the Torah-ordered 
creation, self, and society, there is no doubt that the authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 
Ezra would respond with force and precision. It is the argumentative, theological, 
and hermeneutical force of Paul’s conception of the Christ-gift and the Spirit that 
this study has sought to understand in imagining those responses.
 311 
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